People v. Smith CA2/6

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Filed 2/18/26 P. v. Smith CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B335380
(Super. Ct. No. NA074807)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

VINCENT SMITH, et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

In 2011, Vincent Smith and Derrick Taylor were convicted
by separate juries of first degree murder and burglary. The
juries also found true the special circumstance that the murder
was committed during a burglary, as well as related gang and
firearm enhancements. Appellants are serving life sentences
without the possibility of parole. In an all-too-familiar scenario,
each claims the other was the shooter.
In 2019 and 2020, Smith and Taylor respectively filed
petitions for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.6,1 which the trial court denied. We reversed and remanded
with directions for the trial court to conduct evidentiary
hearings.2 Following the evidentiary hearings, the trial court
again denied appellants’ petitions, finding each was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Appellants contend insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
“reckless indifference” findings. Taylor also contends his defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural Background3
In October 2006, appellants and another companion, all
members of the “Santana Blocc Crips” criminal street gang,
hatched a scheme to commit a burglary. John Ibrahim, a
marijuana seller, was known to keep large quantities of “high
grade” marijuana and cash at his condominium. Either Smith or
Taylor took a loaded firearm to Ibrahim’s condominium. Ibrahim
resisted and a gun battle ensued. Ibrahim suffered several bullet
wounds before succumbing. Smith was apparently the actual
shooter. The trial court so found at the evidentiary hearing we
ordered. Smith was wounded in the gun battle.
We need not go into detail as to the facts. The trial court
did so, and the parties have filed briefs that recite their “version”

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 See People v. Smith (Jan. 4, 2023, B303467) [nonpub.
opn.] and People v. Taylor (Jan. 18, 2023, B305964/B308322)
[nonpub. opn.].
3 These facts are summarized from our prior appellate
opinions (People v. Smith (Feb. 5, 2013, B233544) [nonpub. opn.];
People v. Taylor (Nov. 29, 2012, B233797) [nonpub. opn.]), and
from the record in the instant appeal.

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of what happened. What is crucial and dispositive here is the
trial court’s factual findings that both appellants were “major
participants” in the crime and acted with a “reckless disregard
for human life.”
Discussion
The trial court’s factual findings are presumed to be correct
and these appeals are, in reality, “substantial evidence” appeals.
“Under this standard, we review the record ‘“‘in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’”
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) We do not reweigh
the trial court’s factual findings. (E.g., People v. Schell (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 437, 442-443.)
Major Participant/Reckless Indifference
The trial court considered and rejected arguments based
upon People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
Although appellants challenge the trial court’s “reckless
indifference findings,” we briefly address the major participant
factors enumerated in Banks, as well as the trial court’s
application of them in this case because there is a “significant[]
overlap” in the requirements for being a major participant in a
dangerous felony and acting with reckless indifference to human
life. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-615.) “‘[T]he greater the
defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely
that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’
[Citation.].” (Id. at p. 615.) Those factors include the defendant’s
role in planning the criminal enterprise; his role in supplying or
using lethal weapons; his awareness of the dangers posed by the

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nature of the crime; his presence at the scene; his actions or
inactions in the death; and what the defendant did after lethal
force was used. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th p. 803.)
Here, the trial court analyzed these factors and found
appellants were major participants. Specifically: (1) both planned
to “scam” marijuana and money from the victim’s home; (2) both
“knew of the weapon” and did nothing to dissuade the other from
bringing it into the victim’s home; (3) both were aware of the
particular dangers involved—“common sense says drug dealers
are known to own weapons,” there was only one purpose for
bringing the gun—and that is to kill; (4) both were present at the
scene of the killing and could have stayed to help the victim; (5)
once they knew the victim was home, they “lured him out of the
home” and continued with the burglary; and (6) after lethal force
was used, they both “ran.”
“Reckless indifference to human life is ‘implicit in
knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave
risk of death.’” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676
(Scoggins), quoting Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157.)
Reckless indifference “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to
assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the
defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome
of his actions.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.)
In reviewing the trial court’s findings, we analyze the
totality of the circumstances. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
677.) We consider several factors such as a defendant’s
knowledge that weapons would be used; how the weapons were
used; the number of weapons used; proximity to the crime;
opportunity to stop the killing or aid the victims; the duration of
the crime; knowledge of the killer’s (accomplice’s) propensity to

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kill; and a defendant’s efforts to minimize the possibility of
violence during the crime. (Ibid.; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 618-623.) “‘[N]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor
is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’” (Clark, at p. 618,
quoting Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
Recently, in People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, our
Supreme court applied the Clark factors to a defendant whose
codefendant shot and killed a drug dealer during the commission
of a robbery. The Court found the evidence insufficient to
support a finding of reckless indifference to human life. (Id., at p.
875.) As the Court explained, there was no evidence that the
defendant planned anything other than a “strong-arm daylight
robbery in a public park.” (Id. at p. 895.) He was not armed, and
the trial court found there was no evidence he knew the
codefendant was armed or likely to use lethal force. (Ibid.)
Nothing in Emanuel alters our analysis. Here, the
evidence and the reasonable inferences that flow therefrom show
that appellants planned an armed burglary. They went to a
known drug-dealer’s home to “scam” him of marijuana and cash.
When he resisted, a gun battle ensued. It is just this situation,
one in which appellants knowingly created a “grave risk of
death,” that demonstrates the trial court’s rational conclusion
and findings of fact. An armed entry into a dwelling is fraught
with the possibility of death. Both appellants could easily have
killed. As the trial court stated, it is “common sense” that drug
dealers have guns and will protect themselves.
Smith, who was 20 years old at the time of the crime,
contends his youthful age is a factor that weighs in his favor.
Courts of Appeal have recognized that “a defendant’s youth is a
relevant factor in determining whether the defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (In re Moore (2021) 68

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Cal.App.5th 434, 454; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
970, 987, 990-991.) However, “[t]he fact of youth cannot
overwhelm all other factors.” (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 575, 595.)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that appellants acted
with reckless indifference to human life.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As to Taylor’s additional contention that he was deprived of
the effective assistance of counsel, the claim is without merit on a
number of theories. We note the obvious one. The trial court
gave an example that the Banks and Clark culpability factors
would not apply to a “getaway” driver. This does not mean that
only a nonculpable “getaway” and/or underage driver could have
his sentence reduced. The trial court more than adequately
explained the rulings, both orally and in writing.
Disposition
The judgments are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

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Judith L. Meyer, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________

Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Vincent Smith.
Maggie Shrout, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant, Derrick Taylor.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy Attorney
General, Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

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