People v. Starr CA2/1

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Filed 2/24/26 P. v. Starr CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337884

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA097512)
v.

REGGIE STARR,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kelly M. Kelley, Judge. Affirmed.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Penal Code section 1001.361 grants trial courts discretion
to permit certain defendants with “qualifying mental disorders” to
participate in “pretrial diversion”—that is, “ ‘the postponement of
prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, . . . to allow the
defendant to undergo mental health treatment.’ ” (People v. Frahs
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626 (Frahs), quoting § 1001.36, subd. (c).)
Appellant Reggie Starr challenges an order denying his request for
section 1001.36 diversion.2 We affirm.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Starr did not prove the symptoms of his mental disorders “would
respond to mental health treatment.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1).)
Accordingly, Starr failed to make a prima facie showing he is
“suitable for . . . diversion” (id., subd. (c)), and the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Starr’s request.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Circumstances of Underlying Offenses
“Late in the evening of December 23, 2017, [victim] K.B.
was at home watching a movie on TV with his minor son and
a woman that K.B. had recently met. At around 1:00 a.m., the
woman left, and Starr and an unidentified accomplice came in.
K.B. had dozed off, but he woke up when he heard the sound of
the men entering. Starr pointed a gun at K.B., demanded money,
and asked where his safe was. Starr’s accomplice took jewelry
from K.B. and the son. Starr then led K.B. and his son into a

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Because Starr sought relief under section 1001.36 only
after a trial—specifically, following this court’s conditional
reversal of his convictions—we use the term “diversion” rather
than “pretrial diversion.”

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bedroom while Starr’s accomplice searched the premises and
took additional valuables. [¶] After taking K.B.’s wallet and
cell phone, Starr took K.B.’s car keys and ordered K.B. and the
son to get into the back seat of K.B.’s car. Starr drove the car
while his accomplice kept a gun pointed at K.B. and the son.
(People v. Starr (Apr. 26, 2021, B304944) [nonpub. opn.] (Starr).)
While Starr was driving, “two women in a different car pulled
up next to [K.B.’s] car. The two women were later identified [as]
[Starr’s] girlfriend and [K.B.’s] houseguest.” “Starr drove about
a mile from K.B.’s home, and ordered K.B. and the son out of
the car. Starr said, ‘[Y]ou better not call the police,’ then drove
away.” (Starr, supra, B304944.)

B. Convictions and Conditional Reversal
On June 23, 2018, a jury convicted Starr of various offenses
against K.B. and K.B.’s son. That same day, section 1001.36
became effective. (Starr, supra, B304944.) Starr appealed from
the judgment of conviction, arguing, inter alia, that he should be
allowed to request diversion.
This court agreed and conditionally reversed Starr’s
convictions for residential robbery (§ 211), kidnapping for
carjacking (§ 209.5, subd. (a)), and dissuading a witness
by force (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1)),3 “pending the outcome of a
hearing regarding Starr’s request for . . . diversion under . . .
section 1001.36.” (Starr, supra, B304944.)

3 We also reversed, on other grounds, his convictions on two
counts of kidnapping in violation of section 207, subdivision (a)
and carjacking in violation of section 215, subdivision (a).

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C. Diversion Hearing
Following remand, on April 16, 2024, the trial court held
a hearing on Starr’s request for section 1001.36 diversion, which
respondent the People opposed.

1. Background: Section 1001.36 Diversion
Under section 1001.36, a defendant is “eligible” for
diversion if (1) the defendant suffers from a qualifying mental
disorder and (2) the disorder played a significant role in the
commission of the charged offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)
& (2).) If a defendant satisfies these eligibility requirements,
the court may deem him or her “suitable” for diversion
only if the defendant also establishes all of the following:
(1) The defendant’s “symptoms of the mental disorder causing,
contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would
respond to mental health treatment” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1));
(2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives his or her
right to a speedy trial (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2)); (3) The defendant
agrees to comply with treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3)); and
(4) The defendant “will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18”—meaning a
risk that the defendant will commit one of several statutorily
enumerated violent felonies known as “ ‘ “super strikes” ’ ”
(People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449)—“if treated
in the community” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)).
A hearing on suitability for diversion “shall be informal
and may proceed on offers of proof, reliable hearsay, and
argument of counsel.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (e).) “The court may
consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a
qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s
treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history,

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the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court
deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)

2. Psychological Expert Report
To establish his eligibility and suitability for diversion,
Starr submitted a report of Dr. Lorraine E. Caudra, Ph.D.,
Chief Psychologist at the USC Institute of Psychiatry, Law,
and Behavioral Science (the Caudra report). Caudra based
the report on her review of documents describing Starr’s social,
mental health, and criminal history, which she summarized in
the report, as well as an approximately three-hour interview
with Starr. She concluded Starr met the diagnostic criteria for
two mental health disorders to which section 1001.36 applies—
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and bipolar disorder
(see § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1))—and offered opinions on all
section 1001.36 eligibility and suitability requirements.

a. Starr’s social, mental health, and
criminal history
Starr spent a significant portion of his childhood in foster
care. His foster and family caregivers repeatedly abused and
neglected him. His school and child welfare services records
reflect diagnoses for neurodevelopmental disorders, such as
attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and learning
disabilities. In school, he received special education and
counseling services “to address his behavioral and academic
performance problems.”
Starr has an extensive juvenile criminal history. At
age 11, “on two separate occasions,” authorities “ ‘counseled
and released’ ” him on charges of battery. At age 13, a court
sustained petitions alleging false imprisonment and attempted

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murder. Based on a competency to stand trial evaluation, Starr
spent a year in a “residential treatment program,” rather than
juvenile detention. Mental health professionals supervising the
program diagnosed him with bipolar disorder, PTSD, and ADHD.
He often did not comply with program rules and requirements.
Specifically, he “left the program without permission[,] engaged
in drug use[,] left home without permission while on [a] home
pass,” and at times refused to take prescribed antidepressant
and mood-stabilizing antipsychotic medication.
Once released from the program on probation, Starr
declined to continue taking his prescribed psychiatric medication
at all. Between the ages of 14 and 17—so, beginning within
months of his release from the residential treatment program—
courts sustained multiple juvenile petitions against him. As a
result, he spent much of this time period in juvenile probation
camps.
Starr was 19 at the time of his final release from a juvenile
camp in March 2017. In July 2017, a court convicted him of
carrying a concealed dirk/dagger. While still on probation from
that conviction, Starr committed the offenses underlying his
current request for diversion.
While in jail in 2019, county medical personnel diagnosed
Starr with depression with psychotic features, PTSD, and
stimulant use disorder. They prescribed him antidepressant and
mood-stabilizing antipsychotic medication. Starr reported being
medication compliant.
In March 2020, he was transferred to prison, where
prison medical personnel again prescribed antidepressant and
antipsychotic medication. These prescriptions were still in place
at the time Caudra evaluated him. Prison records reflect Starr

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sometimes does not take his prescribed medication. Starr told
Caudra this is because he sometimes does not get up in time to
take the medication.
In December 2020, Starr participated in a violent physical
altercation with another prison inmate. He had not taken
his medication that day. He told authorities that he did not
remember the altercation, but that when he does not take
his medication, “bad things happen.” Prison medical personnel
reported they could not establish a nexus between the incident
and Starr’s mental health conditions. In early 2021, Starr
continued to display “aggressive” behavior in prison. As of
October 2021, however, he was “ ‘engag[ing] in his mental health
treatment’ ” and taking his medication.

b. Starr’s June 2023 interview with
Caudra
Starr “vehemently” denied having committed the instant
offenses, insisting—as he had at trial—that he was not in
town when they occurred. According to Starr, on that day
and for several months beforehand, he had not been taking his
psychiatric medications and was using alcohol and drugs daily.
He also had not slept for two days. Starr told Caudra he
sometimes hears “ ‘voices telling [him] people are after [him]’ ”
and to hurt others. Starr stated he was willing to comply with
the requirements of diversion, because he knew the alternative is
incarceration.

c. Conclusions and recommendations
Caudra concluded Starr “continues to meet [the] diagnostic
criteria” for PTSD, unspecified bipolar disorder, antisocial
personality disorder and substance abuse disorder (currently

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in remission due to his controlled environment in prison). He has
a history of using cocaine, LSD, opioids, methamphetamine and
ecstasy.
Caudra concluded that “other than his statement [that he
slept] for several hours on the date of the instant offense, [Starr]
did not report any other symptoms that would support or negate
whether his mental health issues contributed to the commission
of the instant offense,” assuming, contrary to Starr’s assertions,
that he committed it.
Caudra concluded that, “[i]n general . . . [Starr’s] mental
health symptoms could respond to mental health treatment.”
“[H]is adherence to his psychiatric medication regimen” would
address some of these symptoms. Without also addressing
the effects of his childhood trauma, however, “he will still
likely engage in problematic and impulsive behaviors.”
Thus, Starr would also need to participate in “evidence-based
psychotherapeutic treatment[ ] . . . for people who have trauma-
related problems.”
Given Caudra’s diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder
and that Starr “has not shown a great deal of responsiveness
to therapeutic interventions or legal sanctions[,] . . [o]verall,
[his] response to treatment, should he actively participate in
psychotherapeutic treatment, is expected to be slow, challenging,
and with setbacks.” Caudra further concluded: “[G]iven that
[he] has a history of violating probation and not complying with
treatment, it is questionable whether he would comply with the
conditions of diversion.”
Finally, Caudra identified “several factors that increase
[Starr’s] risk for reoffending if he is released into the community
at this time” including “poor mental health treatment compliance

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outside of a structured setting” and his “lack of response to
therapeutic interventions and criminal sanctions.” According to
Caudra, “[i]n order to address his risk of danger to public safety,”
Starr would need a “[l]ong-term (at least one year) residential
dual diagnosis treatment program with close supervision”
(underscoring omitted) and a “highly structured daily schedule.”
Caudra did “not recommend[ ] that he be released into the
community and be expected to successfully comply with any
court-ordered conditions.”

3. Court’s Ruling
The court concluded Starr had failed to make a prima facie
showing of several section 1001.36 eligibility and suitability
factors. First, Starr had not shown that symptoms of his
qualifying mental health disorders were “a significant factor in
the commission of the charged offense.” Rather, Starr denied
committing the offenses, and Caudra could not identify any
symptom Starr reported experiencing around the time of the
crimes that could have contributed to them. Second, Starr
had not shown that the “symptoms motivating the criminal
behavior would respond to mental health treatment, because
again the court has no evidence before it that the defendant
was experiencing any of those symptoms at or near the time he
committed these crimes.” Third, the court had “a concern with
regard to . . . [Starr’s] willingness to comply with the proposed
treatment plan. Although he has articulated that he would
comply, his history suggests otherwise,” as Caudra likewise
concluded. Finally, the court found that granting Starr’s
diversion request would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety. Based on “an ongoing pattern of violent criminal
history . . . as well as the facts of the current case and the

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information contained in the [Caudra] report . . . with regard to
his prospects for rehabilitation, . . . [Starr] is likely to commit a
super strike offense.” In this context, the court noted the current
offenses involved “great violence and callousness” as well as
“planning and sophistication.” The court also expressed general
“concern[ ] . . . that there is not an appropriate treatment plan
that would suffice to rehabilitate [Starr] while simultaneously
protect[ing] the public.”
The court denied Starr’s request for diversion. Starr timely
appealed.

DISCUSSION
Whether a defendant is eligible and suitable for diversion
under section 1001.36 depends on the statutory requirements
outlined above. (See Factual Background ante, part C.1.) If “the
defendant makes a prima facie showing” that he or she meets all
of these requirements, and “the trial court is satisfied that the
recommended program of mental health treatment will meet the
specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant, then
the court may grant . . . diversion.” (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 627; see also § 1001.36, subds. (a), (b)(3) & (c)(1).) We review
a ruling on a section 1001.36 motion for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147.) We
review the factual underpinnings of that decision for substantial
evidence. (Ibid.)
Section 1001.36’s third suitability requirement—that
the defendant’s symptoms will respond to mental health
treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1))—is dispositive of the instant
appeal. Substantial evidence—specifically, Starr’s history of
noncompliance with mental health treatment and court-ordered
restrictions—supports the court’s finding that the proposed

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treatment plan will not effectively address Starr’s symptoms.
Accordingly, and as we explain further below, the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Starr’s request for diversion.
The diversion statute does not require, as a prerequisite
for suitability, an express finding that the defendant is likely
to comply with the proposed mental health treatment. (See
generally § 1001.36.) Subdivision (c)(3) requires only that
“[t]he defendant agree to comply with treatment as a condition
of diversion.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3), italics added.) Other
aspects of the statute, however, implicitly obligate the court to
determine whether the defendant will likely follow through on
this agreement. For example, and most relevant to the instant
appeal, a court cannot determine whether the defendant’s
symptoms will “respond to mental health treatment” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(1)) without also assessing whether the defendant is
likely to comply with aspects of the treatment that require such
compliance to be effective.
Here, Caudra described Starr’s compliance as integral to
the efficacy of the contemplated treatment plan in multiple ways.
The treatment plan includes regular psychiatric medication, and
thus requires Starr to consistently take that medication. Caudra
also deemed a highly-structured residential program the only
safe means of effectively treating Starr for at least a year. This
requires Starr to comply with the rules and restrictions of such
a program over a sustained period of time. Finally, Caudra
opined that Starr must participate in psychotherapy if his PTSD
symptoms and antisocial behaviors are to improve.
Starr generally agreed to comply with treatment
as a condition of diversion, including specifically taking his
medication. But the court questioned whether Starr was likely

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to actually do so, and substantial evidence supports the court’s
skepticism. Starr has a history of noncompliance with his
psychiatric medications, absconding from a residential treatment
program, and generally not following restrictions placed on him
both in the community and while incarcerated. Indeed, he was
on probation when he committed the offenses for which he now
seeks diversion. Moreover, based on this “history of violating
probation and not complying with treatment,” Caudra concluded
“it [was] questionable whether [Starr] would comply with the
conditions of diversion.”
Starr offers no evidence suggesting his past noncompliance
is the result of any of his qualifying mental health disorders.
And even if he had, section 1001.36 does not offer diversion to
all who struggle with mental health disorders—only those who,
inter alia, are willing and able to participate in treatment that
may assist with these issues. (See § 1001.36, subds. (b), (c) &
(f)(1)(A)(i); Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 627.) We have concluded
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that Starr is not
so able. We are cognizant that, in deciding whether a defendant
meets the criteria for diversion, “the ‘strong legislative preference
for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits
of such treatment to both the offending individual and the
community’ should inform a trial court’s discretion.” (Vaughn v.
Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 138.) But that
preference does not negate the statute’s eligibility and suitability
requirements. Thus, the court did not err in concluding Starr did
not meet one of these requirements and was thus not a suitable
candidate for diversion.
Moreover, even if Starr had met the eligibility and
suitability requirements for diversion, “a court might [still]

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reject diversion if it concluded that the proposed treatment
services . . . could not effectively address [his] particular
diagnosis.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th
882, 895; see § 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i) [diversion authorized
by the statute requires that “[t]he court is satisfied that the
recommended . . . program of mental health treatment will
meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the
defendant”]; accord, Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 627.) Here,
substantial evidence supports the court’s implicit finding that
the contemplated treatment plan, the efficacy of which depended
on Starr’s willingness to comply in ways he has historically
struggled with, would not “meet [his] specialized mental health
treatment needs.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).)
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Starr’s
request for diversion.4

4 We need not and do not address Starr’s arguments
regarding the court’s analysis of section 1001.36 requirements
other than the responsiveness of his symptoms to treatment
under section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(1). If, as we conclude is the
case, the court did not err in finding Starr does not meet this one
requirement, we must affirm. (See generally § 1001.36, subds. (a)
& (b); accord, Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 627.)

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

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