CourtListener 10803911•People v. Ness CA2/8
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Filed 3/4/26 P. v. Ness CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE B337842
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA117461)
v.
MICHAEL IRVING NESS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joan M. Chrostek, Judge. Affirmed.
Nicholas Seymour, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Lauren Sanchez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Michael Irving Ness shot and killed his roommate, Ray
Bonilla. The People charged Ness with first-degree
premeditated, willful, and deliberate murder. Ness asked jurors
to consider a manslaughter conviction premised, in part, on the
killing being in the heat of passion. The jury rejected both first-
degree murder and manslaughter, instead convicting Ness of
second-degree murder.
Seeking reversal of his conviction, Ness argues: (1) his trial
counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s misstatements of
the law regarding heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter;
(2) the form jury instruction on that theory, CALCRIM No. 570,
was inadequate in light of the prosecutor’s misstatements; (3) the
trial court should have instructed the jury on involuntary
manslaughter arising from unconsciousness due to voluntary
intoxication; and (4) the cumulative prejudice from these errors
requires reversal. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Ness moved in with Bonilla in October 2017. Their
relationship soon deteriorated. Ness, who testified at trial,
believed his girlfriend and Bonilla were having, and concealing
from him, an affair. On a few occasions, Ness testified, Bonilla
partied with women in his bedroom, keeping Ness awake at
night. The hostility between Ness and Bonilla permeates their
frequent text messages, as well as Ness’s texts to others, some of
which contain veiled and not so veiled threats from Ness directed
toward Bonilla. As will become relevant, Ness kept a revolver in
his closet. He normally would not take his gun when leaving the
house.
2
One afternoon, about four months after Ness moved in with
Bonilla, Ness hosted Gustavo Rodgers, a neighbor from across the
street, for a drink. A short while later, Bonilla came home and
began cooking dinner on the stove nearby. Rodgers immediately
felt tension between Bonilla and Ness, observing that although
Bonilla greeted Rodgers, he said nothing to Ness. According to
Rodgers, Ness and Bonilla exchanged dirty looks, and Ness
angrily pounded the kitchen table where he sat a couple of times
with a bottle of alcohol. Rodgers went home when his wife called
and told him dinner was ready. When he left, Bonilla was still
cooking at the stove, and Ness was still sitting at the kitchen
table.
Ness testified that upon Rodger’s departure, he said to
Bonilla: “ ‘You sure get bored easy, don’t you?’ ” Ness explained
at trial that he meant this needling “dig” to inform Bonilla that
he had overhead Bonilla’s phone conversation from the night
before, during which Bonilla had said: “ ‘I’m bored. Would you
like to come over?’ ” At this time, Ness was not carrying his gun.
According to Ness, Bonilla “went ballistic” in response to
his comment and yelled at him. Ness told Bonilla to “tone it
down” because “the neighbors don’t need to hear [their] personal
stuff.” Bonilla then yelled at him again and threw something at
him. Immediately thereafter, Ness testified, Bonilla grabbed
Ness and threw him to the ground. Ness said he was “knocked
unconscious” and did not remember what happened in the
following moments.
The next thing Ness did remember was walking outside
toward Rodgers’s house and seeing Bonilla sitting in Bonilla’s
car. According to Ness, the doors were closed and the windows
were up. Ness’s revolver was now in his waistband.
3
As Ness approached Bonilla’s car, he heard Bonilla
“yelling about a gun” and saw light from Bonilla’s cell phone.
Rodgers, meanwhile, testified to being on the phone with Bonilla
after he had returned home, and that Bonilla said Ness was
“acting crazy” and “has a gun.” Rodgers then immediately heard
gunshots. Ness admitted firing his gun “a few times” through the
car window.
Ness’s next memory was of walking on the street. Ness
testified he was trying to go home but soon realized he was
walking in the wrong direction. He eventually made his way to a
bar next to his home, where he was later arrested by police. The
police recovered a gun from Ness’s waistband.
The People charged Ness with first-degree murder.
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The operative first amended
information alleged numerous firearm-related enhancements in
connection with Ness’s commission of the crime. (Id., § 12022.53,
subds. (b)−(d).)
At trial, Ness, in accord with the testimony we have
recounted, conceded he killed Bonilla. But he asserted the People
failed to prove he killed willfully with premeditation and
deliberation as required for first-degree murder. He further
argued the jury should consider finding him guilty of voluntary
manslaughter, rather than any degree of murder, as he killed in
imperfect self-defense or in the heat of passion.
The jury found Ness guilty of second-degree murder and
found true the sentence-enhancing allegations of firearm use,
including the allegation, under Penal Code section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), that Ness personally and intentionally discharged
a firearm in killing Bonilla. The trial court imposed a sentence to
40 years to life in state prison, consisting of a term of 15 years to
4
life for the murder and a consecutive term of 25 years to life for
the firearm use.
Ness timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Viewing the prosecutor’s arguments regarding heat-of-
passion voluntary manslaughter in context, there was no
misconduct, so Ness cannot succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to object to
those arguments.
1. The Law of Murder and Manslaughter
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a
fetus, with malice aforethought.” (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)
“Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice” (id., § 192) and “is a lesser included offense of murder.”
(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942 (Beltran).)
“Heat of passion is a mental state that precludes the
formation of malice and reduces an unlawful killing from murder
to manslaughter. Heat of passion arises if, ‘ “at the time of the
killing, the reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by
passion to such an extent as would cause the ordinarily
reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and
without deliberation and reflection, and from such passion rather
than from judgment.” ’ [Citation.] Heat of passion, then, is a
state of mind caused by legally sufficient provocation that causes
a person to act, not out of rational thought but out of
unconsidered reaction to the provocation.” (Beltran, supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 942, fn. omitted.)
5
When asking whether provocation can give rise to heat of
passion and reduce murder to manslaughter, the relevant inquiry
is not whether the provocation was “of a kind that would cause an
ordinary person of average disposition to kill.” (Beltran, supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 938.) Instead, “[p]rovocation is adequate only
when it would render an ordinary person of average disposition
‘liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection,
and from this passion rather than judgment.’ ” (Id. at p. 957.)
2. Additional Background
The trial court instructed the jury on heat-of-passion
voluntary manslaughter with CALCRIM No. 570. During closing
argument, Ness’s counsel read jurors the instruction’s language
and argued the essential elements of this offense, not murder,
had been met. Counsel stated: “So what do we have in this case?
We have a fight . . . where my client gets knocked out. So in this
case if my client reacted to that fight, and we know it happened
within minutes and he reacted based on that fight. And he was
upset and he shoots Mr. Bonilla based on that reaction. That’s
also called heat of passion and it’s voluntary manslaughter.”
The prosecutor, in rebuttal, responded that an objective
standard governs whether the provocation was sufficient to
reduce murder to manslaughter. She argued: “For heat of
passion to apply the defendant has – means the defendant was
sufficiently provoked by the victim. Sufficient, what does that
mean? That means that an ordinary person would have acted
rashly or without due deliberation and reflection. An ordinary
person would have reacted the same way that Mr. Ness did.
This is based on the fact that – or not the fact. This is based on
the argument that there was a fight that occurred in that house.
And for you to believe this, you would have to find that an
6
ordinary person would have done and acted and reacted the way
that Mr. Ness did to the fight that he described in that house.
If an ordinary person of average disposition would not have acted
rashly without due deliberation in that circumstance, it’s not
heat of passion. It says the defendant acted rashly and under the
influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or
judgment. The defendant is not allowed to set up his own
standard of conduct. What that means is the defendant can’t
come in here and say, well I acted this way. I reacted this way so
it’s heat of passion. That is what comes back to the ordinary
person. An ordinary person would have reacted the same way.
And if you don’t find that to be true, it’s not heat of passion.
Heat of passion is that the decision was based on passion and not
judgment. But it can never, never be based on revenge or
punishment.”
While deliberating, the jury asked the trial court two
questions relating to provocation. First, it asked: “Can the judge
give us clarification/definition of provocation? [¶] How does
provocation relate to murder 2?” In response, the court directed
the jury to carefully review CALCRIM Nos. 5221 and 570, which
jurors had in writing, and explained that CALCRIM No. 570 “has
the definition of provocation.”
The next day, the jury asked: “Would you please clarify
that the definition as outlined on [CALCRIM No.] 570 applies to
murder 1 & 2 specifically ‘In deciding whether the provocation
was sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition,
in the same situation and knowing the same facts, would have
1 CALCRIM No. 522, also given to jurors in this case,
explains that provocation may reduce murder from first degree to
second degree and may reduce murder to manslaughter.
7
reacted from passion rather than judgment.’ ” Based on this
question, the trial court noted the jury “seemed confused,” as it
was “using the standard put forth in [CALCRIM No. 570 for]
voluntary manslaughter and applying it to [decide between]
murder 1 and murder 2, which is not appropriate.” Finding the
confusion unlikely to be resolved by further directions referring
the jury to the instructions, the court permitted counsel to
address the matter by further argument.
The prosecutor began her supplemental argument by
stating CALCRIM No. 570 “is the heat of passion instruction for
voluntary manslaughter,” which applies only when there is
“sufficient provocation.” As to this standard, she stated: “So as
you know, sufficient provocation means that a person of average
disposition, in the same situation and knowing the same set of
facts would have reacted from passion rather than judgment.
To start off with that, if you think that Mr. Ness or that the way
that Mr. Ness acted in this case that an average person or
ordinary person of average disposition would not have reacted
from passion, then that instruction doesn’t apply and you’re back
to first degree murder or second degree murder, okay?
Provocation can affect those in different ways.”
Later, in addressing how provocation can reduce second-
degree murder to voluntary manslaughter, the prosecutor stated:
“So reduce second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter, the
provocation must be so great that it would have caused an
ordinary person of average disposition to act rationally [sic] and
without due deliberation. So passion rather than judgment. As I
said, if you do not believe that an ordinary person of average
disposition would have acted rationally without due deliberation
in that circumstance, that instruction does not apply. You do not
8
have heat of passion. You do not have voluntary manslaughter.
Now you’re back to murder one, murder two.” Shortly thereafter,
the prosecutor stated: “So again, when you are deliberating and
talking about this standard, this ordinary person standard, if you
have determined that an ordinary person would not have acted
this way, that instruction is gone. It is not manslaughter, okay?”
Ness’s counsel then addressed the jurors on the interplay
between murder, manslaughter, and provocation. Regarding
provocation, counsel, too, pointed jurors toward CALCRIM No.
570 and told jurors the fight with Bonilla was “enough
provocation for my client to react.” He continued: “[A]s long as
[Ness was] under the stress of the fight, heat of passion applies.”
The prosecutor’s final, brief remarks to the jury included
the following: “It is an ordinary person standard for heat of
passion. So the question is, was it sufficient provocation to cause
a person of average disposition to act based on passion, not
judgment. If the answer to that is no, there is no heat of passion,
okay.”
3. Analysis
Ness concedes his trial counsel raised no objections during
the prosecutor’s closing and supplemental arguments, thus
forfeiting any claim of prosecutorial misconduct arising
therefrom. (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1205
[“ ‘To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal,
a defendant must make a timely and specific objection and ask
the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the improper
argument’ ”].) Ness instead asserts reversal is required because
his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to
the prosecutor’s remarks that, in his view, misled the jury into
believing, despite the contrary holding of Beltran discussed
9
above, that “heat of passion voluntary manslaughter requires
provocation sufficient to drive the average person to kill.”
“ ‘A defendant whose counsel did not object at trial to
alleged prosecutorial misconduct can argue on appeal that
counsel’s inaction violated the defendant’s constitutional right to
the effective assistance of counsel.’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014)
60 Cal.4th 659, 674 (Centeno).) To prevail on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, Ness must “show[ ] by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel’s performance
was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and
(2) counsel’s deficiencies resulted in prejudice.” (Ibid.)
We reject Ness’s claim because, as discussed below, the
prosecutor’s remarks, in context, were not misconduct. Since
there was no misconduct warranting a meritorious objection,
the performance by Ness’s counsel was not deficient. (See People
v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 377 (Kipp) [failure to raise a
meritless argument is not ineffective assistance of counsel].)
“Advocates are given significant leeway in discussing the
legal and factual merits of a case during argument. [Citation.]
However, ‘it is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the law
generally [citation], and particularly to attempt to absolve the
prosecution from its . . . obligation to overcome reasonable doubt
on all elements [citation].’ [Citations.] To establish such error,
bad faith on the prosecutor’s part is not required.” (Centeno,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 666−667.)
“When attacking the prosecutor’s remarks to the jury, the
defendant must show that, ‘[i]n the context of the whole
argument and the instructions’ [citation], there was ‘a reasonable
likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of
10
comments in an improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.]
In conducting this inquiry, we “do not lightly infer” that the jury
drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging
meaning from the prosecutor’s statements. [Citation.]’ ”
(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.)
Ness points to several statements from the prosecutor’s
rebuttal and supplemental arguments to support his position
that the prosecutor misstated the law of provocation.
Specifically, Ness asserts the prosecutor inappropriately argued,
in her rebuttal, that to find the provocation sufficient, the jury
had to find that “[a]n ordinary person would have reacted the
same way that Mr. Ness did[,]” that “an ordinary person would
have done and acted and reacted the way that Mr. Ness did to the
fight that was described in that house[,]” and that “an ordinary
person would have reacted the same way.” (Italics added.) Ness
also takes issue with the prosecutor’s argument during her
supplemental argument that: “So again, when you are
deliberating and you’re talking about this standard, this ordinary
person standard, if you have determined that an ordinary person
would not have acted this way, that instruction is gone. It is not
manslaughter, okay?” (Italics added.) To Ness, these remarks
improperly implied that provocation only converts murder to
manslaughter if it would have driven an ordinary person to kill.
Viewed in isolation, the challenged remarks admit of some
ambiguity. They could be construed as suggesting that to find
Ness guilty of heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter, the jury
needed to find an ordinary person would have — as Ness asserted
he had — reacted from passion and without deliberation or
judgment, in response to the fight with Bonilla. Alternatively,
the comments could be interpreted as implying that the jury
11
needed to find an ordinary person would have — again, as Ness
did in this case — reacted by shooting and killing Bonilla in
response to the fight.
But we do not view a prosecutor’s comments in isolation
when discerning whether they constitute misconduct. (People v.
Adanandus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 513.) We consider them
“ ‘[i]n the context of the whole argument and the instructions’ ” to
ascertain whether “there was ‘a reasonable likelihood the jury
understood or applied the complained-of comments in an
improper or erroneous manner.’ ” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at
p. 667.) Further, “we do ‘ “not lightly infer that a prosecutor
intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging
meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will
draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging
interpretations.” ’ ” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 131.)
Applying these principles, we are persuaded there is no
reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the challenged
comments in the manner Ness contends. The prosecutor’s
remarks surrounding the disputed comments, along with the
instructions given and reiterated, dispelled their ambiguity and
directed the jury to apply the correct standard when evaluating
the sufficiency of the provocation required for manslaughter.
We repeat the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument,
again showing the challenged remarks in italics but now bolding
remarks that correctly stated provocation law. “For heat of
passion to apply the defendant has – means the defendant was
sufficiently provoked by the victim. Sufficient, what does that
mean? That means that an ordinary person of average
disposition would have acted rashly or without due
deliberation and reflection. An ordinary person would have
12
reacted the same way that Mr. Ness did. This is based on the fact
that – or not the fact. This is based on the argument that there
was a fight that occurred in that house. And for you to believe
this, you would have to find that an ordinary person would have
done and acted and reacted the way that Mr. Ness did to the fight
that he described in that house. If an ordinary person of
average disposition would not have acted rashly without
due deliberation in that circumstance, it’s not heat of
passion. It says the defendant acted rashly and under the
influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning
or judgment. The defendant is not allowed to set up his own
standard of conduct. What that means is the defendant can’t
come in here and say, well, I acted this way. I reacted this way
so it’s heat of passion. That is what comes back to the ordinary
person. An ordinary person would have reacted the same way.
And if you don’t find that to be true, it is not heat of passion.
Heat of passion is that the decision was based on passion
and not judgment.” (Italics and bolded text added.)
Each challenged comment was immediately preceded and
followed by a correct statement of law. The prosecutor’s repeated
and consistent references to the correct standard for provocation
informed the jury’s interpretation of the remarks in question.
On the whole, then, the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument directed
the jury that, in deciding whether the provocation was sufficient,
it had to determine whether an ordinary person would have acted
rashly from passion, not whether an ordinary person would kill.
Even if some ambiguity remained, the trial court
essentially hit the reset button on provocation after jurors asked
two questions on the subject. It directed jurors back to
CALCRIM No. 570. And then it invited new argument at which
13
the parties’ remarks were more clear. The prosecutor opened her
supplemental remarks by referencing CALCRIM No. 570 and
correctly stating the law on provocation twice. First, she stated:
“So, as you know, sufficient provocation means that a
person of average disposition, in the same situation and
knowing the same set of facts would have reacted from
passion rather than judgment. To start off with that, if you
think that Mr. Ness or the way that Mr. Ness acted in this case
that an average person or ordinary person of average
disposition would not have reacted from passion, then
that instruction doesn’t apply and you’re back to first degree
murder or second degree murder, okay?” (Bolded text added.)
Then, after briefly explaining how provocation can reduce murder
from first degree to second degree, the prosecutor continued:
“So reduce second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter, the
provocation must be so great that it would have caused an
ordinary person of average disposition to act rationally
[sic] and without due deliberation. So passion rather than
judgment. As I said, if you do not believe that an ordinary
person of average disposition would have acted rationally
without due deliberation in that circumstance, that
instruction does not apply. You do not have heat of passion.
You do not have voluntary manslaughter. Now you’re back to
murder one, murder two.” (Bolded text added.)
Toward the end of her supplemental argument, the
prosecutor referenced her earlier, correct statement of
provocation law before speaking the final remark Ness
challenges: “So again, when you are deliberating and you are
talking about this standard, this ordinary person standard,
if you have determined that an ordinary person would not have
14
acted this way, that instruction is gone. It is not manslaughter,
okay?” (Italics and bolded text added.)
Subsequently, in rebutting Ness’s supplemental argument,
which offered no misstatement of note, and providing the final
argument on the topic to the jury, the prosecutor correctly stated:
“It is an ordinary person standard for heat of passion. So the
question is, was it sufficient provocation to cause a person
of average disposition to act based on passion, not
judgment. If the answer to that is no, there is no heat of
passion, okay.” (Bolded text added.)
With these repeated statements articulating the proper
standard for evaluating the sufficiency of provocation for heat-of-
passion voluntary manslaughter, the jury was not reasonably
likely to construe the prosecutor’s remark, italicized just above,
as an invitation to apply a standard contrary to Beltran.
In addition to viewing the challenged comments in the
context of the prosecutor’s argument as a whole, we also consider
the jury instructions. (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.) As
noted above, the court gave and redirected the jury to CALCRIM
No. 570, which correctly sets forth the objective standard for
evaluating the sufficiency of provocation required for heat-of-
passion voluntary manslaughter.2 The court also gave CALCRIM
No. 520, which states, in relevant part: “You must follow the law
as I explain it to you, even if you disagree with it. If you believe
that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with my
instructions, you must follow my instructions.” Presuming “that
the jury relied on the instructions, not the arguments, in
convicting” Ness (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 47), we
2 To the extent Ness argues CALCRIM No. 570 was
ambiguous, we address that in part B.2, post.
15
conclude it is not reasonably likely that the jury misapplied the
challenged comments to find provocation sufficient only if it
would drive an ordinary person to kill.
In sum, Ness has not “show[n] that, ‘[i]n the context of the
whole argument and the instructions’ [citation], there was ‘a
reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.’ ”
(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.) Accordingly, the
comments did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, and Ness’s
trial counsel’s performance was not deficient based on his failure
to object. Reversal is not required. (See id. at p. 674; see also
Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
B. Instructional Error – CALCRIM No. 570
Ness, expanding on his assertion of prosecutorial
misconduct, argues the prosecutor’s arguments regarding heat-of-
passion voluntary manslaughter rendered CALCRIM No. 570
ambiguous, such that its use without further clarification by the
trial court constituted prejudicial error. According to Ness, “the
prosecution argued that the instruction should be interpreted in
a manner inconsistent with the law, and no further instruction
was given to dispel the jurors of that impression.”
1. Forfeiture
As with his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, Ness
concedes his trial counsel did not object to CALCRIM No. 570’s
wording or seek a pinpoint instruction clarifying its application.
Nonetheless, Ness asserts he has not forfeited his instructional
error claim because a trial court must instruct on the law
correctly and its error affected his substantial rights. (See Pen.
Code, § 1259.)
16
Ness is correct that “[i]n general, a defendant may raise for
the first time on appeal an instructional error affecting his or her
substantial rights. [Citations.] But ‘[a] party may not argue on
appeal that an instruction correct in law was too general or
incomplete, and thus needed clarification, without first
requesting such clarification at trial.’ ” (People v. Buenrostro
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 428; cf. People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th
936, 976, fn. 7 [under Penal Code section 1259, defendant need
not preserve by timely objection in the trial court his claim that
an instruction incorrectly stating the law violated his right to due
process].) Here, Ness does not contend CALCRIM No. 570
misstated the law. His assertion is that CALCRIM No. 570 was
too general, susceptible to more than one interpretation following
counsels’ closing and supplemental arguments, such that further
clarification was warranted by the trial court. Under these
circumstances, Ness “was obligated to request a clarifying
instruction and failed to do so, thereby forfeiting h[is] appellate
challenge.” (People v. Buenrostro, at p. 428.)
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Having concluded Ness forfeited his instructional error
claim, we consider his argument that reversal is required because
his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
request a pinpoint instruction clarifying CALCRIM No. 570’s
application. Again, to prevail on his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, Ness must demonstrate: (1) his trial counsel’s
performance was deficient; and (2) counsel’s deficiencies resulted
in prejudice. (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 674.)
Ness’s claim fails because CALCRIM No. 570 is not
ambiguous and the prosecutor’s arguments did not implore the
jury to apply the instruction in a manner inconsistent with law.
17
Consequently, no clarifying instructions were required.
(See Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
Beltran forecloses a claim that CALCRIM No. 570 is
ambiguous. In that case, the trial court gave the 2006 version of
CALCRIM No. 570 (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 943), which
was similar to the instruction here but told the jury that
“ ‘[i]n deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider
whether a person of average disposition would have been
provoked and how such a person would react in the same
situation knowing the same facts.’ ” (Id. at p. 954, italics added.)
Our Supreme Court found this instruction unambiguous,
explaining: “[T]he court instructed that the heat of passion
principle came into play if defendant acted under the influence of
intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment. Telling
the jury to consider how a person of average disposition ‘would
react’ properly draws the jury’s attention to the objective nature
of the standard and the effect the provocation would have on such
person’s state of mind.” (Ibid, fn. omitted.)
Here, the trial court gave a revised version of CALCRIM
No. 570, which instead instructed the jury that “[i]n deciding
whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a
person of average disposition, in the same situation and knowing
the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from
judgment.” (Italics added.) Consequently, unlike the 2006
version, which asked “how” a reasonable person would react in
the same situation, the instruction in this case asked “whether”
that person “would have reacted from passion rather than
judgment.” The revised instruction is clearer and highlights
Beltran’s key emphasis on reactions arising “from passion rather
than from judgment.” (See Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 939,
18
954, fn. 14.) As our Supreme Court has held even the older and
vaguer version of CALCRIM No. 570 was unambiguous (id. at
p. 954), we cannot fault the more specific version given here.
Ness’s instructional error argument relies on — indeed, it
expressly incorporates by reference — his prior contention that
the prosecutor’s arguments misstated the law on provocation and
directed the jury to apply CALCRIM No. 570 in a manner
violative of Beltran. We addressed this point in part A.3, ante.
In short, when viewed in context, the complained-of comments
did not direct the jury to evaluate provocation based on whether a
person of ordinary disposition would have killed in response to
Ness’s altercation with Bonilla.
Beltran, to be sure, recognized the possibility that the
parties’ arguments could sometimes “mudd[y] the waters” and
“confuse[ ] the jury’s understanding” of correct instructions.
(See Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 954–955.) But Beltran did
not reach that conclusion on its own facts, and those facts are
distinguishable in any event. There, “the prosecutor’s closing
argument,” in language different from what the prosecutor used
here, “ ‘used the examples of stubbing a toe, getting cut off in
traffic, or being jealous to argue that minor provocation is not
sufficient to cause a reasonable person to kill someone.’ ” (Id. at
p. 955, italics added; cf. People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
212, 224 [taking issue with a prosecutor stating: “ ‘Would a
reasonable person be so aroused as to kill somebody? That’s the
standard’ ”].) Though these remarks “may” have confused jurors
(Beltran, at p. 955), Beltran ultimately determined, based on the
circumstances at hand, “it was not reasonably probable that any
possible ambiguity engendered by counsel’s argument misled the
jury.” (Id. at p. 956.)
19
In sum, Ness has not demonstrated his trial counsel’s
performance was deficient based on his failure to object to the
wording of CALCRIM No. 570. Ness has accordingly failed to
establish ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Centeno, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 674; see also Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
C. Instructional Error – CALCRIM No. 626
The trial court did not err in withholding a jury instruction
on involuntary manslaughter based on an unconscious killing.
“When a person renders himself or herself unconscious
through voluntary intoxication and kills in that state, the killing
is attributed to his or her negligence in self-intoxicating to that
point, and is treated as involuntary manslaughter.” (People v.
Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 423.) “Unconsciousness for this
purpose need not mean that the actor lies still and
unresponsive . . . .” (Ibid.) Instead, “unconsciousness ‘ “can
exist . . . where the subject physically acts in fact but is not, at
the time, conscious of acting.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 424.)
CALCRIM No. 626 instructs on this theory of involuntary
manslaughter. (CALCRIM No. 626.) Over Ness’s objection, the
trial court refused to give CALCRIM No. 626, agreeing with the
People that insufficient evidence warranted the instruction.
Asserting this ruling was prejudicial error, Ness argues his
statements to police following his arrest and the testimony of his
expert, Dr. Ryan O’Connor, were substantial evidence showing
that, when he shot Bonilla, he was unconscious due to voluntary
intoxication.
We disagree. Although “ ‘ “the trial court must instruct on
the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence,” ’ ” including “all theories of a lesser included offense
which find substantial support in the evidence,” there is no such
20
obligation to instruct when that evidentiary support is lacking.
(People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 162
(Breverman).) Reviewing the question de novo and viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to defendant (People v.
Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137), we conclude the
trial evidence did not support an unconscious killing of any sort.
The evidence Ness cites could support that he was drunk at
the time of the shooting, that he had spotty memory of some
events occurring after Bonilla threw him to the ground, and that
alcohol consumption could have caused this memory loss. None
of this evidence, however, demonstrates he was unaware of his
actions when he shot Bonilla. Instead, uncontradicted evidence
bearing upon Ness’s state of mind in the moments before, during,
and after the shooting shows he was conscious of his actions and
understood their consequences.
As to his state of intoxication, Ness testified he had been
drinking throughout the day and had more than one glass of
vodka while drinking with Rodgers. Ness testified that as he was
walking toward Rodgers’s home after his fight with Bonilla, just
moments before the shooting, he “was blitzed” and “wasn’t feeling
any pain . . . .” Ness then clarified, however, that “[a]t that
moment . . . [he] still knew what was going on.” Therefore, per
his own trial testimony, Ness was under the influence of alcohol
yet remained aware of his actions at the time of the shooting.
Further, in a police interview introduced into evidence, Ness told
officers he “remember[ed] firing” his gun into Bonilla’s car and
that he was “not going to lie about that.”
Contrary to Ness’s argument, Dr. O’Connor did not
undermine Ness’s testimony by “linking [his] unconsciousness
with his intoxication.” Called to testify on Ness’s behalf, Dr.
21
O’Connor is an emergency medical physician and a forensic
medical expert. At trial, Dr. O’Connor explained the concepts of
post-traumatic amnesia and alcohol-induced blackout, also
known as alcohol-related amnesia.
Post-traumatic amnesia, Dr. O’Connor explained, “is a
state of derangement of brain function that can occur after a head
injury[,]” in which “the brain can have difficulty forming new
memories for a period of time . . . .” This condition “can occur
with or without a loss of consciousness” and “can last for minutes
or hours or even days depending on the severity of the head
injury.” Alcohol-induced blackout, Dr. O’Connor testified, “is a
somewhat similar concept[,]” as it is likewise characterized by “a
disruption in memory formation.” According to Dr. O’Connor:
“Alcohol, especially in high doses [and] especially when the
alcohol level increases very quickly can disrupt th[e] process of
encoding . . . [and] transferring short term memory to long term
memory. So people that drink a lot of alcohol very quickly, like
chronic alcoholics for example, can experience alcohol related
amnesia or a blackout where they don’t recall a specific period of
time because of the influence of alcohol on their brain.”
Ness’s counsel presented Dr. O’Connor with a hypothetical
based on Ness’s testimony regarding his drinking on the date of
the shooting, his fight with Bonilla and the resulting injury to his
head, and the memory loss Ness experienced thereafter. On
those facts, Dr. O’Connor opined that the memory loss Ness
described was “plausible” and may have been “trigger[ed] . . . [by]
heavy alcohol use and also head trauma.”
Notably, Dr. O’Connor did not opine whether Ness was
aware of his actions when he shot Bonilla. He only testified it
was plausible that Ness experienced the memory loss described
22
in his testimony due to his alcohol consumption and/or the closed
head injury he sustained during the fight. Similarly, in his police
interview, Ness did not state he lacked consciousness of his
actions at the time of the shooting. He told the police that he
knew he was the one who “went outside” after Bonilla and could
not claim self-defense. He saw Bonilla in his car, and “in his
mind at the time it was still an ongoing fight and [he] really
[didn’t] remember what transpired.”
However, “[d]efendant’s . . . inability to recall [an] event,
without more, [is] insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness
instruction.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 888;
People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 418 (Halvorsen)
[“That [the defendant] did not, by the time of trial, accurately
recall certain details of the shootings does not support an
inference he was unconscious when he committed them”].)
We therefore turn to other evidence illustrative of whether Ness
“lack[ed] awareness of his actions during the course of the
offense[ ].” (Halvorsen, at p. 418; see id. [observing “[t]he
complicated and purposive nature of [defendant’s] conduct in
driving from place to place, aiming at his victims, and shooting
them in vital areas of the body” suggested he was aware of his
actions while committing the offenses].)
At trial, Ness recalled in detail the events that took place in
the moments leading up to his fight with Bonilla, which preceded
the shooting by roughly 10 minutes. Ness testified how the tone
of the room shifted after Bonilla came home and began cooking
porkchops in the kitchen; that Bonilla had his back turned to
Ness; that Ness and Bonilla did not acknowledge one another;
and that after refilling his drink with a less-than-desired juice,
he remarked that “it just tasted horrible” and “made sure
23
[Bonilla] heard it” because Bonilla had drunk the beverages Ness
kept in the fridge such that Ness “got stuck with something [he]
really didn’t want to mix with [his] vodka.” Ness also recalled
verbatim the words he spoke to Bonilla after Rodgers went home
for dinner, why he said them, and Bonilla’s response.
Although Ness could not recall what happened in the
moments after Bonilla threw him to the ground, Ness testified
that he remembered he was walking outside, headed to see
Rodgers, when he saw Bonilla inside his car. Ness then pulled
out his gun and “immediately fired into the car” when he “saw
movement” and heard Bonilla “yelling something about a gun.”
Ness testified that he “pulled the trigger a few times” and said
“not a word” to Bonilla as he did so. At the time, Ness testified,
the car door was closed, the window was up, and the lighting was
“not very good,” as “[i]t was getting dark.” Ness stated he did not
“see [Bonilla] make any attempt to open the car door.” During
the shooting, Ness testified, he was afraid for his life and had
assumed, based on what he had seen and heard, “some[one] was
ready to shoot [him].” And Ness had previously told officers that
while he did not recall everything that transpired, he
“remember[ed] firing” his gun into the car and that he was “not
going to lie about that.” When Rodgers came to investigate the
gunshots he had heard, he saw Ness’s truck driving away.
Thus, even when viewed in the light most favorable to
Ness, the evidence does not demonstrate Ness was unconscious
due to voluntary intoxication when he shot Bonilla. To the
contrary, it shows he was aware of his actions and understood
their consequences, as demonstrated by his detailed description
of the surrounding events, his recollection of the shooting itself
and his thoughts at the time, and his attempt to flee immediately
24
thereafter by driving away in his truck. As there is no
substantial evidence of Ness’s unconsciousness arising from
voluntary intoxication at the time of the killing, the trial court
correctly refused to give CALCRIM No. 626. (See Breverman,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162.)
In any event, assuming CALCRIM No. 626 should have
been given, the trial court’s failure to do so was harmless.
“Error in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is
harmless when the jury necessarily decides the factual questions
posed by the omitted instructions adversely to defendant under
other properly given instructions.” (People v. Lewis (2001)
25 Cal.4th 610, 646.) In finding Ness guilty of second-degree
murder, the jury found true all of the firearm enhancement
allegations, including the allegation that Ness personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, a handgun, which caused
Bonilla great bodily injury and death. By finding intentionality,
the jury necessarily rejected Ness’s theory that he was
unconscious due to voluntary intoxication when he shot Bonilla.
Accordingly, Ness has not shown reversal is required based
on the trial court’s refusal to give CALCRIM No. 626.
D. Cumulative Error
Having found meritless Ness’s assertions of reversible
error, we reject his claim of cumulative error. (People v. Bolin
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 345 [rejecting “claim of cumulative
prejudice” after “find[ing] virtually no merit to defendant’s
individual assignments of error”]; People v. Sedillo (2015) 235
Cal.App.4th 1037, 1068 [“There can be no cumulative error if the
challenged rulings were not erroneous”].)
25
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SCHERB, J.
We Concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
26
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