People v. Sanchez CA2/1

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Filed 2/23/26 P. v. Sanchez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B339394

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA082879)
v.

ENRIQUE SANCHEZ, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Reversed.
John Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Theresa A. Patterson,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Enrique Sanchez, Jr. appeals from a
postjudgment order denying at the prima facie stage his petition
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.61 for resentencing. The
Attorney General concedes, and we agree, the record of conviction
does not show as a matter of law that defendant is ineligible for
resentencing on his murder and attempted murder convictions.
The jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequence
doctrine, and the record does not show the jury necessarily found
all elements of murder and attempted murder under current law.
We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s
petition.

BACKGROUND
We summarize only those facts from the trial testimony
pertinent to this appeal.

1. First amended information
In the 2010 first amended information, the People charged
defendant with the murder of Okpara Wright and the attempted
willful, deliberate, and premediated murder of Herbert Jordan.
With respect to both counts, the People alleged pursuant to
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) that defendant personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm which caused great bodily
injury and death to Wright. The People also alleged additional
firearm enhancements and a gang enhancement.

2. Trial
A jury tried defendant alone. Jordan, the victim of the
attempted murder, testified that on April 1, 2009, he was in Long

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

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Beach at a bus stop with his friend Wright. Jordan testified he
was a member of the East Coast Crips gang prior to 2003.
Jordan further testified a truck pulled up to where Jordan and
Wright were sitting, and the back seat passenger yelled, “ ‘What
that Longo gang like’ ” which is the same as asking, “Where are
you from.” Longo was a Long Beach gang. Jordan and Wright
crossed the street to avoid the truck.
The truck returned and stopped near Jordan and Wright.
The front passenger and the rear passenger exited the vehicle.
Both passengers started shooting, and Jordan thought Wright
“got hit from both directions . . . .” Shortly after the shooting,
Jordan told an officer both the rear passenger and the front
passenger shot at Wright and Jordan. In a photographic lineup
after the shooting, Jordan identified defendant as one of the
shooters.
Based on the evidence found at the scene of the shooting, a
ballistic expert testified there were two firearms shot at the
murder scene. Five casings were ejected from a .45 caliber
semiautomatic. Other bullet fragments were from a .38 or .357
revolver. A deputy medical examiner testified Wright died of
multiple gunshot wounds.

3. Relevant jury instructions
The court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting and
also instructed the jury that an aider and abettor is guilty not
only of the crime he aided and abetted but is also guilty of “any
other crime committed by a principal which is a natural and
probable consequence of the crimes originally aided and abetted.”
The court instructed the jury to find defendant guilty of
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, it had
to find beyond a reasonable doubt “1. The crime of assault with a

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firearm was committed[;] [¶] 2. That the defendant aided and
abetted that crime; [¶] 3. That a co-principal in that crime
committed the crime of murder; and [¶] 4. The crime of murder
was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the
crime of assault with a firearm.”
The court instructed the jury on first degree murder,
defining it as willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder,
requiring that “the killing was preceded and accompanied by a
clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which
was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must
have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a
sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of
deliberation . . . .” The trial court also told the jury, “To
constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must
weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for
and against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences,
he decides to and does kill.” (Italics added.)
Turning to the attempted murder charge, the court
instructed the jury attempted murder requires “[a] direct but
ineffectual act . . . towards killing another human being” and
“[t]he person committing the act harbored express malice
aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another
human being.”
The court further instructed on attempted willful,
deliberate, and premediated murder: “If you find that the
attempted murder was preceded and accompanied by a clear,
deliberate intent to kill, which was the result of deliberation and
premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-
existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or
other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is attempt

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to commit willful, deliberate, and premediated murder. . . .” The
court instructed, “To constitute willful, deliberate, and
premediated attempted murder, the would-be slayer must weigh
and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and
against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences,
decides to kill and makes a direct but ineffectual act to kill
another human being.” (Italics added.)
The court informed the jury the natural and probable
consequence doctrine could apply to attempted murder: “In order
to find the defendant guilty of the crime of attempted murder
under this theory, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that: [¶] 1. The crime of assault with a firearm was
committed[;] [¶] 2. That the defendant aided and abetted that
crime; [¶] 3. That a co-principal in that crime committed the
crime of attempted murder; and [¶] 4. The crime of attempted
murder was a natural and probable consequence of the
commission of the crime of assault with a firearm.”
The trial court also instructed the jury on the elements of
the intentional and personal discharge of a firearm that
proximately caused great bodily injury or death to a person. Part
of that instruction provided: “A proximate cause of great bodily
injury or death is an act or omission that sets in motion a chain of
events that produces as a direct, natural and probable
consequence of the act or omission the great bodily injury or
death and without which the great bodily injury or death would
not have occurred.”

4. Jury verdict
The jury found defendant guilty of the murder of Wright
and further found the murder was committed willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation. The jury found true that

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defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, a
handgun, that proximately caused great bodily injury and death
to Wright. The jury found the other alleged firearm and gang
allegations true.
The jury also found defendant guilty of the attempted
murder of Jordan and that the attempted murder was committed
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The jury found
true defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury and death to Wright. The jury also
found other firearm and gang allegations true.
The court sentenced defendant to prison for a total term of
90 years to life.

5. Appeal from the judgment of conviction
In 2012, defendant appealed to this court. (People v.
Sanchez (Mar. 6, 2012, B230559) [nonpub. opn.].) We rejected
defendant’s argument that the trial court committed evidentiary
error and affirmed the judgment. (Id. at p. 15.)

6. Defendant’s 1172.6 petition for resentencing
On June 22, 2022, defendant filed pro se a petition for
resentencing. He alleged, inter alia, he could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
sections 188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019. The prosecutor
opposed the petition and argued defendant was ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. The judge summarily denied
defendant’s 1172.6 petition for resentencing.2

2 A different judge presided over resentencing than the
original trial judge.

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DISCUSSION
Defendant argues, and respondent agrees, the record of
conviction fails to establish as a matter of law that he is ineligible
for resentencing as a matter of law. We review de novo
defendant’s eligibility for section 1172.6 resentencing. (People v.
Rushing (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1030.)

A. Background on Section 1172.6
“Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) amended sections 188 and 189 of
the Penal Code to ‘eliminate[ ] natural and probable
consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and
abetting, and [to] limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173.)
Amended section 188 provides that except as stated in the
amended section 189 governing felony murder, “ ‘in order to be
convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (Lee, at p. 1173,
quoting § 188, subd. (a)(3).)
The bill also added former section 1170.95, now numbered
section 1172.6, “which creates a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended
to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957.) Relief is potentially available for “[a] person convicted
of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable

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consequences doctrine, or manslaughter . . . .” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).)
“[T]he section 1172.6 petitioning ‘process begins with the
filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements
for eligibility are met ([§ 1172.6], subd. (b)(1)(A)), including that
“[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to . . . Section 188 or
189 . . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th
719, 724.) “ ‘If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial
court may dismiss the petition.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) In People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel), our high court held a
defendant who petitions for resentencing under section 1172.6 is
ineligible for resentencing only if the “record conclusively
establishes every element of the offense.” (Curiel, at p. 463.) In
making that determination a court may “give effect” to a jury’s
factual finding. (Id. at p. 465.)
If the petition survives the prima facie stage, the court
must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the People bear the
burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner
is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as
amended by” Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the
People cannot carry this burden, the court must vacate the
murder conviction and then resentence the defendant on any
remaining charges. (Id., subd. (d)(1).)

B. The Record of Conviction Does Not Show As a Matter
of Law That Defendant Is Ineligible for Resentencing
on His Murder Conviction
Under current law, murder is “the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.” (§ 187,

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subd. (a).) “Malice is express when there is manifested a
deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow
creature.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) With exceptions not relevant
here, “in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed
to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(Id., subd. (a)(3).)
Although the jury found Wright’s murder was committed
willfully and with premeditation and deliberation, the first
degree murder instruction stated the slayer had to harbor that
mental state. The jury finding defendant personally discharged a
firearm causing Wright’s death does not show defendant was the
slayer because the jury instructions allowed the jury to find the
firearm discharge allegation true if defendant “sets in motion a
chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable
consequence of the act or omission the great bodily injury or
death . . . .” Defendant could have set in motion Wright’s death
without being the slayer because there was a second shooter who
could have been the slayer. Additionally, the finding defendant
personally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great
bodily injury and death does not establish the defendant
“intended to kill or was aware of the danger to life that his act
posed.” (People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598 (Offley).)
In sum, the jury verdict does not show as a matter of law
defendant harbored malice aforethought. Under the trial court’s
instructions, the jury could instead have concluded defendant
aided and abetted an assault with a firearm the natural and
probable consequences of which was murder. Thus, the entire
record of conviction does not foreclose that defendant was

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convicted based on a now invalid theory of murder.3 (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 465 [court “may look to the jury’s verdicts,
and the factual findings they necessarily reflect, to determine
whether the record of conviction refutes the factual allegations in
[defendant]’s petition.”].)

C. The Record of Conviction Does Not Show As a Matter
of Law Defendant Is Ineligible for Resentencing on
Attempted Murder
The jury found defendant guilty of the attempted murder of
Jordan and that attempted murder was committed willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation. The jury also found
defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury and death to Wright.
Under current law, attempted murder requires intent to
kill. (People v. Morales (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1132.) We
cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the record of conviction
shows defendant harbored intent to kill. The jury finding that
the attempted murder was committed willfully and with
premeditation and deliberation shows only that the “slayer”
harbored this mental state. The jury does not further identify
the “slayer.” Additionally, the fact defendant intended to
discharge a firearm does not show the defendant “harbored a

3 We thus do not consider defendant’s arguments that
other instructions permitted the jury “to convict appellant under
a theory of imputed malice . . . .” We also do not address
defendant’s argument that the prosecutor’s closing argument
invited the jury to convict defendant based on the natural and
probable consequence doctrine.

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particular mental state . . . .”4 (Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at
p. 598 [explaining that section 12022.53, subdivision (d) “provides
that the defendant must have intended to discharge a firearm,
but does not refer to an ‘intent to achieve any additional
consequence.’ ”]

DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage is
reversed.5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. M. KIM, J.

4 Because we reverse the denial at the prima facie stage of
defendant’s petition for resentencing on attempted murder, we
do not consider defendant’s argument that “[t]he kill zone
instruction . . . eroded the requirement . . . of intent to kill in the
attempted murders [sic].” We also decline to consider defendant’s
argument that his youth militated against a finding of reckless
indifference to human life.
5 We express no opinion on how the trial court should rule
at the evidentiary hearing on defendant’s petition.

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