People v. Ramirez CA2/1

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Filed 2/20/26 P. v. Ramirez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B344278

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA158749)
v.

SAMUEL FERNANDEZ RAMIREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Margaret Miller Bernal, Judge. Affirmed.
Patrick C. Obioha for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
Samuel Fernandez Ramirez appeals from an order denying
his Penal Code section 1473.71 motion to vacate two felony
convictions to which he pleaded no contest in exchange for
a probationary sentence. Section 1473.7 “allows noncitizens
who have served their sentences to vacate a conviction if they can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their conviction
is ‘legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging [their] ability
to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept
the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a
conviction or sentence.’ ” (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311,
316 (Espinoza).)
Fernandez Ramirez contends that, due to his counsel’s
ineffective assistance, he did not understand the immigration
consequences of his plea. We conclude, however, that the record
belies Fernandez Ramirez’s claim. We therefore affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant
to our resolution of this appeal.

A. The Charges, Plea, and Sentence
In August 2021, police found Fernandez Ramirez in
possession of approximately 25 pounds of methamphetamine.
The district attorney charged Fernandez Ramirez with one count
of possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11378) and one count of transportation for sale of a controlled
substance (id., § 11379, subd. (a)). Fernandez Ramirez faced a
possible sentence of seven years in prison. In addition, a conviction
under Health and Safety Code section 11378 constitutes an

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory references
are to the Penal Code.

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aggravated felony under federal immigration law (see People v.
Espinoza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 908, 916) and renders the convicted
defendant subject to mandatory removal from the United States
(see People v. Benitez-Torres (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1262
(Benitez-Torres)).
In December 2023, Fernandez Ramirez—represented by
Alejandro Benitez, a private defense attorney—pleaded no contest
to both counts pursuant to a negotiated plea. In connection with
the plea, Fernandez Ramirez received a felony advisement of rights,
waiver, and plea form, commonly referred to as a Tahl waiver. (In
re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.) The face of the Tahl waiver includes
the following acknowledgement concerning the immigration
consequences of the plea:
“I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States,
I must expect my plea of guilty or no contest will result in my
deportation, exclusion from admission or reentry to the United
States, and denial of naturalization and amnesty.”
This typewritten acknowledgment is surrounded by
handwritten brackets. In addition, handwritten underlining
appears under the phrases “will result in” and “exclusion
from admission or reentry to the United States.” Fernandez
Ramirez initialed the box printed immediately adjacent to the
acknowledgement. He also provided his full signature at the
conclusion of the Tahl waiver, below the following typewritten
paragraph:
“Defendant’s signature [¶] I have read and initialed each of
the paragraphs above and discussed them with my attorney. My
initials mean that I have read, understand and agree with what
is stated in the paragraph. The nature of the charges and possible
defenses to them, and the effect of any special allegations and
enhancements have been explained to me. I understand each and

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every one of the rights outlined above and I hereby waive and give
up each of them in order to enter my plea to the above charges.”
At the December 20, 2023 plea hearing, Fernandez Ramirez
reaffirmed his understanding of the immigration consequences
of his plea during the following colloquy with the prosecutor:
“[Prosecutor]: If you are not [a] citizen[ ] of the United States,
pleading today will cause you to be deported, denied reentry
into the United States, denied citizenship, naturalization, or
amnesty in the future. [¶] Do you understand the immigration
consequences of pleading today, . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Mr. Fernandez
Ramirez?
“[Fernandez Ramirez]: Yes, ma’am.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“[Prosecutor]: Other than what I just stated in open court
about your possible immigration consequences, has anyone told you
anything different, . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Mr. Fernandez Ramirez?
“[Fernandez Ramirez]: No, ma’am.”
Fernandez Ramirez then entered a plea of no contest to
both counts charged against him. In accordance with the plea
agreement, the court sentenced Fernandez Ramirez to formal
probation for a period of two years. As conditions of probation,
the court further ordered that Fernandez Ramirez serve one day
in county jail and perform 30 days of community labor.

B. Proceedings on Fernandez Ramirez’s Motion to
Vacate His Convictions
Four months after the plea hearing, in May 2024, the
Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings
against Fernandez Ramirez. He retained a different defense
attorney, Patrick Obioha, who filed a motion to vacate Fernandez
Ramirez’s convictions pursuant to section 1473.7. In support of the
motion, Fernandez Ramirez filed a declaration in which he attested,

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in pertinent part, that (1) he “first came into the United States
[from El Salvador] in 2010, when [he] was 9 years old[,] and
accompanied [his] mother into the United States in search of
a better life,” (2) he did not “know that [he] was pleading to an
aggravated felony,” and his former counsel, Benitez, failed to
explain that “if [he was] convicted of an aggravated felony, . . .
[he could not] obtain bail from immigration,” (3) Benitez failed
to explain that “if [Fernandez Ramirez] took this plea that [he]
would not be eligible for any [immigration] relief[ ],” and (4) Benitez
“reassured [him] that this was a good plea that would not affect
[him] as immigration would not come for [him].”2
On August 23, 2024, the judge who presided over Fernandez
Ramirez’s plea colloquy held an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
Fernandez Ramirez did not personally appear at the hearing, as he
remained in immigration custody. Obioha appeared on his behalf.
The deputy district attorney who negotiated Fernandez Ramirez’s
plea represented the prosecution at the hearing. She opposed
Fernandez Ramirez’s motion, requesting that the court “take
judicial notice of the written waiver that was filled out and signed
and filed with the court at the time of the plea, as well as the plea
transcript.” In addition, the deputy district attorney presented
live testimony from Benitez, who testified that he told Fernandez
Ramirez the plea would result in deportation: “[I told him] that he
will be deported. I also underlined that in the Tahl [waiver] that
he signed on the date of the plea. The court—it should have been

2 Fernandez Ramirez failed to include a copy of the
declaration in our appellate record. For purposes of argument,
however, we assume the summary of the declaration he includes
in his appellant’s brief is accurate.

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in the court file, the Tahl, and it’s underlined. I underlined ‘will be
deported.’ ”
On cross-examination, Benitez testified that he did not
practice immigration law, did not research any immigration law
in connection with Fernandez Ramirez’s plea, and did not use
the term “aggravated felony” when counseling Fernandez Ramirez.
But Benitez further testified that “[t]here was no investigation
to be done” because the prosecutor was not willing to offer an
immigration-friendly plea:
“[Prosecutor]: Did you ask me, as prosecutor on the case,
did you ask me for crimes that were not Health and Safety Code
section 11378 or 11379 [violations]?
“[Benitez]: I did.
“[Prosecutor]: And what was my response?
“[Benitez]: No.
“[Prosecutor]: Did you ask me for an immigration-safe plea?
“[Benitez]: I did.
“[Prosecutor]: And what was my response?
“[Benitez]: No.
“[Prosecutor]: Did you ask [me] to put the case over
specifically to allow Mr. Fernandez Ramirez to consult with an
immigration attorney?
“[Benitez]: I did, and that was October 2023 before he took
his plea December 2023. I also have that documented in my notes.”
Obioha then requested that the court order Benitez to
produce “[a]ny supporting documentation for the items that
he testified to” and any communications between Benitez and
Fernandez Ramirez. Benitez requested that the court review
the discovery in camera to remove any privileged material before
ordering disclosure. The court granted both requests and continued
the hearing to September 11, 2024.

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At the outset of the continued hearing, the court provided
Obioha with the requested discovery. The court, however,
denied Obioha’s request for a continuance to review the materials,
explaining: “If there is anything in that documentation . . . that
you feel would change my opinion . . . then you’re welcome to do
a motion to have the court reopen the [section 1473.7] motion.”
The court then permitted further cross and redirect
examination of Benitez. He testified, in pertinent part, that
Fernandez Ramirez spoke to two immigration attorneys before
accepting his plea:
“[On] October 29, 2023, when I was going to take [Fernandez
Ramirez] his plea . . . [a]t that point, he had spoken with one
immigration attorney. As I was going over the plea again with him,
and again, advising him to the consequences of the plea that would
result in his deportation, denial of naturalization or exclusion from
this country, I said, do you need more additional time to speak with
another immigration attorney and he said, yes, and at that time,
we then continued the plea to—not the plea but the pre-preliminary
hearing, I believe, to December 15th, I want to say. [¶] I believe
also it was either the day of his birthday or day before his birthday
from what I recall, and he had also informed me that he had spoken
with one other attorney, so he spoke with another attorney between
October to December.”
At the conclusion of Benitez’s testimony, Obioha asked
for a continuance to allow him to call an “expert . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
[i]n criminal defense and immigration” who was “not available”
that day. The court denied both the request for a continuance and
the section 1473.7 motion in its entirety, explaining:
“The court has listened to the testimony, reviewed the
transcript from the sentencing, as well as the Tahl waiver that
was filled out by—initialed, signed by Mr. Fernandez Ramirez.

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[¶] First of all, the court is going to deny the request to continue
it. I do not feel that an expert in criminal defense and immigration
is necessary for this case. I feel like the defendant in this case
received adequate representation. He was told he was going to be
deported multiple times. That is what is necessary for the court to
determine whether he was advised of that and, indeed, he has been
taken by [Immigration and Customs Enforcement]. The court is
going to deny the motion.”
Fernandez Ramirez appealed.3

DISCUSSION
Fernandez Ramirez contends we must reverse the order
because the record demonstrates that, due to the ineffective
assistance of his former defense counsel, he did not understand the
immigration consequences of his plea.4 We are not persuaded.
We independently review the denial of a section 1473.7
motion (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 524–528 (Vivar)),
but “give particular deference to factual findings based on the trial
court’s personal observations of witnesses.” (Id. at pp. 527–528.)
A movant seeking relief under section 1473.7 bears the burden
of establishing both “(1) he did not meaningfully understand

3 Although Fernandez Ramirez failed to file a timely notice
of appeal, we granted his request for leave to file a belated notice.
4 In his appellant’s brief, Fernandez Ramirez identifies
the following additional “issue[ ] presented” (boldface, capitalization
& underscoring omitted): “Did the trial court err in denying
[Fernandez Ramirez’s] request to call a criminal immigration
attorney expert to testify to the standard required of a defense
attorney for a non[-]citizen?” (Capitalization omitted.) But because
Fernandez Ramirez offers no argument or legal authority on this
issue, he has forfeited any claim of error on this point. (See City of
Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287.)

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the immigration consequences of the guilty plea, and (2) he was
prejudiced thereby (there is a reasonable chance he would have
rejected the plea).” (Benitez-Torres, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1255; Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.)
“A defendant seeking to set aside a plea must do more than
simply claim he did not understand the immigration consequences
of the plea. The claim must be corroborated by evidence beyond
the defendant’s self-serving statements.” (People v. Abdelsalam
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 654, 664; see also Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 530 [“we have long required the defendant corroborate such
assertions with ‘ “objective evidence” ’ ”].) “Objective evidence
includes facts provided by declarations, contemporaneous
documentation of the defendant’s immigration concerns or
interactions with counsel, and evidence of the charges the
defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) A
movant need not demonstrate that his or her counsel rendered
ineffective assistance, but such a showing may support
section 1473.7 relief. (Benitez-Torres, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1262; § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) At the “ ‘heart’ ” of the analysis
“ ‘ “is the mindset of the defendant and what he or she understood—
or didn’t understand—at the time the plea was taken.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Benitez-Torres, supra, at p. 1262.)
In his appellant’s brief,5 Fernandez Ramirez argues the
“declaration [he] submitted to the trial court conclusively proved
the prejudice . . . required under [section] 1473.7.” But he fails to
address the first requirement for section 1473.7 relief—namely,
that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea. (Benitez-Torres, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1255.) And objective evidence in the record supports that

5 Fernandez Ramirez filed no reply brief on appeal.

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Fernandez Ramirez understood that his plea would result in his
deportation: His former defense counsel, Benitez, testified that
he so advised Fernandez Ramirez, and that Fernandez Ramirez
consulted with two immigration attorneys before accepting the
plea. The trial court credited Benitez’s testimony—which directly
contradicts Fernandez Ramirez’s declaration—and we must defer to
the court’s credibility determination. (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at pp. 527–528.) In addition, Fernandez Ramirez placed his initials
next to the acknowledgment in the written Tahl waiver that
his plea would result in deportation—an acknowledgment that
Benitez bracketed and underlined. Finally, Fernandez Ramirez
confirmed orally during his plea colloquy that he “underst[ood]
the immigration consequences of pleading,” including that pleading
would cause him “to be deported, denied reentry into the United
States, denied citizenship, naturalization, or amnesty in the
future.” We therefore reject Fernandez Ramirez’s contention that
he made the requisite showing for section 1473.7 relief.
We likewise reject Fernandez Ramirez’s related contention
that we must vacate his convictions because Benitez provided
ineffective assistance. Fernandez Ramirez faults Benitez for
failing to research the immigration consequences of the plea and
neglecting to use the term “aggravated felony” in rendering his
advice. But Fernandez Ramirez fails to demonstrate any resulting
prejudice. (See In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 602 [“[w]hen
there has been no showing of prejudice, we need not determine
whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient”]; Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697 [“[i]f it is easier to dispose
of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, . . . that course should be followed”].) As set forth,
ante, the trial court credited Benitez’s testimony that he repeatedly
advised Fernandez Ramirez—correctly—that the plea would lead to

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deportation. And with the exception of Fernandez Ramirez’s
declaration, all other objective evidence in the record corroborates
Benitez’s testimony. The record thus does not support that
Benitez’s purportedly deficient performance caused Fernandez
Ramirez to misunderstand the immigration consequences of his
plea.
Accordingly, we affirm.

DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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