CourtListener 10799787•In re C.V. CA2/6
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Filed 2/24/26 In re C.V. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re C.V. et al., Persons 2d Juv. No. B347765
Coming Under the Juvenile (Super. Ct. Nos. J073352,
Court Law. J073357, J073358)
(Ventura County)
VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
STEVEN V. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
M.F. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her eight-year-old son, R.F.
and one-year-old twins, S.V. and C.V., and selecting adoption as
the permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26.) On appeal,
Mother challenges the court’s ruling only as to R.F.2 She
contends the court erroneously found the parental benefit
exception and the sibling relationship exception inapplicable. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 2023, Mother’s five children, Ry.F. (15),
Ma.F. (8), R.F. (4), and twins C.V. and S.V. (23 months) were
taken into protective custody. Mother was living in a “dirty”
motel room with some of the children. The motel manager saw
people come in and out of Mother’s room at night. During a home
visit, a social worker saw a man come out of Mother’s bathroom.
He appeared to have just used drugs in the bathroom. Mother
was also not getting proper care or treatment for S.V., who had
cancer.
The Ventura County Human Services Agency (the Agency)
filed juvenile petitions alleging the children suffered or were at
risk of suffering harm because of Mother’s failure to adequately
supervise or provide for them with adequate food, clothing,
shelter, or medical treatment. (§ 300, subd. (b).) The petitions
alleged Mother had a history of substance abuse and engaged in
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 R.F.’s father passed away while Mother was pregnant. He
is not a party to this appeal.
2
domestic disputes.3 The children were sent to different
placements with R.F. sent to a foster family in Ventura County.
The juvenile court sustained the petitions and declared the
children dependents of the court. The court terminated
jurisdiction as to Ma.F. and gave full physical and legal custody
to his father. As to the other children, the court ordered
reunification services for Mother.
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court adopted
the Agency’s recommendation to continue services. At the
contested 12-month review hearing, the Agency recommended
that reunification services be terminated, that Ry.F. be placed in
“Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement (APPLA),”
and a section 366.26 hearing be set for R.F. and the twins. The
juvenile court found Mother had not complied with her case plan
because she had not found stable housing, addressed her
substance abuse issues, drug tested, or participated in
counseling. The court adopted the Agency’s recommendations,
terminated Mother’s reunification services, and set a section
366.26 hearing for R.F. and the twins.
At the section 366.26 hearing, Mother, Steven V., Ry.F.,
and the social worker assigned to the case testified. The Agency
recommended terminating parental rights to R.F., C.V., and S.V.,
and counsel for these children agreed. Mother asserted the
parental benefit and sibling relationship exceptions applied.
3 The petitions also included allegations against Steven V.,
who is father to C.V. and S.V. He filed separate notices of appeal
in this matter. His appointed counsel filed a brief informing this
court that counsel found no arguable issues on appeal. (In re
Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 846.) After giving Steven V. an
opportunity to raise any contentions and his failure to raise any
issues, we dismissed his appeals.
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The juvenile court found R.F., C.V., and S.V. generally
adoptable and found neither the parental benefit exception nor
the sibling relationship exception applicable.
DISCUSSION
Parental benefit exception
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the
parental benefit exception did not apply. We disagree.
After reunification services have been terminated, the court
sets a section 366.26 hearing “ ‘to select and implement a
permanent plan for the child.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
614, 630 (Caden C.).) The juvenile court may order one of three
alternatives: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care.
The statutory preference is for adoption. (In re Katherine J.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316; § 366.26 subd. (b)(1).) If the
juvenile court finds the child adoptable, it must terminate
parental rights unless one of several statutory exceptions applies.
(§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1)(B).)
One exception, the parental benefit exception, exists if the
parent establishes by a preponderance of evidence: “(1) regular
visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of
which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631, italics omitted; § 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).) If the parent meets her burden, then the exception
applies because it would not be in the child’s best interest to
terminate parental rights, and the court must select a permanent
plan other than adoption. (Caden C., at pp. 636–637.) We review
for substantial evidence the first two elements. We review the
third element under the abuse of discretion standard. (Id. at pp.
639–640.)
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Here, it is undisputed Mother met the first element of
regular visitation and contact. The focus is on the second and
third elements.
1. Beneficial relationship
Regarding the second element of a beneficial relationship,
Mother contends the juvenile court applied the wrong legal
standard by focusing on whether Mother occupied a “parental
role” in R.F.’s life. We are not persuaded. The juvenile court
applied the correct law, stating that it must “determine whether
the child . . . ha[s] a substantial positive emotional attachment to
each parent, the kind of attachment implying that the child
would benefit from continuing that relationship.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The court indicated it considered
factors including age of the children; the portion of the children’s
lives spent in the parents’ custody versus while they have been
removed; the positive or negative effect of the interaction between
the parent and the child; and the children’s particular needs
among other factors that the Court deems appropriate. (Id. at p.
632.)
In analyzing these factors, the juvenile court acknowledged
that R.F. was in a “different situation” than the twins because of
his age and that he spent a greater portion of his life in Mother’s
custody. But the court noted that visitation has never been
unsupervised. And, based on the reports of these supervised
visits, the court found that Mother did not demonstrate more
than “frequent [and] loving contact” and that pleasant visits were
insufficient to meet the second element.
Although the juvenile court considered whether Mother
occupied a parental role, Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614 does
not prohibit such consideration. (In re Katherine J., supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at pp. 319–321 [no error where the juvenile court did
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not “summarily state” that the father did not occupy a parental
role, and it further explained its reasoning with evidence
establishing that a beneficial relationship did not exist]; In re
A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th at 1131, 1157 [“whether that parent
has a parental role, is a relevant consideration” and Caden C.
does not state otherwise].) The juvenile court here applied proper
considerations and examined the evidence, including the
“information in the reports regarding the interaction with the
children” during supervised visits to conclude a beneficial
relationship was not established.
Here, the evidence supports R.F. did not have a
“substantial positive emotional” attachment to Mother. The
Agency observed the quality of their family time during the
supervised visits have “not been sufficient enough to demonstrate
[Mother’s] ability to parent independently and safely nor have
they progressed to unsupervised visits.” During visits, Mother’s
attention is “diverted towards the twins,” leaving R.F. “feeling
left out.” And, R.F. “separate[s] easily at the end of each visit
with no concerns” and no signs of distress. In sum, the juvenile
court did not err in finding Mother did not meet the second
element.
2. Detriment
With respect to the third element, Mother contends the
juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to adequately
balance the detriment of terminating Mother’s parental rights
against the benefits of adoption.
In finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable, the
juvenile court need not “recite specific findings relative to its
conclusions regarding any or all of the three elements of the
exception.” (In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156.) We
decline to equate the court’s succinct ruling with the failure to
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conduct a thorough analysis. And here, the court’s ruling reflects
that it properly analyzed the third element.
“When [the juvenile court] weighs whether termination
would be detrimental, . . . the question is just whether losing the
relationship with the parent would harm the child to an extent
not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive
home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Here, the
juvenile court looked at this case “from the perspective of [R.F.],
what is in his best interest for him.” It noted that R.F. enjoyed
his foster placement and “gets stability, . . . security, and that’s
what children need.” The evidence supports these findings.
R.F. has been with the same foster placement since the
beginning of the dependency case and has bonded with his foster
family. He refers to his foster brother as his brother and his
foster mother as his mother. He “consistently seek[s] out [his]
prospective adoptive parent[] to meet [his] daily physical and
emotional needs.” R.F. also expressed that he did not want to
leave his current placement and feels safe.
“A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court
has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination’ ” ’ ” such
that “ ‘ “ ‘no judge could reasonably have made the order.’ ” ’ ”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) Given the lack of
evidence that R.F. had a substantial positive attachment to
Mother and the substantial evidence establishing R.F.’s stability
and close relationship with his adoptive family, the juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion in finding Mother did not meet the
third element.
Sibling relationship exception
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the
sibling relationship exception inapplicable. Mother’s contention
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only pertains to Ry.F. and. Ma.F., and not to the twins. We again
disagree.
An exception to termination of parental rights exists when
“[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling
relationship . . . .” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) To make this
determination, courts consider “the nature and extent of the
relationship, including, but not limited to, [1] whether the child
was raised with a sibling in the same home, [2] whether the child
shared significant common experiences or has existing close and
strong bonds with a sibling, and [3] whether ongoing contact is in
the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional
interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through
adoption.” (Ibid.)
“If the court determines terminating parental rights would
substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is
then directed to weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that
sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by
the permanency of adoption.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 942, 952.) “[W]e apply the substantial evidence
standard to the juvenile court’s underlying factual
determinations, and the abuse of discretion standard to the
court’s weighing of competing interests.” (In re D.O. (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 166, 174.)
Here, the juvenile court acknowledged “there would be
some difficulty for [R.F.], if he were not to see his brother [Ma.F.]
or his sister [Ry.F.],” but it found that the sibling relationships
did not “outweigh the stability that [R.F.] would have with the
permanency in an adopted home.” The court did not abuse its
discretion. R.F. was six years old at the time of the section
366.26 hearing and had not been raised in the same home as
Ma.F. or Ry.F. for almost two years. Ry.F. testified that she
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“ha[s]n’t really seen [R.F.] like often,” and during visits, he “just
plays . . .usually with [Ma.F.]” With Ma.F., R.F. appeared to
have a closer relationship. The social worker observed this
“brotherly” relationship, but she nevertheless reported there was
“not a compelling reason to determine that termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the children.” R.F. also
did not appear to have a hard time separating from his siblings
after visits.
R.F. also appeared to have formed a strong bond with his
foster brother and refers to him as his brother. R.F. appeared
happy and stable, and he expressed his wish to never leave his
foster family’s home. In sum, Mother has not demonstrated that
this is a “rare” case in which the sibling relationship exception
applies. (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
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Gilbert A. Romero, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Tiffany N. North, County Counsel, Joseph J. Randazzo,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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