People v. Pswatai CA4/1

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Filed 3/24/26 P. v. Pswatai CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D086043

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. FBA800772)

v.

DUDZAI PROSPER PSWATAI,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, John Peter Vander Feer, Judge. Affirmed.
Dudzai Prosper Pswatai, in pro. per., and James Martin Kehoe, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Dudzai Prosper Pswatai appeals from an order after an
evidentiary hearing denying his petition for resentencing relief under Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 His appointed counsel filed an opening brief raising no
arguable issues and requesting we exercise our discretion to review the

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
record for potential issues under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), and Anders v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). Pswatai filed a supplemental brief

on his own behalf.2
We have independently reviewed the record and find no arguable
issues. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2009, Pswatai was convicted of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)),
kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), and second degree robbery (§ 211) of Robert
Mastrangelo. Mastrangelo’s body was discovered in a roadside ditch in
Barstow, California on June 14, 2008. Mastrangelo was wearing only his
underwear, and his ankles were bound with a piece of black cloth. He had
been shot six times in the head, neck, and torso. The pathologist who
testified at Pswatai’s trial opined that Mastrangelo died between June 11 to
June 13. The cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds.
A friend of Mastrangelo’s testified that on June 10, 2008, several days
before Mastrangelo’s body was discovered, Mastrangelo asked him to meet
with Jeffrey “Slutter” Berrouet to buy ecstasy for Mastrangelo. After making
the purchase, the friend discovered the ecstasy pills were fake. The friend
told Mastrangelo that Mastrangelo “got burned” by Berrouet. Berrouet later
returned the money from the sale of the fake ecstasy pills.

2 We construe Pswatai’s statement in the supplemental brief that “the
Appellate Court already has [his evidence]” as a request to take judicial
notice of the appellate record from the direct appeal (case No. D056851). So
construed, the request for judicial notice is granted.

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Celina Sanchez, who was Pswatai and Berrouet’s roommate, also
testified at Pswatai’s trial. Sanchez pled guilty to kidnapping Mastrangelo.
She knew Pswatai by the name “Baby Ike.” She testified that on June 10,
2008, Pswatai and Berrouet came home appearing angry. She overhead
them discussing “something that went wrong that night.” She then
overheard Pswatai say, “We should kidnap a white boy like they do in Alpha
Dog.” She explained that “Alpha Dog” is a movie involving a “white boy” who
is kidnapped and then killed over drug money.
Sanchez testified that the following day, Berrouet and Pswatai arrived
at the house asking for bleach and trash bags. Pswatai also asked for a
yellow rope they previously used to fix Berrouet’s bumper. When Sanchez
responded that she did not know where the rope was, Pswatai grabbed a
black bathrobe belt that was sitting on a couch, and left. In court, Sanchez
was shown a photo of a piece of cloth, Exhibit 101, which she claimed was the
robe belt Pswatai took from her but that in the photo it appeared dirty and
ripped. Later at trial, the crime scene investigator identified Exhibit 101 as a
photo of the piece of cloth used to bind Mastrangelo’s legs.
Sanchez claimed she saw Berrouet and Pswatai going in and out of the
garage throughout the evening of June 11, 2008. At one point, Berrouet and
Pswatai changed their clothes and discarded their original clothing in a box
in the garage. Sanchez also saw Pswatai at some point during the night
counting “a stack” of money.
On June 12, 2008, Berrouett asked to borrow Sanchez’s car. When the
car was returned later that day, she noticed it was “really clean,” and the

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floor mats and car seats had been removed.3 She also saw a cellophane bag
with six fired bullet casings sitting on top of the television inside the shared
house. She claimed the garage smelled like bleach and items that were
stored in the garage had been discarded in a nearby dumpster. She also
claimed that when Pswatai arrived at the house later that afternoon, he had
a new haircut, new jewelry, and a new cell phone.
Later that month, Berrouet and Pswatai moved out of Sanchez’s home
and began living with Berrouet’s acquaintance, Arlene Pitchford. Pitchford
testified that she overheard a conversation between Pswatai and Berrouet, in
which Pswatai was crying. Pswatai said he was “sorry,” and “he didn't mean
to do what he did.” Pswatai stated he did not mean to shoot anyone, “he was
just going to rob him[ ],” and he “lost control.” Pswatai also said it was a
“drug deal gone bad.” Pswatai then admitted to tying up the victim in
“Sanchy’s garage” and shooting the victim. Pitchford further testified that
Pswatai and Berrouet asked for her help in reupholstering Sanchez’s car.
The investigating officer, Detective Keith Libby, testified that when
Pswatai was arrested, Pswatai knew the type of bullets used to shoot
Mastrangelo even before ballistics testing had been done. Pswatai also
admitted giving Berrouet the bullets. Pswatai claimed he went into
Sanchez’s garage and saw Mastrangelo with Berrouet and three other men.
According to Pswatai, “[Berrouet] wanted [Pswatai] to be a part of it[.]”
Pswatai denied shooting Mastrangelo, but admitted giving Berrouet rope and
holding Mastrangelo’s legs while someone else tied him up. Pswatai also

3 Sanchez would later see the seats in the garage of the house she shared
with Berrouet and Pswatai.

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wrote a note to Mastrangelo’s family apologizing for his “small role” in the
murder.
Detective Libby testified about another conversation between Berrouet
and Pswatai that was recorded from the jail where they were detained after
their arrests. The recording was not played for the jury because background
noise and other factors made it difficult to understand on the courtroom
speaker system. According to Detective Libby, Pswatai said on the recording,
“I need that gun. It’s in Canada.” Detective Libby also claimed Pswatai
called Berrouet a “rat” during the conversation.
When Pswatai testified, he claimed he never discussed a gun or called
anyone a “rat” in the recorded jail conversation. He also claimed he lied
during his entire postarrest interview with Detective Libby because he did
not want to “snitch.” He claimed he was not in the garage when the victim
was shot.
At trial, the trial court instructed the jury that they could find Pswatai
guilty of murder under multiple theories of murder liability: (1) as a direct
perpetrator of deliberate and premeditated murder; (2) as a direct aider and
abettor of deliberate and premeditated murder; (3) of kidnapping and/or
robbery felony murder; (4) as an aider and abettor of kidnapping and/or
robbery felony murder; (5) as a member of an uncharged conspiracy (with
Berrouet and/or Sanchez) to commit murder; and (6) as a member of an
uncharged conspiracy (with Berrouet and/or Sanchez) to commit a
kidnapping and/or a robbery, the natural and probable consequence of which
was murder.
After deliberations, the jury found Pswatai guilty of the first degree
murder, kidnapping, and second degree robbery, but not guilty of solicitation
of murder. For each conviction, the jury also returned true findings on

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allegations that Pswatai personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), he
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (Id., subd. (c)), and he
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, which proximately caused
great bodily injury and death to Mastrangelo (Id., subd. (d)).
The trial court sentenced Pswatai to 109 years to life in prison. This
court affirmed the judgment in the direct appeal. (People. v. Pswatai (Jan. 5,
2021, D056851 [nonpub. opn.].)
Following the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437, Pswatai filed a
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. After the trial court
summarily denied the petition, this court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings required by section 1172.6. (People v. Pswatai (May 8, 2023,
D080367) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, the trial court issued an order to show cause and set the
matter for an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6. In response to the
order to show cause, the People argued Pswatai was guilty under a still-valid
theory of murder, because the evidence presented at trial showed beyond a
reasonable doubt that Pswatai was the “ringleader/mastermind” of the plan
to kidnap, rob, and kill the victim. Thus, Pswatai could be found liable for
murder either as the actual killer, a major participant, or because he acted
with reckless indifference to human life.
Pswatai, who elected to represent himself in the section 1172.6
evidentiary proceedings, claimed he was not involved in the alleged crimes
and was not the actual shooter. In support, Pswatai submitted the recording
of his jail conversation with Berrouet and a new transcript of the recording.
He believed the actual recording showed that Detective Libby
mischaracterized the conversation and presented false testimony to the jury.

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In their opposition, the People maintained Pswatai was guilty of
murder either as the actual killer, a major participant, or because he acted
with reckless indifference to human life.
After holding an evidentiary hearing on January 3, 2025, the trial court
denied the resentencing petition on March 28, 2025. The court stated that it
reviewed over 3,000 pages of transcripts from Pswatai’s trial, in addition to
the other exhibits offered by Pswatai. The court also considered testimony
from Pswatai’s preliminary hearing but only to the extent such testimony
was not admitted as hearsay. Based on the evidence, the court found beyond
a reasonable doubt that Pswatai was guilty of first degree murder as the
actual killer who shot the victim. Alternatively, the court found the evidence
was sufficient to find Pswatai liable for murder as a major participant.
Lastly, the court found that Pswatai acted with reckless indifference to
human life, because Pswatai was aware that a gun would be used; Pswatai
used a gun himself; the incident did not involve a sudden explosion of
violence; Pswatai was aware Berrouet was likely to kill Mastrangelo; and
Pswatai did nothing to minimize the possibility of violence despite having the
opportunity to stop the killing.
DISCUSSION
Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief raising no arguable issues and
requesting that we exercise our discretion to review the record under
Delgadillo, Wende, and Anders. The brief identifies the following potential
issue to assist this court in conducting its independent review of the
record: Whether the court erred in denying Pswatai’s section 1172.6
resentencing petition?
In his supplemental brief, Pswatai challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the denial of his request for relief under section 1172.6.

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He contends there is no credible evidence that he was the shooter. He argues
that Detective Libby provided false testimony to the jury about the recorded
jailhouse conversation between him and Berrouet. He claims that other
witnesses at trial provided contradictory testimony and were otherwise not
credible. He also notes the lack of physical evidence connecting him to the
shooting, specifically that there was no DNA evidence connecting him to the
robe belt found binding the victim’s legs.
We have considered each of Pswatai’s contentions and conclude there
are no potentially meritorious issues in this appeal. This court reviews the
trial court’s findings after a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing for
substantial evidence. (People v. Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 314.)
“We ‘ “examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment
to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier
of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”
(People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) We must
“ ‘ “presume[ ] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier
could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ [Citations.] Substantial
evidence also ‘ “includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable
inferences drawn from that evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Vargas (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) “Our job is only to see if substantial evidence exists to
support the [trial court’s ruling] in favor of the prevailing party, not to
determine whether substantial evidence might support the losing party's
version of events.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570,
582.)
We conclude the trial court’s order denying Pswatai’s petition after the
evidentiary hearing is supported by substantial evidence. The evidence

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presented at Pswatai’s trial included witness testimony from Sanchez, who
claimed she overheard Pswatai say that he and Berrouet “should kidnap a
white boy like they do in Alpha Dog.” The next day, Pswatai asked Sanchez
for a rope and took a belt that belonged to her robe. Later that night,
Sanchez saw Pswatai and Berrouet go in and out of the garage for several
hours, they asked her for bleach and trash bags, and they changed their
clothes at one point during the night. Another witness, Pitchford, testified
that she overheard defendant admit to the shooting and that it was a “drug
deal gone bad.” Additionally, in a postarrest interview, despite claiming he
never shot the victim, Pswatai admitted helping tie the victim’s legs when
the victim was in the garage. Pswatai also knew the type of bullets used to
kill the victim even before a ballistics test had been done. At trial, the robe
belt Pswatai took from Sanchez was identified as the piece of cloth found
binding the victim’s legs when the victim’s body was discovered. Thus, there
is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Pswatai was
the actual killer, even if other evidence in the record supports Pswatai’s
version of events.
In his supplemental brief, Pswatai also challenges whether the factors
identified by the California Supreme Court in People v. Banks (2015) 61
Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) were
supported by substantial evidence. However, those factors are only relevant
to determine whether a defendant convicted of felony murder, who was not
the actual killer, was a major participant in the underlying felony or acted
with reckless indifference to human life. As discussed above, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Pswatai was the actual killer.
Accordingly, we do not need to consider whether the Banks and Clark factors
were established.

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Separate from his contentions related to section 1172.6, Pswatai also
contends that the trial court “denied” him the opportunity to raise a Racial
Justice Act (RJA) claim during his section 1172.6 proceedings. Pswatai’s
contentions related to the RJA, however, are contradicted by the record.
After Pswatai informed the court that he intended to bring an RJA claim, the
court indicated that an RJA petition relied on a “separate code section[ ]” and
was “completely separate from the 1172.6.” The court stated that although it
was not going to address his RJA claims during section 1172.6 proceedings,
the court was “not barring [Pswatai] from it, from filing it[.]” Pswatai then
stated he had filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under the RJA, which
the court confirmed would be “handled separately” from his section 1172.6
resentencing claims. The record therefore reveals that the court did not
prevent Pswatai from raising his RJA claims, only that any RJA claims
would be considered separately from Pswatai’s section 1172.6 claims.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion
beyond a reasonable doubt that Pswatai was guilty of murder under current
law and was thus ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. We have
exercised our discretion to independently review the record for error

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consistent with the process mandated by Wende and Anders.4 We have not
discovered any arguable issues for reversal. Competent counsel has
represented Pswatai on this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Pswatai’s section 1172.6 resentencing petition is
affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.

HUFFMAN, J.*

4 In Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, the California Supreme Court
held that Wende and Anders procedures do not apply in appeals from the
denial of a section 1172.6 postjudgment petition. (Delgadillo, at pp. 224–226.)
The Supreme Court explained that where, as here, a defendant has filed a
supplemental brief, “the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific
arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion,” but the
filing of a supplemental brief alone does not compel the court to
independently review the entire record to identify unraised issues, although
it may exercise its discretion to do so. (Id. at p. 232.) In this appeal, we have
exercised our discretion to independently review the entire record to identify
any arguable issues.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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