CourtListener 10796990•People v. Manuel CA1/5
Texto completo
Filed 2/20/26 P. v. Manuel CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, A170342
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Lake County Super. Ct. No.
DAVID JOHN MANUEL, CR962687)
Defendant and Appellant.
[REDACTED]
David John Manuel was originally sentenced to formal
probation for committing domestic battery against his former
girlfriend, in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision
(a).1 After the trial court found that he had violated a term of his
probation by contacting the victim, the court revoked his
probation and sentenced him to eight years in prison. Manuel
now contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment
rights by imposing a sentence based on aggravating
circumstances that were neither admitted by him nor tried to a
jury. (See Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281
(Cunningham); U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) He also asserts that the
trial court conducted an inadequate inquiry when he requested
that new counsel be substituted under People v. Marsden (1970) 2
Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) due to his attorney’s alleged failure to
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
provide effective representation. Because his claims have merit,
we remand for resentencing and for reconsideration of his
Marsden motion.
BACKGROUND
A.
Manuel’s conviction arose from an incident in February
2022 in which he assaulted his then-girlfriend at her residence.
At the preliminary hearing, a deputy sheriff testified to out of
court statements from the victim and her minor daughter
describing what had happened. According to that testimony, the
victim appeared disoriented and had blood running down her face
from a head wound. She reported that she and Manuel had been
arguing “due to his level of intoxication,” as he had been drinking
all day. Manuel “became irate, threatened to kill a cat that was
owned by the victim’s daughter, strangled the cat . . . and then
threw it out of a window[,] and then continued to assault [the
victim].” Her daughter reported that the couple had argued in
the bathroom, where she saw Manuel bite her mother on the
head. When the victim’s daughter attempted to intervene,
Manuel kicked her away. The couple continued arguing,
eventually moving outside, where Manuel struck the victim;
threatened to kill her; put her in a headlock; and slammed her
head into the pavement. After momentarily losing consciousness,
the victim suffered a concussion and fractured ribs, requiring her
to be airlifted to the hospital.
The deputy testified that Manuel appeared to be
intoxicated based on his red, watery eyes and slurred speech, the
fact that he had “trouble staying on topic” when speaking to the
deputy, and the fact that he “continued to fall asleep” in the back
of the patrol vehicle. When the deputy later spoke with him at
the jail, Manuel stated that “he didn’t recall anything from the
incident because of his level of intoxication. He believed he drank
so much that he blacked out.”
2
Manuel subsequently pled no contest to domestic battery
(§ 273.5, subd. (a)). At the time he entered his plea, he stipulated
that he “struck the victim multiple times, . . . causing a
concussion as well [as resulting in her] having been life flighted
out to the hospital[;] it was determined that she had multiple
fractured ribs.” Manuel also admitted a special allegation that he
“inflicted great bodily injury on the victim under circumstances
involving domestic violence” for purposes of a sentencing
enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (e). In addition,
he admitted, as an aggravating circumstance, that the offense
occurred in front of the victim’s minor children.
Although Manuel faced up to nine years in prison, the trial
court initially sentenced him to three years of formal probation
with up to one year in county jail at the request of the victim.
The probation conditions included requirements that Manuel
complete a batterer’s treatment program, abstain from alcohol,
perform community service, and participate in rehabilitative
services as directed by probation staff. Another condition
required him to comply with a protective order, issued in March
2022, under which he was to have no contact with the victim.
B.
1.
At a probation violation hearing in March 2024, the trial
court found that Manuel had violated a term of his probation by
failing to comply with the protective order. A probation officer
testified at the hearing that Manuel had reported to her that the
victim had driven him to his probation appointment, that she
planned to pick him up after the appointment, that the two were
in telephone contact, and that he was violating the protective
order because “he loved her.”
3
2.
In April 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing.
The court took judicial notice of the clerk’s file, and Manuel
stipulated that the probation reports could be received into
evidence.
According to a June 2022 probation report, before the
instant offense, Manuel had no prior criminal convictions as an
adult.
An April 2024 probation report summarized Manuel’s
performance on probation as “poor.” According to the report,
“[h]e refuses to comply with the domestic violence protective
order, continues to abuse drugs, and failed to enroll and
effectively participate in a batterer’s program as ordered by the
Court. He has failed to take advantage of the opportunities
afforded to him and is not amenable to probation.” Between June
2023 and January 2024, Manuel participated in two substance
abuse treatment programs. The probation report indicated,
however, that he did not formally complete either program: he
left the first program after 90 days, believing that he had
satisfied his probation requirement; and he was discharged from
the second program after about five months because he was
“causing issues with other household members, not following
rules, and not engaging in treatment.”
At the sentencing hearing, after the victim and her
daughter provided statements on how Manuel’s offense had
affected them, Manuel spoke on his own behalf. He apologized
and stated, “If I could, I would take it all back. There's no excuse
for what I’ve done or anything that has happened.” He explained
that he had “been through the system before as a child for . . .
four years” and that “I tried to leave . . . that whole system life
behind. I wanted to live better, so much so that I would allow
people to like abuse me, hit me, you know. And I could take it, I
could take a punch[.]” Under questioning by his attorney,
4
Manuel testified that he had not committed any additional acts of
violence since the February 2022 offense. Manuel acknowledged
that he had an addiction, explaining that his addiction was fueled
by a feeling that he was “in a rut” and “[n]o matter how much I
try, I can't make it out” of the rut.
Defense counsel argued to the court that Manuel had paid
his restitution and completed his community service
requirement, emphasizing that Manuel had committed no further
acts of violence. Counsel asserted, “[t]his is a young man who is
not getting it, but he’s not going to get it at nine years in state
prison. He’s going to get it through a committed drug
rehabilitation program. . . . [N]ine years prison for minor --
relatively minor technical violations of his probation I think is
extremely heavy. We have a few more tools in our tool chest
before we send him away, and I would recommend and request
that the Court use those tools before we decide to close the lid on”
him. Counsel added, “What we’re dealing with [is] a person [who
is] not getting it, he’s not tackling his addictions. He’s not
tackling his mental health issues. Granted, he maybe has not
signed up for the batterer's treatment program, . . . but, you
know, one has to have resources to do that. Those aren’t free.”
Counsel continued, “I think it speaks volumes that he hasn’t
continued to victimize people. . . . We’re seeing a person who’s . . .
abusing himself through drugs and basically failing to do what
he[] . . . said he would do. But, again, nine years is a lot.”
After the matter was submitted, defense counsel interjected
that Manuel was requesting a Marsden hearing. The court
explained to Manuel that a “Marsden hearing is where the
defendant is asking that his attorney be relieved and another
attorney be appointed to represent him. Is that what you’re
requesting?” Manuel responded that he was “not sure.”
Observing that the court had not heard any request for a
5
Marsden hearing from Manuel, the trial court proceeded with
sentencing.
As the court began to explain its findings as to aggravating
circumstances, Manuel asked, “Could I go with that Marsden
hearing?” Noting that it was the second time he had interrupted
while the court was pronouncing his sentence, the court stated
that it would finish pronouncing the sentence and then hold a
Marsden hearing. The court explained that after the Marsden
hearing, if appropriate, the court would vacate the sentence.
The trial court proceeded to sentence Manuel. After
providing a detailed factual summary of the offense, the court
revoked probation and sentenced Manuel to eight years in prison.
With respect to aggravating circumstances, the court found that
the offense involved “great violence, great bodily harm, threats of
great bodily harm, and other acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.” (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1).) The court found that Manuel had admitted as
an aggravating factor that the victim’s minor daughter had
witnessed the offense. Finding no circumstances in mitigation,
the court reasoned that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The court imposed the
upper term of four years for the violation of section 273.5,
subdivision (a), with a four-year enhancement (representing the
middle term) for great bodily injury involving domestic violence
under section 12022.7, subdivision (e).
3.
At the Marsden hearing, Manuel told the court that
[REDACTED]. After questioning Manuel further and hearing
from his counsel, the trial court disagreed and denied the request
for substitute counsel. The court found: “It appears that your
issues with [counsel] had to do with his representation of you at
the sentencing hearing. He spoke to the victim. He made
arguments. After reviewing the report, I would note that prior to
6
this hearing, he requested documents from the court file to verify
that you actually admitted a special allegation in this case. He
called you to the stand and had you testify. I saw him during the
hearing go to someone else in the audience and ask them if they
wanted to testify, and they said they didn’t. So he’s really done
all he can do to represent you in this case. The sentence you
received isn’t about [your counsel] at all. . . . [I]f you had any
other attorney, you would have received the same sentence. So I
do find that [counsel] has properly represented you and will
continue to do so.”
DISCUSSION
A.
Manuel contends that he is entitled to resentencing
because the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by
relying on aggravating circumstances based on facts that had not
been admitted or tried to a jury.2 We agree.
1.
In Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 270, the United States
Supreme Court held that, except for prior conviction allegations,
the Sixth Amendment requires “any fact that exposes a
defendant to a greater potential sentence” to be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Cunningham, at p. 281.)
Cunningham concluded that the sentencing scheme in effect in
California at the time violated the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial because it allowed a defendant’s prison sentence to be
increased beyond the statutory maximum based on facts that had
not been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or
admitted by the defendant. (See Cunningham, at pp. 274-275;
2 Although Manuel did not preserve this claim in the trial
court, his failure to do so does not forfeit his Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36,
47-48.)
7
see also People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 746-747 (Lynch).)
The statutory maximum, for Sixth Amendment purposes, is the
maximum sentence the court may impose without finding any
additional facts beyond those necessary to support the verdict.
(See Lynch, at p. 747.) Cunningham explained that California
could comply with the Sixth Amendment either by requiring jury
findings for any facts necessary to impose an aggravated sentence
or, alternatively, by authorizing sentencing courts “ ‘to exercise
broad discretion . . . within a statutory range.’ ” (See
Cunningham, at p. 294; Lynch, at p. 747.)
California’s current sentencing scheme (in effect at the time
of Manuel’s 2024 sentencing) adopts the first option Cunningham
outlined. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 748.) Under section
1170, subdivision (b)3, when a statute specifies three possible
terms, the court must “order imposition of a sentence not to
exceed the middle term” unless “there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subds.
(b)(1)-(2), as amended by Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.), Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.)
2.
At the April 2024 hearing, when pronouncing Manuel’s
sentence, the trial court first recited the following facts: “[O]n
February 26th, 2022, the defendant pushed the victim inside of a
bathroom and bit her. The victim’s 13-year-old daughter
attempted to intervene. The defendant shoved her, kicked her
3 An amended version of section 1170 went into effect on
January 1, 2026. (See Sen. Bill No. 551 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.),
Stats. 2025, ch. 225, § 2.) The amendments are not relevant to
our analysis.
8
away, took her cat, said he was going to kill it, then strangled it
and threw it out of an elevated window. The defendant and
victim then exited the residence. Outside, the defendant
threatened to kill the victim, elbowed her in the chest, placed her
in a headlock, and slammed her head first onto the ground. The
victim briefly lost consciousness. When she regained
consciousness, the defendant was biting her on the face and head.
He then pinned her to the ground and punched her in the face
with a closed fist. The victim suffered substantial injuries,
including broken ribs. The defendant was intoxicated at the
time.” After revoking probation, the court stated: “I do find the
following aggravating factor. The crime involved great violence,
great bodily harm, threats of great bodily harm, and other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.
This aggravating factor was not admitted or otherwise proved to
the trier of fact.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).) After
concluding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances, the court imposed the upper term for
the violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a).
3.
Manuel argues persuasively that the trial court improperly
relied on facts neither admitted by him nor determined by a jury
when it found as an aggravating circumstance that the crime
involved great violence, great bodily harm, threats of great bodily
harm, and other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness.4 (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1).)
4 Section 1170, subdivision (b)(5), prohibits the trial court
from “impos[ing] an upper term by using the fact of any
enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any
provision of law.” Here, because the court imposed an
enhancement based on great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)),
it could not also rely on great bodily injury as an aggravating
9
Apart from the fact that he struck the victim several times
and she suffered fractured ribs, none of the factual details relied
on by the trial court in pronouncing the sentence were admitted
by Manuel. The trial court expressly stated its finding that the
offense involved great violence, great bodily harm, and threats of
great bodily harm, and reflected a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)),
and it observed that that aggravating factor “was not admitted or
otherwise proved to the trier of fact.” The trial court’s imposition
of the unproven aggravating factor violated Manuel’s Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 742.)
As our Supreme Court explained in Lynch, we apply the
rigorous Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman)
standard of review to determine whether the trial court’s reliance
on unproven aggravating circumstances was prejudicial. (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768; see also People v. Wiley (2025) 17
Cal.5th 1069, 1087.) Under that standard, the violation is
prejudicial unless we can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that a jury would have found true all the aggravating facts upon
which the challenged sentence was based. (Lynch, at p. 768; see
also id. at p. 775 [explaining that the defendant is entitled to a
factor for purposes of imposing the upper term. (See People v.
Gutierrez (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1735 (Gutierrez); see also
People v. Castaneda (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 611, 614-615.)
However, that error is subject to harmless error analysis (see
Gutierrez, at pp. 1735-1736), and the court could, without
running afoul of section 1170, subdivision (b)(5), rely on other
aggravating circumstances independent of the great bodily injury
enhancement, such as a finding that the offense involved great
violence or reflected a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)). (See Gutierrez,
at pp. 1735-1736.) As a result, we proceed to consider whether
the trial court erred by relying on unproven aggravating
circumstances.
10
remand for resentencing unless the appellate court “can conclude
that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact the trial court used
to justify an upper term sentence”].) Put another way, Manuel is
entitled to a remand unless “ ‘ “ ‘[n]o reasonable jury’ ” would
have found in favor of the defendant’ ” as to any of the
aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court. (Lynch, at p.
775; see also Wiley, at p. 1087.) In conducting this analysis,
moreover, we may not assume that the record contains all the
evidence that would have been presented had the aggravating
circumstances been tried to a jury. (Lynch, at p. 775.)
Lynch illustrates the high bar that the People must clear to
avoid a remand. In Lynch, the trial court had found, as
aggravating factors, that the defendant’s actions displayed a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; the victim was
particularly vulnerable; and the defendant posed a serious
danger to society. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 744-745.) The
defendant had physically abused the victim daily for several
months. (Id. at p. 743.) The victim was in a romantic
relationship with the defendant at the time and was the mother
of his child. (Ibid.) The defendant struck the victim with a small
wooden table until a leg broke off and then continued to strike
her with the detached leg, an extension cord, and a metal broom,
causing the victim to sustain multiple bruises. (Id. at pp. 743-
744.) On one occasion, a witness observed the defendant
standing over the victim with his arm drawn back, as if he were
getting ready to strike her, while the victim was lying on the floor
with her hands raised in defense. (Id. at p. 743.) Nevertheless,
our Supreme Court concluded that it was “not . . . impossible” for
the jury to have found in favor of the defendant on one or more of
the aggravating factors. (Id. at p. 776.)
Lynch requires reversal here. Although the trial court
understandably concluded that Manuel’s assault—as described in
11
the probation report—involved great violence, cruelty, and
callousness, it is not impossible for a jury to reach a different
conclusion, particularly given that in a jury trial, Manuel could
seek to introduce mitigating evidence absent from our present
record. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.) For example,
Manuel maintained that he was blackout drunk at the time of the
offense, which was consistent with the victim’s report that he had
been drinking all day and the police observations that he had a
strong odor of alcohol emanating from his person, his speech was
heavily slurred, and he fell asleep in the patrol car. A jury might
conclude that Manuel acted because he was drunk rather than
cruel. As a result, we cannot say that the denial of a jury trial
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating
factor relied on by the trial court, and Manuel is entitled to a
remand for resentencing. (See id., at p. 776.)
B.
Manuel further argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his Marsden motion. Because we agree that
the court’s inquiry was inadequate, Manuel is entitled to another
Marsden hearing on remand.
When a defendant requests that his appointed counsel be
relieved and new counsel be appointed under Marsden, the trial
court must give the defendant an opportunity to explain his
concerns about his counsel’s performance and provide examples
of deficiencies. (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599
(Taylor).) The defendant is entitled to substitute counsel when
“ ‘the record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not
providing adequate representation.’ ” (Taylor, at p. 599.) The
trial court abuses its discretion when “ ‘the defendant has shown
that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would
substantially impair the right to assistance of counsel.’ ” (People
v. Carter (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1092, 1099, 1102-1103 (Carter).)
12
The trial court also abuses its discretion if it does not
conduct an “adequate inquiry into the defendant’s motion.”
(People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 500 (Ng); see also Carter,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 1102-1103). When the defendant has
identified shortcomings by counsel, the court must obtain
counsel’s response and conduct any further inquiry that is needed
to determine whether counsel “had adequate explanations for all
of [the] defendant’s complaints.” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41
Cal.4th 472, 488; see also People v. Ivans (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th
1654, 1666 [stating the trial court must make a “ ‘careful inquiry’
” before it can intelligently rule on the Marsden motion].) The
“ ‘critical factual inquiry’ ” in a Marsden hearing will often
involve whether counsel consulted sufficiently with their client,
adequately investigated the facts, and properly prepared for the
relevant hearing. (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 123-124).
When the trial court’s inquiry is deficient, we remand the case for
a new Marsden hearing. (See Carter, at pp. 1103-1104.)
When asked about his specific complaints about counsel’s
performance, Manuel asserted generally [REDACTED]. To be
sure, he referred to these issues obliquely, but the Marsden court
itself cautioned us against requiring semantic precision from lay
defendants unversed in the law. (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p.
124.) All three issues, notably, are relevant to mitigation of
Manuel’s sentence. (See [REDACTED].)
What happened next is equally important. When the court
asked Manuel’s counsel—who had been newly appointed to
represent Manuel the previous month–about his preparation,
counsel’s response raised serious red flags. He candidly admitted
that “Mr. Manuel and I had a brief discussion about the
circumstances of his case, but honestly we haven’t spoken too
much.” He explained: “I received the probation report. We had a
brief discussion on the phone about its contents. We had a brief
discussion on the phone about what time he’s facing. He
13
expressed he was pretty concerned about that.” Counsel added
that “I did on his behest reach out to the victim just to gauge her
temperature[,] . . . what she was feeling, what she was thinking.
She talked about maybe dropping off a letter at my office as well
as at the District Attorney's Office, but I didn’t . . . see one in my
box. And that’s fine, obviously. But that was about the extent of
my investigation.” Counsel offered nothing specific about
investigating mitigation factors. The court did not inquire
further.
Nor did counsel’s performance at the sentencing hearing
allay the concerns. At the hearing, counsel did not mention the
possibility that [REDACTED]. Nor did he cite [REDACTED]
as mitigation, though he evidently was aware of the problems
because he admitted that [REDACTED]. Similarly, he did not
argue that [REDACTED] was a mitigating factor. (See
[REDACTED].) Rather, he argued only that since the time of
the offense at issue, Manuel had not committed any further
violent crimes, and he did not object when the trial court found
that there were no mitigating factors applicable, a failure that
ordinarily forfeits any claim that the trial court abused its
discretion in so finding. (See People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th
1048, 1075.)
Finally, counsel’s other actions during the sentencing
hearing indicate a lack of preparation. The trial court observed
that, during the hearing, counsel asked an audience member if
they would be willing to testify on Manuel’s behalf. This
eleventh-hour effort suggests that there may have been more
counsel should have done in advance. The trial court did not ask
him, however, whether he took any steps before the hearing to
procure favorable witnesses, apart from contacting the victim.
Additionally, as noted above, counsel did not object when the trial
court expressly relied on an aggravating factor that was based on
14
unproven facts—an error that should have been apparent. (See
Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 281.)
On this record, the trial court lacked an adequate basis to
determine whether counsel had properly investigated and
prepared Manuel’s mitigation case for the sentencing hearing.
(See Carter, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 1102-1103.) Likewise, we
lack an adequate record to review the trial court’s denial of
Marsden relief. (Carter, at p. 1103.) On remand, the trial court
should conduct a Marsden hearing to determine whether Manuel
is entitled to substitute counsel for purposes of his resentencing.
(See Carter, at pp. 1103-1104; Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp.
123-124.) We need not reach the parties’ remaining arguments.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the case remanded to the trial
court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. The trial
court’s order denying Manuel’s Marsden motion is also vacated.
Prior to resentencing, the trial court shall conduct another
Marsden hearing and reconsider the motion consistent with this
opinion.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
CHOU, J.
People v. Manuel (A170342)
15
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