CourtListener 10793866•People v. Lee CA2/8
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Filed 2/13/26 P. v. Lee CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B340610
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA090448
v.
SHERMAN LEE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Altus W. Hudson, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with instructions.
Jonathan Demson and Michael Reed, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Sherman Lee appeals the trial court’s denial of his section
1172.6 petition for resentencing. In light of People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton), we remand and instruct the trial
court to consider an amended petition if Lee files one within 30
days of the remand. Statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
Ronnie Hayes testified at the preliminary hearing that he
was with Hoover Darnell Carter at the building where both Lee
and Carter lived the morning of the shooting. Hayes testified
Carter told him Lee had been threatening Carter. Hayes and
Carter were walking together when Lee approached. Lee said,
“Let’s do this shit.” Hayes left because he did not want to be part
of what he assumed would be a fistfight. Hayes went to the
building’s kitchen. A man named Melvin later entered the
kitchen saying Carter had been shot.
Police arrived to find Carter lying face up on the street with
multiple gunshot wounds. Carter died in the hospital.
Lee’s former girlfriend testified he called her after the
shooting. When she asked him why he had done it, he told her,
“Well, if you were there too, you wouldn’t be talking to me right
now.”
Lee also called the manager of the building and told her “he
was as angry – still angry as he was the day that it happened,
that he did not have any regrets.” Lee told the manager “he shot
[Carter] in the knee first or his leg,” and when Carter said he was
crazy, Lee said, “You don’t know how crazy I am,” and proceeded
to shoot him.
Fifty-four days after the shooting, on his 54th birthday, Lee
turned himself in to the police. In an interview, Lee said Carter
had stolen his girlfriend and was taunting him. Lee said on the
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day of the shooting he “just couldn’t take it anymore.” Lee also
stated, “It’s not me. I’m not a killer. . . . They made me do it.”
Pursuant to a plea bargain, Lee pleaded no contest to
voluntary manslaughter and criminal threats. He also admitted
a gun use enhancement. The trial court sentenced Lee to 21
years and eight months in prison.
In 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which altered the rules
of murder liability to ensure culpability more closely matched
punishment. (People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 472.) As
part of this reform, the Legislature amended section 188 to
prohibit imputing malice based solely on a defendant’s
participation in a crime. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) In effect, a
defendant can no longer be convicted of murder under an aiding
and abetting theory merely because a killing was a natural and
probable consequence of another intended offense. (People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 839.)
To provide retroactive relief, Senate Bill 1437 also
established a resentencing process, now codified in section
1172.6. This statute permits individuals convicted of murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter under a theory of imputed
malice to petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction
and seek resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Once the court receives such a petition, the section 1172.6
process unfolds in three distinct stages. (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 562.) At the first stage, a petitioner need only
submit a facially sufficient petition that alleges the statutory
prerequisites for relief. (Ibid.) If the petition is facially valid, the
petitioner is entitled to the appointment of counsel, if requested,
and the matter proceeds to the second stage. (Ibid.)
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At the second stage, the trial court must determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 562.) If the
court finds the petitioners have met their burden of establishing
a prima facie case, the court must then issue an order to show
cause and proceed to the third stage: an evidentiary hearing at
which the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioners remain guilty under
current law. (Ibid.)
This case concerns the second step.
Lee filed a petition under section 1172.6. The court
appointed him counsel, received briefing, and held a hearing on
whether Lee made a prima facie showing. The court ruled
because the preliminary hearing transcript showed Lee was the
perpetrator he was ineligible for relief.
Patton came out after the trial court determined Lee had
not made a prima facie showing. Patton makes clear that at the
second stage a trial court may consider uncontroverted facts from
the record of conviction. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563–
564.) This includes an evaluation of preliminary hearing
evidence to determine whether a still-valid theory of liability
supported the conviction. (Ibid.) However, Patton also teaches
that at the second stage petitioners have the opportunity to show
why they are not ineligible, despite what might appear in
preliminary hearing transcripts. To meet the burden of
establishing a prima facie case for relief, the petitioner must
provide nonconclusory allegations that alert the court and
prosecution to the issues to be decided at the evidentiary hearing.
(Id. at p. 567.)
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Lee argues that because neither he nor the trial court had
the benefit of Patton’s guidance at the time of his hearing, we
should remand the case to allow him to make the type of showing
described in Patton. Because we see no material difference
between the facts in this case and those in Patton, we agree.
While the prosecutor argues such a remand would be “an idle
act,” he also does not oppose such a remand. We therefore
remand to allow Lee to provide nonconclusory allegations to
support his claim of eligibility.
DISPOSITION
We remand with instructions for the trial court to consider
any amended allegations filed by Lee within 30 days of remand.
We otherwise affirm the order.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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