CourtListener 10813785•People v. Busch CA1/5
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Filed 3/23/26 P. v. Busch CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171681
v. (Lake County
Super. Ct. No. CR968271)
CRAIG BUSCH,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant and appellant Craig Busch, who had been sentenced to life
in prison for first degree murder, was released on lifetime parole in 2019
under Penal Code section 3000.1, subdivision (a)(1).1 In 2023, the trial court
found that he violated the conditions of his parole and remanded him to the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) as required
by section 3000.8, subdivision (h). But under section 3000.01, a statute
adopted by the Legislature in 2020, Busch would not have been remanded to
CDCR for his parole violation if he had been released after June 30, 2020.
(See People v. Reed (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 43, 54–55 (Reed).) On appeal, he
contends that this disparity in punishment based solely on the date of his
release on parole violates equal protection principles. He further contends
that there is insufficient evidence to establish that he made any criminal
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
threats in violation of the conditions of his parole. Finally, he contends that a
factual misstatement in a minute order should be corrected. We agree that
the minute order should be corrected but reject the other contentions and
affirm in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
Busch was convicted of first degree murder (§ 187) and sentenced to
prison for 25 years to life. He was released on lifetime parole on July 18,
2019.
On September 5, 2023, the Division of Adult Parole Operations of
CDCR filed a petition to revoke Busch’s parole. The petition alleged that
Busch violated the conditions of his parole by committing assault with a
deadly weapon, a vehicle (§ 245), and making criminal threats (§ 422).
At the hearing on the petition, the victim, a police officer, and Busch’s
parole agent testified on behalf of the People.
The victim, who understood “a little bit of English,”2 testified that he
was getting gas at a Tower Mart on July 18, 2023, when Busch pulled up
behind him in his truck. Busch left his truck to put some garbage in a trash
can next to the gas pump that the victim was using. According to the victim,
Busch looked at him in an “unfriendly” manner.
After he finished pumping gas, the victim testified that he got into his
car and began looking for his keys. He then felt something hit his car from
behind. He got out and accused Busch of hitting his car. Busch responded,
“ ‘Yes, I hit you. And I’m ready to hit you again if you don’t get the fuck out
of here.’ ” The victim then returned to his car and drove to the middle of the
gas station parking lot.
2 During cross-examination, the victim testified that he understood
about 10 percent “of what somebody said in English when” he was “nervous.”
2
After leaving his car to talk to the gas station clerk, the victim returned
to his car and called the police. At that time, Busch, who was standing three
to four feet from the victim’s car, asked the victim what he was doing. When
the victim told him he was calling the police, Busch “said, ‘No matter who you
call, they’re not going to do anything to me. And I want you to leave my
town, you fucking Mexican Beaner.’ ”
The victim then testified that he asked Busch to “get away” from him.
In response, Busch “kept saying, ‘Leave my town because I’m going to fuck
you up.’ ” The victim testified that Busch made him feel “threatened”
through his words, “tone,” facial expressions, “gestures,” and “body
language,” and that he understood that Busch “was going to beat [him] up.”
The victim, however, acknowledged that he did not remember the “exact
words” used by Busch. He also acknowledged that he did not notice any
damage to his car and that Busch never struck him. The victim eventually
went into the Tower Mart to wait for the police and Busch left.
Deputy Sheriff Michael Nakahara testified that the victim told him
that Busch threatened him and hit his car twice. Deputy Nakahara also
testified that Busch told him he got into an argument with the victim at
Tower Mart but did not hit the victim’s car or threaten him. Artemiza
Avalos, Busch’s parole agent, testified that Busch told her he got into an
argument with the victim at Tower Mart but denied hitting the victim’s car.
He, however, told Avalos that his truck did roll towards the victim’s car
because he forgot “to put on the brake” or “put it in park” but that he stopped
the truck before it hit the victim’s car.
Busch called four witnesses, including himself. But only two of those
3
witnesses testified about the Tower Mart incident.3
Busch testified that after waiting a long time for the victim at the
Tower Mart gas pump, he honked his horn and yelled at the victim to move
his car. According to Busch, the victim exited his car and approached him.
As Busch “stepp[ed] out” of his truck, the truck started “rolling forward” so he
got back in his truck and stopped it. He then claimed that the victim
confronted him about hitting his car and repeatedly said, “ ‘Do you want to
hit me?’ ” and “ ‘You’re going to be in trouble.’ ” Busch claimed that he told
the victim, “ ‘I didn’t fucking hit you.’ ” Busch further testified that he never
threatened the victim or touched the victim or his car and that the victim was
“aggressive” and did not seem threatened. Busch also denied using any
racial slurs. He did, however, admit to “cursing at” the victim.4
William Lyons, a passenger in Busch’s truck at the time of the Tower
Mart incident, testified that Busch never hit the victim’s car, never
threatened the victim, and never struck the victim. He corroborated Busch’s
claim that his truck started rolling towards the victim’s car but that Busch
stopped the truck before it hit the car. Lyons also claimed that the victim
refused to move his car and threatened to have Busch “killed.”
At the end of the hearing, the trial court found that Busch “bumped”
the victim’s car but did not find that he “intentionally” did so. But after
finding Busch’s and Lyons’ testimony not “trustworthy” or credible, the court
found by “a preponderance of the evidence” that Busch “made threatening
statements to the victim and [that] the victim was in fear.” According to the
3 Because only the testimony about the Tower Mart incident is relevant
to this appeal, we do not describe the testimony of Busch’s other two
witnesses.
4 For example, Busch testified that he told the victim “ ‘Get the fuck
away from my truck and if you think I fucking hit you, call the cops.’ ”
4
court, “if this was a criminal case,” it would treat the threats as “a
misdemeanor . . . .” Based on this finding, the court found that Busch “did
violate the terms and condition of his parole.” It then remanded Busch into
the custody of CDCR “for a determination as to whether he should be re-
paroled or be sanctioned.”
Pursuant to our order granting Busch’s Motion for Constructive Filing
of Notice of Appeal, the trial court filed his notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Equal Protection Claim
Under section 3000.1, subdivision (a)(1), an inmate sentenced to “a
maximum term of life imprisonment” for “first or second degree murder” may
be released on parole for “the remainder of the inmate’s life.”5 And if the
inmate violates any conditions of the lifetime parole imposed under section
3000.1, then he “shall be remanded to the custody of” CDCR “for the purpose
of future parole consideration.” (§ 3000.08, subd. (h).)6 In 2020, however, the
Legislature “passed Senate Bill No. 118 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) . . ., which
implemented section 3000.01.” (Reed, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.)
Section 3000.01 applies to inmates “who are subject to supervision under
section 3000.08 and were released from state prison on or after July 1, 2020”
5 Section 3000.1, subdivision (a)(1), states: “In the case of any inmate
sentenced under Section 1168 for any offense of first or second degree murder
with a maximum term of life imprisonment, the period of parole, if parole is
granted, shall be the remainder of the inmate’s life.”
6 Section 3000.08, subdivision (h), states: “Notwithstanding any other
law, if Section 3000.1 or paragraph (4) of subdivision (b) of Section 3000
applies to a person who is on parole and the court determines that the person
has committed a violation of law or violated his or her conditions of parole,
the person on parole shall be remanded to the custody of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation and the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole
Hearings for the purpose of future parole consideration.”
5
and “limits parole terms to three years for inmates serving a life sentence.”7
(Reed, at p. 52.)
In reconciling these statutory provisions, the Court of Appeal in Reed
concluded that sections 3000.1 and 3000.08, subdivision (h), no longer apply
to parolees released on or after July 1, 2020. (Reed, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 53–54.) As a result, after June 30, 2020, an inmate serving a life
sentence for murder may only be released subject to a parole term of three
years. (Id. at pp. 52–53.) And if that inmate violates the conditions of his
parole, he may no longer be punished under section 3000.08, subdivision (h).
Instead, he “may be punished only as provided in [section 3000.08,]
subdivisions (f) and (g) for any parole violation . . . .” (Reed, at pp. 54–55.)
Those subdivisions, in turn, give the trial court “discretion to modify or
revoke parole, including the authority to sentence the person to county jail for
up to 180 days, or refer the person to a reentry court or other evidence-based
program.”8 (Id. at p. 51.)
Because he was released on lifetime parole before July 1, 2020, Busch
acknowledges that section 3000.01 does not apply to him. Nonetheless, he
7 Section 3000.01, subdivision (b), states in relevant part: “Except as
provided in subdivision (d) and notwithstanding any other law, persons
described in subdivision (a) shall serve a parole term as follows: [¶] . . . [¶] (2)
Any inmate sentenced to a life term shall be released on parole for a period of
three years. . . .”
8 Section 3000.08, subdivision (f) states in relevant part: “Upon a
finding that the person has violated the conditions of parole, the court shall
have authority to do any of the following: [¶] (1) Return the person to parole
supervision with modifications of conditions, if appropriate, including a
period of incarceration in a county jail. [¶] (2) Revoke parole and order the
person to confinement in a county jail. [¶] (3) Refer the person to a reentry
court pursuant to Section 3015 or other evidence-based program in the court’s
discretion.” Subdivision (g) then establishes that: “Confinement pursuant to
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (f) shall not exceed a period of 180 days
in a county jail.”
6
contends that remanding him to CDCR pursuant to section 3000.08,
subdivision (h), violates equal protection principles because an inmate
serving the same life sentence for committing the same crime would be
eligible for punishments other than mandatory remand to CDCR solely
because he was released on parole after June 30, 2020. He further contends
that the Court of Appeal in People v. Batten (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 908
(Batten) erred in rejecting this very same contention. We, however, agree
with Batten and reject Busch’s equal protection challenge.9
“When a party challenges a law ‘drawing distinctions between
identifiable groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the distinctions
drawn are inconsistent with equal protection, . . . [t]he only pertinent inquiry
is whether the challenged difference in treatment is adequately justified
under the applicable standard of review.’ ” (Batten, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 912–913.) At a minimum, that unequal treatment “ ‘ “must be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” ’ ” (People v.
Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 122 (Williams).) But “[i]f the unequal
treatment involves a suspect class or fundamental right, then we apply strict
scrutiny and ‘ “ ‘the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has
a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn
by the law are necessary to further its purpose.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
In rejecting an equal protection challenge to the remand of a lifetime
parolee to CDCR under section 3000.08, subdivision (h), after July 1, 2020,
the Court of Appeal in Batten concluded that rational basis review, rather
9 Because Busch raises a facial constitutional challenge, we find no
forfeiture even though he failed to raise it below. (See People v. Gonzalez
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 960, 975 [“ ‘the forfeiture rule does not extend to facial
constitutional challenges presenting pure questions of law that can be
resolved without referring to the particular sentencing record developed
below’ ”].)
7
than strict scrutiny, applied because the challenge did not implicate a
“fundamental interest in personal liberty.”10 (Batten, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th
at p. 913.) Distinguishing People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236 (Olivas), the
court held that a “ ‘defendant . . . “does not have a fundamental interest in a
specific term of imprisonment or in the designation a particular crime
receives.” ’ ” (Batten, at p. 913.)
The Court of Appeal in Batten then found a “rational reason” for
distinguishing between parolees released before and after July 1, 2020.
(Batten, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 914.) Because the Board of Parole
Hearings (Board) offers parole “in part based on conditions of treatment or
control on parole,” the Board could “determine that some inmates would only
be suitable for parole if subject to the heavy consequence of a mandatory
remand to CDCR custody for a parole violation.” (Ibid.) Thus, the
“Legislature could reasonably decide that upending these Board
considerations by . . . releasing [inmates] from the mandatory consequences
for a parole violation would be unwise, and . . . therefore rationally choose to
make section 3000.01 operate prospectively only.” (Id. at pp. 914–915.)
Busch contends that Batten erred by declining to follow Olivas and
apply strict scrutiny. According to Busch, “disparate treatment of individuals
convicted of the same crime and sentenced to the same punishment, but with
varying consequences for a parole revocation based entirely on their date of
parole,” implicates the same fundamental liberty interest implicated in
Olivas and must therefore be subject to strict scrutiny. But Olivas—which
found that disparate punishments given to a juvenile between the age of 16
and 21 who was convicted of a crime as an adult and an adult convicted of
that same crime violated equal protection principles—“has been limited by
10 The parties agree that there is no suspect class involved here.
8
subsequent decisional law.” (In re Thai (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 1, 20.) As
explained by our high court, Olivas only requires strict scrutiny when “the
boundaries between the adult and juvenile criminal justice systems” are not
“maintained,” such as when “an individual face[s] a longer period of
confinement if treated as a juvenile rather than as an adult.” (People v.
Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 837–838.) Otherwise, the Legislature has
broad discretion in “ ‘defining crimes and specifying punishment.’ ”
(Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 123.) And “[w]here, as here, the question
involves the possible retroactive application of a more beneficial sentencing
scheme, defendant has no fundamental liberty interest at stake.” (People v.
Lynch (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 353, 359 (Lynch).)
Busch also contends that the rationale proffered in Batten to justify the
unequal treatment of parolees sentenced to life imprisonment for murder who
were released on parole before July 1, 2020 cannot satisfy rational basis
review. In support, he claims that he is similarly situated to the defendant in
Reed, who was not remanded to CDCR even though he was sentenced to life
in prison for murder, was initially paroled for life before July 1, 2020, and
committed a parole violation after June 30, 2020. But unlike Busch, the
defendant in Reed was also released on parole a second time after June 30,
2020. (Reed, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 47.) Thus, section 3000.01 did
apply to the defendant in Reed. (Reed, at p. 54.) By contrast, section 3000.01
does not apply to Busch because he was never released on parole after June
30, 2020.
We therefore reject Busch’s equal protection challenge. In doing so, we
not only follow Batten, we also follow the many cases holding that a
“ ‘reduction of sentences only prospectively from the date a new sentencing
statute takes effect is not a denial of equal protection.’ ” (People v. Floyd
9
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 189; see also, e.g., Lynch, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p.
359 [“The right to equal protection of the law generally does not prevent the
state from setting a starting point for a change in the law”].)
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim
Busch contends that there is insufficient evidence that he made
criminal threats in violation of the conditions of his parole. We disagree.
We review an order revoking parole for abuse of discretion and the trial
court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Butcher (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318 [probation revocation]; People v. Shepherd (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1198 [“Parole revocation and probation revocation
after the imposition of a sentence are constitutionally indistinguishable”].)
“The substantial evidence standard ‘gives full play to the responsibility of the
trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,
and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’
[Citation.] . . . ‘Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable
suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive
province of the trial judge [in a court trial] . . . to determine the credibility of
a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends.’ ” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 202.)
Busch contends that the victim’s testimony was insufficient to establish
that Busch uttered any verbal threats because the victim’s understanding of
English was poor. (See § 422 [criminal threat must be conveyed by a
“statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic
communication device”]; People v. Gaines (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 91, 140
(Gaines) [section 422 requires “some words or sound”].) But the victim
testified that he understood English “a little.” And given the simplistic
nature of the verbal threats made by Busch, the trial court could reasonably
10
find the victim’s recitation of Busch’s words to be largely accurate and
credible. Finally, the court could reasonably infer that Busch uttered verbal
threats even if the victim understood only 10 percent of what Busch said
based on Busch’s threatening tone, facial expressions, gestures, and body
language at the time he spoke. (See Gaines, at p. 140 [“combination of words
and gestures may be sufficient” to establish a “criminal threat”].)
Accordingly, the victim’s testimony was more than sufficient to establish that
Busch made criminal threats in violation of the conditions of his parole.
(§ 422.)
C. Minute Order
The trial court’s minute order following Busch’s parole revocation
hearing on November 29, 2023 states: “Court finds that the defendant made
threatening statements to the victim and the victim was in fear. Court does
not find any criminal conduct other than the bumping of the car. Court does
find that it took place but cannot find if it was intentional.” (Italics added.)
Busch contends that the italicized language is misleading because it suggests
that he committed “criminal conduct” by “bumping the [victim’s] car” even
though the court found otherwise. At oral argument the People conceded that
the court did not find that Busch committed criminal assault but maintained
that the minute order is not misleading. We find that the italicized language
arguably suggests that Busch’s bumping of the victim’s car was “criminal
conduct.” To avoid any unnecessary confusion, we therefore order that the
italicized language in the minute order be corrected to state: “Court does not
find any other potentially criminal conduct other than the bumping of the
car.”
11
DISPOSITION
We order that the third sentence in the second to last paragraph of
page 2 of the minute order titled “Revocation—Parole—Minutes (Amended
on 10/6/2025 by Danielle Andre)” be replaced with the following sentence:
“Court does not find any other potentially criminal conduct other than the
bumping of the car.” In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
CHOU, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.
A171681/ P. v. Busch
12
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