People v. Richards CA1/1

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Filed 2/27/26 P. v. Richards CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171039
v.
ROYCE DEIONTE RICHARDS, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 01-22-01721)
Defendant and Appellant.

Nine months after Royce Deionte Richards committed an assault and
false imprisonment, his victim paid for one night in a motel room after seeing
Richards drive by her home multiple times. In this appeal, Richards
challenges $105.01 of the court’s restitution order on the grounds that the
motel expense was not proximately caused by his criminal conduct. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In June 2023, Richards pleaded guilty to numerous felony crimes
committed against four different women on separate dates1 with the

All statutory references are to the Penal Code. Richards pleaded guilty
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to committing assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4)) against four victims between June 2020 and May 2022, to
committing false imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237) against the same
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understanding he would be sentenced to six years in prison, subjected to 10-
year criminal protective orders (§ 136.2, subd. (i)), and required to pay
restitution to all victims on all counts including the dismissed counts, among
other terms. Jane Doe 3, whose restitution claim is the subject of this appeal,
was the victim of an assault and false imprisonment committed by Richards
in November 2021.
At the hearing when Richards pleaded guilty, and at his sentencing
hearing, Jane Doe 3 appeared in court to object to the plea agreement.
During the first hearing, before Richards pleaded guilty, Jane Doe 3
described the planned six-year prison sentence as “unacceptable” in part
because, “for nearly a year, . . . [she] had to . . . suffer [Richards’s] freedom
and see him at public parks”, which prevented her from taking her children
there. She explained that she “stay[ed] in a hotel for an amount of time” and
didn’t “sleep[] in [her] own bed for several months.” Jane Doe 3 had also
learned of other people who were victimized by Richards and believed he
“continued to show up and try to harass and intimidate . . . other victims.”
Jane Doe 3 claimed Richards had left her “disfigured,” “bloody”, “and
stranded[] in Vallejo.” The incident resulted in broken facial bones, a large
lump behind her ear, and spitting “out blood for 13 days” after the attack.
Crying, Jane Doe 3 explained, “it’s just a lot of embarrassment, and anxiety,
and, you know, everything connected to it has been really overwhelming.”
She also claimed she had “been living in fear for a long time now, because of

victims over that same period, and to making criminal threats (§ 422), against
Jane Doe 1 in May 2022. The balance of charges was dismissed. During
proceedings, the trial court referred to the victims as Jane Does 1 through 5.
Although five victims are referenced in the information, Richards pleaded
guilty to crimes involving all but Jane Doe 5.
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all of the large amount of evidence . . . and [because of] information [she has]
proving police used this man to target certain people for them.”
Jane Doe 3 would see Richards around town and made many phone
calls to the police that she felt went ignored. Even after Richards was in
custody, she struggled with anxiety from seeing vehicles like the one used to
kidnap her. She had lost “[c]ountless hours” of sleep and spent “hours and
hours of crying . . . .” Jane Doe 3 had also been informed that Richards was
known to be a “shooter” and she feared he had somehow learned her address.
She witnessed Richards drive by her home on more than one occasion, and
once while she and her son were out front working on a vehicle. She felt she
had “been made to suffer Mr. Richards’ unjust liberty for nearly a year before
he was finally incarcerated . . . .”
Richards was sentenced in July 2023. Jane Doe 3 appeared in court to
object once more to the plea deal. She also accused a police officer and a
district attorney of making sexual advances that she turned down. After
listening to her concerns, the trial court explained the court’s role when
presented plea agreements reflecting the “thoughtful negotiations of two
opposing sides.” Richards was sentenced to prison pursuant to the terms of
the plea agreement. Restitution for all victims was reserved.
At the restitution hearing in May 2024, Jane Doe 3 submitted a
restitution packet seeking $700 million.2 As relevant to this appeal, Jane
Doe 3 requested “hotel costs” and presented a receipt for $105.01, the cost of a

2 At variance with this total, the individual components of the claim included

$25,000 in “security expenses” for her home and car, $2,000 for a stolen phone,
$1,200 to obtain copies of court documents “pertaining to this case,” and $2 billion
for medical expenses including future therapy. On October 29, 2025, this court
granted Richards’s unopposed motion to augment the record with this restitution
packet.
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one-night motel room rental plus tax. When the court asked why she felt she
had to stay at a motel, she replied that “[she] saw [Richards] drive by [her]
home multiple times” and had been told Richards “is known to be [a]
shooter.” “I even saw him outside of my home drive by when I was out front
working on my vehicle with my son, and so I didn’t feel safe there.” She also
feared the police and their retaliation toward her.
Counsel for Richards disputed the entirety of Jane Doe 3’s restitution
claim, challenging its accuracy and commenting that the underlying offense
from almost three years earlier resulted in Jane Doe 3 being discharged from
the hospital with ibuprofen and without any significant long-term injuries.
The court announced it intended to “fashion an order of some
restitution and then deny others without prejudice . . . .” It made orders for
restitution concerning Jane Doe 3’s missing cell phone and for her costs to
copy court documents. Other claims regarding security, medical, and therapy
costs were denied without prejudice, subject to further proof. Two billion
dollars, the court added, was not “a realistic estimate of therapy even if it
were to continue for the remainder of Jane Doe 3’s lifetime.” The court also
confirmed that Richards had been “in the community” at the time she stayed
at the motel. Due to technical issues that limited Richards’s ability to
participate by videoconference, the restitution hearing was continued to a
new date.
At the next hearing, Richards’s counsel argued against restitution for
the motel room because Jane Doe 3 lacked credibility and there was not “a
satisfactory nexus between this particular hotel room and her
victimization . . . .” The prosecutor responded that, during proceedings, Jane
Doe 3 had made it clear to his office “she was seeing the defendant in public.”

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She would see him in various places: around the downtown Concord area, at
a 7-Eleven store, and in an area where Richards was transient at the time.
The court ordered Richards to pay $105.01 as restitution for the one-
night motel stay.
II. DISCUSSION
A. General Principles of Victim Restitution
In California, restitution for victims of crime is “constitutionally and
statutorily mandated.” (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039,
1045.) The state constitution grants victims the right to seek restitution and
requires the people who commit crimes to pay for the losses they cause. (Cal.
Const., art. I, §§ 28, subds. (b)(13)(A), (B).) To implement this requirement,
the Legislature enacted section 1202.4, a statute that requires criminal
defendants to make restitution to victims “in every case in which a victim has
suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct.” (§§ 1202.4,
subds. (a)(3)(B), (f); People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 24.) A
victim's right to restitution is “ ‘broadly and liberally construed’ ” and “[t]he
term ‘economic losses’ is . . . entitled to an expansive interpretation.” (In re
Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132–1133.)
Defendants are entitled to a hearing before a judge to determine the
amount of restitution, which must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(1); People v. Trout-Lacy (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th
369, 373.) The court enjoys wide discretion over the source and kind of
information it may consider. (People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266,
1275.) “ ‘ “ ‘This is so because a hearing to establish the amount of restitution
does not require the formalities of other phases of a criminal prosecution.’ ” ’ ”
(Ibid.) Economic losses may be “based on the amount of loss claimed by the
victim” or upon “any other showing to the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)

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“At a victim restitution hearing, a prima facie case for restitution is
made by the People based in part on a victim's testimony on, or other claim or
statement of, the amount of . . . her economic loss. (Citations.) ‘Once the
victim has [i.e., the People have] made a prima facie showing . . ., the burden
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the amount of the loss is other
than that claimed by the victim. [Citations.]’ (Citation.)” (People v. Millard,
supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) The court’s restitution order must, to the
extent possible, reflect “a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse
the victim . . . for every determined economic loss . . . .” (§ 1202.4,
subd. (f)(3).)
On appeal, “we review the trial court's restitution order for abuse of
discretion.” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663.) “ ‘[E]ven though
the trial court has broad discretion in making a restitution award, that
discretion is not unlimited.’ ” (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493,
498.) It may not be arbitrary or capricious. (Ibid.) But “ ‘[w]hen there is a
factual and rational basis for the amount . . . ordered by the trial court, no
abuse of discretion will be found’ ” on appeal. (Id. at p. 499) “ ‘ “[T]he power
of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether
there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support
the trial court's findings. ’ ” (People v. Keichler, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1045.)
B. The Trial Court Properly Found that the Motel Stay was an Economic
Loss Proximately Caused by Richards’s Criminal Conduct
Richards challenges the order directing him to reimburse Jane Doe 3
for the cost of the motel. He contends the order must be reversed because
there was insufficient evidence his crimes against her in November 2021

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were the proximate cause of the motel stay nine months later in August 2022.
We disagree.
An economic loss has been suffered “as a result of the defendant’s
conduct” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)) when there is a proximate causal connection
between his criminal conduct and that loss. (People v. Jones (2010)
187 Cal.App.4th 418, 425.) California courts have adopted the “ ‘substantial
factor’ ” test to evaluate proximate cause. (People v. Holmberg (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1321–1322; People v. Foalima (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th
1376, 1396 [“trial court's task was to determine whether the criminal conduct
for which defendant was convicted was the proximate cause of the damage to
. . . clothing and household items”]; People v. Jones, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th
at p. 427 [case remanded for trial court to decide restitution liability
“consistent with the principles of proximate causation”].) This test requires
only that the defendant’s criminal conduct constitute more than a
“ ‘ “negligible or theoretical” ’ ” cause of the victim’s loss. (People v. Holmberg,
supra, 195 Cal.App.4th, at p. 1321–1322) “ ‘Thus, “a force which plays only
an ‘infinitesimal’ or ‘theoretical’ part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss
is not a substantial factor” . . . but a very minor force that does cause harm is
a substantial factor.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) Phrased alternatively, “the
defendant's criminal conduct must be more than a ‘trivial or remote’ factor
contributing to the victim's loss, but it need not be the ‘sole’ cause of the loss.”
(In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1101; People v. Holmberg, supra, 195
Cal.App.4th at p. 1321–1322 [there can be more than one cause of injury].)
Notwithstanding the nine-month interval, Richards’s criminal conduct
constituted far more than a negligible, infinitesimal, or theoretical cause for
Jane Doe 3’s decision to rent a motel room. She only feared him because he
had attacked and falsely imprisoned her. Months later, as he continued to

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live in the community before his arrest, Jane Doe 3 again feared for her
safety after seeing Richards drive down her street multiple times, perhaps
having learned where she lived. Under these circumstances, Richards’s
crimes against her are substantial factors causing Jane Doe 3 to incur the
cost of hiding for one night.
Independent intervening causes may cut off a defendant’s restitution
liability. But to be “ ‘ “ ‘ “independent[,]” the intervening cause must be
‘unforeseeable . . . an extraordinary and abnormal occurrence, which rises to
the level of an exonerating, superseding cause.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Foalima,
supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1397.) This is not the case here. That the
presence of her attacker driving down her street multiple times would
motivate Jane Doe 3 to pay for one night away from home strikes us as an
expense that is neither extraordinary nor abnormal. Quite the opposite, it is
an expense well within the reasonably foreseeable consequences of Richards’s
crimes against her. (People v. Jones, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 [“ ‘If an
intervening cause is a normal and reasonably foreseeable result of
defendant's original act the intervening act is ‘dependent’ and not a
superseding cause, and will not relieve defendant of liability’ ”].)
We reject Richards’s claim that the restitution order was not supported
by substantial evidence. He argues that because Richards never threatened
her or “gave her the impression that he would cause her harm” during their
“chance encounters” in the community, Jane Doe 3 had no reason to feel “so
unsafe at home that she needed to stay at [a] Motel 6” in August. He
contends the fact that Jane Doe 3 crossed paths with Richards without
renting a motel room before August shows that Richards was not a threat to

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her.3 And, although she claimed to have learned about other misconduct
committed by Richards in the community, “[t]he most recent alleged criminal
conduct Doe 3 heard about . . . occurred in March 2022”, “five months prior to
her one-night [motel] stay . . . .”
These observations do not reveal the insufficiency Richards urges.
They are interpretations of the evidence and of Jane Doe 3’s credibility the
trial court was free to accept or reject. On appeal, however, “ ‘[w]e do not
reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact.’ ”
(People v. Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) Here, the evidence was
sufficient. After confirming Richards had been out of custody at the time
Jane Doe 3 stayed at the motel, the court credited Jane Doe 3’s explanation
for staying there. Thus, as the circumstances before the trial court
reasonably justified its findings, the restitution order will not be overturned
simply because the circumstances might also support an alternate or contrary
finding. (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the order. The court did not abuse its
discretion by ordering restitution for the motel room.
DISPOSITION
The restitution order is affirmed.

3 We do not draw this same conclusion from the record. When Jane Doe 3
first objected to the plea agreement, she told the court she had “stay[ed] in a hotel
for an amount of time” and “wasn’t even sleeping in [her] own bed for several
months.”
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_________________________
SMILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
HUMES, P. J.

_________________________
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

People v. Richards / (A171039)

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