People v. Diaz

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Filed 1/28/26; Certified for Publication 2/11/26 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B339253

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA060767)
v.

MONICA DIAZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maria Andrea Davalos, Judge. Affirmed.
Juvenile Innocence and Fair Sentencing Clinic, Christopher
Hawthorne, Alice Newman, and Michael Capovilla for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Seth P. McCutcheon,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
Several times during 1999, 16-year-old Monica Diaz and
her boyfriend confided in one another about their admiration for
murderers and their desire to commit murder themselves. In the
early morning hours of July 21, 2000, they followed through.
Diaz let her boyfriend into her home and waited in the bathroom
while he stabbed her uncle, aunt, and three cousins; everyone
except the aunt perished from their wounds. Diaz’s fingerprints
or palm print were found on butterfly and throwing knives at the
murder scene and on a roll of duct tape that was to be used to
bind the victims or cover their mouths. A jury, instructed as to
both direct aiding and abetting and felony murder theories,
convicted Diaz of four counts of first degree murder among other
charges. The trial court sentenced Diaz to four consecutive terms
of 25 years to life.
In 2020, Diaz sought resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 After an evidentiary hearing, the court found
Diaz guilty of first degree murder under current law under two
theories: (1) directly aiding and abetting the murder with the
intent to kill (i.e., she harbored express malice); and (2) as a
major participant in the underlying felony (burglary with false
imprisonment) who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. Diaz does not dispute any facts regarding her involvement
in the murders, but argues the trial court erred in failing to
consider her youth when determining whether she possessed the
requisite mental state under either theory. She further argues

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
Code. The statute was initially enacted at section 1170.95, and
later renumbered as section 1172.6, effective June 30, 2022
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). For ease of reference, we use the
current citation at section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.

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that her counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not
sufficiently focusing the court’s attention on her youth.
Diaz has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in
determining that she acted with express malice. Because
resentencing under section 1172.6 is not available to a direct
aider and abettor of murder who acts with intent to kill, this is
dispositive of her appeal, and we do not consider her argument
that the court failed to consider her age when finding she acted
with reckless indifference to human life. We thus affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Summary
Diaz requests that we take judicial notice of our opinion in
her direct appeal (People v. Diaz (Dec. 22, 2005, B175089)
[nonpub. opn.] (Diaz I)), explaining she does not dispute that she
“participated [in the offense conduct] in the ways described in
[Diaz I].” The Attorney General also relies on Diaz I for its
factual summary. Accordingly, we take judicial notice of Diaz I
and rely on its factual recitation, as background only. We draw
the facts upon which we rely for our substantial evidence analysis
from the trial testimony considered by the court as part of the
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing.
In July 2000, 16-year-old Diaz and her 17-year-old half-
sister, Laura R., lived with Diaz’s aunt and uncle, Richard and
Sylvia F., and their four children, 18-year-old Esperanza, 17-
year-old Richard Jr., 14-year-old Sylvia Jr., and 10-year-old
Matthew. Diaz and Laura’s mother had died when Diaz was
three years old. After a period of living with other relatives, Diaz
and Laura came to live with Richard and Sylvia. Diaz and Laura
were considered part of the family. (Diaz I, supra, B175089.)

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Diaz met Michael Naranjo in high school. By March or
April 1999, they were girlfriend and boyfriend, and Naranjo was
a frequent guest at Richard and Sylvia’s house. In a letter to
Naranjo dated March 9, 1999, Diaz talked admiringly about
murderers. She stated that “[t]he best job is to kill people
professionally” and that books about serial killers were her
favorites because she could learn from their mistakes. In an
April 1999 letter, Diaz told Naranjo that she thought the
Columbine school shootings “kicked ass” and that the
“Trenchcoat Mafia” who committed that massacre was “cool.” In
another letter written in April, Diaz told Naranjo that when
there was a minimum school day, the two “should do something
that day. Not your average day though. Go, kill a few people.
Break some windows and stuff like that. You get the picture,
right? Maybe I should add some more details to it. I just have to
do something really crazy and really soon. Cause if I don’t, I
might hurt the people I care about most.”
In the early morning hours of July 21, 2000, the members
of Diaz’s household (except for Diaz) were asleep in bed. Sylvia
awoke to find an intruder struggling with her husband. She
realized that she was bleeding and kicked the intruder, who fell
and then fled. Esperanza was awakened by the noise, got up to
investigate, and saw someone go out the back door. She went
into her parents’ bedroom, where her father told her that he had
been stabbed before falling to the floor. Esperanza attempted to
dial 911 but the home phone did not work. She ran across the
street and called 911 from a neighbor’s home.
Sheriff’s deputies and paramedics who arrived at the scene
found Richard on the bedroom floor, dead from multiple stab
wounds. Sylvia also had multiple stab wounds, for which she was

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taken to the hospital; she survived. Richard Jr. and Matthew
were found dead in the bedroom that they shared. Sylvia Jr. was
found dead in the bedroom she shared with Diaz. Like Richard,
all had died of multiple stab wounds. Esperanza and Laura, who
also shared a bedroom, were not harmed.
Witnesses at the scene testified that Diaz appeared calm
and seemed unaffected in the aftermath of the murders. She
kept to herself, playing with a toy bear while others mourned.
Investigators found a butterfly knife and a throwing knife in one
of the bathrooms of the house. A flashlight with a red lens was
found in the hallway. Near the gate to the side yard, other
knives, an axe, and a roll of duct tape were found. Pieces of duct
tape were also found at three locations inside the house and on
the air conditioning unit outside.
Diaz spoke with officers the next afternoon. She said she
was in the bathroom during the attack. When shown
photographs of the butterfly and throwing knives, Diaz said they
were not in the bathroom when she was there.
In the days following the murders, Diaz stayed with a
relative. Naranjo often came to visit, and he and Diaz were
affectionate with each other, mainly staying by themselves. At
one point Diaz visited Sylvia in the hospital but “seemed distant.”
Forensic examination revealed Diaz’s fingerprints or palm
prints on the knives found in the bathroom, the piece of duct tape
on the air conditioning unit, and the roll of duct tape. All of the
pieces of duct tape found by officers had been part of the same
roll. Naranjo’s prints were on one of the knives found in the
bathroom and the flashlight.
Diaz and Naranjo were arrested on July 26, 2000. While
they sat in a police car, they professed their love for each other.

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Sometime later, Esperanza visited Diaz in jail. Diaz told
Esperanza that no one was supposed to die and that the plan was
to tie up the family members and put duct tape over their
mouths. The purpose of this scheme was to bring the family
together.
B. The Charging Document
An amended information charged Diaz and Naranjo with
four counts of murder (§ 187, subd. (a); counts 1-4) and one count
of attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 5). It further
alleged the multiple murder special circumstance within the
meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3). Naranjo pleaded
guilty to all charges against him.
C. The Defense’s Trial Evidence
Diaz’s defense included that she was young and susceptible
to Naranjo’s influence. During opening statement, defense
counsel told the jury, “[Y]ou must consider this case in the
context of a young woman or young girl that was 16 years old at
the time,” and called Naranjo a “Svengali,” who “convince[d]”
Diaz that a staged robbery would bring her family together while
he “used . . . Diaz as his ticket inside” the home to kill her family.
1. Naranjo
Naranjo testified that Diaz told him Richard and Sylvia
had been having problems with each other. In response, Naranjo
devised a plan in which he would break into the family home and
pretend to commit a robbery. But, explained Naranjo, unknown
to Diaz, he actually planned to kill all the family members once
he got inside. Naranjo had no particular reason for wanting to do
this, although he had been thinking about killing people from the
time he was 13 or 14 years old. (In March or April 1999, Naranjo

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wrote a letter to Diaz in which he said that the one thing he
wanted to “do before [his] life ends, one thing is to kill a shit-load
of people.”) While he was attacking Richard and Sylvia in their
bedroom, Sylvia kicked him. Naranjo then went into the
bathroom, where Diaz was waiting, and handed some knives to
her. She put them down and left the bathroom. Naranjo then
fled.
Naranjo also testified that his mother saw him get into bed
that evening. He and Diaz planned for him to come to Diaz’s
home around 1:30 a.m., and he waited at the back door for Diaz
to let him in. After the murders, Naranjo returned to his house
and went to bed. Diaz telephoned him, causing it to seem to his
mother that Naranjo had been in bed all night. After the
telephone call, Naranjo went to Diaz’s home and gave law
enforcement a toy bear for Diaz. Witnesses observed her playing
with the bear at the scene.
2. Diaz
Testifying in her own behalf, Diaz asserted that she had
written letters to Naranjo about murder because she knew he
was interested in the subject and she wanted to get him to like
her. She thought Naranjo’s interest in killing people was “just
talk.” She knew that Naranjo had a collection of knives but did
not think much of it.
According to Diaz, at one point Richard and Sylvia started
to argue with each other. She thought their marriage was at risk
and felt anxious about what would happen to her if they
separated. Hearing this, Naranjo proposed a plan by which he
would come to the house, bind the family members, gather
property and pile it in the living room as if it were going to be
stolen, and then leave without taking anything. Naranjo said

7
that doing so would scare the family and make them unite. Diaz
initially thought the plan was unworkable but reconsidered when
Naranjo explained that the lights would be off so he would not be
identified.
Diaz said that, on the night of the murders, she went
outside when Naranjo arrived and helped him cut the duct tape.
She did not see any weapons at that time. The two then entered
the house and Diaz went into the bathroom. She heard
struggling noises from other rooms, and when Naranjo came into
the bathroom, he had two knives and was covered in blood. At
that point, Diaz realized that her family members had probably
been hurt. She went to see what was happening as Naranjo fled.
She did not want to believe what she saw and did not tell the
police because she was in denial. She told the police about
Naranjo only after she and Naranjo had been arrested. When
police asked Diaz what Naranjo planned to bring to scare her
family, Diaz said she assumed he would have knives with him as
he always carried them. She also told police that she called
Naranjo at his home to give him an alibi.
Diaz testified that Naranjo was well-acquainted with her
family, but he did not attempt to conceal his identity with a mask
during his attack. When asked to explain how Naranjo planned
to bind Diaz’s family without being recognized, she responded she
did not think about it.
Diaz’s testimony included several references to her youth.
For example, Diaz testified that her mother died when she was
three years old, and until third grade, she sometimes lived with
her grandmother, who was abusive. Diaz met Naranjo when she
was 14 years old, and they started dating when she was 15 years
old.

8
3. Dr. Gregory Doane
Child psychiatrist Dr. Gregory Doane testified that for
about one and one-half years he had been meeting with Diaz in
the juvenile facility where she had been detained following the
murders. Dr. Doane’s initial diagnosis of Diaz was dysthymic
disorder, a condition of low to mid-grade depression which
persists throughout one’s life. Two weeks later, Dr. Doane
revised the diagnosis to include major depression with psychotic
features. In September 2000, Dr. Doane again revised the
diagnosis, this time to include borderline personality disorder.
Dr. Doane opined that at approximately three years of age,
Diaz “apparently must have gone through a lot of abandonment,
. . . feelings of no stability, and throughout the rest of her teenage
years kind of emotionally relived those chaotic years, and being
very afraid of being abandoned.” Diaz reported that between
ages four and six, she invented an imaginary character, a person
named “Freddy.” The character had “stayed with her” and “took
on a psychotic hallucinatory value when she was under stress.”
Dr. Doane explained that “[w]hen stressed [Diaz] tends to
disassociate . . . . She just can’t realize what’s gone on.” Diaz’s
failure to report that Naranjo had committed the murders and
that Diaz continued to cling to him after the murders was
consistent with her diagnoses. “She idolized [Naranjo], she
couldn’t see any wrong in him, and she just couldn’t put two and
two together when she saw what happened.” “[U]ntil the very
end she considered [Naranjo] to be God, basically.” It was
“credible to [Dr. Doane] that [Diaz] just basically could not
understand what had happened and just refused to think about
it.” However, Dr. Doane also testified that a person with
borderline personality disorder could feel an intense and

9
irrational hatred of people and that the shift from love to hate
could occur rapidly.
D. Closing Argument
The prosecutor argued to the jury that Diaz and Naranjo
had jointly planned the murders and Diaz was therefore guilty of
premeditated murder and murder by lying in wait, as well as
attempted premeditated murder of Sylvia. The prosecutor
further argued that Diaz’s testimony constituted a judicial
admission of first degree felony murder under the theory that
Diaz had aided and abetted a burglary in which she intended
that her family be falsely imprisoned to frighten them. (Diaz I,
supra, B175089.)
In Diaz’s argument to the jury, her counsel referred to Dr.
Doane’s testimony about Diaz’s efforts to avoid abandonment and
her idolization of Naranjo. Counsel described Diaz’s
vulnerability, calling her “a 16-year-old star-struck child,” who
“was duped” by Naranjo, and argued Naranjo was solely
responsible for the murders. Counsel acknowledged the existence
of the felony-murder theory but did not directly refute it. (Diaz I,
supra, B175089.)
E. The Verdict, Sentence, and Appeals
The jury was instructed on premeditated, deliberate
murder and felony-murder theories. It found Diaz guilty of all
counts and found the multiple-murder special-circumstance
allegations true. The court sentenced Diaz to life without the
possibility of parole for counts 1 through 4 and 15 years to life for
count 5 for attempted murder.
On direct appeal, we reversed Diaz’s attempted murder
conviction (count 5) and the special circumstance findings. We
explained, “[Diaz] contends that, by way of evidentiary rulings

10
[excluding Dr. Doane’s testimony that a vulnerable and
dependent person could be dominated by someone else] and a
special instruction [that being under the influence of another
person was not a defense to homicide], the trial court erroneously
limited consideration of evidence that [Diaz] thought her
boyfriend would only frighten the people inside the house by
pretending to rob them and did not know of his plan to kill. We
find merit in this contention to the extent that attempted murder
and multiple[-]murder special circumstances require proof of
intent to kill. But the error did not affect [Diaz]’s guilt of first
degree felony murder on the prosecution’s alternative theory that
[Diaz] aided and abetted a burglary by entering the house with
the intent to commit felony false imprisonment.” (Diaz I, supra,
B175089.)
The People elected not to retry the attempted murder and
special circumstances allegations. (People v. Diaz (May 23, 2008,
B198569) [nonpub. opn.] (Diaz II).) The trial court denied Diaz’s
request to continue her sentencing hearing and resentenced Diaz
to consecutive terms of 25 years to life for each of the four murder
counts. Diaz appealed. We held the court erred in denying the
requested continuance and remanded for a new sentencing
hearing. (Ibid.)
During that resentencing, Diaz argued her age and
immaturity, among other things, were mitigating factors. (People
v. Diaz (Apr. 28, 2011, B218806) [nonpub. opn.] (Diaz III).) The
trial court sentenced Diaz to four consecutive terms of 25 years to
life. (Ibid.) Diaz appealed and we affirmed (with modification of
custody credits), explaining that in Diaz I “[w]e did not conclude
that the record established that [Diaz] was only an aider and
abettor in a felony murder, as [Diaz] argues repeatedly in this

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appeal, but merely that no retrial of the murder charges was
required because she was at least an aider and abettor in a felony
murder. . . . [T]he trial court was not required to minimize the
role [Diaz] played in the crimes or accept either the psychological
evidence or [Diaz]’s and Naranjo’s testimony that she did not
intend for anyone to be killed.” (Diaz III, supra, B218806.)
F. Diaz’s Resentencing Petition
In 2020, Diaz filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. In 2022, the superior court found Diaz had made
a prima facie showing and issued an order to show cause.
At the May 24, 2024 evidentiary hearing, the court took
judicial notice of the clerk’s transcripts and reporter’s transcripts
from trial and indicated that it had reviewed them. The People
argued that the evidence demonstrated that Diaz and Naranjo
planned and orchestrated the slaughter of Diaz’s family
members. During argument, the People observed that Diaz was
16 years old at the time of the murders.
Diaz attended the hearing by Webex. She did not testify or
offer any evidence (including but not limited to any evidence
excluded from her trial). Diaz’s counsel argued that she lacked
the intent to kill. Diaz and Naranjo planned to stage a burglary
with the hope it would bring the family together, but Naranjo
strayed from the plan when he killed Diaz’s family members.
Diaz’s counsel further explained, “[S]he was 16 [years old] at the
time. . . . The fact that they concocted this plan . . . doesn’t mean
that that was thought through in a manner that would create
such liability for . . . Diaz. The issue is whether or not she knew
at the time that . . . Naranjo was going to kill members of her
family. He’s clear that she didn’t, and she also is adamant in her
testimony that she never held such an intent.” Diaz conceded she

12
was a major participant in the crime but argued the evidence did
not establish that she acted with reckless indifference to human
life.
The trial court did not find the defense’s version of events
credible, stating “[I]t was clear to this court that . . . Diaz and . . .
Naranjo were continuously concocting plans. They concocted this
plan to kill the members of this family that took her in.” The
court observed that both Diaz and Naranjo “had been fantasizing
about” the murders for “months before the actual killings.” The
court described that Diaz’s conduct “belies her contentions that
she did not know that . . . Naranjo was going to kill her family
members.” It pointed to the letters Diaz had written to Naranjo
and her conduct after the killings, including that Diaz never
expressed surprise about the killings and continued her
relationship with Naranjo. The court concluded Diaz was a direct
aider and abettor in the killings who acted with the intent to kill.
The court also determined Diaz was a major participant in the
underlying burglary who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. The court denied Diaz’s resentencing petition.
DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Principles Regarding Section 1172.6
and Standard of Review
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
narrowed the scope of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448, citing § 189, subd. (e).) Under current
law, “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration
of a [specified] felony . . . in which a death occurs is liable for
murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person
was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, . . . or assisted

13
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also required that except in cases of
felony murder, “in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in
a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Thus, Senate Bill No. 1437
eliminated murder liability under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
984.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 did not change the law as to an
accomplice’s liability for directly aiding and abetting a murder
with malice aforethought. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 848; see People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595-596
[explaining direct aiders and abettors of murder “necessarily
‘know and share the murderous intent of the actual
perpetrator’ ”].) Malice may be express or implied. (§ 188, subd.
(a).) “Malice is express when a defendant intends to kill . . . .” (In
re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 600) “ ‘A person aids and abets
the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of
the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent
or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission
of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates the commission of the crime.’ [Citations.] ‘ “[U]nder
direct aiding and abetting principles, an accomplice is guilty of an
offense perpetrated by another [e.g., murder] if the accomplice
aids the commission of that offense with ‘knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in

14
achieving those unlawful ends.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Ramos (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 460, 465-466.)
The trial court denied Diaz’s petition at a section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing. During that stage, “the
trial judge is charged with determining, beyond a reasonable
doubt, if the petitioner is guilty of murder under a theory that
remains valid after [Senate Bill No. 1437].” (People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 952.) “The admission of evidence in
the [evidentiary] hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code,
except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted
at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,
including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Ordinarily, we review the trial court’s factual findings
following a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing
for substantial evidence. (People v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
393, 412.) Diaz argues our review should be de novo because she
“does not ask this [c]ourt to examine the trial court’s evidentiary
findings. The facts are undisputed.” She contends her “right to
have her youth considered presents a ‘pure question of law.’ ”
(Underscoring omitted.) We do examine legal questions de novo.
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) However, there are
facts here—such as whether Diaz had the intent to kill—that are
disputed, and as to which Diaz argues the court should have
interpreted the evidence differently. Thus, to the extent Diaz
challenges the court’s factual findings (which include the
inferences the court drew from uncontested facts), we review the
record for substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to
support the court’s finding. (People v. Oliver (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 466, 480.) We examine the record in the light most

15
favorable to the judgment and defer to the trial court’s implicit
credibility findings. (Id. at pp. 480, 482.) “ ‘A reversal for
insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that
upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support’ ” the [fact finder]’s verdict.’ ” (People v.
Davis (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 500, 510.)
B. Youthful Offenders in Section 1172.6 Proceedings
Diaz does not contest that the evidence established the
actus reus element that she directly aided and abetted the
murders or that she was a major participant in the underlying
felony. Rather, Diaz contends that the court should have
considered her youth in determining whether she had the
requisite mental state of reckless indifference to human life or
intent to kill (i.e., express malice). We thus limit our discussion
to these mental states.
“ ‘[R]eckless indifference to human life is “implicit in
knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave
risk of death.” ’ ” (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 883.)
Recklessness includes a subjective element that “ ‘ “[t]he
defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent
manner in which the particular offense is committed,” and he or
she must consciously disregard “the significant risk of death his
or her actions create.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 884.) People v. Clark (2016) 63
Cal.4th 522, 617 set out a nonexhaustive list of factors for courts
to consider when determining whether reckless indifference
existed. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677; see also People
v. Emanuel, supra, at p. 884.) However, “[t]he ‘totality of the
circumstances’ must be analyzed to determine whether the
defendant acted with reckless indifference.” (People v. Emanuel,
supra, at p. 885.)

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Since 2021, “Courts of Appeal have recognized that ‘a
defendant’s youth is a relevant factor in determining whether the
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ”
(People v. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885, fn. 6; see, e.g.,
People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1002; People v.
Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1093; People v. Keel (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 546, 558-559; In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
450, 470; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 990-991;
In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454.)2 This is because the
“ ‘hallmark features’ of youth,” including “ ‘immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,’ ”
bear upon a youthful offender’s culpability. (In re Moore, supra,
at p. 454.) Case law “stress[es] two areas of divergence” between
youthful offenders and adults: (1) youthful offenders’ “relative
impulsivity”; and (2) “their vulnerability to peer pressure.”
(People v. Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489; see People v.
Jones, supra, at p. 1093.)
People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400 extended the
consideration of a defendant’s youth to implied malice murder
cases. Pittman explained, “The policy interests underlying the
felony-murder cases—that youth is relevant to a criminal
defendant’s ability to perceive risk and consequences, and
therefore to the level of culpability—apply equally in the context

2 Although a relevant factor, youth is not dispositive and
courts have recognized that youthful offenders can act with
reckless indifference to human life. (Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481
U.S. 137, 151-152, 158 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127] [19-year-
old and 20-year-old acted with reckless indifference to human
life]; In re Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 453 [16-year-old
acted with reckless indifference to human life].)

17
of implied malice murder. . . . [T]he implied malice mental
state—conscious disregard for human life [citation]—is similar to
the ‘reckless indifference to human life’ standard applicable to
felony murder. [Citation.] Indeed, the concept of reckless
indifference to human life has a subjective component that
expressly incorporates the ‘conscious[] disregard’ of ‘ “the
significant risk of death [the defendant’s] actions create.” ’
[Citation.] Given these similarities, and the lack of any
distinction supplied by the parties, we see no reason not to apply
the principle articulated in the felony-murder cases here.” (Id. at
p. 417.)
C. Analysis
Based upon these legal developments—all of which
occurred before the evidentiary hearing here, and of which the
trial court was thus presumably aware3—Diaz argues the trial
court erred in not considering her youth. She further argues that
had the court not so erred, there was a reasonable probability
that the result would have been more favorable to her. (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
The trial court found Diaz ineligible for resentencing relief
for two independent reasons, one of which was that she was a
direct aider and abettor who acted with express malice. (People
v. Ramos, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 465 [direct aider and
abettor who had the intent to kill is ineligible for § 1172.6 relief].)

3 A reviewing court “presume[s] . . . that the [trial] court
knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.” (People v.
Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644, overruled on other
grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069,
fn. 13.)

18
The court was aware of Diaz’s age at the time of the offense; the
trial record was rife with references to her youth, and her counsel
at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing argued that her age
meant there was not a “thought through” plan to murder anyone.
The court rejected that claim, found the “bring[ing] the family
together” excuse not credible, and found Diaz intended to kill her
family members and helped Naranjo accomplish that goal. In
doing so, the court admittedly did not expressly reference Diaz’s
age. But Diaz cites no case—and we are aware of none—
suggesting that a court hearing a section 1172.6 petition must
expressly state that it has considered the defendant’s youth in
evaluating whether he or she had the express intent to kill.
Because a defendant who acts with express malice intends
that his or her conduct result in death, express malice does not
implicate to the same degree the concerns that arise when
evaluating whether a youthful defendant’s perception of risks
supports a finding of reckless indifference or implied malice.
Diaz argues that In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at page 454
states, “[a]ge and youth-related factors are always relevant to
determining intent to kill.” This quote does not appear on page
454 of that opinion nor anywhere else in it. Diaz also cites People
v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at page 991 and People v.
Jimenez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at page 1007 for the proposition
that, as she puts it, “youth fundamentally limit’s one’s ability to
form the same level of criminal intent as an adult.” (Italics
added.) Each of the cases she cites, however, concerned whether
the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life, a
different mental state than intent to kill/express malice. “Cases
are not authority for propositions they do not consider.” (People
v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 118.)

19
Diaz also argues that like the defendant in People v.
Jimenez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 994, her youth made her
“particularly susceptible to” Naranjo’s influence. She explains
that she “was subject to a substantial amount of peer pressure
related to the offense. . . . [She] had recently begun a new
romantic relationship with Naranjo, who ultimately planned and
committed the killings. Naranjo had a preexisting interest in
committing violent crimes before he ever became romantically
involved with [Diaz].”
As to the court’s finding of express malice, this argument
fails for at least two reasons. First, Jimenez is distinguishable.
It is a reckless indifference case and not an express malice case.
Even setting that aside, the defendant there “had only known
[his girlfriend] for less than a month before the offense, and there
is no evidence he knew or had reason to know she had a
propensity for violence.” (People v. Jimenez, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 1008.) Here, Diaz and Naranjo’s relationship
was not short-term or “new,” and the letters between the two
support the conclusion that Diaz was well aware of Naranjo’s
propensity for violence and desire to murder, shared it, and
wanted to participate in such a crime along with him.
Second, Diaz’s “peer pressure” argument ignores that the
court’s finding that she had the intent to kill means the court
necessarily found she personally wanted her family members
dead and not that she was under the influence of someone else
who wanted to kill them. Indeed, the court’s statement that Diaz
and Naranjo together concocted a plan to kill her family members
and that her conduct after the killing belied her version of the
story demonstrate that the court did not find Diaz’s theories that
she was gullible or unduly influenced by Naranjo credible. Such

20
credibility findings are solely for the trier of fact (here, the trial
court) to make. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403;
People v. Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 480.)
We reject Diaz’s claim that her resentencing counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on her
claim of ineffective assistance, Diaz must show (1) the failure to
raise an argument fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) such
failure prejudiced her, meaning there is a reasonable probability
that, had counsel raised the argument, the court would have
ruled differently on her petition. (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [104 S.Ct. 2042, 80 L.Ed.2d 674]; People
v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 745-746.) Defense counsel did
not fail to argue Diaz’s age; he in fact highlighted that Diaz was
16 years old at the time of the murders in arguing the court
should grant relief under section 1172.6. Diaz’s contention that
defense counsel could have made a better argument than he did
“is not a sufficient basis for finding deficient performance by
defense counsel.” (People v. Ledesma, supra, at p. 748.)
Because the trial court’s finding that Diaz was a direct
aider and abettor with the intent to kill is a sufficient basis to
have denied her section 1172.6 petition, we need not also consider
Diaz’s argument that the trial court erred in not considering her
youth in determining whether she acted with reckless
indifference to human life.

21
DISPOSITION
The order denying Diaz’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

22
Filed 2/11/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B339253

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA060767)
v.
ORDER CERTIFYING
MONICA DIAZ, FOR PUBLICATION

Defendant and Appellant.

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on
January 28, 2026, was not certified for publication in the Official
Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion should
be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

____________________________________________________________
WEINGART, J. ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.

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