CourtListener 10813735•In re Ca.V. CA2/1
Texto completo
Filed 3/23/26 In re Ca.V. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re CA.V. et al., B350331
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP00985)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Courtney Fisher, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
A.H. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s termination
of her parental rights to her sons Ca.V. (born 2019) and Ch.V.
(born 2021). The children’s father, Cl.V. (Father), is not a party
to this appeal. Mother claims the court abused its discretion
when it denied her request to have then six-year-old Ca. testify at
the Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing that
resulted in the termination of her parental rights. For the
reasons explained below, we disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As this appeal involves solely the denial of Mother’s request
to have Ca. provide live testimony at the section 366.26 hearing,2
we limit our summary of the factual and procedural background
accordingly. Mother’s appellate briefing focuses on the order
concerning Ca. and makes no argument as to how the alleged
error in excluding his testimony could have impacted the court’s
1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Mother’s briefing asserts the juvenile court relied on an
incorrect factor in assessing the parental-benefit exception to the
termination of her parental rights, but argues this point only in
the context of whether the court’s exclusion of Ca.’s testimony
was prejudicial and not as an independent ground for reversal.
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order regarding Ch. Accordingly, we focus on Ca. and deem any
challenge as to the order concerning Ch. abandoned. (In re S.C.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
A. Petition, Adjudication, and Disposition
On March 23, 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a section 300 petition
concerning Ca. and Ch., alleging they were at risk from the
parents’ domestic violence and substance abuse. At a combined
adjudication and disposition hearing on May 24, 2023, the
juvenile court sustained the petition, finding the parents’
domestic violence and substance abuse, and failure to protect the
children from both, placed Ca. and Ch. at substantial risk of
harm under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court removed
both children from parental custody and ordered monitored
visitation as well as family reunification services. The children
were later placed with paternal aunt.
B. Mother’s Visitation
When ordering monitored visitation, the court permitted
DCFS to liberalize Mother’s future visitation. After initial visits
went well, DCFS did so and Mother’s visits became unmonitored.
Mother thereafter rear-ended another vehicle in July 2024 with
the children in her car and them not being properly
seated/restrained. Mother denied smoking marijuana that day
but declined to submit to a drug test. During a visit in November
2024, Mother failed to return the children to paternal aunt and to
communicate about the children’s whereabouts. In January
2025, Ch. told his therapist that he saw Father hit Mother during
a visit. The therapist also noted Ca. was demonstrating
increased anxiety and sadness about visiting his parents.
3
Given these and other incidents, DCFS filed a section 388
petition in April 2025 requesting Mother’s visitation revert to
being monitored. Ca.’s counsel agreed, and asked the court to
order monitoring begin immediately pending the hearing on the
section 388 petition, after an incident on May 2, 2025 in which
law enforcement was called to paternal aunt’s home when Mother
refused to leave. The juvenile court granted these requests, and
Mother’s visits thereafter were monitored.
C. Ca.’s Reluctance to Visit Mother
When visits initially began, Ca. was happy and excited to
see Mother. That changed over time. In July 2024, Ca. told
DCFS that he liked residing with paternal aunt and felt safe with
her; in contrast, he said his parents were “ ‘mean’ ” and recalled
seeing Mother crying and apologizing to Father. Sometime
around January 2025, Ca. said that if he was asked he would say
he wanted to live with paternal aunt; Mother then yelled at him.
In February 2025, Ca.’s therapist reported that Ca. had increased
anxiety and sadness about visits with Mother, including more
nightmares and difficulty sleeping. Paternal aunt confirmed that
Ca. expressed concerns about visits with Mother and was
exhibiting physical symptoms of anxiety such as grinding his
teeth and biting his nails.
In late April 2025, Ca. began saying he did not want to visit
Mother. Mother responded to this with aggression. At one
scheduled visit that Ca. wished to skip, Mother expressed to the
DCFS monitor that she did not believe Ca. did not want to visit
and demanded that Ca. “tell me that to my face.” Ca. overheard
Mother’s statement and had a meltdown—he cried, shook, and
asked the monitor if Ca. was in trouble. At a visit Ca. did attend,
Mother launched a tirade of accusations against the DCFS
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monitor during the visit, blamed others for coaching Ca. not to
visit, and denied any responsibility despite her history of
explosive, insulting, and aggressive actions in front of the
children during visits. Mother then pressed Ca. to say he was
afraid of the DCFS monitor and not Mother. Ca. began to cry and
nodded he was afraid; when later speaking privately with DCFS,
Ca. continued to cry and say he was afraid but would not explain
why. At another visit, when the DCFS monitor attempted to end
a visit after Mother’s inappropriate behavior, Mother forcibly
pulled Ca. away and law enforcement had to be called to secure
Ca.’s release.
Ca. told paternal aunt, various DCFS social workers, and
his therapist that he no longer wanted to visit Mother. A last
minute information for the court, filed in June 2025, summarized
the situation: “Based on direct observations and reports from
caregivers and professionals, [Ca.] is currently displaying
behaviors most consistent with an anxious-ambivalent
attachment with [M]other, with some symptom[s] of fear,
anxiety, and disorganization based on his response. [Ca.]
exhibits a conflicting behavioral pattern in which he expresses a
strong reluctance to visit his mother, often stating he is scared
that she will become angry. When visits are mentioned, [Ca.]’s
demeanor noticeably shifts, he begins crying, becomes visibly
anxious, and emotionally shuts down. These consistent reactions
reflect a deep internal struggle and suggest an ambivalent desire
for connection paired with a fear of emotional consequences.”
Mother, for her part, claimed Ca. was saying that he
wanted to visit her all the time.
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D. Mother Indicates She Plans to Call Ca. to Testify and
the Court Orders a Bonding Study
Once a section 366.26 hearing was set, Mother’s counsel
indicated Mother might call Ca. to testify at that hearing
regarding the parental-benefit exception to the termination of
parental rights. Mother asserted that Ca.’s testimony was
necessary to explain why he stopped visiting Mother and to show
the bond between them. Ca.’s counsel consistently objected that
such testimony would subject Ca. to pressure from Mother and
traumatize him. Ca.’s counsel also objected that the testimony
was unnecessary because information was available from other
sources about why Ca. was not attending visits and about the
nature of Ca.’s bond with Mother. The court ordered counsel to
meet and confer on the issue of Ca.’s possible testimony pending
completion of a bonding study by Dr. Chuck Leeb, who the court
had appointed at Mother’s request to conduct such a study.
On October 1, 2025, Ca.’s therapist provided an update.
The therapist stated that although Ca. had improved somewhat,
he continued to exhibit symptoms of post-traumatic stress
(including crying, shutting down, yelling, and physical
aggression) when discussing past experiences with Mother, and
that these symptoms impacted Ca.’s daily functioning. Ca.’s
ability to discuss visits with Mother had improved but his
tolerance was low; he would become anxious and change the
subject or shut down after brief engagement. The therapist
opined that Ca. having to “testify[] in court may exacerbate his
current symptoms leading to increased functional impairments
due to the pressure and fear he may experience having to speak
on topics that are emotionally triggering for him, especially if he
is being asked to speak in front of his parents.”
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That same day, October 1, 2025, Dr. Leeb filed his bonding
study with the court. Dr. Leeb based his opinions on observing a
visit between Ca. and Mother, speaking with Mother and with
two social workers that monitored Mother’s visits, and reviewing
available DCFS reports. Dr. Leeb opined that the bond between
Mother and Ca. was minimal. Their interaction was similar to
one between a child and an older acquaintance, where the
acquaintance provided snacks and a mobile phone for games.
Dr. Leeb also opined that Mother’s behavior was consistent with
oppositional defiant disorder and intermittent explosive disorder,
and that Mother met some criteria for narcissistic personality
disorder.
DCFS updated the court about visitation between
August 20 and October 1, 2025. Of the 13 available visits during
that time,3 Mother cancelled or failed to show up for four. DCFS
terminated a fifth visit on October 1, 2025, when Mother arrived
smelling like marijuana; security officers eventually had to
intervene to remove Mother from the visitation room. Ca. was
present during only two of the visits.
E. Section 366.26 Hearing
The court held the section 366.26 permanency planning
hearing on November 5, 2025. The day before, at a pre-hearing
status conference, Mother’s counsel reiterated his intent to call
Ca. to testify. Counsel proffered that Mother wanted to have Ca.
testify about his visits with Mother and statements Ca.
purportedly made to Mother “that he wants to be with her and
not be adopted.” Counsel for Ca. continued to object and moved
3 One additional scheduled visit did not occur because the
monitor was unavailable.
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to exclude Ca. from testifying. Ca.’s counsel referred to the letter
from Ca.’s therapist indicating the concerns with having Ca.
testify, said there was little probative value in what Mother
intended to elicit from the six-year-old child, and said what
Mother was proposing “is that [Ca.] is going to be forced to sit in
the courtroom and have his mother confront him about why he’s
not wanting to have visits with her or why those visits aren’t
consistent, and that that is going to be incredibly damaging to
[Ca.]” In response, Mother’s counsel asked the court to consider
having Ca. testify in chambers.
The court indicated it would rule on whether Ca. would
testify after hearing testimony from Mother, who was the only
other witness Mother’s counsel intended to call at the section
366.26 hearing.
1. Mother’s Testimony
Mother testified that during the last two or three visits,
both children said how much they missed her; at the end of visits,
the children cried and did not want to leave. Mother believed Ca.
had missed recent visits only because of his school schedule, and
said that he had never refused visitation with her. Mother said
Ca. repeatedly expressed to her that he wanted to return to
Mother’s home. Mother claimed to be familiar with the evidence
in DCFS’s reports, but said she was unaware of the many
statements in those reports that Ca. did not want to visit with
her. She also denied any knowledge that Ca.’s therapist was
concerned about Ca.’s emotional response when the topic of
visitation was mentioned.
Mother disparaged Dr. Leeb’s work, saying that he only
observed her visit with the children for about 30 minutes and
missed important interaction between her and the children.
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Mother also denied that Dr. Leeb asked her any questions about
her mental health.
2. Court Ruling Regarding Ca.’s Testimony
After Mother testified, the court granted Ca.’s request to
preclude him from testifying. The court noted that Mother was
proffering that Ca. would testify his recent visits with Mother
“have been of a more positive nature” than his prior visits,
something about which Mother had already testified. The court
stated that even if Ca. confirmed this was true, the totality of the
evidence showed the visits “were not of the quality or consistency
that would reach the level of the parental bond.” It further held
that “the probative value of having [Ca.] testify to this very, very
narrow issue is not sufficient to outweigh the psychological harm,
which was described by the therapist.”
3. Court Order Terminating Mother’s Parental Rights
In determining whether to terminate Mother’s parental
rights, the juvenile court assessed the parental-benefit exception
set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Our Supreme
Court has articulated “three elements the parent must prove to
establish the exception: (1) regular visitation and contact, and
(2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the
child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
631, italics omitted.)
The court found Mother had established “some regularity”
and “some consistency” “over the long term” in her visitation with
the children. It concluded Mother had not shown her
relationship with Ca. was a parental one that would benefit the
child, but was “more one of a friendly type” “that was minimal in
terms of bonding.” The court found that terminating Ca.’s
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relationship with Mother would not be detrimental and that “the
benefits of permanency for [Ca. and Ch.], particularly given the
length of their time in the care of the [paternal aunt], would
balance against detriment” and “far outweigh any harm” from
terminating Mother’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
When conducting a permanency planning hearing, “the
court shall consider the wishes of the child and shall act in the
best interests of the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (h)(1).) The child
need not be present for the hearing unless that is what the child
or the child’s counsel wants, or the court orders it. (§ 366.26,
subd. (h)(2).) “[P]arents in a dependency proceeding do have a
right to call and examine witnesses” including through the
“issuance of process to compel attendance of witnesses.” (In re
Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1085.) But “it is within
the juvenile court’s discretion to exclude the testimony of a child
[from a section 366.26 hearing] in order to avoid psychological
harm to the child, even though that testimony is relevant, the
child is competent to testify, and the child is both practically and
legally ‘available’ to testify.” (Id. at p. 1088.) The court has the
power to exclude such testimony where “the child’s desires and
wishes can be directly presented without live testimony, where
the issues to be resolved would not be materially affected by the
child’s testimony, and where it is shown that the child would be
psychologically damaged by being required to testify.” (Id. at
p. 1089.)
“We review the exclusion of a child’s testimony to avoid
psychological harm to the child for an abuse of discretion. (See
[In re] Jennifer J., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.) To the
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extent [Mother] challenges the factual findings underlying the
juvenile court’s ruling, our review is for substantial evidence, and
to the extent [her] claims raise questions of law, our review is de
novo.” (In re Daniela G. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1090.)
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Granting Ca.’s Motion to Exclude Himself from
Testifying
The record discloses substantial evidence on all three
elements of the test set forth in In re Jennifer J., supra, 8
Cal.App.4th at page 1089, supporting the exclusion of Ca.’s
testimony from the section 366.26 hearing. We therefore find no
abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to exclude Ca. from
testifying at the section 366.26 hearing.
First, Ca.’s desires and wishes could be (and were)
presented without live testimony from him. There was evidence
Ca. told his caretaker (paternal aunt), DCFS social workers, and
his therapist that he did not want to be with Mother. Ca.
informed DCFS he preferred to remain with paternal aunt, and
that he felt safe, secure, and happy in her care. Mother testified
without objection that Ca. told her that he wanted to return home
to Mother. The court had all the necessary information to weigh
Ca.’s preferences without subjecting Ca. to testifying directly.
Second, Ca.’s potential testimony did not materially affect
the issues to be resolved. Mother proffered that Ca. would testify
positively about their recent visits. The court found that even if
Ca. credibly testified as Mother expected about those recent
visits, that testimony would be insufficient to carry Mother’s
burden of proof as to the parental-benefit exception in light of a
wealth of other record evidence (including from the visitation
monitors and Dr. Leeb’s bonding study) about their overall
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visitation and lack of a bond. This conclusion was reasonable,
particularly where the child at issue was six years old, and
demonstrates the exclusion of Ca.’s testimony did not affect the
result of the section 366.26 hearing.
Finally, there was evidence (which the juvenile court
credited) that Ca. would be psychologically damaged by being
required to testify, regardless of whether that testimony was in
court or in chambers. Ca.’s therapist opined to her concerns
about the trauma to Ca. from having to testify. There was also
evidence from other sources that discussing the topic of visitation
with Mother even in a safe space such as therapy was traumatic
for Ca., and resulted in things such as nightmares, lack of sleep,
grinding of teeth, and other symptoms.
DISPOSITION
The orders terminating Mother’s parental rights are
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. M. KIM, J.
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