CourtListener 10813725•People v. Simpson CA3
Texto completo
Filed 3/23/26 P. v. Simpson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----
THE PEOPLE, C102041
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. 23F5537,
24F1817)
v.
MATTHEW RAY SIMPSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
After the trial court denied his petition for mental health diversion under Penal
Code section 1001.36 (statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated), defendant Matthew Ray Simpson pleaded guilty to numerous
narcotics and firearm offenses in two criminal matters, and the court sentenced him to an
aggregate term of 21 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in finding him ineligible
for mental health diversion; (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to object when, after he waived a preliminary hearing, the prosecution added a
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firearm enhancement that was not originally alleged in the complaint; (3) the court erred
by accepting his guilty plea to a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11357,
subdivision (b) based on conduct that is not criminal under the statute; and (4) the court
should have stayed punishment on several counts and enhancements under section 654.
We agree the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in ruling on his
petition, and substantial evidence does not support its ineligibility finding. We also agree
the court erred by accepting a guilty to plea to conduct that is not criminal. We reverse
defendant’s possession of marijuana conviction, conditionally vacate the remainder of
defendant’s guilty pleas, conditionally reverse the judgment, and remand the matter for
further proceedings consistent with section 1001.36 and this opinion. We do not reach
defendant’s remaining appellate claims.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Case No. 23F5537
According to the police report to which defendant stipulated as the factual basis
for his plea, in July 2023 Anderson police officers served a search warrant at a parcel of
land with multiple residences. Officers detained several individuals found in the various
residences, including defendant. In a bedroom that contained defendant’s belongings,
officers located approximately 216 grams of methamphetamine, an operable digital scale,
Ziploc style plastic baggies, and methamphetamine water bongs. A safe in the bedroom
contained 43.9 grams of fentanyl, $2,000 in currency, and two handguns—a non-
serialized Glock style “P80” handgun with an empty magazine and a threaded barrel, and
a Glock 9-millimeter 43X that was reported stolen from Oregon. Officers arrested
defendant.
During their investigation, officers interviewed a woman who owned and lived in
the residence where defendant was found; she told police she did not want defendant
living there anymore due to frequent foot traffic around her property. A neighbor said she
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saw at least five or six people a day, who appeared to be under the influence, visiting
defendant’s residence.
Following his arrest, defendant and a codefendant were jointly charged in a
complaint in Shasta County case No. 23F5537 with various drug and firearm offenses.
After defendant waived a preliminary hearing, the prosecution filed an information
against defendant alone (with renumbered counts) charging him with possession of
fentanyl for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351, count 1); maintaining a place for selling
or using a controlled substance (id., § 11366, count 2); possession of methamphetamine
for sale (id., § 11378, count 3 [formerly count 4 in the complaint]); possession of an
assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a), count 4 [semi-automatic pistol with a threaded
barrel]); unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a), count 5);
felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a), count 6 [Glock .9 millimeter 43X]);
possession of a controlled substance while armed with a firearm (a Glock .9 millimeter
43X) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a), count 7); and misdemeanor possession
of an injection/ingestion device (id., § 11364, subd. (a), count 8).
The information alleged a principal was armed with a firearm (a semi-automatic
pistol with a threaded barrel) (§ 12022, subd. (a)(2)) as to count 1 (possession of fentanyl
for sale) and count 2 (maintaining a place for selling or using a controlled substance),
which had previously been alleged in the complaint. The information also added the
same arming enhancement to count 3 (possession of methamphetamine for sale), which
had not been alleged in the complaint. One factor in aggravation was alleged. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2) [prior convictions increasing in seriousness].)
Defendant was released on bond. He later filed a petition for mental health
diversion under section 1001.36, which the People opposed because he provided no
evidence that he had been diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder. Defendant
subsequently withdrew the petition.
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Case No. 24F1817
On March 13, 2024, Anderson police officers stopped a car defendant was driving
after he drove through a crosswalk as a pedestrian crossed. A subsequent vehicle search
revealed about one ounce of methamphetamine in the center console, which defendant
admitted he possessed for sale. Officers later searched two storage units linked to
defendant and recovered additional methamphetamine in various quantities (totaling 4.61
ounces plus an additional 1.9 grams). They also located 7.6 grams of psilocybin
mushrooms, 11 pounds of marijuana, 20-30 items of drug paraphernalia, a pay/owe
notebook with records, and 12 firearms, including two shotguns and one short-barreled
shotgun, three rifles, an assault rifle, two revolvers, and three handguns. Thousands of
rounds of ammunition were recovered, and officers also seized stolen property, license
plates, and nearly $2,800 in cash.
Defendant was charged in Shasta County case No. 24F1817 with possession of
methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378, count 1); sale/offer to
sell/transportation of methamphetamine (id., § 11379, subd. (a), count 2); three counts of
being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a), count 3 [three shot guns],
count 7 [five handguns], count 8 [four rifles]); unlawful possession of ammunition by a
felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1), count 4); possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd.
(a), count 5); possession of a short-barreled rifle or shotgun (§ 33215, count 6);
misdemeanor possession of an injection/ingestion device (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364,
subd. (a), count 9); misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (id., § 11377, subd.
(a), count 10); misdemeanor “possession of marijuana 28.5 grams or less” (id., § 11357,
subd. (b), count 11); misdemeanor sale/offer to sell/transportation of cannabis (id.,
§ 11360, subd. (a)(2), count 12); and misdemeanor receiving stolen property not
exceeding $950 in value (§ 496, subd. (a), count 13).
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The complaint alleged two aggravating factors for counts 1 through 4 and counts 6
through 9. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1) [violent conduct indicating a serious
danger to society], (b)(2) [prior convictions numerous or of increasing seriousness].) An
on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)) was also added to the complaint before
defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the charges.
In April 2024, defendant filed an amended petition for mental health diversion in
case No. 24F1817, which the trial court denied at a hearing four days later. The amended
diversion petition and the ruling denying it are discussed more fully below.
Defendant’s Plea and Sentence
After the trial court denied his amended diversion petition, defendant agreed to an
open plea in both cases.1 In case No. 23F5537, defendant pleaded guilty to all eight
counts, admitted the section 12022, subdivision (a)(2) firearm enhancements attached to
counts 1, 2, and 3, and admitted the alleged aggravating factor (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(b)(2)) in exchange for a potential maximum term of 13 years 10 months in prison.
In case No. 24F1817, defendant pleaded guilty to all 13 counts, admitted the on-bail
enhancement (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)), and admitted the two factors in aggravation in
exchange for a potential maximum term of 11 years, two months in prison.
Defendant filed a sentencing memorandum asking the trial court to grant him
probation to attend a residential treatment program that had accepted him for treatment.
According to defendant, his heavy drug addiction over the years caused his life to spiral,
making him unemployable and leading him to sell drugs to earn income to finance his
drug habits. He traded or sold methamphetamine in exchange for weapons from fellow
1 Defendant also pleaded guilty to various charges in two misdemeanor cases (case
Nos. 24M98 and 24M1821). The court later sentenced defendant to credit for time
served in both matters, which are not at issue on appeal.
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addicts, which he then traded for more methamphetamine. The People asked the court to
deny probation and impose a 21-year prison sentence.
At the sentencing hearing in August 2024, the trial court found defendant was not
eligible for probation absent unusual circumstances, and there were no unusual
circumstances. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate determinate term of 21
years in prison.
In case No. 23F5537, the court selected count 1 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351) as
the principal term and imposed the four-year “aggravated term,” plus an additional three
years for the associated arming enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(2)). For counts 2
through 7, as well as the arming enhancements attached to counts 2 and 3, the court
imposed consecutive one-third the midterm sentences; the court awarded credit for time
served for count 8 (a misdemeanor).
In case No. 24F1817, the court imposed consecutive sentences of one-third the
midterm each on counts 1 through 8, two years for the on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1,
subd. (b)), and credit for time served for each of the remaining misdemeanors (counts 9
through 13).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and obtained a certificate of probable
cause.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant’s Amended Petition for Mental Health Diversion
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his amended
petition for mental health diversion because it misapplied the law, and substantial
evidence does not support its ruling. We agree.
Defendant filed an amended diversion petition in April 2024. The petition alleged
defendant was not charged with any disqualifying offenses and asserted he was prima
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facie eligible for relief under section 1001.36. “[B]ased on the presumption imposed by
Penal Code § 1001.36(b)(2)” and an attached “psychological evaluation,” defendant
argued there was evidence that his mental disorders were a significant factor in
committing the alleged offenses.
Defendant submitted documentation from Laura McArdle, a substance use
disorder registered counselor with Empire Recovery Center, stating he had been assessed
by the agency on February 29, 2024, and had been diagnosed with severe amphetamine
use and cannabis use disorders. According to McArdle, defendant attended three
recovery groups at Empire Outpatient and two community recovery groups per week; he
had been “steady and dedicated to his recovery” during that time. While receiving
treatment, defendant indicated he needed a higher level of care and asked to be referred to
the agency’s residential program. McArdle recommended that defendant “receive 90
days of residential treatment due to his diagnoses of severe methamphetamine and
cannabis use disorder.” Defendant also submitted a proposed treatment plan from Empire
Recovery that included the recommended 90 days of residential treatment, plus medical
evaluations, doctor’s appointments, and participation in various educational groups.
Defendant waived his speedy trial rights, consented to treatment, and stated he was
willing to comply with the treatment program, including any substance abuse or other
psychological or psychiatric treatment the court might order. He further asserted he did
not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public of committing a super strike.
The trial court considered the amended petition at a hearing four days later.
Although the court offered to continue the hearing to allow the People to oppose the
petition in writing, the People declined and instead elected to proceed with argument.
Defense counsel asserted defendant was eligible and suitable for diversion, and did
not pose an unreasonable risk of danger if treated in the community. In counsel’s view, a
substance use disorder registered counselor (like McArdle) had sufficient expertise and
abilities regarding substance abuse to make a diagnosis under section 1001.36.
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Regarding whether there was a sufficient nexus to show the diagnosed mental health
disorders were a significant factor in committing the offenses, counsel argued, “there is a
clear connection between his use disorder and him using and possessing controlled
substances” and that “it is generally very common that people who possess controlled
substances have in their possession a firearm” because a drug dealer could not necessarily
call police if someone stole his or her drug stash.
The People argued the petition was “facially deficient” because a substance abuse
counselor was not qualified to render a diagnosis under section 1001.36. Rather, the
statute required a diagnosis from “a medical provider with the legal qualifications to
provide a diagnosis [under the DSM-V] such as a psychologist or psychiatrist or medical
doctor.” The People also disagreed that possession of a firearm was necessarily an
“element of a substance abuse disorder” but conceded such was an “evidentiary issue and
that can be raised by the People, for example, by calling their expert who provides an
appropriate diagnosis to the stand.”
Following argument, the trial court made several observations before denying the
petition. The trial court initially commented that whether a substance abuse counselor
was qualified to give a diagnosis under the diversion statute was “a little bit of a
question,” although it acknowledged that section 1001.36 “pretty broad[ly]” defined a
qualified “mental health professional.” It then stated it was somewhat unclear if, and
when, the substance abuse counselor had diagnosed defendant with the substance use
disorders, if defendant had self-reported the diagnoses, or if someone else diagnosed
defendant with the disorders. Without resolving these questions, however, the court
turned to its main concern—a perceived lack of connection or nexus between the charged
offenses and defendant’s substance use orders.
After noting it was “a little surprised” that the People did not focus on nexus, the
court stated it did not understand how there is a “clear connection as the defense has
indicated to the use and possession and particularly possession for sale of controlled
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substances to addiction.” In the court’s view, “[t]he level of sophistication that would be
required to determine how and where to acquire a controlled substance, to process it for
the purpose of sale, to distribute it in a manner that would be sellable, to track that sale
and to do all of that within a profitable and effective way and avoid detention from law
enforcement is something that is not an unconscious act as a result of being addicted to a
controlled substance. That is something that takes planning and sophistication and
premeditation, something that is not just an involuntary act,” especially considering
defendant possessed more than one controlled substance and acquired and maintained
numerous different assault weapons or firearms.
The court continued: “this isn’t just an addict that possesses for his own purposes
and own use one controlled substance, that is different, that is [section] 1000 diversion.
This is mental health diversion. And, I don’t think in any way shape or form this is what
the [L]egislature intended mental health diversion to be.” According to the court, if it
were “to stretch this into a mental health diversion, then . . . 80 to 90 percent of the cases
that run through each of the two felony home courts in this county every person would
qualify for mental health diversion because . . . controlled substances in some way enter
into or relate to a lot of felony cases.”
The court recognized that section 1001.36 required it “to at least presume or find
that there is some sort of nexus here” unless clear and convincing evidence showed
otherwise, but found, “for common sense reasons,” that the presumption was rebutted.
The court reasoned that “methamphetamine addiction use is [not] a common sense causal
factor to all of these things where we talk about possession for sale.” The court thus
denied the petition.
Mental Health Diversion under Section 1001.36
Section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial diversion for criminal defendants suffering
from certain recognized mental disorders. (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
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1138, 1147.) To qualify, criminal defendants must show they are both “eligible” and
“suitable” for the program. (§ 1001.36, subds. (a), (b).)
A defendant accused of a qualifying offense is eligible for mental health diversion
if, within the last five years, a qualified mental health expert has diagnosed the defendant
with a qualifying mental health disorder that was a significant factor in the commission of
the charged offense. (§1001.36, subds. (b), (f).) A qualifying diagnosis creates a
rebuttable presumption that the disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
offense, which may only be overcome if “there is clear and convincing evidence that [the
disorder] was not a motivating factor, casual factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(2); Sarmiento v. Superior
Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891.) For purposes of the diversion statute, a
“ ‘qualified mental health expert’ ” includes, but is not limited to, “a psychiatrist,
psychologist, . . . or a person whose knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
qualifies them as an expert.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(2).)
If a defendant satisfies the statutory eligibility criteria, the court must then
consider whether he or she is suitable for diversion. All four suitability factors must be
met. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) These include: (1) a qualified mental health expert has
opined that the defendant’s symptoms would respond to mental health treatment; (2) the
defendant consents to diversion and waives his or her speedy trial rights; (3) the
defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and (4) the
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
section 1170.18, if treated in the community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).)
We review a trial court’s order denying mental health diversion for abuse of
discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Moine (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449.) “ ‘When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved
by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the
record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
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have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ ” (Lacour v. Superior Court (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401 (Lacour).)
“A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by
applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied
factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Moine, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.) We presume a trial court’s order is correct and indulge all
intendments and reasonable inferences to support it. (People v. Giordano (2007)
42 Cal.4th 644, 666.) Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume a trial court knew and
applied the law. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.)
Analysis
We begin by noting that although the trial court found defendant was ineligible for
relief, it never reached the issue of his suitability for diversion. In doing so, the record
shows the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standards to its eligibility decision.
While the trial court initially questioned whether defendant had satisfied the first
eligibility requirement—a timely diagnosis from a qualified mental health expert—the
court never expressly found defendant had not done so and, as far as we can tell, did not
deny the petition on this basis. By proceeding to the second eligibility requirement—
whether there was a causal connection between the diagnoses and the alleged offenses—
the trial court arguably found the proffered diagnosis sufficient under the circumstances.
Despite the People’s argument to the contrary, substantial evidence supports this implied
finding.
Here, the letter and proposed treatment plan defendant submitted from the
substance use disorder registered counselor showed Community Behavioral Health had
referred him to the counselor’s agency (Empire Recovery) where he had been assessed in
February 2024 with two qualifying mental health disorders (severe methamphetamine
and cannabis use disorder), within five years of both the charged offenses and when the
court considered the petition.
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As the court itself recognized, section 1001.36 defines a “qualified mental health
expert” broadly. (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(2).) Unlike the People asserted below, the statute’s
plain language does not limit a qualified mental health expert to a psychiatrist,
psychologist, or other medical doctor. (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141
[appellate court interprets a statute to effectuate the law’s purpose, applying a plain and
commonsense meaning to the statute’s text].) Instead, the definition applies to anyone
“whose knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education qualifies them as an expert.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(2).) Defendant correctly notes that a substance use disorder
registered counselor must complete hundreds of hours of classroom education and
supervised training regarding addiction counseling, at least over 2,000 hours of work
providing counseling services in an alcohol or drug program, and must pass an
examination confirming their skill and ability. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, § 13040, subds.
(a)-(d).) Under these circumstances, a substance abuse disorder registered counselor
possesses the knowledge, skill, experience, training and education to make a substance
use disorder diagnosis under the statute.
When assessing defendant, the substance abuse counselor could rely on an
examination of defendant, his medical records, arrest reports, “or any other relevant
evidence.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) Here, the counselor noted defendant reported a 25-
year history of daily methamphetamine use and a 35-year history of daily cannabis use,
and these addictions “caused negative consequences in his life.” This self-reported
history of addiction was relevant to diagnosing defendant with substance use disorders.
While the counselor’s letter and treatment plan might have been more artfully phrased,
the evidence was sufficient to show a qualified mental health expert timely diagnosed
defendant with two qualifying mental disorders.
The problem with the trial court’s ruling lies in its application of the second
eligibility requirement concerning the presumed nexus between the qualifying diagnosis
and the offenses. As previously noted, to ensure section 1001.36 applies as broadly as
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possible (People v. Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1149), the Legislature included a
presumption that a defendant’s diagnosed mental disorder is a significant factor in the
commission of an offense unless the prosecution presents clear and convincing evidence
that it was not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement
in the alleged offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2); Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
p. 404.)
It was the People’s burden to overcome the statutory presumption. (People v.
Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485, 491.) But, as the trial court acknowledged, the
People did not focus on a lack of connection or nexus at the hearing. And although the
prosecutor questioned whether possession of a firearm was an element of a substance use
disorder, the People did not present any evidence to support a finding that defendant’s
substance use disorders were not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor to his
commission of the charged drug and firearm possession offenses. (Ibid. [“argument by
counsel ‘is not evidence in the case and cannot be relied upon to support the trial court’s
order’ ”].)
Despite this lack of evidence, the trial court ruled, based on “common sense,” that
possession for sale offenses like defendant’s could not be causally connected to a
substance use disorder and that the Legislature could not have intended section 1001.36
to apply to possession of narcotics for sale cases because a vast majority of the felony
cases before the court involved drugs. In essence, the trial court carved out a wholesale
exception to mental health diversion for possession for sale offenses that does not appear
in the plain text of the statute. (People v. Harlow, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 491 [“It is
a corollary to fundamental principles of separation of powers that courts must ‘apply the
statute[s] as written unless doing so would yield absurd results’ ”].)
Section 1001.36 does expressly exclude certain offenses from eligibility, including
murder, voluntary manslaughter, and various sex offenses (§ 1001.36, subd. (d)(1)-(8)),
but neither possession of narcotics for sale nor possession of firearms are included among
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those offenses that are categorically ineligible for relief. The fact that a large swath of
felony cases may involve some element of drug use does not mean the Legislature meant
to preclude diversion relief for all criminal defendants, with a qualifying mental disorder,
who are charged with possession for sale or possession of firearms. Had it so intended,
the Legislature knew how to exclude specific offenses. The absence of an express
statutory exclusion for these offenses is telling.
The trial court’s musings regarding “the level of sophistication” needed to possess
multiple drugs for sale as well as firearms, which, in its view, showed the charged
offenses were not the result of an “unconscious” or “involuntary act” resulting from a
controlled substance addiction, also do not constitute clear and convincing evidence that
defendant’s substance use disorders were not a contributing factor in his involvement in
the crimes. Again, nothing in section 1001.36, subdivision (b) requires that the
commission of the crime be the result of an “unconscious” or “involuntary act” stemming
from the mental disorder.
Furthermore, the absence of evidence showing defendant’s mental disorder was a
factor in the commission of the offenses cannot satisfy the People’s burden to rebut the
statutory presumption by clear and convincing evidence. (See Lacour, supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at p. 404 [“the absence of evidence proving that [a] petitioner’s mental
disorder was a factor in the commission of the offenses is not substantial evidence
supporting a finding by clear and convincing evidence that [the] petitioner’s mental
disorder was not a factor in the commission of the offenses”].) In Lacour, this court
found insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that the defendant’s
mental disorders were not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor to his involvement
in 23 car burglaries and carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle based on its finding that
nothing in the police report indicated he was suffering from a mental disorder at the time
of the offenses. (Ibid.) Similarly, in Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
671, 687-689, this court held that by finding the statutory presumption had been
14
overcome by the lack of indication in the police reports that the defendant was suffering
from the mental disorder at the time of a robbery, the trial court improperly shifted the
burden to the defendant to affirmatively prove that her mental disorder contributed to the
offense.
The People’s attempt to distinguish Lacour and Gomez is unavailing. Citing the
probation report that describes the police reports, they argue the record here, unlike in
Lacour and Gomez, contains affirmative rebuttal evidence showing defendant’s criminal
conduct was profit-motivated and not symptom-driven. But the People did not submit the
police reports for the court’s consideration during the hearing, and the probation report
itself had not yet been prepared when the court considered the diversion petition. Thus,
contrary to the People’s assertion, the record here contains even less evidence than the
evidence found insufficient in Lacour and Gomez.
Because the People were required to show that defendant’s diagnosed disorders
did not contribute to causing the charged criminal conduct, and they did not do so, there
was no clear and convincing evidence to rebut the statutory presumption under section
1001.36, subdivision (b)(2). By applying an incorrect legal standard, which improperly
shifted the burden to defendant regarding the statutory presumption, the trial court abused
its discretion in denying defendant participation in the diversion program based on being
ineligible.
The People raise other arguments to support the trial court’s denial of the diversion
petition. They argue defendant failed to show several suitability factors, including that
his symptoms would respond to mental health treatment, that he did not present an
unreasonable risk of danger of committing a super strike if treated in the community, and
that the recommended treatment plan would meet his specialized mental health needs.
They also argue that the trial court could exercise its residual discretion to deny mental
health diversion, even if all other qualifications are met.
15
Because the trial court did not consider any of the suitability factors, nor did it
exercise its residual discretion in denying the petition, it will be able to address these
issues on remand. We express no opinion as to how the trial court should exercise its
discretion or whether defendant’s diversion petition should ultimately be granted. “But
we will not deny the petition solely on the basis that the court could possibly have denied
mental health diversion on other grounds had it not abused its discretion in finding that
the statutory presumption had been overcome.” (Lacour, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
p. 405.)
II
Guilty Plea Based on Lawful Conduct
The parties agree the trial court erred in accepting defendant’s guilty plea to count
11 (misdemeanor possession of marijuana) in case No. 24F1817, and sentencing him on
that count, because the alleged conduct to which he pleaded was not criminal. We agree.
Health and Safety Code section 11357, subdivision (b) criminalizes the
“possession of more than 28.5 grams of cannabis.” (Italics added.) By its plain terms,
the statute does not apply to possession of less than 28.5 grams of marijuana.
Here, count 11 in the information alleged defendant “did unlawfully possess not
more than 28.5 grams of marijuana.” By accepting defendant’s guilty plea to conduct
that is not criminal, and sentencing him for that offense, the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction. (People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 395-396, 399 [conviction for conduct
not prohibited by statute is void]; People v. Soriano (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 781, 784-785
[the defendant “could not have been guilty of violating Penal Code section 115 by
attempting to file a forged instrument because, as a matter of law, the writing he was
charged with and admitted forging, a death certificate, is not an instrument within the
meaning of section 115”].) Accordingly, we shall modify the judgment to vacate
defendant’s conviction and sentence on count 11.
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DISPOSITION
Defendant’s conviction on count 11 in case No. 24F1817 is reversed and the
sentence thereon is vacated. Defendant’s remaining guilty pleas are conditionally
vacated, and the judgment is conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial
court to conduct new proceedings on defendant’s petition for mental health diversion in
accordance with section 1001.36 and consistent with this opinion. If the trial court grants
defendant’s petition for mental health diversion, defendant’s guilty pleas are vacated, and
the judgment is reversed. If the trial court again denies mental health diversion, the trial
court shall conduct a full resentencing hearing in light of the reversal of count 11. We
need not address defendant’s remaining claims, which he may raise at any resentencing
hearing, if necessary.
____\s\_____________________
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
____\s\____________________
KRAUSE, J.
____\s\_____________________
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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