People v. Tindle CA1/4

CourtListener 10815031Calctapp25 de mar. de 2026

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 3/25/26 P. v. Tindle CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171774
v.
WILLIAM JOSEPH TINDLE, (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CR2103985)
Defendant and
Appellant.

William Joseph Tindle appeals after a jury convicted him of
one count of possession for sale of methamphetamine, with a
special allegation that he was personally armed with a firearm,
and one count of possession for sale of methamphetamine with a
firearm. (Health and Saf. Code, § 11378, former § 11370.1, subd.
(a); Pen. Code, former § 12022, subd. (c).)1 The trial court
sentenced him to 180 days in jail and two years on probation.
Tindle contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury on an

1 Health and Safety Code section 11370.1, subdivision (a)

and Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (c) were amended by
Proposition 36, an initiative measure adopted by the California
voters in the November 5, 2024, General Election. We cite to the
version of the statute in effect when Tindle committed his
offenses.

1
aiding and abetting theory because there was not substantial
evidence that a second party committed a predicate offense to
which he contributed. He also argues that the electronics search
condition of his probation is unconstitutionally overbroad and
that his counsel gave him ineffective assistance by failing to
object below that the condition is unreasonable.
We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the
aiding and abetting instruction, Tindle’s constitutional challenge
is as-applied not facial, and he forfeited it by failing to object
below. We further conclude the record in this direct appeal does
not show he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We will
affirm.
BACKGROUND
In late 2021, a Eureka police officer, Dustin Nantz, began
investigating Alejandro Luna for drug trafficking. Using GPS
trackers, Nantz identified three vehicles that Luna drove. One of
those vehicles, a Ford pickup, was frequently located at the home
of Tindle’s mother, Rita S., where Nantz knew Tindle stayed.
Confidential informants told Nantz that Luna was storing large
amounts of drugs at Tindle’s home. Nantz also identified another
associate of Luna named William Egan.
In December 2021, Nantz noticed that one of Luna’s
vehicles was on its way back to Humboldt County from Modesto,
a known source location for drug trafficking. Nantz and other
law enforcement officers stopped the vehicle. Luna was not in
the vehicle, but it contained four pounds of methamphetamine.
Nantz searched Luna’s residence and found a small digital scale

2
with a crystalline substance on the weighing section and four
grams of methamphetamine. Nantz found a quarter pound of
methamphetamine at Egan’s residence.
Later the same day, Nantz finally searched Rita S.’s home
in Eureka, arriving between 4:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. They
knocked and announced, and Tindle answered the door pretty
quickly. Nantz asked whether there was any methamphetamine,
cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, or firearms inside the residence. Tindle
said Nantz would probably find some methamphetamine and a
firearm in his room.
Nantz identified one of the rooms as Tindle’s bedroom
based on indicia such as mail and a phone with Tindle’s name
etched into its back. Nantz found one pound of
methamphetamine in the nightstand next to the bed in that
room. Two loaded pistols in working condition were in a
backpack on the bed near the nightstand. A gun cabinet on the
wall held three unloaded rifles, and there was an unloaded black
powder pistol on the bed. There was also a digital scale with a
crystalline substance on the weighing section and a box of Ziploc
sandwich bags.
Nantz and the officers searching the house made contact
with Rita S. They also found two people in the attic area of the
garage attached to the house, who appeared to be living there.
Nantz was qualified as an expert in the possession for sale
and drug trafficking of methamphetamine and opined that the
methamphetamine was for the purpose of sale, based on the
quantity of methamphetamine and everything found near it.

3
Nantz also explained that it was common for someone running a
drug trafficking organization to store narcotics at someone else’s
residence and compensate them in money or narcotics. In
Nantz’s opinion, Luna was in charge of the organization.
After searching the house, Nantz spoke to Tindle again.
According to Nantz, Tindle was not surprised that there was a
pound of methamphetamine in his room. A recording of the
conversation shows that Tindle confirmed that he had previously
told Nantz that he had some meth and firearms in his room.
Tindle said the meth was not his. Tindle initially said he did not
know the name of the person it belonged to, but he thought the
person’s truck was outside the residence. Nantz asked whether
the person was Alejandro Luna, and Tindle said yes. Nantz
asked whether Luna paid Tindle or gave him meth to allow Luna
to keep meth there, and Tindle said no.
Tindle was charged with possession for sale of a controlled
substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378,
with a special allegation under Penal Code former section 12022,
subdivision (c) that he was personally armed with a firearm.
Tindle was also charged with possession of a controlled substance
with a loaded, operable firearm in violation of Health and Safety
Code former section 11370.1, subdivision (a). Nantz was the
prosecution’s only witness.
Tindle called Rita S. as a witness in his defense. Tindle
had arrived at her house in Eureka around 1:30 a.m. the day the
police arrived. He had not been there for two weeks. Rita S. said
that she had inherited her husband’s rifles and shotguns, and she

4
owned a pistol. She kept those guns in the room with the gun
case, which she called a “catch-all bedroom,” except that she
sometimes kept her pistol in her room. Tindle stayed in a
different room when he arrived that night, but he usually uses
both rooms, as well as the rest of the house. Rita S. did not
recognize the pistols that the police found in the backpack.
Rita S. met Luna a long time ago. He came over to take
care of her apple tree and bushes. He had come over with a
friend to help Rita S. with a television during the two weeks that
Tindle was away. Rita S. stayed in her room while they were
there and did not know what they were doing elsewhere in the
house. Rita S. said Luna did not have a key to the house. She
did not know if Luna had ever stayed overnight. Rita S. stayed in
bed in her room most of the time and did not get around much.
Rita S. did not know the man and woman were in her garage and
had not given anyone permission to be in there.
Tindle testified in his own defense. He said he had been
away from his mother’s house for two weeks before the search.
He had been helping his brother level a foundation in Lewiston.
He left around 10:30 p.m. and arrived in Eureka around 1:00 a.m.
the day of the search. Tindle immediately went to sleep. At 3:00
a.m., he was awakened by someone beating on the door. The
police handcuffed him and told him they knew that Luna kept
seven to ten pounds of methamphetamine at the property. Tindle
was “a little bit surprised” by this.
Tindle denied storing or selling drugs for Luna, or ever
selling drugs. He also denied telling the police they would find

5
drugs in his room. But he also claimed that when Nantz told him
there was meth at the house, he believed Nantz so he said yes.
Tindle said Luna was an acquaintance whose vehicles he
worked on. Tindle said he met Luna after working on a vehicle
for one of Luna’s friends. Luna’s Ford pickup quit running a few
blocks from the house, so Luna towed it to the house for Tindle to
work on it. Rita S. met Luna independently.
Tindle showed Luna where a key to the house was hidden
outside. Luna had been in the house but not often. Luna had
showered and had changed clothes in the bedroom where the
methamphetamine was found.
Tindle’s brother Lonnie K. confirmed that Tindle had been
helping him fix the foundation on a mobile home in early
December 2021 and had left for Eureka one night around 10:00 or
10:30 p.m.
Among the jury instructions the trial court delivered were
CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401, which deal with aiding and abetting
principles. The jury found Tindle guilty as charged.
The trial court sentenced Tindle to 180 days in jail and two
years of supervised probation, with 61 days of credit. One of the
conditions of probation states, “Defendant shall submit any
electronic devices of which they are the authorized possessor as
defined in Section 1546 of the California Penal Code to search
and seizure at any time of the day or night, with or without a
search warrant, by a supervision officer or other law enforcement
officer.”

6
DISCUSSION
I. Jury Instructions on Aiding and Abetting
Tindle contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury
on aiding and abetting because there was not substantial
evidence that Luna committed a criminal act to which Tindle
contributed.
“We review a claim of instructional error de novo.” (People
v. Barber (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787, 798.) It is error for a trial
court to give an abstract instruction that correctly states the law
but has no application to the facts of the case. (People v. Cross
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67.) “ ‘The test for determining whether
instructions on a particular theory of guilt are appropriate is
whether there is substantial evidence which would support
conviction on that theory. [Citation.] To determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support a conviction we must
view the record in a light most favorable to conviction, resolving
all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences
in support of conviction. We may conclude that there is no
substantial evidence in support of conviction only if it can be said
that on the evidence presented no reasonable fact finder could
find the defendant guilty on the theory presented. [Citation.]’
[Citations.] Substantial evidence is evidence ‘ “of ponderable
legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid
value.” ’ ” (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 408.)
“ ‘[T]he testimony of a single witness, including the defendant,
can constitute substantial evidence’ ” to support a jury
instruction. (People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 346.)

7
“[P]roof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three
distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus — a crime
committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s
mens rea — knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent
and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and
(c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus — conduct by the aider and
abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.” (People
v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) Tindle’s argument focuses
on the first of these elements.
There was substantial evidence that Luna committed the
crime of possession of methamphetamine for sale, so the trial
court did not err in instructing the jury that Tindle could be
liable for aiding and abetting Luna’s offense. As the jury here
was instructed, the elements of possession for sale of a controlled
substance like methamphetamine are: (1) the defendant
possessed a controlled substance, (2) the defendant knew of its
presence, (3) the defendant knew of the substance’s nature as a
controlled substance, (4) the defendant intended to sell the
substance when he possessed it, (5) the controlled substance was
methamphetamine, and (6) the controlled substance was in a
usable amount. (People v. Montero (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1170,
1175–1176; see CALCRIM No. 2302.) Possession can be actual or
constructive, with constructive possession existing “where a
defendant maintains some control or right to control contraband
that is in the actual possession of another.” (People v. Morante
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 417.)

8
The testimony of Nantz and Tindle was sufficient to
establish that Luna possessed the methamphetamine for sale.
Tindle testified that Luna had access to the house and used the
room where the methamphetamine was found. Nantz described
the drugs found in vehicles and other residences tied to Luna,
gave expert testimony about how drug traffickers store drugs in
others’ residences, and concluded from the quantity of
methamphetamine and other circumstances that the purpose of
the methamphetamine was for sale. A reasonable conclusion to
draw from this testimony is that Luna possessed the
methamphetamine found at Rita S.’s house, even if he was not in
actual possession of it.
Even if Tindle’s and Nantz’s testimony did not connect
Luna to the specific methamphetamine found at Rita S.’s house,
Tindle’s statements to Nantz after the search of the house
provided the necessary connection. When Nantz questioned him,
Tindle said he thought the methamphetamine belonged to the
person whose truck was parked outside, whose name was
Alejandro Luna. A recording of this conversation was played for
the jury. Although Tindle claimed that he was simply agreeing
with what Nantz had told him because Tindle believed him, the
jury could have taken his statements as exactly what they
appeared to be: statements that the methamphetamine belonged
to Luna.
Tindle compares this case to Perez, but the cases are not
similar. The defendant there was arrested with
methamphetamine precursors, which he intended to sell to a

9
third person. (Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1223.) The trial
court delivered aiding and abetting instructions because one of
the prosecution’s theories was that the defendant aided and
abetted a third person’s manufacture methamphetamine. (Id. at
p. 1227.) Perez held the trial court erred by delivering the aiding
and abetting instructions because no evidence showed the third
person violated or attempted to violate a statute relating to
manufacture of methamphetamine. (Ibid.) Here, by contrast,
Tindle’s own statements to the police were evidence that the
large quantity of methamphetamine belonged to Luna. There
was no error.
II. Constitutional Challenge to Electronic Device
Search Condition
Tindle contends the probation condition that he submit his
electronic devices to warrantless search or seizure is
unconstitutionally overbroad. “A probation condition that
imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must
closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to
avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” (In re
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) Tindle admits he did not
challenge the condition in the trial court but contends his
argument is cognizable on appeal because it is a facial challenge
that raises a pure question of law.
“Ordinarily, a criminal defendant who does not challenge
an assertedly erroneous ruling of the trial court in that court has
forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on appeal.” (In re
Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 880.) Applying this forfeiture

10
rule “to appellate claims involving discretionary sentencing
choices or unreasonable probation conditions is appropriate,
because characteristically the trial court is in a considerably
better position than the Court of Appeal to review and modify a
sentence option or probation condition that is premised upon the
facts and circumstances of the individual case. Generally,
application of the forfeiture rule to such claims promotes greater
procedural efficiency because of the likelihood that the case
would have to be remanded to the trial court for resentencing or
reconsideration of probation conditions.” (Id. at p. 885.) “[A]
challenge to a term of probation on the ground of
unconstitutional vagueness or overbreadth that is capable of
correction without reference to the particular sentencing record
developed in the trial court can be said to present a pure question
of law” and be raised for the first time on appeal. (Id. at p. 887,
italics omitted.) But not “ ‘all constitutional defects in conditions
of probation may be raised for the first time on appeal, since
there may be circumstances that do not present “pure questions
of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular
sentencing record developed in the trial court.” [Citation.] In
those circumstances, “[t]raditional objection and waiver
principles encourage development of the record and a proper
exercise of discretion in the trial court.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 889.)
Tindle’s overbreadth argument does not raise a pure
question of law that can be resolved without regard to the
sentencing record developed in the trial court. He first contends
that the search condition implicates his constitutionally protected

11
expectation of privacy in his electronic devices, which could
perhaps be a question of law. But he then argues that the
probation condition is not narrowly tailored to achieve its
rehabilitative goal. He argues that nothing about his offenses or
social or criminal history suggests that he is likely to use
electronic devices for criminal purposes. This is a
quintessentially fact-based argument that turns on the goals for
rehabilitation and the facts in Tindle’s specific case. The trial
court would have been better positioned to evaluate Tindle’s
arguments concerning overbreadth in the context of his offense
and criminal history, so Tindle should have raised his argument
there in the first instance. Had he done so, the sentencing record
would have been better developed to allow us to review Tindle’s
contentions. Tindle’s failure to raise the issue below means he
has forfeited it, and we will not consider it.
III. Failure to Challenge Probation Condition as
Unreasonable
Tindle finally argues that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his counsel failed to object in the trial court that
the electronic search condition is unreasonable under In re Ricardo
P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 and People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Tindle
“ ‘must show that [his] counsel’s performance was deficient, and
that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.’ [Citations.] On direct
appeal, a finding of deficient performance is warranted where
‘(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational
tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was

12
asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply
could be no satisfactory explanation.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]here
counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions
do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance
of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason
for counsel’s acts or omissions.’ ” (People v. Johnsen (2021)
10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165.)
We cannot find ineffective assistance of counsel on the record
in this direct appeal because the record does not indicate the
reasons for Tindle’s counsel’s failure to object and she could have
had a reasonable basis for not objecting. In re Ricardo P., supra,
7 Cal.5th at page 1118 applied our Supreme Court’s longstanding
rule from Lent that a “ ‘condition of probation will not be held
invalid unless it “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the
offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself
criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not
reasonably related to future criminality.” ’ [Citation.] The Lent
test ‘is conjunctive — all three prongs must be satisfied before a
reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.’ ”
Tindle’s counsel could have reasonably decided not to
challenge the probation term relating to his use of electronic
devices because she believed it was valid. As discussed ante,
evidence at trial supported a theory that Tindle aided and abetted
Luna in the possession of methamphetamine for sale, as part of
Luna’s larger methamphetamine trafficking operation. This
implies some degree of communication and coordination between
Luna and Tindle. Presumably for this reason another condition of

13
probation prohibits Tindle from associating with Luna and others
involved in Luna’s operation. The presence of Tindle’s phone in
the room where the methamphetamine was found suggests that
Tindle used electronic methods of communication. Tindle’s counsel
could therefore have decided that there was a connection between
the electronic search condition and Tindle’s offense. Similarly, his
counsel could have decided that the condition related to future
criminality by discouraging Tindle from contacting Luna or other
drug traffickers in the future. Tindle’s counsel therefore could
have determined that an objection to the condition based on Lent
was unlikely to succeed. Even if these conclusions were ultimately
incorrect and the condition is invalid under Lent (an issue we need
not and do not decide), it is not inconceivable that Tindle’s counsel
believed the condition was permissible. Tindle’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in this direct appeal therefore fails.
(People v. Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1165 [courts “ ‘will not
find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could
be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
MOORMAN, J.

People v. Tindle (A171774)

14

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.