CourtListener 10813730•People v. Grimes CA2/4
Texto completo
Filed 3/23/26 P. v. Grimes CA2/4
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B336757
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA033697)
v.
GERALD RICHARD GRIMES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard H. Kirschner, Judge. Remanded
with instructions.
Milena N. Blake, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Ana R. Duarte, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In 2000, a jury found Gerald Grimes guilty of inflicting
corporal injury on a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a), count 1), and
making terrorist threats (former § 422, count 4). (People v.
Grimes (Feb. 28, 2001, B140435) [nonpub. opn.].) The court
sentenced Grimes to concurrent terms of 26 years to life on count
1 and 39 years to life on count 4; the sentences included
enhancements under sections 667, subdivision (a)(1); 667.5,
subdivision (b); and 12022, subdivision (b)(1). (Ibid.)
In 2022, Grimes petitioned for resentencing under former
section 1171.1, later renumbered as section 1172.75, which
invalidated certain sentence enhancements based on prior
convictions. Grimes also submitted evidence of his rehabilitation
and disciplinary infractions while in prison. The People opposed
Grimes’s motion.
After several continuances and additional briefing by the
parties, the court resentenced Grimes on February 14, 2024. The
court dismissed the enhancements and denied Grimes’s Romero2
motion. The court resentenced Grimes to 25 years to life on count
1 as a third strike, and a concurrent term of 25 years to life on
count 4. Grimes timely appealed.
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural
background because our opinion is unpublished and the parties
are familiar with the facts of the case and its procedural history.
(People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished
opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial court’s decision
“does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 497.
2
Grimes asserts that that the trial court erred in
resentencing him on count 1. He contends that following the
Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by
voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)) (Reform Act), corporal injury of
a spouse, which under the circumstances was not a serious or
violent felony under the Penal Code, should not be sentenced as a
strike offense. The People concede this point under the
circumstances of this case.
In an opinion filed June 17, 2025, a different panel of this
division followed published case law holding that resentencing to
apply Reform Act changes was not authorized in the context of
resentencing under section 1172.75. (People v. Grimes (June 17,
2025, B336757) [nonpub. opn.].) Grimes petitioned our Supreme
Court for review. The Supreme Court granted review and
deferred the matter; it later transferred this case to us with
instructions to vacate our opinion and reconsider the cause in
light of People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838
(Guevara).
Guevara requires us to remand for a new resentencing
hearing. Guevera held that the Reform Act and section 1172.75
may be interpreted to “operate harmoniously, [so that] the
revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act may constitutionally
apply at a resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75.” (Guevara,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 850.) The court held that “section
1172.75, when applied to Third Strike defendants seeking relief
from their indeterminate terms under the Reform Act’s
ameliorative provisions, incorporates the substantive
requirements of” the Reform Act, including the resentencing
provisions in section 1170.126. (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p.
861.) The court stated that for purposes of resentencing, section
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1172.75 “incorporate[s] section 1170.126’s discretionary public
safety override.” (Id. at p. 862; see § 1170.126, subd. (f) [a trial
court shall resentence an eligible defendant “unless the court, in
its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”].) Thus, a
petitioner such as Grimes who is being resentenced under section
1172.75 “is entitled to a full resentencing provided that he can
satisfy the substantive eligibility criteria established in section
1170.126 to obtain resentencing pursuant to the revised penalty
provisions of the Reform Act.” (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p.
877.)
The Supreme Court remanded the matter in Guevara with
the following instructions: “If the superior court determines that
resentencing [Guevara] pursuant to the revised penalty
provisions of the Reform Act would ‘pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety,’ the court shall reimpose an
indeterminate term.[ ] (§ 1170.126, subds. (f)-(g).) If the superior
court does not determine that resentencing [Guevara] would ‘pose
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,’ and [Guevara] is
otherwise eligible under the Reform Act, the court shall
resentence [Guevara] pursuant to the revised penalty provisions
of the Reform Act.[ ] (§§ 1170.126, subds. (f)-(g), 1170.12, subd.
(c)(1), (2)(C), 1172.75, subd. (c).)” (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at
p. 878.) A similar result is required here.
Because we remand for resentencing, Grimes’s additional
appellate claims of error regarding his sentence are moot and we
do not address them. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857,
893 [“when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand
for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is
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appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing
discretion in light of the changed circumstances’”].)
DISPOSITION
We remand the case to the trial court with directions to
vacate the February 2024 sentence, and reconsider Grimes’s
request for resentencing under the guidance of Guevara.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, ACTING P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
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