Pena v. Inter Stone Tools CA2/8

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Filed 2/3/26 Pena v. Inter Stone Tools CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

HECTOR JAVIER PENA, B333308

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC659877)
v.

INTER STONE TOOLS, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Frederick C. Shaller, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Tabone and Derek L. Tabone for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Law Offices of Wendy L. Slavkin and Wendy L. Slavkin for
Defendants and Respondents Marina Interlandi and Luigi
Interlandi.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Hector Javier Pena was injured while working for
Inter Stone Tools, Inc. (Inter Stone), a company that did not carry
workers’ compensation insurance for its employees. Pena filed a
civil lawsuit for negligence against Inter Stone and its alleged
owners, Luigi and Marina Interlandi,1 but ultimately pursued
the action solely against the Interlandis. During the litigation,
Pena obtained a default judgment against the Interlandis after
they failed to file a responsive pleading; however, the trial court
later granted the Interlandis’ motion to set aside the default
under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).
Following a bench trial on Pena’s negligence claim, the trial court
found in favor of the Interlandis on the grounds that Pena failed
to prove that either Luigi or Marina were liable for the negligence
of Inter Stone under an alter ego or joint employer theory.
On appeal, Pena argues that reversal is required because
the trial court erred (1) in failing to find that the Interlandis were
liable under Labor Code section 3700.5 for not carrying workers’
compensation insurance; (2) in finding that the Interlandis were
not liable for negligence as the alter ego of Inter Stone; and (3) in
granting the Interlandis’ motion to set aside the default. We
conclude Pena forfeited his claim regarding the Interlandis’
liability for an alleged violation of Labor Code section 3700.5 by
failing to timely raise this theory in the trial court. We further
conclude the trial court did not err in finding that Pena failed to
meet his burden of proving that the Interlandis were liable for

1 Because Luigi and Marina Interlandi share the same last
name, we refer to each of them by their first names for clarity
and convenience.

2
the negligence of Inter Stone under the alter ego doctrine.
We also conclude the trial court did not err in finding that the
Interlandis were entitled to mandatory relief from default based
on the error of their attorney. We accordingly affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Pena’s complaint for negligence
On May 2, 2017, Pena filed a civil complaint for negligence
against Inter Stone and Luigi. Pena later amended the
complaint to add Marina as a named defendant. As alleged in
the complaint, Pena was employed by the defendants and worked
with acetone in the course of his employment. While Pena was at
work, the acetone ignited and started a fire, causing Pena to
suffer burn injuries.
2. The Interlandis’ motions for relief from default
On January 10, 2019, the trial court granted Pena’s
application for service of the summons and complaint by
publication. Pena then obtained the Interlandis’ default and
dismissed Inter Stone as a defendant in the action without
prejudice. On January 6, 2020, the trial court entered a default
judgment against the Interlandis. However, on March 3, 2021,
the court granted the Interlandis’ motion to set aside the default
and default judgment because the Interlandis were not properly
served with the summons and complaint.
On April 25, 2021, Pena re-served the summons and
complaint on the Interlandis by substitute service. The
Interlandis then filed a motion to quash service of summons,
which the trial court denied. On October 6, 2021, after the
Interlandis failed to file a responsive pleading, Pena again
obtained their default.

3
On June 7, 2022, the Interlandis moved to set aside the
default and any default judgment entered against them under
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). The
Interlandis supported the motion with an attorney affidavit of
fault in which their counsel asserted that the failure to file a
responsive pleading was due to his error in calendaring the
matter. On July 5, 2022, while that motion was pending, the
trial court again entered a default judgment against the
Interlandis for $1,161,549.73. However, on August 25, 2022, the
court granted the motion to set aside the default and default
judgment based on a finding that the Interlandis’ failure to
timely file a responsive pleading was due to the mistake,
inadvertence, or neglect of their counsel.
3. Trial on Pena’s action against the Interlandis
On June 30, 2023, the trial court held a one-day bench trial
on Pena’s negligence action against the Interlandis. The court
admitted various exhibits by stipulation of the parties and heard
testimony from Marina, Luigi, and Pena. As set forth in the
settled statement later issued by the trial court, the witnesses
testified as follows:
“[Marina] took the stand and . . . was questioned by the
Plaintiff’s attorney about her understanding, knowledge and
involvement with a business called Inter Stone Tools, Inc. Inter
Stone Tools, Inc. was a California corporation with Marina being
the sole owner and listed as the only share holder. [Marina] was
shown documents (while under oath) including California Articles
of Incorporation and Statements of Information that had been
filed with the Secretary of State. Marina confirmed that the
signature on those documents appeared to be hers but insisted
that she did not know anything about the business and that she

4
just signed paperwork that her husband gave her. Multiple
times she indicated that it was his business and that those
questions should be asked of him. [Marina] testified she believed
that by signing the incorporation documents she was establishing
a close corporation by which her husband would operate a new
business of the same type he previously worked in with his
parents who had retired.
“Marina testified that she had no information as to the
value of the business, how much money the business made, the
value of the products inside the store, who had authorization
other than her husband to write checks out of the business, how
much money was invested in the business to start it, or if the
business ever made a profit at all. [¶] Marina also testified that
she sold the business to Kevin Moda before Hector Pena was
injured. She confirmed that she did not run the business, never
held any meetings, and did not follow any corporate formalities.
[¶] Marina further testified that she had no knowledge of any
insurance or workers compensation policy that was held by Inter
Stone Tools, Inc. that was active at the time of Mr. Pena’s injury
or if Inter Stone Tools, Inc. ever carried any such policy. She did
confirm that she currently owns a separate business, a sole
proprietorship, called First Class Tailors, which has no other
employees and performs styling and closet cleaning services.
“When asked about her answers to interrogatories [Marina]
claimed to have never seen them before and that if she had
signed them it would have been at the request of her husband or
attorney. During the questioning multiple inconsistences
between her interrogatories and testimony were disclosed.
“[Luigi] took the stand and was questioned by Plaintiff’s
counsel. Luigi confirmed that he ran the business and was paid

5
by check on the checking account of Inter Stone Tools, Inc. He
also testified the monthly paycheck was the only money he ever
received from the business. He was aware that the business was
not doing well because he did not have extra money to take his
wife out to dinner. [Luigi] could not state the value of the
business, the investment in the business, the amount of assets
the business had at the time of the accident, the value of the
inventory, or the amount [that] Inter Stone Tools, Inc. had in the
bank. [Luigi] testified that [Marina] had to sign the lease for the
business location and be made the holder of the lease because
[Luigi’s] credit was not as good as his wife’s. When [Marina]
signed the lease, it was signed by her as an officer of and on
behalf of Inter Stone Tools, Inc.
“[Luigi] confirmed that he had been in this business of
selling tools and products related to the stone cutting and
finishing business for some time and his parents were in the
same line of work. One of the products sold by the business was
acetone which is used in stone finishing. [Luigi] testified that he
did not recall whether or not, at the time of the injury to
Mr. Pena, he had any safety manuals or documents regarding the
correct handling of the chemical (acetone) being handled by
Mr. Pena at the time of the accident. [Luigi] testified that at the
business premises there was specific safety equipment and a
ventilation system. [Luigi] testified that there was a fire
suppression system in the building and he believes that it
engaged when the fire involving Mr. Pena started. [Luigi] also
testified that there was a ventilation system to vent chemicals
such as acetone. [Luigi] testified that he trained Mr. Pena in
specialized procedures for handling chemicals including the
acetone and gave him instructions about how to safely pour from

6
a larger container into smaller container, which was the
procedure being done at the time of the fire.
“Luigi was also asked about his responses to form
interrogatories where multiple inconsistences were found. When
asked about certain interrogatory answers he hypothesized that
some blanks he left in answers must have been filled by someone
at his counsel’s office after he turned in the answers and
verification since he did not provide the specific answer referred
to in the testimony. However, Luigi was able to confirm that his
wife did not have anything to do with the business and that he
had complete control over all aspects of the business including
financial management and direction.
“Hector Pena was the last individual to testify. Mr. Pena
testified that he worked for Inter Stone Tools, Inc[.] and that he
was paid by check issued on an account in the name of Inter
Stone Tools, Inc. Mr. Pena also testified that he had never met
[Marina] and that he believed [Luigi] owned and ran the
business. He also testified [he] had never seen Mr. Moda nor was
informed that the business was for sale or had been sold.
“Hector Pena testified that he received no training for
hazardous materials and that he was significantly burned after
returning from a smoking break and while working with acetone.
Mr. Pena authenticated certain photographs depicting his burns
and that he had incurred significant medical bills.”
4. Judgment in favor of the Interlandis
On August 22, 2023, the trial court entered judgment in
favor of the Interlandis and against Pena. In its statement of
decision, the court found that Pena was injured within the course
and scope of his employment with Inter Stone, that Inter Stone
did not carry workers’ compensation insurance at the time of the

7
incident, and that the presumed negligence of Inter Stone caused
Pena’s injury within the meaning of Labor Code section 3708.
However, the court also found that neither Marina nor Luigi were
liable to Pena for the negligence of Inter Stone under a joint
employer or alter ego theory.
As to the joint employer theory of liability, the court found
that Pena was solely employed by Inter Stone, and that there was
no evidence that Pena had any other employer, including either
Marina or Luigi as individuals. As to the alter ego theory, the
court found that there was no evidence that the Interlandis took
any money from the company apart from the paychecks that were
issued to Luigi from Inter Stone’s corporate account for his work
in managing the business. The court also found that there was
no evidence that the Interlandis commingled any personal and
corporate funds, that Luigi was overcompensated or received
benefits from the company other than a salary, that the business
was undercapitalized rather than not profitable, or that the
Interlandis used the corporate form to perpetrate a fraud,
circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or
inequitable purpose.
Following the entry of judgment, Pena filed a notice of
appeal.
5. Settled statement
Because the trial proceedings were not transcribed, Pena
submitted a proposed settled statement to the trial court after
the filing of his appeal. The court found that Pena’s settled
statement was factually inaccurate and failed to state the issues
being raised on appeal. The court ordered Pena to submit a
corrected settled statement.

8
Pena then submitted a second proposed settled statement.
The court found that this second settled statement failed to
correct the factual errors previously identified by the court.
The court also found that, while this second settled statement
added a list of issues being raised on appeal, that list included an
issue never pleaded or tried before the court, which was whether
the Labor Code allowed for the imposition of civil liability on the
owners, directors, or officers of a business for failing to carry
workers’ compensation insurance.
The court made corrections to the second settled statement
proposed by Pena, and issued a modified settled statement that it
certified as accurate.
DISCUSSION
1. Liability under Labor Code section 3700.5
On appeal, Pena argues the trial court erred in failing to
find the Interlandis directly liable for his injuries based on their
violation of Labor Code section 3700.5. That statute makes the
failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance “by one who
knew . . . or . . . should be reasonably expected to have known” of
such obligation a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in
the county jail, a fine, or both. (Id., subd. (a).) However, as the
Interlandis correctly assert, Pena forfeited his claim regarding
liability for an alleged violation of Labor Code section 3700.5 by
failing to timely raise this theory in the trial court.
“ ‘The rule is well settled that the theory upon which a case
is tried must be adhered to on appeal. A party is not permitted to
change his position and adopt a new and different theory on
appeal. To permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the
trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing litigant.’ ”
(Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334,

9
1350, fn. 12; see also Cox v. Griffin (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 440,
443 [“appellant ‘cannot challenge a judgment on the basis of a
new cause of action [he] did not advance below’ ”].)
In this case, Pena’s complaint alleged a single cause of
action for negligence. At trial, Pena’s theory of liability as to the
Interlandis was that Marina and Luigi were liable for the
negligence of Inter Stone as either a joint employer or alter ego of
the company. Pena never alleged a statutory cause of action for
violation of Labor Code section 3700.5, nor did he pursue that
theory at trial. Rather, the record reflects that the first time
Pena mentioned Labor Code section 3700.5 was after the trial
ended in his written objections to the court’s tentative statement
of decision. Even then, however, Pena solely referenced that
statutory provision in the context of arguing that the Interlandis
were liable for the negligence of Inter Stone under a joint
employer or alter ego theory. It appears that Pena first raised
the issue of direct liability for a violation of the Labor Code in his
second proposed settled statement where he claimed that one
issue on appeal was whether the Labor Code “imposes both civil
and criminal liability upon the officers, directors and owners of
the business” for failing to carry workers’ compensation
insurance, and if so, whether “the Director of Workers
Compensation has more authority to recover from [these
individuals] than an injured employee would have.” However, as
the trial court noted in rejecting this proposed settled statement,
“there was no issue regarding penalties to Defendants for failing
to carry workers’ compensation insurance raised by the pleadings
or at trial.”
In his reply brief, Pena acknowledges the general rule that
a party cannot raise a new theory for the first time on appeal.

10
Pena nevertheless claims that he may raise the issue of direct
liability for a violation of Labor Code section 3700.5 in his appeal
because it involves the application of law to undisputed facts.
An appellate court does have discretion to consider a new theory
on appeal when it presents a pure question of law on undisputed
facts. (Ramirez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 1313, 1335.) However, “ ‘if the new theory
contemplates a factual situation the consequences of which are
open to controversy and were not put in issue or presented at the
trial the opposing party should not be required to defend against
it on appeal.’ ” (Krechuniak v. Noorzoy (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th
713, 725.)
Here, Pena contends the Interlandis violated Labor Code
section 3700.5 because they either knew or should have known
that the law required Inter Stone to carry workers’ compensation
insurance for its employees, and they chose not to purchase such
coverage. Yet it appears the extent of the Interlandis’ knowledge
of an employer’s obligations under workers’ compensation law
was never put in issue at the trial on Pena’s negligence claim.
According to the trial court’s settled statement, Luigi had sole
responsibility for running the business of Inter Stone, but there is
no indication that he was asked any questions at trial about
workers’ compensation insurance or why the company did not
have coverage at the time of Pena’s injury. Because the record
does not demonstrate that this new theory of liability presents a
pure question of law on undisputed facts, Pena is precluded from
raising it on appeal.
2. Liability under an alter ego theory
On appeal, Pena also asserts the judgment against him
must be reversed because the trial court erred in finding that the

11
Interlandis were not liable for the negligence of Inter Stone under
the alter ego doctrine. We conclude Pena has failed to show error
in the trial court’s alter ego ruling.
2.1 Governing law
“ ‘ “Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a legal entity
separate and distinct from its stockholders, officers and directors.
Under the alter ego doctrine, however, where a corporation is
used by an individual or individuals . . . to perpetrate fraud,
circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or
inequitable purpose, a court may disregard the corporate entity
and treat the corporation’s acts as if they were done by the
persons actually controlling the corporation.” ’ ” (Toho-Towa Co.,
Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th
1096, 1106–1107.) “ ‘ “In California, two conditions must be met
before the alter ego doctrine will be invoked. First, there must be
such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation
and its equitable owner that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist. Second,
there must be an inequitable result if the acts in question are
treated as those of the corporation alone.” ’ ” (Hacker v. Fabe
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1276.) “The plaintiff has the burden
of establishing both requirements.” (Angel Lynn Realty, Inc. v.
George (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 655, 667.)
“Among the many factors relevant in applying the alter ego
doctrine are ‘one individual’s ownership of all stock in a
corporation; use of the same office or business location;
commingling of funds and other assets of the individual and the
corporation; an individual holding out that he is personally liable
for debts of the corporation; identical directors and officers;
failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records;

12
disregard of corporate formalities; absence of corporate assets
and inadequate capitalization; and the use of a corporation as a
mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for the business of an
individual.’ [Citation.] Other recognized factors include ‘ “the
use of the corporate entity to procure labor, services or
merchandise for another person or entity” ’ and ‘ “the diversion of
assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or
entity, to the detriment of creditors.” ’ ” (JPV I L.P. v. Koetting
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 172, 194–195.) “ ‘Because it is founded on
equitable principles, application of the alter ego [doctrine] “is not
made to depend upon prior decisions involving factual situations
which appear to be similar.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 195.) Rather, “ ‘[t]he
conditions under which the corporate entity may be disregarded
vary according to the circumstances in each case and the matter
is particularly within the province of the trial court.’ ” (Misik v.
D’Arco (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1071–1072.)
Generally, “ ‘[i]n reviewing a judgment based upon a
statement of decision following a bench trial,’ we ‘apply a
substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s
findings of fact.’ ” (Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of
Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 583, 596.) However, “ ‘where the
issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question
for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a
finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.]
Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s
evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ”
(Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838; see also In re R.V. (2015) 61 Cal.4th

13
181, 218; Hacker v. Fabe, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1279.)
The determination of whether the trial court applied the correct
legal standard is a question of law subject to de novo review.
(Castaneda v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1443.)
2.2 The trial court did not err in finding that Pena
failed to prove the Interlandis were liable for
negligence under an alter ego theory
In this case, the trial court found that Pena failed to meet
his burden of proving that either Marina or Luigi was liable for
the negligence of Inter Stone under the alter ego doctrine. On
appeal, Pena claims the trial court applied the wrong legal
standard in making this finding by requiring him to prove the
Interlandis were the alter ego of Inter Stone “for all purposes.”
The record, however, does not support this claim.
In its statement of decision, the trial court set forth the
correct legal criteria for determining the applicability of the alter
ego doctrine. The court accurately described the unity of interest
and equitable interest requirements, and identified many of the
factors that may be considered by the trier of fact in making its
determination. The court also noted that “[n]o one characteristic
governs,” and it “must look at all the circumstances to determine
whether the doctrine should be applied.” The court then applied
the relevant factors to determine whether alter ego liability
should be imposed on either Marina or Luigi for Inter Stone’s
negligence in causing Pena’s injury.
Among other factors, the trial court considered whether the
Interlandis commingled corporate and personal funds or used any
corporate assets for personal purposes, whether corporate funds
were distributed to the Interlandis other than to pay a salary to
Luigi for his services in managing the business, whether Luigi

14
was overcompensated for his services or treated the assets of the
business as his own, whether the business was undercapitalized,
and whether the Interlandis failed to maintain corporate records
or to comply with corporate formalities. After weighing the
evidence, the court determined that it “cannot find there was
such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation
and its shareholder or equitable owner that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in
reality exist.” Contrary to Pena’s claim, the court did not find
that he failed to prove the Interlandis should be treated as the
alter ego of Inter Stone for all purposes. Rather, the court found
that Pena had “not met his burden of proof to a preponderance
standard that either defendant should bear alter ego liability for
the . . . presumed negligence of Inter Stone Tools, Inc. for Mr.
Pena’s injury.” The trial court thus applied the correct legal
standard in determining whether the Interlandis were liable for
negligence under an alter ego theory.
We also reject Pena’s claim that he met his burden of proof
at trial by merely showing that the Interlandis “were in control of
the corporation and the corporation form was used to work an
injustice to [him].” The fact that the Interlandis had sole control
over the business of Inter Stone was a relevant factor to consider,
but it did not, standing alone, satisfy the unity of interest
requirement for alter ego liability. (See Zoran Corp. v. Chen
(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799, 812 [“ ‘[n]o single factor is
determinative, and instead a court must examine all the
circumstances to determine whether to apply the doctrine’ ”];
Meadows v. Emett & Chandler (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 496, 499
[“[m]ere ownership of all the stock and control and management

15
of a corporation by one or two individuals is not of itself sufficient
to cause the courts to disregard the corporate entity”].)
Moreover, in considering the equitable interest
requirement, the trial court found “no evidence that the
Interlandis used or attempted to use the corporate form of the
business to perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or
accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose.”
In particular, the court found “no evidence that Inter Stone[’s]
failure to pay for workers compensation insurance was part [of]
some scheme [or] plan, [or] was deliberate or intentional.” It was
the exclusive province of the trial court to evaluate the credibility
of witnesses and resolve conflicts in the evidence, and it is not the
role of this court to substitute its view of the evidence for that of
the trial court. On this record, the evidence did not compel a
finding in Pena’s favor on the issue of alter ego liability as a
matter of law.
3. Relief from default
Pena next contends the trial court erred in granting the
Interlandis’ motion for relief from default under Code of Civil
Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). He claims the Interlandis
were not entitled to mandatory relief under the statute based on
attorney error because they were not represented by an attorney
at the time of their default, but rather were representing
themselves. We conclude this claim lacks merit.
3.1 Governing law
Code of Civil Procedure “section 473, subdivision (b)
‘contains two distinct provisions for relief from default’
[citation]—one makes relief discretionary with the court; the
other makes it mandatory.” (Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v.
Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 438.) The mandatory

16
relief provision of the statute “requires the court to vacate a
default and any resulting default judgment, if a motion or
application for relief from the default judgment (1) is filed ‘no
more than six months after entry of judgment,’ (2) is ‘in proper
form,’ and (3) is accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault,
unless the court finds that the default judgment or dismissal was
not caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
neglect.” (Jimenez v. Chavez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 50, 57.)
“ ‘Unlike the discretionary ground for relief, a motion based
on attorney fault need not show diligence in seeking relief. The
motion is timely if filed within six months of the entry of the
default judgment or dismissal.’ ” (Dollase v. Wanu Water, Inc.
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1315, 1323.) Additionally, “a party is
entitled to mandatory relief under [Code of Civil Procedure
section 473, subdivision (b)] even when the attorney error is
inexcusable, so long as the attorney affidavit of fault shows the
error was the fault of the attorney rather than the client.”
(Jimenez v. Chavez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 57–58.)
Whether the requirements of the statute “have been satisfied in
any given case is a question we review for substantial evidence
where the evidence is disputed . . . .” (Martin Potts & Associates,
Inc. v. Corsair, LLC, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 437.)
3.2 The trial court did not err in granting the
Interelandis’ motion for relief from default
In support of their June 7, 2022 motion to set aside the
default and any default judgment entered against them, the
Interlandis provided an affidavit of fault from attorney Thomas
Sands. In that affidavit, Sands stated that he was retained by
the Interlandis in or about July 2021, and that his office had been
working remotely since March 2020 due to the COVID-19

17
pandemic. Sands also stated that his office underwent a
reduction in staff as a result of the pandemic, and that he was
suspended from the practice of law for a 90-day period starting in
October 2021. Sands asserted that he was never served with
Pena’s requests for entry of default and a default judgment, and
that he only recently learned of the case status by reviewing the
docket. Sands admitted that he made errors regarding the
calendaring of the matter, and that he should have instructed his
staff to calendar the due date for a responsive pleading.
In granting the motion, the trial court concluded that the
Interlandis were entitled to mandatory relief under Code of Civil
Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), because Sands’s affidavit
“establishes mistake, inadvertence or neglect in connection [with]
failing to file a responsive pleading for the Interlandis prior to
the entry of default against them.” In reaching this conclusion,
the court noted that Sands appeared on behalf of the Interlandis
in prior proceedings in this matter, including their motion to
quash service of the summons and complaint. The court also
noted that Pena served his request for entry of default and
request for a default judgment on the Interlandis rather than
Sands, which corroborated Sands’s assertion that he did not
receive notice of these filings. The court found that, based on his
admission of fault in his affidavit, Sands’s error was the
proximate cause of the defaults entered against the Interlandis.
On appeal, Pena argues the Interlandis could not rely on
Sands’s affidavit in seeking relief from default because Sands
was not their attorney of record at the time that Pena filed his
request for entry of default and request for a default judgment.
Specifically, Pena contends that when Sands previously appeared
in the action on the Interlandis’ behalf, the papers that he filed

18
with the trial court stated that he was “specially appearing” for
the Interlandis. Pena claims that, because Sands had not yet
made a general appearance in the case, the Interlandis
“themselves were the attorneys of record” at the time of their
default, and thus, any fault in failing to file a responsive pleading
was that of the Interlandis alone. This claim fails.
The record reflects that, in his initial filings for this case,
Sands stated that he was the “Attorney for Specially Appearing
Deft. Marina and Luigi Interlandi.” Given that the Interlandis
were objecting to the court’s jurisdiction on the grounds of
improper service of summons, it made sense that they “specially”
appeared in these prior court proceedings instead of making a
general appearance. (See In re Marriage of Obrecht (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [defendants “can preserve objections to
personal jurisdiction only by making a special appearance, i.e., an
appearance for the sole purpose of objecting to the court’s
jurisdiction”].) But the fact that the Interlandis had only made a
special appearance at the time of their default does not show that
they were representing themselves. Instead, Sands’s prior filings
on behalf of the Interlandis support the trial court’s finding that,
when their default was entered in October 2021, the Interlandis
were represented by Sands.
Yet even assuming that Sands was not the Interlandis’
attorney of record at the time of their default, they were not
precluded from seeking relief from default based on Sands’s error
in failing to file a responsive pleading. As the court explained in
SJP Limited Partnership v. City of Los Angeles (2006)
136 Cal.App.4th 511, there is “nothing in the language of [Code of
Civil Procedure] section 473, subdivision (b) to suggest that the
Legislature intended the mandatory relief provision to be limited

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to those circumstances where the attorney affidavit of fault is
signed by the defaulting or dismissed party’s attorney of record in
the civil case.” (Id. at p. 517.) Rather, “[b]y its language, the
statute only requires the affidavit be executed by an attorney
who represents the client and whose mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or neglect in fact caused the client’s default or
dismissal.” (Ibid.; see also Younessi v. Woolf (2016)
244 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1147 [attorney providing the affidavit of
fault need not be the moving party’s attorney of record to support
the granting of mandatory relief from a default or dismissal].)
Here, the trial court found that Sands was representing
the Interlandis at the time their default was entered, and that
Sands’s mistake, inadvertence, or neglect in fact caused the
Interlandis’ default. While Pena suggests that Sands signed a
false affidavit at the behest of the Interlandis, the trial court
found the affidavit and Sands’s admission of fault to be credible.
A trial court’s “determination of whether the default was caused
by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect is in
part a credibility determination,” and in reviewing that decision
on appeal, “ ‘we do not reweigh evidence or reassess the
credibility of witnesses.’ ” (Cowan v. Krayzman (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 907, 915.) Based on the record before it, the
trial court’s finding that the Interlandis were entitled to
mandatory relief from default was supported by substantial
evidence.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents Marina and Luigi
Interlandi shall recover their costs on appeal.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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