In re S.O. CA2/6

CourtListener 10795071Calctapp17 de fev. de 2026

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Filed 2/17/26 In re S.O. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re S.O., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B347844
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. 24JD00026-001)
Law. (San Luis Obispo County)

SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

M.F.,

Objector and Appellant.

M.F. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s findings and
orders terminating jurisdiction over his daughter, S.O., pursuant
to Welfare and Institutions Code section 364,1 granting sole legal
and physical custody to mother, and denying father all contact
and visitation with S.O. Father contends the juvenile court erred
in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. He also
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by modifying
visitation in its exit order without a detriment finding, requiring
reversal. In a letter brief, the San Luis Obispo County
Department of Social Services agrees with father that reversal is
required. We accept the department’s concession and will reverse
and remand.
Factual and Procedural Background2
In February 2024, the San Luis Obispo Department of
Social Services secured a protective custody warrant and
detained S.O. after mother and S.O. tested positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamine at S.O.’s birth. The
department filed a dependency petition alleging, among other
things, S.O.’s positive drug test, mother’s refusal to stop
breastfeeding S.O. even after being informed of the risks given
her positive drug test, mother’s admission to using substances
throughout her pregnancy, and mother’s prior child welfare

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.

2 We granted father’s request to take judicial notice of our
prior opinion in In re S.O. (May 15, 2025, B340698) [nonpub.
opn.]), from which we summarize this factual and procedural
background.
In his opening brief, father also seeks to augment the
record from his prior appeal in case number B344842. Pursuant
to local rule 9, we grant father’s request and augment the record
accordingly. (Ct. App., Second Dist., Local Rules of Ct., rule 9.)

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history. The department also alleged S.O. was without provision
for support because father was unknown.
At the time of S.O.’s birth, father was incarcerated. He
sent four letters to the department claiming to be the biological
father of S.O., requesting a DNA test to establish his paternity,
and asserting his desire to have custody of S.O.
After DNA test results established that father was S.O.’s
biological father, the department filed an amended petition and
included new allegations related to father, including that he had
been incarcerated for the duration of the case, was unavailable to
be protective of the child, and had left S.O. without any provision
for support.
Prior to the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the
department social worker met separately with father and mother.
Father admitted that he had “put his hands” on mother in the
past but had “decided within himself” he would not do it again.
Father also stated that he and mother planned for S.O.’s birth,
that he rubbed mother’s hands and feet while she was pregnant,
purchased prenatal vitamins for her, and otherwise cared for her
before he was incarcerated. The social worker discussed services
that would be beneficial to address safety concerns. The juvenile
court subsequently authorized father to have supervised
visitation with S.O. one day per week for one hour.
When mother met with the social worker, she stated that
she “genuinely fears” father and that she was “running from him”
when he was arrested and sent to prison for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. She explained that she believed father
“intended to use that firearm to harm or kill her.” Mother
provided the social worker with hundreds of text messages and
dozens of voicemails that she had received from father while she

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was pregnant. The social worker described the tone in the
messages as a “cycle” ranging from father professing his “undying
love” for mother, to calling her vulgar names, to threatening her,
her loved ones, and his own life to gain mother’s compliance. The
social worker noted that as mother spoke about father, she had a
“physical reaction” and was visibly shaking.
In July 2024, following a three-day, contested jurisdiction
and disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained the
amended dependency petition, ordered S.O. removed from
parents, and mother to be provided with reunification services.
The juvenile court granted a restraining order after hearing
protecting mother and S.O. from father. It also granted father’s
request to be designated a “biological father” but denied his
request for services and placement after finding that contact with
father would be detrimental to S.O.
Subsequent Factual and Procedural Background
Following Appeal in B340698
In January 2025, the juvenile court terminated the suitable
placement order and ordered S.O. released to mother under a
home of parent order with family maintenance services.
In February 2025, following a contested six-month review
hearing, the juvenile court found father had sufficiently
demonstrated his progress in treatment and lifted the detriment
finding. It also allowed father supervised visitation with S.O. for
one hour per month.
In July 2025, the department prepared a status review
report and recommended the juvenile court terminate jurisdiction
and issue a custody order. The department reported mother had
completed her treatment program, was working to obtain her

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GED, and continued to make progress toward ensuring S.O.
remain in a safe and sober home.
On May 19, 2025, the department social worker spoke with
father’s probation officer who reported that father was compliant
with probation and had only 10 days left. Father did not have
any pending legal matters, however there remained an active
restraining order protecting mother from father.
The social worker also spoke to father’s Drug and Alcohol
Services (DAS) counselor who reported that father had last tested
on May 19, 2025, but had since stopped engaging with DAS.
Father had two visits with S.O., one on March 24, 2025,
and one on April 28, 2025.
Section 364 Hearing
On July 17, 2025, the juvenile court conducted a review
hearing pursuant to section 364 and considered terminating
jurisdiction over S.O. with an exit order giving mother sole legal
and physical custody and denying father all contact and
visitation with S.O. Father requested a contested evidentiary
hearing to challenge the juvenile court’s proposed order. The
juvenile court denied the hearing on the basis that father was a
“mere biological” father and not a “presumed” father and
therefore lacked standing.
Discussion
Father contends (1) he has standing to challenge the
juvenile court’s custody and visitation orders because he was
“aggrieved” by the orders, and (2) the juvenile court abused its
discretion in denying visitation without conducting an
evidentiary hearing to determine S.O.’s best interests. We agree.
Whether a party has standing to appeal is a question of
law. (Bridgeman v. Allen (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 288, 292.) We

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liberally construe the issue of standing and resolve doubts in
favor of the right to appeal. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
942, 948.)
“[O]nly a person aggrieved by a decision may appeal. . . .
These rules apply with full force to appeals from dependency
proceedings.” (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236 (K.C.); In re
D.S. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 671, 673-674; In re Carissa G. (1999)
76 Cal.App.4th 731,734.) “To be aggrieved or affected, a parent
must have a legally cognizable interest that is affected
injuriously by the juvenile court’s decision.” (D.S., at p. 674;
Carissa G., at p. 736.) Thus, to determine whether a parent is
aggrieved by a finding or order, we must identify the parent’s
interest in it.
“All parents, unless and until their parental rights are
terminated, have an interest in their children’s ‘companionship,
care, custody and management . . . .’” (K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at
p. 236.) “‘This interest is a “compelling one, ranked among the
most basic of civil rights.”’” (In re J.C. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th
1489, 1492-1493.)
Here, father remained a biological father with his parental
rights intact and was also allowed visitation with S.O. from
February 2025 to July 17, 2025, when the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction with an exit order denying father all
future contact and visitation with S.O. As such, father has
standing to have a hearing on custody and visitation orders and
was aggrieved by the juvenile court’s decision to deny the
hearing.
Father was also prejudiced by the juvenile court’s decision.
Although he can seek modification of the visitation order in
family law court, a family law court must defer to a recent order

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of the dependency court concerning custody and visitation unless
it finds a significant change of circumstances. (See In re Michael
W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 190, 192, 196 [presuming prejudice, and
holding that “when requested, an evidentiary hearing must be
held”]; see also In re Armando L. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606, 619-
621 [juvenile court abused discretion in denying evidentiary
hearing on issues related to jurisdiction and exit orders]; Heidi S.
v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1164 [“before modifying
the visitation schedule set forth in the Exit Order, the family
court must find a significant change of circumstances that
warrants that modification].) The juvenile court therefore abused
its discretion when it denied father’s request for a hearing.
Disposition
The juvenile courts orders, dated July 17, 2025, are
reversed and the matter remanded for the juvenile court to
conduct a contested section 364 hearing at which father may
present evidence concerning his present circumstances, as well as
S.O.’s best interests.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J., Acting P. J.

We concur:

CODY, J.

DEROIAN, J.*

* (Judge of the Sup. Ct. for Santa Barbara, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to

art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.

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Denise DeBelleFeuille, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
_____________________________

Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Objector and Appellant.
Jon Ansolabehere, County Counsel, Vincent M. Uberti,
Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.

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