People v. Shaw CA4/1

CourtListener 10814322Calctapp24 de mar. de 2026

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 3/24/26 P. v. Shaw CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084236

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD296802)

v.

PATRICK ISAIAH SHAW,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Francis M. Devaney, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted Patrick Isaiah Shaw of numerous offenses, including
one count of torture and multiple counts of domestic violence resulting in
corporal injury, involving two separate victims. The trial court sentenced
Shaw to life in prison with the possibility of parole and a determinate term of
13 years and four months.
On appeal from the judgment, Shaw argues the trial court erred in
denying his request for self-representation, and in failing to stay the
punishment for either the torture conviction or one of the domestic violence

convictions under Penal Code section 654.1 As we shall explain, we conclude
that because Shaw’s request to represent himself was equivocal, the trial
court’s denial was proper. We also reject Shaw’s contention that the court
erred by failing to stay punishment under section 654. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution Case
1. Janet Roe
In January 2022, Shaw and Janet Roe met through Facebook when
Shaw asked Roe if she could braid his hair. Thereafter, they began hanging
out and occasionally had sex. Sometime in February, Roe suffered a severe
broken left ankle, requiring her to wear an orthopedic boot and use crutches.
Around 7:00 p.m. on April 17, 2022, Shaw picked Roe up at her house
and drove her to a drugstore. Because Roe was still in the orthopedic boot,
she sat in the back seat of Shaw’s car. After Roe returned from the drugstore
to Shaw’s car, Shaw was agitated and confrontational, so Roe asked him to
take her home. Shaw refused and drove in an erratic manner away from
Roe’s house. Roe then told Shaw she did not want to continue a relationship

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
with him, which enraged Shaw further. Shaw drove onto the freeway,
heading farther away from Roe’s house.
Roe’s daughter, J.H., called Roe while she was in Shaw’s car. J.H.
heard Shaw yell, “We’re going somewhere, but you’re not going home.” Roe
told J.H. that Shaw was driving in the wrong direction. Shaw then exited the
freeway, parked behind a grocery store, and ordered Roe to get off the phone
with J.H. Roe refused to end the phone call because she did not feel safe and
wanted J.H. to hear what was happening. Shaw then got out of the car,
walked around to the passenger side, opened the door, punched Roe in the
head and grabbed Roe’s phone. He threw the phone on the ground, breaking
it, and continued to assault Roe by punching her in the head and face. A
bystander at a nearby apartment yelled for Shaw to take his hands off Roe
and threatened to call the police. Shaw yelled back at the person to mind his
own business and told Roe, “I am really going to beat your ass now.”
Roe tried to protect herself with her hands and her right leg. She felt
like she could not escape because it was dark, she was disabled, and Shaw
had broken her phone. When Shaw finally stopped the assault, he returned
to the driver’s seat and drove back onto the freeway. Shaw continued to yell
at Roe, calling her names and threatening to hurt her again. Shaw exited the
freeway and parked his car at an empty park. He got out of the car and
resumed assaulting Roe, repeatedly punching her body and head. Shaw took
Roe’s boot off and threatened to rebreak her ankle. As Roe tried to defend
herself with her right arm, Shaw hit her hand so hard that one of Roe’s veins
ruptured, causing blood to spray inside the car. Shaw then retrieved a phone
charging cord from the car, dragged Roe out of the car, and began whipping
her back, legs, stomach and neck with the cord. Roe crawled back into the
car in an attempt to protect herself. Shaw then got back into the driver’s seat

3
and drove away from the park, threatening to kill Roe and bury her in the
desert.
Roe realized that she had to escape and when Shaw stopped at a red
light, she got out of the car and tried to get another driver to help her. A ride
share driver approached Roe and told her to get into his car. He took Roe to a
bar where Roe was able to call a friend to get a ride home.
Two days later, Roe went to the hospital. Medical staff noted Roe had
significant bruising all over her body, swelling in her broken ankle, and she
was suffering from headaches. The staff suspected Roe had been beaten and
told Roe they would notify the police.
2. Jane Doe
Around August 2022, Doe met Shaw through an online dating website
and they began seeing each other. Within a month, however, Shaw began
threatening and physically abusing Doe. The abuse escalated on October 9,
when Shaw picked Doe up from her house, where Doe lived with her mother
and her mother’s boyfriend, so the couple could spend time together during
Shaw’s shift as a security guard. On the way to Shaw’s job site, he became
verbally abusive. Doe asked Shaw to take her home, but he refused,
beginning a week-long ordeal of abuse.
During the week, Doe and Shaw spent some nights sleeping in Shaw’s
car and other nights sleeping in motel rooms. Over that time, Shaw
physically abused and threatened Doe. On October 16, Doe finally sent a text
to her brothers asking for help. Doe’s brothers called law enforcement and
met a sheriff’s deputy in the parking lot of Shaw’s worksite where his car was
parked.
Doe did not disclose the abuse to the police because she feared
retribution by Shaw, who had warned her to lie and say that bruises on her

4
face were caused by falling in the shower and not by him. Doe did leave with
her brothers and mother, and the following day obtained a temporary
domestic violence restraining order against Shaw. Doe was not able to serve
the order on Shaw, which was required to seek a permanent restraining
order, but returned to court on November 3, 2022, to extend the temporary
order.
That same night, however, Doe let Shaw sneak into her bedroom at her
mother’s house, which began another extended episode of abuse. During this
encounter, Doe initially consented to having sex with Shaw, but he became
too rough and she asked him to stop. Shaw refused and continued to
penetrate Doe until he ejaculated. The following morning, Doe sought
medical attention because she was in pain and experiencing vaginal bleeding.
The doctor who examined Doe concluded she suffered two vaginal lacerations.
The next evening, on November 4, 2022, Doe left her house around
10:30 p.m. to go to a convenience store and saw Shaw pull into her driveway.
Shaw yelled at Doe to get in his car and threatened to kill her mother and her
mother’s boyfriend if she did not comply. Doe believed Shaw’s threats and
got into the car. Shaw drove to a residential area and parked the car. After
parking the car, Shaw ordered Doe into the back seat and told her to take off
her clothes. Doe complied because she was afraid of Shaw.
Shaw then got into the back seat and forced Doe to have sex with him.
Doe was crying in pain and kept asking him to stop. Shaw told her to shut
up and held her face down on the back seat. Afterwards, because of injuries
caused by the rape, Doe bled through the shorts she was wearing.
While Shaw and Doe were still sitting in the parked car, Doe received
several phones calls from her ex-girlfriend, V.R. Shaw accused Doe of being
in a sexual relationship with V.R. and when Doe tried to assure Shaw this

5
was not true, Shaw accused Doe of lying and physically assaulted her. He
slapped her, slammed his head into hers, struck her arm several times, and
punched her in the mouth and eye. Shaw told Doe that he was going to kill
her and he wanted her money. He also demanded that Doe give him her
social security number.
Around 12:30 a.m., Shaw drove Doe to a park. He took her phone and
began scrolling through her photos. When he came across some old photos of
Doe with V.R., he erupted in anger again. He physically assaulted Doe,
punching her multiple times in the face and pelvic area. He eventually
stopped hitting Doe and fell asleep in the back seat of the car with her.
The following morning, on November 5, 2022, they drove to Shaw’s
work. Shaw left Doe in the parked car during the day and warned her that
he would beat her if she did not keep her head down. Doe testified she tried
to contact a domestic violence hotline but could not get through to anyone.
After Shaw’s shift ended, he drove Doe to get some fast food and a bag of ice
for her swollen face, and then they checked into a motel.
A few hours later, Shaw told Doe to clean herself up and lay down
naked on the bed. Doe again complied. Shaw laid down naked next to Doe,
grabbed her by the hair, forced her head down toward his penis, and ordered
her to orally copulate him. Doe complied out of fear, crying in pain
throughout because of the cuts on her mouth from Shaw beating her face.
Afterwards, Doe rinsed her mouth and went to sleep.
The next morning, on November 6, 2022, Shaw elbowed Doe in the side
and punched her shoulder. After this, while Doe was lying on the bed, Shaw
got on top of her and ordered Doe to have sex with him. Doe did not comply
this time and Shaw became angry. Shaw demanded Doe remove a necklace
and bracelet she was wearing and threatened to beat her if she did not

6
comply. While Doe tried to remove the bracelet, Shaw ripped the necklace
from her neck. Shaw then started prying Doe’s acrylic fingernails from her
fingers. He pulled each acrylic nail so that it either separated from Doe’s
nails or removed the nail bed completely, causing her fingers to bleed. Doe
experienced excruciating pain and begged Shaw to stop. Shaw threatened to
beat her if she did not stop screaming and continued pulling up her acrylic
nails until they were all off.
After ripping off Doe’s fingernails, Shaw demanded she braid his hair.
When Doe told him that she could not do this because of the injuries to her
fingers, Shaw became angrier and more aggressive, accusing Doe of “acting
up” and being ungrateful. Shaw forced Doe into the bathroom and punched
her several times, then dragged her into the bedroom and continued
punching her all over her body.
Around noon that day, Shaw took Doe to a fast food restaurant and
then had her reserve a different motel room. While at the restaurant, Doe
went to the bathroom and texted V.R. that Shaw had tortured her by ripping
off her fingernails. She asked V.R. to contact the police and Doe’s mother,
and told V.R. what motel she was going to after the restaurant.
V.R. called Doe’s mother and the two of them drove to the area where
they believed Doe was. V.R. also called the police who arrived at the motel
and arrested Shaw.
B. Defense Case
Shaw testified in his own defense. He told the jury he met Doe through
an online dating website in August 2022 and met with her once or twice per
week for the next few months. Their meetups did not always involve sex, but
they occasionally met at a hotel room for that purpose.

7
On November 4, 2022, Doe called Shaw several times while he was
working. After his shift ended, Shaw had car trouble and took his car to a
friend to repair it. While the car was being repaired, Doe called Shaw and
asked him to pick her up. When Shaw arrived at Doe’s house, between 10:30
and 11:00 p.m., she was outside and walking toward his car. He testified Doe
was “banged up” and had broken nails, so he offered to get her some ice or
take her to the hospital, but Doe declined. Doe told Shaw that she was
injured during a fight with her roommates. Shaw drove Doe to a hotel, but
because Doe could not pay for the room and Shaw had to work early the next
morning, they decided to sleep in Shaw’s car.
The next day, on November 5, 2022, Shaw went to work, and Doe
stayed in his car during his shift. Shaw gave Doe a pair of his sweatpants to
wear. He texted with Doe throughout the day and came back to the car on
his lunch break to bring her bandages for her nails. After Shaw’s shift ended,
he and Doe got fast food and went to a motel for the night. On November 6,
2022, Doe woke Shaw and they had sex. Shaw took the day off work and
drove Doe to another motel. When he walked into the lobby, he was arrested.
Shaw testified that all of his interactions with Doe were consensual,
and he denied forcing Doe to engage in any sexual acts with him. He told the
jury he felt “a lot of love” for Doe and admitted he had described their sexual
encounters to police as “great, amazing porn-star shit.”
Shaw testified that he met Roe in January 2022 and had a sexual
relationship with her for a few months. He stated that on April 17, 2022, he
picked Roe up from her apartment and drove her first to a drugstore and then
to a grocery store. They got into an argument and Roe began acting
strangely. Shaw told the jury he left Roe, unharmed, in the parking lot of the
grocery store. Roe called Shaw, but he told her that he was heading home

8
because he did not want to argue with her. Shaw said all of his sexual
interactions with Roe were consensual.
C. Verdict & Sentencing
Before trial, the San Diego County District Attorney filed an amended
information charging Shaw with torture (§ 206; count 1), two counts of
kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)); counts 2 & 10), two counts of forcible rape
(§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 3 & 4), forcible oral copulation (§ 287,
subd. (c)(2)(A); count 5), two counts of domestic violence resulting in corporal
injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 6 & 12), two counts making criminal threats
(§ 422; counts 7 & 15), intimidating or dissuading a witness (§ 136.1,
subd. (a)(2); count 8), violating a protective or restraining order (§ 273.6,
subd. (a); count 9), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1);
count 11), battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 13),
and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4);
count 14). Counts 1 through 9 related to Doe and counts 10 through 15
related to Roe. As to all but count 6, the amended information alleged the
victim was a person defined in Family Code section 6211 (§ 1203.097,
subd. (a)); as to counts 1, 2, 6, 11, 12 and 14, the information alleged Shaw
inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence
(§ 12022.7, subd. (e)); as to count 3, the information alleged the offense
qualified for sentencing under the One Strike Law (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c) &
(e)); and as to count 13, the information alleged Shaw personally inflicted
great bodily injury (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). The amended information further
alleged Shaw had suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction,
subjecting him to sentencing under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–
(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d).) Finally, the amended information alleged four

9
aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(6), (b)(1) &
(b)(2)).
After the prosecution rested its case, Shaw filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to section 1118.1. The trial court granted the motion as to counts 9
and 13, and as to the section 12022.7, subdivision (e) allegations on
counts 11, 12 and 14.
The jury found Shaw guilty on counts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, and
15, and found true the enhancement allegations pertaining to each of those
counts. The jury deadlocked on the rape, forcible oral copulation, and
violation of restraining order charges (counts 3, 4 and 5), and the trial court
dismissed those counts on its own motion. Thereafter, Shaw admitted the
prior strike and serious felony conviction allegations and the court found true
the aggravating factor allegations.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an indeterminate
sentence of life with the possibility of parole on count 1, plus a determinate
sentence of 13 years and four months consisting of consecutive terms of three
years for count 2; one year for count 6; eight months for count 7; two years for
count 8; five years for count 10; one year for count 11; and eight months for
count 15. The court stayed the sentences on count 12 and 14 pursuant to
section 654 and dismissed the prior strike and serious felony allegations
pursuant to section 1385.
Shaw timely appealed from the judgment of conviction.
DISCUSSION
I
Shaw contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to self-
representation, as established by Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806
(Faretta), when it denied his request at a pretrial hearing 10 days before trial

10
began. The Attorney General concedes the trial court’s stated reason for
denying Shaw’s request to represent himself—that the request was
untimely—is not sufficient to uphold the denial. However, he argues this
court should affirm because Shaw’s request was not sufficiently unequivocal
to invoke his right to try his case without counsel.
A
Additional Background
During the 18 months of pretrial proceedings, Shaw brought several
motions under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) seeking to
replace his counsel. Shaw’s first Marsden motion occurred at the preliminary
hearing, and the trial court denied the motion. At that hearing, Shaw also
requested that he be allowed to represent himself. The trial court denied the
request, explaining that granting the motion at that stage of the proceedings
would interfere with the witnesses and cause the preliminary hearing, which
was in process, to take longer than necessary. The court, however, advised
Shaw he could renew his request at a later time. On March 27, August 31,
and November 6, 2023, Shaw made additional Marsden motions. The trial
court conducted a hearing and denied each motion.
On January 25, 2024, Shaw again requested he be permitted to
represent himself. This time, the court granted the request and relieved
Shaw’s appointed counsel, Shea Connelly. A month later, on February 26,
2024, Shaw told the court he no longer felt comfortable representing himself,
but he did not want Connelly reinstated as his counsel. The court granted
the withdrawal, reappointed Connelly, and permitted Shaw to make another
Marsden motion. The trial court proceeded with the Marsden hearing and
determined there was not an irreconcilable conflict between Shaw and
Connelly. The court explained to Shaw that his accusations that Connelly

11
had lied to the court about the length of one of Connelly’s visits with Shaw in
jail were not accurate and were not sufficient to relieve Connelly. Further,
the court explained that Connelly was an experienced public defender and
that he was providing Shaw with excellent representation.
On April 11, 2024, at a pretrial conference, Shaw told the court he did
not understand why his counsel was not planning to call his mother as a
witness. Shaw stated his mother had “evidence pertaining to one of the
alleged victims.” Shaw also said Connelly was “not bringing [other
witnesses] forward” and Connelly was not “relaying anything to me, and [he
had] concerns moving towards trial about that.” The court reminded Shaw
his counsel was in charge of making such strategic decisions. The court also
told Shaw it was not going to “have mini Marsden hearings every time I see
you. … You are well represented, believe you me.”
Shaw responded, “I’m going to continue talking because it’s my rights
being violated right now.” The court and Shaw engaged in a tense exchange
and the court expressed frustration with Shaw for being disrespectful. After
telling Shaw, “Don’t push me. Don’t interrupt me. Don’t mimic me,” Shaw
stated, “You’re doing this, you’re mimicking me.” The court responded, “Mr.
Shaw, I suggest you get back on the right foot with me. You can sit in that
room and watch the thing through video if you ---” Shaw interrupted, “Or I
can go pro per.” The court responded, “You can go pro per, and you can end
up with life in prison.” Shaw retorted, “Which I won’t. I won’t.”
The court then stated, “Mr. Shaw, this is your case. We’ve had this
conversation. You went pro per when you first met me. I talked to you about
it, and you agreed with me it was not a good idea. Now you’re here raising
that issue again. You’ve had numerous Marsden hearings. Mr. Connelly is
well representing you, and he’s trying. You need to cooperate with him as

12
much as he needs to cooperate with you. [¶] Now, if you have issues with
him, talk in person, in private, not air in front of me and the prosecution.
You know, this is the problem. If we’re going to have a trial and you’re going
to be yelling and screaming in front of that jury, it’s not going to go well. I
want this case to go smoothly. I’m here to uphold your constitutional rights,
so don’t accuse me of violating them. My job is to uphold them. [¶] I’m going
to give you a fair trial, but you need to cooperate. You’re not the only person
in this room with information about this case. Share it with Mr. Connelly
and listen to him when he responds. If there are issues, I’ll address them,
but I’m not going to have them rudely raised every time I see you. [¶] Now,
come on. I want to get your trial done and get it done fairly. So let’s all be on
the same page. You have issues with Mr. Connelly, he can talk to you in
there, not in front of the district attorney and in front of me. [¶] Anything
else?”
Shaw then stated Connelly had refused to “submit some motions for
me.” The court explained Connelly had submitted 19 motions on Shaw’s
behalf, some successfully. Shaw then asked if his counsel had filed a motion
to dismiss, and the court explained Connelly had filed a section 995 motion,
which was denied. Shaw then said repeatedly that Connelly should have
filed additional 995 motions. When the court asked counsel if there was
anything further, Shaw interjected and stated he wanted to represent himself
since Connelly would not file another 995 motion “to prove [his] innocence.”
Shaw also stated he was ready to go to trial and would not waive any
additional time. The court denied the motion, stating, “We have already
invested lots of time on pretrial motions. We are ready to go to trial. It’s too
late for you all of sudden to take up a mantle to defend yourself. [¶] You are
incapable [of] being ready to go to trial by April 22. I’ve already had this

13
conversation with you. You’ve already had numerous Marsden hearings. Mr.
Shaw, you are in good hands. I’ve told you that. It’s too late for you to get up
to speed.”
Shaw again repeated that he wanted to represent himself, and that he
would tell this to the jury. Shaw further stated Connelly was not explaining
why he would not call the witnesses Shaw wanted him to call or why he had
not filed more motions. The court asked Connelly if he wanted to talk with
Shaw privately, presumably to explain his strategy, and Shaw interjected
that he did not want to talk to Connelly and that it was too late for them to
reconcile. The court repeated its ruling denying Shaw’s request to represent
himself, and Shaw again repeated his request to do so several times before
the court adjourned the hearing.
At the final pretrial conference on April 22, 2024, the day before trial
began, the court considered whether the testimony of two of Shaw’s experts
should be limited because the experts had relied on or considered hearsay
statements by Shaw’s adoptive mother that his biological mother had abused
alcohol while pregnant with Shaw. The prosecutor alleged that only this
hearsay statement supported the experts’ opinions that developmental
disabilities that were recently diagnosed could have been the result of
prenatal or postnatal alcohol syndrome. The court ruled that the experts
could testify about the history of alcohol use by Shaw’s biological mother
during her pregnancy, but they could not relay the hearsay statements of
Shaw’s adoptive mother. After the court issued its ruling, the court reporter
captured Shaw stating to Connelly, “What are you looking at me for, man?
Look at the judge. … Stop trying to antagonize me.” The court responded by
asking Shaw if he was aware the court had ruled in his favor.

14
Shaw then stated Connelly was not doing his job and that he wanted
Connelly to present evidence that the victims had consented to all of the
conduct alleged in the case. Shaw stated Connelly was refusing to consider
presenting nude photos Doe sent to Shaw, which Shaw asserted would prove
his innocence. Shaw then said, “You should have fired him. You should have
substituted him. … He’s not representing me properly.” The court told
Shaw to provide the photos he was referencing to Connelly and reprimanded
Shaw, stating, “You are not going to continue every time you walk into this
room, to tell me I want to represent myself, I want to get rid of him. [¶] ... [¶]
He is representing you. We start trial tomorrow. Shaw then returned to his
complaint that Connelly had not filed another section 995 motion. The court
asked Shaw to stop yelling and reminded Shaw that Connelly had filed a
section 995 motion, and that he had ruled in Shaw’s favor on various other
matters.
Shaw replied, “It’s this relationship, it’s deteriorated. This [is] past
reconcile. I don’t see this going forward with him. This attorney needs to be
out of here, not me. This is my – this is – I’m the defendant in my – I have to
prove my innocence. Me, not him. He’s not doing it trying to have fetal-
alcohol syndrome. That don’t got shit to do with them lying on me.” Shaw
repeated several times that he did not want Connelly representing him, and
the court explained to Shaw that Connelly would cross-examine the victims
on Shaw’s claims that his encounters with them were consensual. After this
interaction, the court continued the hearing, ruling on the parties’
evidentiary objections, discussing the witnesses, voir dire, and the court’s
statements to the jurors once they were empaneled. The court then excused

15
the prosecutor to conduct a Marsden hearing and at the conclusion of that

hearing again denied Shaw’s Marsden motion.2
B
Legal Standards
“ ‘The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a criminal
defendant has a federal constitutional right to represent himself if he
voluntarily and intelligently so chooses. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 835–
836.) A trial court must grant a defendant’s request for self-representation if

2 On the sixth day of trial, May 1, 2024, Shaw was not present and the
court exercised its discretion to proceed with trial. The following day, Shaw
explained he was absent because “I’m … having suicidal thoughts because
this is my life on the line. And when I met you, you talked me out of having
my waiver to represent myself. You promised me a fair trial. And I’m not
receiving that having [Connelly] represent me.” The court responded Shaw
was receiving a fair trial, Connelly was representing him “very, very well,”
and the court intended to proceed with trial even if Shaw decided not to
attend. The court then proceeded to address Shaw’s motion to dismiss the
case under section 1118 and, as discussed, the court granted the motion in
part, dismissing counts 9 and 13, and the section 12022.7, subdivision (e)
allegations for counts 11, 12, and 14.
At the start of the next and final day of trial, May 3, 2024, Shaw again
requested a Marsden hearing. Shaw repeated an assertion he made in
several prior Marsden hearings that Connelly had made a sexual advance
toward him at the preliminary hearing. Shaw also stated that because he
had made this allegation, Connelly had “been strategically trying to ruin
[Shaw’s] life.” Shaw then said he was going to tell the jury that Connelly was
harming him and threatened to kill himself in front of the jury. Shaw also
said the court’s refusal to appoint another attorney was causing him to be
suicidal. This prompted the court’s deputy to remove Shaw from the
courtroom. After he was removed from the courtroom, Shaw continued to
threaten to kill himself, hit his head repeatedly against a wall, and tried to
fight with the deputies that were restraining him. As a result, the court
again proceeded with the trial that day in Shaw’s absence. Shaw returned to
court the following and final trial day, and testified in his own defense.

16
the request is made within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of
trial, is unequivocal, and is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.’ ”
(People v. Frazier (2024) 16 Cal.5th 814, 843, cert. den. sub nom. Frazier v.
California (2025) 145 S.Ct. 1186.)
“On appeal, a reviewing court independently examines the entire
record to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently
invoked his right to self-representation.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th
390, 453.) The appellate court reviews whether the defendant clearly stated
the request for self-representation and whether his conduct and words reflect
unambiguity. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23 (Marshall).) A
Faretta “ ‘motion made out of a temporary whim, or out of annoyance or
frustration, is not unequivocal—even if the defendant has said he or she
seeks self-representation.’ ” (People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 932
(Stanley); see also Marshall, at p. 21 [“a court ‘properly may deny a request
for self-representation that is a “momentary caprice or the result of thinking
out loud” ’ ”].) “ ‘Equivocation, which sometimes refers only to speech, is
broader in the context of the Sixth Amendment, and takes into account
conduct as well as other expressions of intent.’ ” (Stanley, at p. 932.) “ ‘[T]he
right of self-representation is waived unless defendants articulately and
unmistakably demand to proceed pro se.’ ” (Marshall, at p. 21.)
Further, “the right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the
dignity of the courtroom, but a right that can be lost through deliberate,
serious misconduct.” (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 20.) “[S]ome
assertions of the right of self-representation may be a vehicle for
manipulation and abuse. It is not only the stability of judgments that is at
stake, however, when we require a defendant to make an unequivocal request
for self-representation. The defendant’s constitutional right to the effective

17
assistance of counsel also is at stake—a right that secures the protection of
many other constitutional rights as well.” (Id. at pp. 22–23.) In addition, the
fact that a defendant did not renew a request to represent himself may also
be considered as relevant to whether the Faretta motion was unequivocal.
(Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 933; People v. Tena (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th
598, 610 (Tena).)
Thus, a “court faced with a motion for self-representation should
evaluate not only whether the defendant has stated the motion clearly, but
also the defendant’s conduct and other words. Because the court should draw
every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel, the
defendant’s conduct or words reflecting ambivalence about self-
representation may support the court’s decision to deny the defendant’s
motion. A motion for self-representation made in passing anger or
frustration, an ambivalent motion, or one made for the purpose of delay or to
frustrate the orderly administration of justice may be denied.” (Marshall,
supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 23.)
If the defendant is found to have invoked the right to self-
representation, the trial court’s denial of the request is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 735.) The court’s decision
is given deference and “ ‘will not be disturbed in the absence of a strong
showing of clear abuse.’ ” (Id. at p. 735.) However, “ ‘[i]n determining on
appeal whether the defendant invoked the right to self-representation, we
examine the entire record de novo.’ ” (People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269,
295 (Danks).) This court is not bound by the trial court’s determination that
the defendant unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation. (People
v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 703; see Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 24
[reviewing court “examine[s] the entire record to determine whether the

18
invocation of the right of self-representation and waiver of the right to
counsel was knowing and voluntary”].)
C
Analysis
We agree with the parties that the timing of Shaw’s request for self-
representation, which was 11 days before the trial began, was not alone a
sufficient basis to support the court’s denial of the request. (See People v.
Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128 [“when a motion to proceed pro se is
timely interposed, a trial court must permit a defendant to represent himself
upon ascertaining that he has voluntarily and intelligently elected to do so,
irrespective of how unwise such a choice might appear to be”].) The record
before this court, however, shows Shaw’s Faretta request was equivocal and
the trial court’s denial of the request on this basis was appropriate. The facts
show that Shaw’s request was born out of annoyance and frustration with his
counsel’s tactical decisions and failure to establish Shaw’s innocence before
trial. The record reveals not that Shaw wanted to proceed to trial in pro per,
but that he was attempting to force the trial court to relieve Connelly from
his appointment. (See, e.g., Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 932 [a Faretta
motion made out of a temporary whim, annoyance, or frustration is not
unequivocal even if defendant has said he seeks self-representation]; Danks,
supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 296 [“defendant’s references to self-representation
were equivocal, born primarily of frustration regarding the granting of
[defense] counsel’s requests for continuances and his desire to avoid further
psychiatric examination”]; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 407–410
[expression of dissatisfaction with attorney in conjunction with other
statements about being unrepresented were too equivocal for Faretta

19
request], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Williams (2010) 49
Cal.4th 405.)
Shaw made his Faretta request on April 11, 2024, only after engaging
in a tense discussion with the trial court about Connelly’s decision not to call
Shaw’s mother and other unspecified witnesses to the stand in his defense.
After Shaw’s outburst, the court expressed frustration with his repeated
efforts to have Connelly fired and his inability to understand that he was
well-represented. This triggered Shaw’s initial angry response to the court
that he could “go pro per.” After the court continued to explain that Shaw
needed to work with Connelly to prepare his defense, Shaw again erupted
that Connelly had not sufficiently attempted to have the case dismissed
before trial and that he wanted to represent himself. These statements do
not show an unambiguous request to proceed without counsel. Rather, the
context here shows a request made in anger and frustration, and fear, about
the proceedings. Shaw’s request was an “impulsive reaction[] to his
frustrated attempts to secure an attorney who would subpoena the witnesses
he desired, rather than [an] unequivocal Faretta request[].” (Tena, supra,
156 Cal.App.4th at p. 608; see Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 21 [“[T]he
high court’s emphasis in Faretta … on defendant’s knowing, voluntary,
unequivocal, and competent invocation of the right [to self-representation]
suggests that an insincere request or one made under the cloud of emotion
may be denied”].)
The proceedings leading up to the April 11, 2024 readiness conference
further support a finding that Shaw’s request was equivocal. Just two
months prior to the conference, Shaw withdrew his previous request for self-
representation, which had been granted a month earlier, and accepted

20
reappointment of counsel. Shaw, thus, recognized the risks of self-
representation and made a reasoned decision to proceed to trial with counsel.
The proceedings following the April 11, 2024 hearing also show
equivocation in Shaw’s request for self-representation. Contrary to Shaw’s
assertion, he did not make a “renewed” request for self-representation.
Rather, Shaw only expressed dissatisfaction with Connelly’s performance and
asked for substitute counsel. Shaw’s failure to renew his request again prior
to or during his trial supports our conclusion that his April 11, 2024 Faretta
request was the result of emotion and frustration, not a genuine desire to
represent himself. (Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 933 [“once defendant’s
request for self-representation was denied, he never renewed it. … In light
of defendant’s subsequent acceptance of several appointed counsel to
represent him without ever renewing his request for self-representation, we
conclude he must further be found to have ultimately abandoned his desire to
invoke his Faretta rights in these capital murder proceedings”]; Tena, supra,
156 Cal.App.4th at p. 610 [failure to renew his Faretta request after the
initial denial constituted an abandonment of the request].)
In sum, “[w]hen we examine the record of the hearing at which [Shaw]
assertedly invoked his right of self-representation, we conclude that the
request was ambivalent in the context of that hearing” and was made in an

attempt to have Connelly replaced and to disrupt the proceedings.3
(Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 25.) Accordingly, we reject Shaw’s request
to reverse the judgment of conviction on this basis.

3 Because we conclude that Shaw failed to invoke his right to self-
representation, we do not reach his additional argument that the court erred
by failing to assess his mental competency to invoke that right.

21
II
Shaw also argues the trial court erred by imposing separate
punishments for his convictions for torture (count 1) and domestic violence
resulting in corporal injury (count 6) because the crimes were part of a
continuous course of conduct. The Attorney General responds that although
the crimes both occurred over the three-day span that Shaw held Doe against
her will, substantial evidence supported the court’s implicit finding that the
offenses were committed with different intents at different times.
A
Additional Background
In his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the relationship
history between Shaw and Doe, starting from the date they met to the date
Doe obtained the restraining order against Shaw. The prosecutor then
moved into the facts supporting each charge involving Doe. When addressing
count 6 (domestic violence resulting in corporal injury), the prosecutor stated
that on the night of November 4, 2022, Shaw was enraged after Doe received
a call from V.R., which triggered Shaw to drive Doe to a remote location and
beat her repeatedly, causing bruising and swelling to her face. When
addressing count 1 (torture), the prosecutor focused on Shaw’s act of forcibly
removing Doe’s acrylic fingernails one at a time, causing Doe to suffer
excruciating pain and requiring her to wear bandages for a long time after.
The prosecutor asserted Shaw inflicted this torture because Doe refused to
have sex with him.
In the probation report, the officer stated that the basis of the domestic
violence charge in count 6 was Shaw’s physical assault on Doe in his car on
November 4, 2022. The officer noted Doe received a phone call from V.R. and
in response, he headbutted Doe and slapped her in the face. With respect to

22
count 1, the officer stated the basis of the torture charge was the forcible
removal of Doe’s fingernails on November 6, 2022. In setting forth
sentencing considerations, the probation officer concluded section 654 did not
apply to the counts involving Doe because counts 1 through 2 and counts 6
through 8 involved separate criminal acts. With respect to concurrent or
consecutive sentencing, the officer recommended consecutive sentencing
because “the crimes were committed at separate places rather than being
committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of
aberrant behavior.”
At the sentencing hearing, the parties did not address the applicability
of section 654 to count 1, and both parties agreed that sentencing for count 6
was not subject to a stay pursuant to section 654. When discussing which of
Shaw’s acts were the basis for count 6, both parties and the court referenced
Shaw’s beating of Doe in the car on November 4, 2022. The trial court
imposed a term of life with the possibility of parole for count 1, and for the
remaining counts, it imposed an aggregate determinate term of 13 years and
four months, which included a one-year term for count 6.
B
Legal Standards
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]n act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.” This provision “precludes multiple
punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct.” (People v.
Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) With respect to whether section 654
applies to preclude multiple punishments, a course of conduct is generally

23
indivisible if the defendant harbored a single criminal objective the entire
time. (People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935.)
“ ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible ... depends on the
intent and objective of the actor.’ [Citations.] ‘[I]f all the offenses were
merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one
objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and
therefore may be punished only once.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]
However, if the defendant harbored ‘multiple or simultaneous objectives,
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the defendant may be
punished for each violation committed in pursuit of each objective even
though the violations share common acts or were parts of an otherwise
indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139,
1143.) In addition, “ ‘a finding that multiple offenses were aimed at one
intent and objective does not necessarily mean that they constituted “one
indivisible course of conduct” for purposes of section 654. If the offenses were
committed on different occasions, they may be punished separately.’ ” (People
v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 715, 736–737 (Cruz).)
“The trial court has broad latitude in determining whether section 654,
subdivision (a) applies in a given case.” (People v. Garcia (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 1550, 1564.) “When a trial court sentences a defendant to
separate terms without making an express finding the defendant entertained
separate objectives, the trial court is deemed to have made an implied finding
each offense had a separate objective.” (People v. Islas (2012) 210

24
Cal.App.4th 116, 129.) Such findings will be upheld on appeal if supported by
substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
C
Analysis
Shaw argues he intended to harm Doe when he beat her up in the car
and again when he forcibly peeled off her fingernails at the motel, and thus
his intent was “identical” in both crimes and the punishment for count 6
should be stayed under section 654. This argument is not well taken.
When Shaw beat Doe in the car on November 4, 2022, he did so
immediately after Doe received a phone call from her ex-girlfriend. His
reaction to the call showed an intent to punish or scare Doe for her
relationship with V.R. When Shaw later tortured Doe by removing her
fingernails at the motel on November 6, 2022, he did so after Doe refused to
have sex with him and refused to comply with his demand to remove her
jewelry. This suggests Shaw’s intent was to punish Doe for refusing his
sexual advance and reestablish control over her. Based on the circumstances
surrounding each offense, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding
that Shaw’s intent in removing Doe’s acrylic fingernails was distinct from his
intent to beat her in the car two days earlier. (See People v. Mejia (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 1036, 1047 [affirming imposition of separate sentences for
criminal threats and torture that were related, but where there was evidence
of separate intents].)
Further, even assuming Shaw harbored the same intent for both
crimes—i.e., the intent to harm Doe—he is still not entitled to a stay under
section 654 because the crimes were divisible in time. (Cruz, supra, 46
Cal.App.5th at pp. 736–737.) The infliction of corporal injury, which the
parties agreed was the basis for count 6, occurred two days before the torture

25
of removing Doe’s fingernails, the basis for count 1. Because the criminal
acts underlying counts 1 and 6 were temporally separated by almost two
days, the court appropriately concluded section 654 did not apply to stay the
punishment for count 6.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

CASTILLO, J.

26

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.