In re E.G. CA4/1

CourtListener 10815659Calctapp26 de mar. de 2026

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Filed 3/26/26 In re E.G. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re E.G., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D086740
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. EJ04460B)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alejandro Morales, Judge. Affirmed.
Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
David J. Smith, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
E.G. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s orders terminating his

parental rights to his child, E.G. (Child). (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26.)
Father contends the juvenile court erred in finding that the beneficial parent-
child relationship exception to adoption did not apply because he has
maintained consistent visitation, had a beneficial relationship with Child,
and there was substantial emotional attachment between Father and Child.
(Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Father also contends the San Diego County Health
and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with inquiry
requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 United
States Code section 1901 et seq., and Welfare and Institutions Code section
224 et seq. He contends the Agency did not fulfill its duty of inquiry as to
paternal relatives and requests conditional reversal and remand for
compliance with ICWA. We disagree and affirm the orders terminating
parental rights. We also decline to order a conditional remand for further
ICWA inquiry.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 29, 2023, the Agency filed the initial petition alleging a
section 300, subdivision (b) violation. The Agency filed the petition after
Mother and Child tested positive for fentanyl, amphetamines, and
methamphetamines at Child’s birth. The petition further alleged that Father
knew of Mother’s drug use during pregnancy and was unable to stop her. In
the attached ICWA-010(A) form, an Agency social worker stated she asked
Mother and Father about Child’s Native American status. The social worker
determined that nothing Mother and Father said gave her reason to believe
Child was, or may be, a Native American child. In its detention report, the

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2
Agency stated that Mother and Father denied any Native American ancestry.
Mother and Father also stated neither they, nor any family members, had
ever lived on a reservation or were enrolled members in a tribe. The
detention report also stated that two maternal aunts denied Native American
ancestry. The Agency also stated that in the previous dependency case of
Child’s older half-sibling, the juvenile court found in 2019 that ICWA did not
apply.
At the initial hearing, Mother and Father denied Native American
ancestry. The Agency also stated that the maternal grandmother denied
Native American heritage. The court instructed the parents to complete the
ICWA-020 form and deferred a finding on ICWA.
Child remained in the NICU for approximately two and a half months
due to his symptoms of withdrawal and underwent a procedure to insert a
feeding tube. While in the NICU, Mother and Father visited Child every few
days, often late at night.
In the disposition report, the Agency stated that Mother and Father
again denied any Native American ancestry. The Agency mailed the paternal
grandparents and paternal aunt documents inquiring about any Indian
heritage. Using the phone numbers listed on the relative search, the Agency
attempted to call the paternal grandparents and the paternal aunt to inquire
about ICWA. However, the numbers had all been disconnected.
Additionally, Father twice declined to provide contact information for either
the paternal grandparents or paternal aunt so the Agency could assess them
as potential placements for Child. When the Agency was finally able to reach
the paternal grandmother, she denied any Native American ancestry or that
she or any family members had ever lived on a reservation or were enrolled
members in a tribe. The paternal grandmother declined to provide the

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Agency with contact information for other family members, stating she “can
vouch” there is no Native American ancestry in the family.
Upon the child’s discharge from the hospital, he was placed in a foster
home. The foster mother received training from the hospital on how to care
for the child’s complex medical needs.
In February 2024, the juvenile court sustained the petition, ordered
Child detained, and reunification for Father with supervised visitation for
both parents. The court also found that ICWA did not apply. The Agency did
not recommend reunification services for Mother pursuant to section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10) and (11). Mother and Father had supervised visitation
with Child for one hour, twice per week.
In April 2024, Father enrolled in a methadone clinic. In May 2024,
Father entered a residential substance use treatment center. He also
completed parenting sessions. While receiving treatment, Father had
supervised visits with Child twice a week at the treatment center. Father
“cared for [Child], changed his diaper, held him when he cried, and played
with him.”
At the six-month review hearing, the court ordered unsupervised visits
for Father upon clearance by the public health nurse. The court asked the
paternal grandmother whether she had any Indian ancestry, and she
responded in the negative. The nurse observed Father handling Child’s
feeding tube sessions “without any hitches.”
The following month, Father was discharged from his residential
treatment program due to “a couple of relapses in the last week.” Father
tested positive for methamphetamine on August 26, 2024 and admitted to
using methamphetamine on September 4, 2024. Father agreed to return to
supervised visits with Child until he enrolled in a new program and tested

4
negative. On September 23, Father enrolled in an outpatient treatment
program and resided at a sober living facility. Father identified as triggers
for using drugs both “being comfortable” and “the pressure of being the only
parent that can reunify with the baby.”
On October 28, Father returned to unsupervised visitation with Child
and agreed to contact the caregiver if he had any concerns or needed support
during the visit. On November 4, Father’s counselor reported that Father
tested positive for fentanyl. Father declined to discuss the test result with
the social worker, said “it was dirty” but that “it should not have been
positive.” Father reverted to supervised visitation twice a week for two hours
each time. In its November report, the Agency reported Father “regularly
attends visitation with the child and arrives on time, presents well, and acts
appropriately with the child” and “is able to successfully hook up and
disconnect the child’s [feeding tube].”
On November 14, Father tested positive for methamphetamine and
fentanyl and admitted he had been using drugs since October. Due to his
lack of participation in treatment, he was no longer allowed to reside in the
sober living home.
At the December modification hearing, the court ordered supervised
visits for Father and ordered him into dependency drug court.
On January 14, 2025, Father tested positive for methamphetamine and
fentanyl. At the twelve-month review hearing, the Agency recommended
termination of Father’s reunification services due to his lack of progress. The
court granted the Agency’s section 388 petition, reverted Father’s visits to
supervised, and set the matter for trial. Later that month, the dependency
drug court informed the Agency that Father had “followed through with

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everything that he is being asked to do” and was waiting on an opening at a
detox facility. Father continued to have supervised visits with Child.
In February, Father entered a detox facility and dependency drug court
reported he was in “good compliance.” While in detox, Father could not leave
the facility or attend Child’s doctor’s appointments. Father’s counselor
reported that he was “doing very well.” Father’s supervised visits with Child
resumed on February 24.
At the contested 12-month review hearing in March, the Agency
renewed its recommendation to terminate reunification services for Father
due to his inability “to stay free from illegal drugs.” Father identified his
sober date as February 4, 2025—the day he entered detox. Father testified
about his treatment plan and efforts to maintain his sobriety. Father asked
the court to continue his reunification services to the 18-month mark. Child’s
attorney agreed with the Agency’s recommendation to terminate services for
Father, stating Father’s effort was “just a little too late.” The court adopted
the Agency’s recommendation, terminated services for Father, and scheduled
a section 366.26 hearing.
At the section 366.26 hearing in August, the Agency and minor’s
counsel asked the court to find Child was generally and specifically
adoptable. The court then considered whether Father met the parental bond
statutory exception to terminating his parental rights. (See § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This is a three-part analysis. All parties agreed Father
met the first prong of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception by
maintaining regular and consistent visitation. However, the Agency and
minor’s counsel argued Father did not establish the second and third prongs
because Child has never lived with Father, did not form a substantial
relationship with Father, and any detriment from terminating parental

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rights would be outweighed by the benefits of a “safe, stable, adoptive home.”
Father argued he met all three prongs of the exception and asked the court to
find that the parent-child bond exception applied and to order a less
permanent plan such as guardianship.
The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Child was
generally and specifically adoptable. The court also found that Father
maintained regular visitation and contact with Child under the first prong of
the parent-child bond exception. As to the second prong, the court explained
that given Child’s young age and the fact that he had been in foster care since
birth, Child had not formed a substantial positive emotional attachment with
Father. As to the third prong, the court explained it must weigh the
detriment of severing the relationship against the benefits of adoption. The
court considered that reunification services were terminated because of
Father’s inability to maintain sobriety and concluded that the stability and
benefits of adoption outweighed any detriment in severing their relationship.
Finding that no exceptions applied, the court terminated the parental rights
of Mother and Father as to Child. The court found, without prejudice, that
ICWA did not apply to Child’s case, stating “there is no information to the

contrary.” Father timely appealed.2
DISCUSSION
A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Terminating Father’s Parental Rights
Father contends the juvenile court erred in finding the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception did not apply. We disagree. Substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding that Child did not have a significant,
positive emotional attachment to Father and the benefits of adoption
outweighed the loss of the parent-child relationship.

2 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
7
1. Guiding Principles
“The sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and
implement a permanent plan for the child after reunification efforts have
failed.” (In re J.D. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 594, 612.) At this hearing, “the
juvenile court has three options: (1) to terminate parental rights and order
adoption as a long-term plan; (2) to appoint a legal guardian for the
dependent child; or (3) to order the child be placed in long-term foster care.
[Citation.] Adoption is the preferred plan and, absent an enumerated
exception, the juvenile court is required to select adoption as the permanent
plan. [Citation.] The burden falls to the parent to show that the termination
of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the
exceptions.” (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534.)
One of the exceptions to the preference for adoption is the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) For this
exception to apply, the parent must show by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) regular visitation and contact with the child; (2) the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent; and
(3) terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.).)
The first element, visitation, is “straightforward,” requiring that the
“ ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by
court orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The second element
focuses on the child and is determined by taking into consideration factors
such as “the age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.” (In re Autumn H. (1994)

8
27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) For the third element, “the court must decide
whether it would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose
adoption. [Citation.] Because terminating parental rights eliminates any
legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must
assume that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship.”
(Caden C., at p. 633.) When the benefits of a stable, adoptive, permanent
home outweigh the harm the child would experience from the loss of a
continued parent-child relationship, the court should order adoption. (Id. at
p. 634.)
When deciding whether terminating parental rights would be
detrimental to the child, the court is not comparing the parent’s and custodial
caregiver’s attributes. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Additionally,
a parent’s lack of progress in addressing the issues that led to dependency is
not determinative. (Id. at p. 637.) Nonetheless, a parent’s inability to
address the issues leading to dependency can be relevant in assessing
whether the interaction between parent and child “has a ‘ “negative effect” ’
on the child.” (Ibid.) Performing this analysis is a “subtle enterprise.” (Id. at
p. 634.) “In many cases, ‘the strength and quality of the natural parent/child
relationship’ will substantially determine how detrimental it would be to lose
that relationship, which must be weighed against the benefits of a new
adoptive home.” (Ibid.)
We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the parent has
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, as well as the
existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship, for substantial evidence.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) “We review its ruling on the
third element under a hybrid standard, reviewing its factual determinations
concerning the detriment analysis for substantial evidence but its ultimate

9
weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for
an abuse of discretion.” (In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1068.) A
court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination. (Caden C., at p. 641.) As a reviewing court, we do not
reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve
evidentiary conflicts and will uphold the juvenile court’s determinations even
where substantial evidence to the contrary also exists. (Id. at p. 640.)
2. Analysis
The juvenile court found Father established the first prong of the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception by maintaining regular
visitation and contact with Child. The Agency concedes Father established
the first prong, and we agree substantial evidence supports this conclusion.
As to the second prong, Father claims the juvenile court erred in
finding the parent-child relationship exception did not apply because the
record contained sufficient evidence that Child enjoyed a significant, positive
attachment to Father. At this step of the analysis, “courts assess whether
‘the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ ” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The focus is on the child, and factors considered are
“ ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and
child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.)
Child has been in foster care since his discharge from the NICU. When
he was discharged from the hospital at almost three months old, Child was
too young to have developed a strong emotional attachment to Father or
understand the concept of a biological father. (In re Angel B. (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 454, 459, 467 [two-year old child was “very young, too young
to understand the concept of a biological parent”].) Then, at the time of the

10
section 366.26 hearing, Child was 21 months old and had been living with the
foster family for all but the first three months of his life and had never lived
under Father’s custody or care. Child was happy, thriving and receiving
appropriate, specialized care while living with the foster family. While
Father changed Child’s diaper, played with Child, managed Child’s feeding
tube sessions, and was attentive to him, visits were supervised and
dependent on Father’s drug treatment schedule. Father clearly loves Child,
and Child appeared to enjoy his visits with Father. The Agency consistently
reported positive interactions between Father and Child. Child, however,
was consistently content and largely did not suffer negative reactions at the
end of visits.
Given Child’s age, the short time he spent with Father throughout his
young life, and the lack of any significant effect on him following visits or
when Father missed visits, it is far from clear that Father’s interactions rose
above pleasant visits with some emotional connection. In sum, substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that Father fell short of
establishing the second prong of the beneficial relationship exception.
As to the third prong, Father claims the juvenile court erred by
considering Father’s inability to maintain his sobriety when it found the
benefits of adoption would outweigh the detriment to Child caused by
terminating their relationship. Assuming arguendo Father met the second
prong, the juvenile court weighed the harm to Child of losing the relationship
with Father against the benefits of adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 640.) It considered how it must “assume that the moment parental rights
are terminated, [Father] will not have any relationship whatsoever with
[Child].” The court explained it considers “the basis of why dependency was
declared” and the “stability provided for [Child].” In doing so, the court

11
considered that it “terminated reunification services because [Father] was
unable to maintain his sobriety” and explained “that’s a factor to consider.”
The court concluded that “the stability and the benefits of adoption outweigh
any detriment in severing their relationship.”
Contrary to Father’s assertion, the juvenile court engaged in a
comprehensive analysis as to whether Father met the third prong of the
exception, as instructed by Caden C. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–
634.) While the court considered Father’s inability to maintain sobriety, it
correctly explained it was only one factor to consider, ultimately concluding
that the benefits of adoption outweighed the loss of the relationship with
Father. (Id. at p. 639 [“a parent’s struggles with substance abuse, [. . . ] could
be directly relevant to a juvenile court’s analysis in deciding whether
termination would be detrimental”].)
We conclude both that substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s ruling, and that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that terminating the relationship would not be detrimental to Child
“when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The Agency removed Child from
Father’s custody when he was a newborn, and he spent all his life with a
foster family and prospective adoptive parents. Child has ongoing, complex
medical needs which his foster family is diligently caring for. His caregivers
are committed to providing stability and structure.
Father asserts that the loss of “another adult capable of changing
[Child]’s feeding tube” is a specific harm to Child. However, nothing in the
record suggests the caregivers were unable to meet Child’s feeding needs in
Father’s absence. For example, in late August 2024, Father was cleared by
the public health nurse to handle Child’s feeding tube meals, but shortly after

12
that, Father relapsed multiple times and entered treatment for varying
periods of time. There is no indication that Child was harmed by Father’s
unavailability during that time.
Like the juvenile court noted, we have no doubt that Father loves
Child, but he points to no evidence that terminating Child’s relationship with
him would be detrimental to Child; he identified no specific harm Child
would suffer from the loss of this relationship; and he offered no theory under
which we could conclude that Child’s loss of his relationship with Father
would outweigh the benefit of stability to Child in a new adoptive home.
In contrast, the record supports the court’s determination that Child’s
current caregivers have provided a safe, stable, secure home for the majority
of Child’s life; that Child had been thriving, meeting milestones, growing, and
developing in their home; and that Child had minimal difficulty transitioning
from visits with Father. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the juvenile court’s order (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640), as we must,
we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
apply the parental-benefit exception to adoption.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports Court’s Finding ICWA Did Not Apply
Father contends that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile
court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to Child’s case because the Agency
did not comply with its duty of initial inquiry regarding his possible Native
American ancestry. In particular, he argues the Agency should have inquired
of the paternal grandfather and paternal aunts about any possible Native
American ancestry.
1. Guiding Principles
Congress enacted ICWA to address concerns regarding the separation
of Native American children from their tribes through adoption or foster care

13
placement. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7.) ICWA provides: “In any
involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason
to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify
the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe” . . . of the pending
proceedings and of their right of intervention.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); see also,
Isaiah W., at p. 8.) California law also requires such notice. (§ 224.3, subd.
(a).) Both ICWA and California law define an “Indian child” as a child who is
either a member of a Native American tribe or is eligible for membership in a
Native American tribe and is the biological child of a member of a Native
American tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subds. (a), (b).)
Sections 224.2 and 224.3 describe California’s ICWA inquiry and notice
requirements for juvenile dependency cases. Under sections 224.2 and 224.3,
the Agency and the juvenile court are generally obligated to: (1) conduct an
initial inquiry regarding whether there is a reason to believe the child is, or
may be, a Native American child; (2) if there is, then further inquire whether
there is a reason to know the child is a Native American child; and (3) if there
is, then provide ICWA notice to allow the Native American tribe to make a
determination regarding the child’s tribal membership. (See In re D.S. (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048–1052 (D.S.); In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th
870, 882–885.)
Section 224.2, subdivision (a) imposes on the juvenile court and the
Agency “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for
whom a petition under Section 300 . . . has been filed, is or may be an Indian
child.” Section 224.2, subdivision (b) establishes the Agency’s duty of initial
inquiry, providing:
“If a child is placed into the temporary custody of [the
Agency] . . . , [the Agency] . . . has a duty to inquire whether

14
that child is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not
limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child
and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is
domiciled.”
An “extended family member” under that statute includes a person “who is
the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-
law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.”
(25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); §§ 224.1, subd. (c), 224.2, subd. (b).)
When a juvenile court finds that ICWA does not apply to a case, it
implicitly finds that neither the Agency nor the court knew, or had reason to
know, that the child was a Native American child, and that the Agency
fulfilled its duty of inquiry. (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)
On appeal, we review for substantial evidence a juvenile court’s finding that
ICWA does not apply. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th
303, 314.) Our Supreme Court stated that a juvenile court’s “fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential
standard of review.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1141 (Dezi C.).)
Regarding the applicable standard of review, the court held: “If, upon review,
a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and
ICWA does not apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence and
record documentation as required by California law [citation], there is no
error and conditional reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did
not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child.” (Ibid.)

15
2. Analysis
Father contends the Agency’s initial section 224.2 inquiry was deficient
because it failed to ask the paternal grandfather and the paternal aunts
about the possibility of Child’s Native American ancestry. As Father
correctly notes, the Agency’s duty to make that initial inquiry applied to,
among other persons, “extended family members,” which includes Child’s
paternal grandparents and aunts. (§§ 224.1, subd. (c), 224.2, subd. (b);
25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)
Based on our review of the record, we conclude, contrary to Father’s
argument, that there is substantial evidence to support findings by the court
that the Agency fulfilled its duty of initial inquiry and that ICWA did not
apply to Child’s case. First, the record shows that the Agency inquired of
Mother, Father, maternal grandmother, maternal aunts, and paternal
grandmother about any possible Native American ancestry, and they all
denied Native ancestry. Also, the paternal grandmother informed the Agency
that there was no Native American ancestry in the family.
Second, there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding
by the court that the Agency fulfilled its duty to contact the paternal
grandfather and paternal aunts and inquire regarding Child’s possible Native
American ancestry. As discussed above, the Agency mailed notification and
information forms relating to Child’s case to the paternal grandfather and
the paternal aunts, but it did not receive a response from anyone. The
Agency then attempted to call the paternal grandfather and paternal aunts,
but the phone numbers were disconnected. Father twice declined to provide
current contact information for the paternal grandfather and paternal aunts.
Paternal grandmother also declined to provide contact information for other
family members. The court could reasonably find that, given their failure to

16
respond to the Agency’s mailings and calls, the Agency had no further duty to
make additional attempts to contact them to inquire about any Native
American ancestry. In particular, the court could find that the Agency, by
mailing the notification and information forms and calling the paternal
grandfather and paternal aunts (presumably, to the only addresses or other
contact information it had for them), made “a meaningful effort to locate and
interview” the paternal grandfather and paternal aunts. (In re K.R. (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709 (K.R.).) “The Agency is not required to ‘cast about’
for information or pursue unproductive investigative leads.” (D.S., supra,
46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053.) The duty of initial inquiry “ ‘does not require the
agency to “find” unknown relatives and others who have an interest in the
child, merely to make reasonable inquiries. The operative concept is those
people who are reasonably available to help the agency with its investigation
into whether the child has any potential Indian ancestry should be asked.’ ”
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) Therefore, the court here could
reasonably find that the paternal grandfather and paternal aunts, by not
responding to the Agency’s mailings and calls, were not reasonably available
to help the Agency investigate whether Child was possibly a Native American
child. (Ibid.)
Accordingly, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support a
finding by the court that the Agency made a meaningful effort to locate and
interview those persons who were reasonably available to help it investigate
whether Child had any possible Native American ancestry. (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1140; K.R., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 709.) Because there
is substantial evidence to support the court’s findings that the Agency’s
initial inquiry was adequate and proper and that ICWA does not apply to

17
Child’s case, the court did not err by finding that ICWA did not apply to
Child’s case. (Dezi C., at p. 1141.)
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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