CourtListener 10814321•Singh v. Khaira CA1/1
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Filed 3/24/26 Singh v. Khaira CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
SURINDER SINGH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
NAVJEET KAUR KHAIRA, as
Trustee, etc., A172222
Defendant and Respondent;
(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RG19011626)
SIMARJOT SINGH GILL,
Intervenor, Defendant and
Respondent.
In this matter, the trial court entered quiet title judgment in favor of
Navjeet Kaur Khaira, trustee of the Mandeep Kaur Living Trust (trust).1
The court determined title to the real property located at 32473 Edith Way
(home) in Union City “was and now is vested in [Navjeet] . . . 100% as owner
in fee simple,” and Surinder Singh has no right, title, or other interest in the
1 We recite only those facts and procedural history necessary to resolve
the issues before us. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.) For
clarity, we use related individuals’ first names, intending no disrespect.
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property. On appeal, Surinder primarily alleges the court’s decision was the
product of bias. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Mandeep Kaur was trustee of the trust, and Simarjot Singh Gill—
Mandeep’s son—was and is its sole beneficiary. Mandeep was sole owner of
the home until May 2013, when she transferred ownership to herself as
trustee. Navjeet (Mandeep’s sister) was successor trustee and—when
Mandeep died in January 2018—became record title owner of the home in her
capacity as trustee of the trust.
Surinder and his wife, Rajinder Kaur, lived in the home pursuant to an
October 2015 rental agreement, which required them to pay Mandeep $3,000
monthly. Although the agreement was not modified, Rajinder began paying
$3,400 in November 2017. Surinder, Rajinder, their children, and Rajinder’s
parents lived in the home from November 2015 until March 2023. From
November 2015 through January 2018—when Mandeep died—Surinder and
Rajinder made 25 payments, totaling $53,670. They made no further
monthly payments, and Navjeet served a three-day notice to pay or quit in
March 2018.
In March 2019, Surinder filed a quiet title complaint against Navjeet,
seeking a judgment that he was the sole owner of the home. He alleged that
at the time the rental agreement was executed, Mandeep orally agreed to sell
him the home for $475,000, and a promissory note was executed two years
later reflecting the agreement. He also alleged several “large payments
[were] made in cash in India,” and the full purchase amount was paid in
January 2018 as shown in a receipt. Finally, he alleged Mandeep died before
recording a transfer deed for the sale. In September 2019, Navjeet filed an
unlawful detainer complaint against Surinder and Rajinder, alleging they
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owed past due rent. The two actions were consolidated, and the trial court
granted Simarjot’s motion to intervene.
There was a three-day unreported bench trial in 2024. Various
witnesses testified—including Surinder, Rajinder, Sukhdev Singh (Surinder’s
brother), Navjeet, Simarjot, Onkar Singh (Mandeep’s widower), and Nanette
Barto (handwriting expert)—and exhibits were admitted into evidence,
including the promissory note and receipt. After considering the testimony,
exhibits, briefing, and Surinder’s objections to the proposed statement of
decision, the trial court ruled for Navjeet.
The trial court found Surinder failed to provide any “credible evidence
that he or anyone else acting on his behalf paid any amount toward the
purchase.” It found Onkar’s testimony refuted the idea that Mandeep
received sizable payments. Based on the expert’s testimony, the court found
the alleged signatures of Mandeep on the promissory note and receipt were
forged. It also concluded Surinder and Rajinder altered checks to make them
appear as if they were for purchase payments when bank records showed
they were in fact for rent. In sum, the court concluded the documents
underlying the purported agreement to purchase the home were “fraudulent”
and “forged,” and it did not “credit [Surinder and Rajinder’s] claim that
[their] family paid the purchase funds.” Accordingly, the court entered quiet
title judgment in Navjeet’s favor, and Surinder appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
At trial, Surinder argued there was a valid purchase agreement and
that much of the purchase amount was paid, in India, by his father to
Mandeep’s representative. He argued the payments from a “family funded
financial fund” were pursuant to a “tenet” of the “Sikh [r]eligion.” Finally,
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citing Evidence Code2 section 622, he argued the promissory note and receipt
must be “conclusively presumed to be true.” On appeal, he contends the trial
court was “prejudiced against religious practicing Sikhs” and failed to
“maintain an open mind” regarding testimony that payments were made in
accord with a tenet of his religion. We are unpersuaded.
A judgment “is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on
an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 (Jameson).)
“ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in
favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court.’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for
meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.” ’ ” (Ibid.) For that reason, “the absence of a court
reporter at trial court proceedings and the resulting lack of a verbatim record
of such proceedings will frequently be fatal to a litigant’s ability to have his or
her claims of trial court error resolved on the merits by an appellate court.”
(Id. at p. 608.) Such is the case here.
The judgment appealed from was entered after a three-day unreported
bench trial, at which the trial court heard extensive testimony from seven
witnesses—the parties, several relatives, and a handwriting expert. As a
result of that testimony, and the court’s resulting credibility determinations,
it concluded the promissory note and receipt were fraudulent and forged,
there was no valid agreement to purchase the home, Surinder and Rajinder
altered evidence, and their claims of family payments to Mandeep were not
credible. (See 640 Octavia LLC v. Walston (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 861, 869
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
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[deferring to trial court’s credibility determinations].) Indeed, even
Surinder’s opening brief heavily relies on the testimony of Surinder,
Rajinder, and Sukhdev. But we have no transcript, and without it the record
“ ‘ “is inadequate for meaningful review,” ’ ” and the judgment must be
affirmed. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
Surinder’s claims fail for another reason. “ ‘[T]o demonstrate error, an
appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument
supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (Hernandez v. First
Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277; see also Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [brief must “support each point by argument”].) “We may
and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent
legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant
reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ” (Hernandez, at p. 277.)
Surinder asserts the trial court was biased and prejudiced against him
“and his Sikh Religion Tenets,” but that accusation is unsupported by legal
analysis or citation to the record. (See Hernandez v. First Student, Inc.,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.) To the extent he offers any argument, it can
be summed up as such: the court ruled against him and did not credit his
evidence, thus it was biased against him and his religion. While we could
simply disregard such a conclusory argument, we also note that a court’s
rulings against a party “ ‘do not establish a charge of judicial bias.’ ”
(People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 447.)
Finally, Surinder contends section 622 required the trial court to
presume the promissory note and receipt were true and, thus, there was
insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings. We disagree. Section
622 provides that the “ ‘ “facts recited in a written instrument are
conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties thereto.” ’ ” (Citizens
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Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 602, 625.) But the
statute does not preclude “an assertion of fraud.” (Ibid.) Here, after
considering the testimony and the other evidence, the court found the
promissory note and receipt were “forged” and “fraudulent.” Section 622 “has
no application here.” (Ibid.) And in the absence of a transcript, and making
all inferences in favor of the judgment, we presume sufficient evidence
existed to support the court’s decision. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Navjeet and Simarjot shall recover their
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
BANKE, Acting P. J.
_________________________
SMILEY, J.
Singh v. Khaira / A172222
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