CourtListener 10807367•People v. Meza CA2/7
Texto completo
Filed 3/11/26 P. v. Meza CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B341480
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA212674)
v.
JUAN JAVIER MEZA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Keith H. Borjon, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
The United Firm, Seth R. Hancock and Georgina Gannon
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Juan Javier Meza appeals the denial of his motion under
Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate his 2001 guilty plea to
corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant.1 In his motion, Meza
explained that he had served his sentence and his conviction had
been expunged, he continued living openly in the United States
while being gainfully employed, and he submitted unrebutted
declarations attesting he did not understand the immigration
consequences of his plea until 20 years later when he sought to
obtain legal status. The People filed no written opposition and
presented no evidence. The superior court denied Meza’s motion
because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel
at the time of his plea or his counsel’s case file, despite Meza’s
diligent efforts in attempting to contact his prior counsel, who
had retired since representing him.
After independent review, we conclude Meza met his
burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, error
affecting his ability to “meaningfully understand, defend against,
or knowingly accept” the immigration consequences of his plea.
(§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) Meza also established a reasonable
probability he would have rejected his plea had he understood the
consequences. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Meza’s
motion and direct the superior court to vacate Meza’s conviction.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and Sentence
In January 2001, Meza “became involved in a serious
argument” with the mother of his two children, Susana Zavala
Gonzalez. Meza struck Gonzalez in the face, grabbed her around
the neck with both hands, and bruised her thigh and breast. He
also pulled the telephone from the wall to prevent Gonzalez from
contacting law enforcement.
Meza was charged with two felony counts: corporal injury
to a spouse or cohabitant (count 1; § 273.5, subd. (a)) and
dissuading a witness by force or threat (count 2; § 136.1,
subd. (c)(1)). The complaint alleged that Meza was convicted
within the previous seven years of a section 273.5 offense in 1997.
(See § 273.5, subd. (f)(1) [“A person convicted of violating this
section for acts occurring within seven years of a previous
conviction under subdivision (a) . . . shall be punished by
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by
imprisonment in the state prison for two, four, or five years, or by
both imprisonment and a fine of up to ten thousand dollars”].)
In February 2001, before a preliminary hearing occurred,
Meza pleaded guilty to count 1, and count 2 was dismissed.
During the plea hearing, the prosecutor stated: “Mr. Meza, if
you’re not a United States citizen, pleading today will cause
problems with immigration. You will not be able to become a
citizen. . . . You will not be able to have any type of legal status
here. You will be deported. And you will not be able to come
back into the country if you leave. Do you understand all these
consequences?” Meza answered, “Yes.”
3
Meza was sentenced to 180 to 365 days in county jail and
five years of probation and ordered to complete a year-long
domestic violence counseling program. Meza successfully
completed probation and domestic violence counseling, as well as
a six-month drug treatment and alcohol counseling program.
After completing probation, Meza petitioned the court for
expungement, requesting to reduce his felony charge to a
misdemeanor (see § 17) or to withdraw his plea of guilty and
dismiss the action (see § 1203.4). At the recommendation of the
probation department, the trial court granted Meza’s
expungement petition, although it is not clear from the record on
what ground.2
B. Section 1473.7 Motion To Vacate
In January 2024, Meza (through counsel) moved to vacate
his conviction under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). Meza
asserted he did not understand the immigration consequences of
his guilty plea because “neither the court nor his attorney
advised him that this type of conviction requires mandatory
deportation, denial of naturalization, and permanent exclusion.”
At the time of his motion, Meza was unable to obtain the
reporter’s transcript from his plea hearing.
Meza provided a personal declaration stating he was born
in Mexico, he arrived in the United States in 1991 at “about
12 years old,” and he was not a United States citizen and did not
have legal status in the United States. Meza attended school in
2 The grant of relief under section 1203.4 “has no effect on
the federal immigration consequences of [a] conviction.” (People
v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 560; see Ramirez-Castro v.
I.N.S. (9th Cir. 2002) 287 F.3d 1172, 1174-1175.)
4
the United States and “worked [his] entire adult [life] in the
United States since the age of 18,” including as a cab dispatcher,
a taxi driver, a dishwasher, and a busser. Meza declared that at
the time of his guilty plea in 2001, he had two young children
(both United States citizens) of two and four years old, and his
father was also living in the United States. As of 2024, Meza had
three adult children (one deceased), financially supported his
parents, including his United States resident father, and lived
with and financially supported his partner of 12 years and her
two children. Meza declared, “The United States is my home and
it has been since the age of 12.”
Meza averred that his defense attorney did not “mention[]
any immigration consequences for pleading guilty” but instead
advised him that “this was the best deal because it allowed
[Meza] to avoid more time in custody.” Meza declared he did not
understand the immigration consequences until he consulted
with an immigration attorney after he completed his sentence,
and had he “known that the case was going to cause these severe
consequence[s], [he] would have requested [to] seek other options
such as an immigration safe plea or tak[ing] the case to trial. I
would have been willing to risk going to trial and getting more
time in jail if it meant I could avoid these severe immigration
consequences.”
The People did not file a written opposition nor did they
present any argument on the merits of Meza’s motion, other than
stating, “We oppose.” Before the hearing, the parties located the
reporter’s transcript from Meza’s plea hearing, which reflected
the prosecutor’s immigration advisement. Meza filed a
supplemental brief in support of his motion, explaining that he
reached out to his public defender and requested the defense file,
5
but these efforts were unsuccessful. Meza explained that on
May 22, 2024 his counsel “emailed a Deputy Public Defender in
the Immigration Unit of the Los Angeles County Public
Defender’s Office to inquire about what advisements, if any, were
given to Mr. Meza by his Deputy Public Defender at the time of
his plea,” and learned that the public defender who represented
Meza in 2001 “had recently retired.” The public defender’s office
offered “to try to contact” the retired attorney and “to search for
the defense file.” As of June 4, the public defender’s office stated
that “after an exhaustive search, the defense file for Mr. Meza’s
case could not be located,” and as of August 8, the retired
attorney “had not responded to [the public defender’s office’s]
efforts to contact her.”
Meza also provided a supplemental declaration stating he
had “no recollection of any mention of immigration consequences”
at his plea hearing, even after reviewing the plea hearing
transcripts, which he believed indicated “that [he] wasn’t truly
understanding everything when the statements were made.”3
Meza averred:
“During the plea . . . I was scared and nervous
because I knew I was pleading to a felony with jail
time. During the conversation with the Judge, I
remember saying ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to the different
3 Meza’s declaration stated that “the Judge discussed
immigration consequences with me” at the plea hearing, and his
attorney similarly stated at the section 1473.7 hearing that “the
court” advised Meza of immigration consequences. As stated,
however, the reporter’s transcript reflects that the prosecutor
gave Meza the immigration advisement at the plea hearing.
6
questions in order to just get through the plea and
get the case over with. . . .
“At the time of my plea, I did not think that
immigration consequences were a possibility for a few
reasons. First, I had a previous conviction from 1997,
and no immigration consequences had come as a
result of it. Second, I was of the belief that if the
Court was sending me to jail and putting me on
probation, that was the full extent of the
consequences. I thought that if I did everything the
Court told me to do, I would not face any additional
consequences. Last . . . my attorney told me that I
was getting the best deal possible. Since my attorney
thought this was the best deal, I believed her.
“I first found out about the immigration consequences
of my plea when I reached out to an Immigration firm
about two years ago. They told me that I could not
proceed with any immigration applications because of
my convictions. As soon as I found out, I hired
[another firm] to see if there was any way to fix the
criminal convictions since I didn’t know there were
immigration consequences for them that would
prevent me from adjusting my status.”
The superior court heard the motion to vacate on
August 22, 2024. Meza argued that even though he was advised
of mandatory immigration consequences during the plea hearing,
there was no evidence that his defense attorney advised him on
7
immigration matters, and Meza’s declaration established that he
did not subjectively understand the immigration consequences of
his plea at the time of his conviction. As stated, the People
opposed Meza’s motion by stating, “We oppose.”
Interpreting the case law, the superior court believed that
even if a section 1473.7 petitioner was notified of mandatory
immigration consequences, he could be eligible for relief if he was
also “misadvised . . . as to immigration consequences” by his
defense counsel. But in Meza’s case, the court observed that “all
we have as to defense counsel’s files is a file that [is] silent on
th[e] question o[f] immigration consequences” and there is “no
declaration from counsel.” The court stated that in Meza’s
declaration, “there’s no explanation as to how [he] came to this
misunderstanding” of the immigration consequences, and there
was no “corroborat[ion] [of] any of [the declaration’s] assertions.”
The court added, “at the time of the plea in this case, defense
counsel in California had no obligation [to give] advice regarding
immigration consequences . . . unless asked about it by their
client. There’s no evidence before [the court] that Mr. Meza
asked his counsel about immigration consequences, so counsel
was under no obligation to advise him.”
The court concluded that Meza understood the immigration
advisement given by the prosecutor, because he “acknowledged
understanding the advisement,” “did not express any concerns
about possible deportation, denial of naturalization, or reentry,”
and “did not seek any additional time to consult with counsel”
about immigration consequences. Accordingly, the court denied
Meza’s motion to vacate.
Meza timely appealed.
8
DISCUSSION
A. Immigration Consequences of a Section 273.5 Conviction
“Under federal law, a noncitizen convicted of a crime of
domestic violence is deportable. (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).)”
(People v. Villalba (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 659, 666 (Villalba).)
This includes an offense under section 273.5, subdivision (a).
(See id. at pp. 666-667; People v. Manzanilla (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 891, 903 (Manzanilla).)
A section 273.5 conviction is also a crime of violence under
federal immigration law. (Villalba, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 667; Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder (9th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 1080,
1083; see 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).) If a defendant is sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of at least one year (365 days) for a crime of
violence, the offense qualifies as an aggravated felony conviction.
(Villalba, at pp. 666-667; Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 903-904.) This designation carries even harsher
consequences. “A noncitizen who is convicted of an aggravated
felony at any time after admission is conclusively presumed
deportable and is subject to mandatory removal. (8 U.S.C.
§ 1228(c); see id., § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).) An aggravated felony
conviction renders a noncitizen ‘ineligible for cancellation of
removal, a form of discretionary relief allowing some deportable
aliens to remain in the country. See [8 U.S.C. §] 1229b(a)(3),
(b)(1)(C). Accordingly, removal is a virtual certainty for a[]
[noncitizen] found to have an aggravated felony conviction, no
matter how long he has previously resided here.’ ” (Villalba, at
pp. 666-667; accord, Manzanilla, at p. 904.)
9
B. Section 1473.7 and Standard of Review
“[S]ection 1473.7 allows noncitizens who have served their
sentences to vacate a conviction if they can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that their conviction is ‘legally
invalid due to prejudicial error damaging [their] ability to
meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a
conviction or sentence.’ ” (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th
311, 316 (Espinoza).) “[T]o establish a ‘prejudicial error’ under
section 1473.7, a person need only show by a preponderance of
the evidence: 1) he did not ‘meaningfully understand’ or
‘knowingly accept’ the actual or potential adverse immigration
consequences of the plea; and 2) had he understood the
consequences, it is reasonably probable he would have instead
attempted to ‘defend against’ the charges.” (People v. Mejia
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 862 (Mejia).) A preponderance of the
evidence means evidence with more “ ‘convincing force’ ” than the
opposing evidence (People v. Miller (1916) 171 Cal. 649, 653) or
evidence which is more likely to be true than not true (People ex
rel. Brown v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
1549, 1567).
As to the first prong, “the focus of the inquiry . . . is on the
‘defendant’s own error in . . . not knowing that his plea would
subject him to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion
from the United States.’ ” (Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at
p. 871; accord, People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 958
(Padron); see People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 713-714
(Lopez) [“At the heart of the prejudicial error analysis ‘is the
mindset of the defendant and what he or she understood—or
didn’t understand—at the time the plea was taken’ ”].) There is
10
“no additional need to establish [the petitioner’s] mistake was
caused by some ‘third party.’ ” (People v. Alatorre (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 747, 769 (Alatorre); accord, People v. Carrillo
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 16 (Carrillo).) For instance, a
defendant may show, but is not required to show, that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Ruiz (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1067; accord, Padron, at p. 959; People v.
Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1008 (Camacho); see
§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)
Accordingly, the California Supreme Court has instructed
that “[a] party seeking relief under section 1473.7 is not required
to provide the declaration of plea counsel” or “to submit
contemporaneous documentation from the time of the plea.
Rather, the inquiry under section 1473.7 requires consideration
of the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ which necessarily involves
case-by-case examination of the record [citation], and no specific
kind of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 325.) Even a court’s advisement that a guilty
plea will result in immigration consequences “d[oes] not preclude
[a petitioner] from demonstrating that []he did not meaningfully
understand the immigration consequences of h[is] plea.” (People
v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1175 (Curiel) [collecting
cases].)
As to the prejudice prong, “a defendant must demonstrate a
‘reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected
the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or
potential immigration consequences’ [citation] and must
corroborate any assertions with ‘ “ ‘objective evidence.’ ” ’ ”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 316; accord, People v. Vivar
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 530 (Vivar).) “ ‘ “A ‘reasonable probability’
11
‘does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable
chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ ” ’ ” (Lopez, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 714; accord, Padron, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th
at p. 959; People v. Soto (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 602, 610.)
Prejudice turns on the “totality of the circumstances,” with
“particularly relevant” factors including “the defendant’s ties to
the United States, the importance the defendant placed on
avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea
bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an
immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible.” (Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 529-530.) Additional factors can include
“the defendant’s remaining ties or lack thereof to his or her home
country [citations], the defendant’s immigration status in the
United States at the time of the plea [citations], the defendant’s
criminal history [citations], and the defendant’s employment
history.” (Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) Prejudice can
include a showing that if the petitioner had known of the
immigration consequences, he “would have risked going to trial
(even if only to figuratively throw a ‘ “Hail Mary” ’).” (Mejia,
supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 871; see Lopez, at pp. 714-715 [“while
the probability of obtaining a more favorable result at trial may
be one factor a court considers in determining prejudice, it is not
controlling or necessarily even the most important factor courts
consider”].)
We independently review the denial of a section 1473.7
motion. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527; Padron, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 959.) “ ‘[U]nder independent review, an
appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine
whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ ” (Vivar, at p. 527.) If
the superior court heard testimony, we “give particular deference
12
to [any] factual findings based on the trial court’s personal
observations of witnesses.” (Id. at pp. 527-528.) But “[w]here, as
here, the facts derive entirely from written declarations and other
documents . . . , there is no reason to conclude the trial court has
the same special purchase on the question at issue; as a practical
matter, ‘[t]he trial court and this court are in the same position in
interpreting written declarations’ when reviewing a cold record in
a section 1473.7 proceeding. [Citation.] Ultimately it is for the
appellate court to decide, based on its independent judgment,
whether the facts establish prejudice under section 1473.7.”
(Vivar, at p. 528, fn. omitted.)
C. Meza Established He Did Not Meaningfully Understand the
Immigration Consequences of His Plea
Meza argues that he established error affecting his
understanding of his conviction’s immigration consequences,
because he was previously convicted of a section 273.5 violation
without immigration problems, his counsel failed to advise him of
immigration consequences, and he did not understand the trial
court’s immigration advisement. He contends there is “no
evidence that [his] counsel discussed immigration consequences
with him, much less that she discussed immigration
consequences in a specific and accurate fashion.”
We conclude Meza has demonstrated, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that he did not understand the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea. Meza attested he did not
understand the immigration consequences of his conviction
because his attorney did not advise him of the consequences and
told him he was “getting the best deal possible,” because he was
previously convicted of the same offense “and no immigration
13
consequences had come as a result,” and because he believed jail
and probation were “the full extent of the consequences.” Meza
asserted he did not recall hearing the advisement on immigration
consequences because he was “scared and nervous . . . [of]
pleading to a felony,” leading him to believe he “wasn’t truly
understanding everything when the statements were made.”
(See Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 17 [petitioner “is the
only one with direct access to his state of mind and his
declaration asserted he ‘did not meaningfully understand the
immigration consequences of being convicted’ ”].) Meza also
declared that he did not understand that he was ineligible for
naturalization until he “reached out to an [i]mmigration firm” in
2022, and they informed him he “could not proceed with any
immigration applications because of my convictions.”
Meza’s declaration is corroborated by the available record.
The record establishes that Meza was previously convicted of
violating section 273.5 in 1997, supporting his assertion that his
experience with the 1997 conviction impacted his understanding
of the consequences flowing from the 2001 conviction. After
completing his sentence and his court-ordered treatment, Meza
also successfully petitioned the court for expungement of his
conviction. (See Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009 [“It
was only after [petitioner’s] conviction was expunged and reduced
to a misdemeanor that [he] consulted an immigration
attorney . . . [and] then learned of the true immigration
consequences of his plea”].)
Similarly, the record supports that Meza did not
comprehend the mandatory immigration consequences of his
conviction until he pursued changing his immigration status in
2022. (See Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1177 [petitioner’s
14
“subjective misunderstanding of the immigration consequences of
her plea [was] corroborated” by her attempts to seek lawful
immigration status 10 years after her plea, which was “not
consistent with that of [an] individual[] who understood that
their convictions made them presumptively deportable and
ineligible for reentry into the United States”]; Alatorre, supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 769 [“there can be little doubt in this case
that [petitioner] never appreciated his plea and subsequent
conviction made him automatically deportable” where he
attempted “to become a naturalized citizen within three years of
his conviction”].) Nothing in the record here suggests that Meza
encountered adverse immigration consequences before he
consulted with an immigration firm. (Cf. People v. Diaz (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 102, 115 (Diaz) [affirming denial of section 1473.7
motion where immigration officials advised petitioner he was
deportable right after his conviction and he “did not state that he
was surprised, dismayed, or that he attempted to take any action
to secure his legal status at that time”; petitioner’s “inaction
[was] inconsistent with his claim that he did not believe he would
face any adverse immigration consequences”].) Indeed, after his
conviction, Meza did not go into hiding but continued to live in
the United States, maintained gainful employment, and had
another child, supporting that he did not expect automatic
deportation as a result of his conviction. (See Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 320 [section 1473.7 relief warranted where
“[a]fter his conviction, rather than living in hiding, [petitioner]
started his own business, [and] joined community
organizations”].)
Likewise, the available record does not reflect that Meza
received personalized advice from his defense counsel as to the
15
immigration consequences of his plea. Meza provided emails and
letters demonstrating that he reached out to the public defender’s
office to request his case file and contact his former plea counsel,
but his former counsel was retired, she did not respond to
inquiries from the public defender’s office, and an “exhaustive
search” could not produce the defense file. The record does not
otherwise indicate any discussion of immigration consequences
between Meza and his counsel. (See, e.g., People v. Abdelsalam
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 654, 659-660, 663 [denying section 1473.7
relief where plea counsel told the court that she had discussed
immigration consequences with the petitioner and she believed
he understood them, the court advised petitioner he would be
deported, and petitioner replied “ ‘I understand. I’m just going to
wait for immigration.’ ”].) Indeed, Meza’s declaration that he did
not discuss the immigration consequences with his counsel is the
only evidence on this point. Meza’s assertion that his counsel did
not advise him also aligns with the applicable law at the time of
his plea: before the United States Supreme Court decided Padilla
v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356 (Padilla), “there was no Sixth
Amendment obligation on the part of defense counsel to
affirmatively advise a defendant of the immigration consequences
of a conviction.”4 (Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 17-18
4 The superior court erred on this point. The court concluded
that Meza could not establish error as to his understanding of the
immigration consequences because Meza pleaded guilty before
Padilla and thus his “counsel was under no obligation to advise
him” of immigration consequences. But as stated, the error
supporting section 1473.7 relief “need not be one made by defense
counsel or the court but may be one made by the moving party
herself if supported by contemporaneous evidence.” (People v.
16
[concluding a section 1473.7 petitioner established subjective
misunderstanding of the immigration consequences of his 2002
conviction because the petitioner and his trial attorney could not
“recall any discussion of immigration consequences,” which made
sense under “then applicable law”].)
In Espinoza, our Supreme Court concluded that a section
1473.7 petitioner established prejudicial error under similar
circumstances. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) There,
the petitioner declared that his attorney “ ‘did not mention to me
that my plea would have immigration consequences,’ ” the
attorney’s assistant told him “to plead no contest and ‘everything
was going to be fine,’ ” and he did not understand the trial court’s
immigration advisement to apply to him. (Id. at p. 318.) The
California Supreme Court held the petitioner was “not required
to provide the declaration of plea counsel” or “to submit
contemporaneous documentation from the time of the plea,”
especially “15 years [after] the plea” and where the parties
attempted to reach plea counsel “without success.” (Id. at p. 325.)
Here, the People contend that “[n]othing in the record
corroborates a claim that [Meza’s] counsel failed to advise,
advised incorrectly, or otherwise induced the plea based on
immigration misinformation,” because there is “no declaration
from his prior counsel, no defense file, and no contemporaneous
objective evidence supporting [the] claim.”5 But Meza diligently
Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 311; see Camacho, supra,
32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1008 [ineffective assistance of counsel not
required for relief].)
5 The People additionally argue that the superior court found
Meza’s declaration was not credible, and that we should not
17
attempted to contact his plea attorney and obtain his case file,
and under Espinoza, such evidence is not a prerequisite for
section 1473.7 relief, particularly given the 23 years since Meza’s
plea. (Espinoza, at p. 325.)
Finally, the prosecutor’s immigration advisement does not
conclusively establish that Meza subjectively understood the
immigration consequences. As stated, the prosecutor advised
that “if [Meza was] not a United States citizen,” the conviction
would “cause problems with immigration,” he would “not be able
to become a citizen” or “have any type of legal status here,” he
would “be deported” and would “not be able to come back into the
country if you leave.” Under section 1016.5, Meza’s plea colloquy
was required to include this advisement.6
“ ‘second-guess’ ” this “ ‘factual finding[].’ ” But, as stated, the
superior court did not hear any testimony at the hearing on
Meza’s motion but merely considered Meza’s declaration, the plea
transcript, and other documentary evidence. Under Vivar, we
defer only to “factual determinations that are based on ‘ “the
credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and
observed.” ’ ” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527-528 [appellate
and superior courts “ ‘are in the same position in interpreting
written declarations’ [and] reviewing a cold record”].)
6 At the time of Meza’s plea, section 1016.5 provided, in
relevant part, “Prior to acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere to any offense punishable as a crime under state law,
. . . the court shall administer the following advisement on the
record to the defendant: [¶] If you are not a citizen, you are
hereby advised that conviction of the offense for which you have
been charged may have the consequences of deportation,
exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.”
18
While the prosecutor’s admonishment described the
immigration consequences attendant to Meza’s conviction, Meza
alleges that he did not understand the advisement because he did
not receive personal advice on the matter from his attorney, and
he had previously been convicted of the same offense without
immigration consequences. “[D]epending on the surrounding
circumstances, even [a] warning that deportation ‘ “will result” ’
is not a categorical bar to relief.” (People v. Lopez (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 561, 577; accord, Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 320 [“general advisement under section 1016.5” does not
establish meaningful understanding of immigration
consequences]; Padron, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 962 [same];
Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011, fn. 8 [petitioner may
“present[] sufficient evidence of his lack of understanding such
that the court’s advisement cannot be taken as irrebuttable proof
that defendant likely would have entered his plea
notwithstanding [adverse immigration] consequences”].)
The People concede the prosecutor’s immigration
advisement “may not necessarily present an insurmountable
barrier to bringing a successful section 1473.7 claim,” but they
argue that Meza cannot demonstrate his lack of understanding
because the advisement was “clear and unequivocal” and Meza
did not “express[] confusion or questions at the time the
advisements were given.” In Espinoza, however, the high court
held that evidence of a petitioner’s “contemporaneous confusion”
about immigration consequences during the plea proceedings was
not required where the petitioner averred “he did not discover
(Former § 1016.5, subd. (a), as enacted by Stats. 1977, ch. 1088,
p. 3495, § 1.)
19
those consequences until more than a decade after his plea.”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 324-325.)
Here, Meza similarly attested he did not understand the
court’s advisement until more than 20 years after his guilty plea,
and in the meantime he lived his life openly in the United States,
where he continued to put down roots in his community. Meza’s
silence at the plea hearing thus does not establish that he
understood the immigration advisement—nor does the plea
hearing transcript otherwise reflect that Meza affirmatively
understood the advisement. (Cf. Diaz, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 114-115 [petitioner’s claim that he did not understand
immigration consequences of plea was not credible where
petitioner “was aggressive in his self-advocacy at the plea
hearing,” “asked multiple questions, spoke directly to the court
several times, and attempted to bargain directly with the court,”
but asked no questions to follow up on the prosecution’s advice of
immigration consequences]; People v. Perez (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
818, 829-830 [same, where the petitioner raised his concern about
deportation at the plea hearing and was advised of mandatory
deportation by his attorney, by his plea form, and by the trial
court].)
On the record before us, Meza has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence his subjective misunderstanding of
the immigration consequences of his plea. (See Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 320 [record established petitioner did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his
plea, despite trial court’s “general advisement” that the
conviction “may have immigration consequences,” because
petitioner’s attorney “never advised him that pleading no contest
to the charges at issue would result in his deportation,” and
20
petitioner’s post-plea behavior was “not consistent with the
behavior of a person who understood that his convictions
effectively ended his [lawful immigration] status”]; Curiel, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1175-1177 [same, despite court’s statement
that guilty plea “ ‘will result’ in deportation,” where petitioner
received “inadequate and incomplete” immigration advice from
plea counsel and defendant’s “postplea conduct” demonstrated
that she did not understand she was presumptively deportable
and ineligible for reentry].)
D. Meza Established Prejudice
Based on our independent review of the record, we also
conclude that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Meza
presented evidence demonstrating a reasonable probability he
would have rejected the plea deal had he known of its
consequences to his immigration status. (See Vivar, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 529.) Meza argues he established a reasonable
possibility he would have rejected the plea had he meaningfully
understood its immigration consequences, based on his “strong
personal ties to the United States.”
Meza attested that had he “known that the case was going
to cause . . . severe [immigration] consequence[s], [he] would have
requested that we seek other options such as an immigration safe
plea or taken the case to trial. I would have been willing to risk
going to trial and getting more time in jail if it meant I could
avoid these severe immigration consequences.” As stated, to
establish prejudice, Meza must corroborate his “assertions with
‘ “ ‘objective evidence.’ ” ’ ” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
316.)
21
“Ties to the United States are an important factor in
evaluating prejudicial error under section 1473.7 because they
shed light on a defendant’s immigration priorities. . . .
Depending on the strength of a defendant’s community ties, ‘the
prospect of deportation’ may be ‘ “an integral part” ’ or ‘ “the most
important part” ’ of the defendant’s ‘calculus in responding to
certain criminal charges.’ [Citation.] Community ties may be
established by length of residence; immigration status; lack of
connection to the country of origin; connections to family, friends,
or the community; work history or financial ties; or other forms of
attachment. [Citations.] Objective evidence of a defendant’s
community ties includes facts provided by a defendant’s
declaration.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.)
In Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th 510, the high court held a
section 1473.7 petitioner established prejudice in light of his
lifelong connections to the United States. (Id. at p. 530.) The
Vivar petitioner “was brought to this country at age six as a
lawful resident, and he attended schools, formed a family, and
remained here for 40 years. At the time of his plea, he had two
children, two grandchildren, and a wife, all of whom are citizens.”
(Ibid.) In Espinoza, the petitioner established prejudice by
showing he “ha[d] spent most of his life in the United States,” he
“came to California when he was 13 years old,” his “wife and five
children were United States citizens,” his extended family lived
in the United States, and he was “the financial provider for his
family.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 322.) After his plea,
the petitioner “returned home to care for his family and
community,” “lend[ing] credence to [his] assertion that his
community ties were important to him at the time of his plea.”
(Id. at p. 323.) These “deep and long-standing ties [were]
22
undisputed and weigh[ed] in favor of finding that [the petitioner]
would have considered immigration consequences to be of
paramount concern in deciding whether to accept a plea
agreement.” (Id. at p. 322.)
Meza’s declaration established that at the time of his plea,
Meza had resided in the United States for 10 years since he was
12 years old; he attended school and was gainfully employed; he
had two young children, both United States citizens; and he
financially supported his father, who also lived in the United
States. After his plea, Meza continued to reside and work in the
United States for more than 20 years, had another child (a
United States citizen), and began a new relationship with his
partner of 12 years, providing financial support to her and her
two daughters. As in Vivar and Espinoza, these circumstances
objectively corroborate Meza’s claim that he would have
renegotiated or rejected the plea to avoid “severe immigration
consequences.”
In assessing prejudicial error, we also consider “whether
alternative, immigration-safe dispositions were available at the
time of the defendant’s plea. Factors relevant to this inquiry
include the defendant’s criminal record, the strength of the
prosecution’s case, the seriousness of the charges or whether the
crimes involved sophistication, the district attorney’s charging
policies with respect to immigration consequences, and the
existence of comparable offenses without immigration
consequences. [Citations.] These matters can be placed in the
record by either party.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323.)
Here, Meza’s section 1473.7 motion and supporting
declarations did not identify any potential immigration-neutral
dispositions. The People thus argue that Meza failed to establish
23
a possibility of pleading to an immigration-neutral charge. The
People also assert that Meza faced a maximum sentencing
exposure of nine years in prison, and that his plea was “a
tremendous bargain because he avoided prison time.” (See
§§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1), 273.5, subd. (f)(1).)
Meza points to his “unequivocal[]” declaration, which
states: “Had I known that the case was going to cause these
severe consequence[s], I would have requested that we seek other
options such as an immigration safe plea or taken the case to
trial. I would have been willing to risk going to trial and getting
more time in jail if it meant I could avoid these severe
immigration consequences.” Meza further declared, “The United
States is my home and it has been since the age of 12.” Meza
contends that because the defense case file is unavailable despite
his diligent efforts to obtain it from his prior counsel, he is unable
to provide any details about the plea negotiations.
Looking to the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
Meza has sufficiently demonstrated a “reasonable probability
that [he] would have rejected the plea if [he] had correctly
understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.”
(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) As stated, a reasonable
probability “does not mean more likely than not,” but “merely a
reasonable chance, which is more than an abstract possibility.”
(Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 19.) A petitioner “may
show prejudice by ‘convinc[ing] the court [that he] would have
chosen to lose the benefits of the plea bargain despite the
possibility or probability deportation would nonetheless follow.’ ”
(Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1010.)
24
As discussed, Meza established strong ties to the United
States at the time of his plea: his 10-year residence in this
country since the age of 12, consistent work history since he
turned 18, his status as the financial provider for his family, his
two United States citizen children under the age of five, and his
father’s residence in the United States. Meza’s declaration
further indicated that avoiding automatic deportation from the
United States was his top priority. (See People v. Ogunmowo
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 67, 79 [finding prejudice where petitioner’s
“declaration ma[de] clear that he wanted to avoid deportation at
all costs, such that he would have rejected a scenario of
automatic deportation—pleading guilty . . . —in favor of a
scenario of possible deportation—defending his case at trial,
regardless of the other potential consequences (a longer prison
sentence)”].) Finally, we note that Meza pleaded guilty before the
court held a preliminary hearing on the charges, suggesting
further negotiations were possible. (See People v. Rodriguez
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 326 [petitioner demonstrated
reasonable probability of rejecting plea deal in hope of
immigration-neutral plea where she pleaded guilty early in
proceedings and “never tested the prosecution’s resolve”].) These
circumstances demonstrate prejudice and warrant section 1473.7
relief. (See Villalba, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 674-675
[finding section 1473.7 petitioner demonstrated prejudice, where
his strong “ties to the United States” corroborated his declaration
that “he would have risked trial and additional jail or prison time
in order to avoid deportation,” absent any showing of a potential
immigration-neutral disposition]; Camacho, supra,
32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1011-1012 [same].)
25
DISPOSITION
The order denying Meza’s section 1473.7 motion is
reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to grant the
motion, vacate the conviction, and permit Meza to withdraw his
plea and to enter a different plea.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
STONE, J. GIZA, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
26
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.