CourtListener 10782982•People v. Rivera-Torres CA1/3
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Filed 2/2/26 P. v. Rivera-Torres CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169827
v.
JOSE CARLOS RIVERA-TORRES, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 02-23-01543)
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted Jose Carlos Rivera-Torres of three misdemeanor
counts of contempt of court for violating a protective order issued as to Jane
Doe (Pen. Code,1 § 166, subd. (c)(1)). The trial court then imposed a three-
year term of probation pursuant to section 1203.097 as Doe was a person
defined in Family Code section 6211 (defining victims of domestic violence).
On appeal, Rivera-Torres argues the court erred by finding section 1203.097
applicable and asserts trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by asking
the court to impose the three-year minimum probation term required by that
statute. We affirm.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Rivera-Torres and Doe began dating in 2022 and subsequently moved
in together to a home in Hercules. Unless otherwise indicated, all further
dates refer to 2023.
On June 16, Rivera-Torres and Doe had a physical altercation at their
home during which Rivera-Torres hit Doe in the head (the June 16 incident).
Doe called the police and a responding officer found her in the garage hiding
under a trailer. Doe was frightened, shaking, and crying. She had multiple
injuries, including a bruised eye that was swollen shut and abrasions on her
collarbone. Rivera-Torres had bruising on his right hand, a cut on the back of
his head, and a red mark on his chin.
Doe was taken by ambulance to the hospital. While on the way, a judge
granted an emergency protective order (EPO) for Doe. The EPO was effective
immediately and expired on June 23. It prohibited Rivera-Torres from going
near Doe or their shared home and from contacting her, including by
telephone.
An officer provided a copy of the EPO to Rivera-Torres and explained
its terms. Rivera-Torres was arrested. Later that same day, Rivera-Torres
called Doe from jail while she was still in the hospital. He acknowledged the
EPO and asked Doe if she was going to “ ‘help’ ” him or “ ‘sink’ ” him in his
case.
On June 20, Doe went with a police escort to the home she had shared
with Rivera-Torres to pick up some of her belongings. Once inside the home,
Doe found Rivera-Torres hiding under a couch. Rivera-Torres was taken
back into custody. On June 21, Rivera-Torres again called Doe from jail and
asked for her help.
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Charges and Jury Trial
In October, Rivera-Torres was charged by information with one count of
injuring a cohabitant or person with a past or present dating relationship
following a previous conviction for the same offense (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1);
count 1), three counts of contempt of court for violation of a protective order
issued pursuant to section 136.2 (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); counts 2, 5, & 6), and two
counts of dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1) & (2); counts 3 & 4).
Count 1 concerned the June 16 incident. The three contempt counts
concerned Rivera-Torres’s calling Doe while she was in the hospital on June
16 (count 2), entering the home on June 20 (count 5), and calling Doe from
jail on June 21 (count 6).
A jury trial took place in January 2024. The prosecution presented
testimony by Doe and the police officers consistent with the factual summary
provided above. Rivera-Torres admitted he hit Doe in the head during the
June 16 incident but asserted he was acting in self-defense because Doe had
lunged at him and bit him on the chin. He also testified that, after he hit her
in the head, Doe punched him in the back of the head and he flung his arm
back with his hand in a fist, which made contact with Doe’s face.
Rivera-Torres further admitted that he knowingly violated the EPO as
alleged in the three contempt of court charges (counts 2, 5, & 6). He denied
attempting to get Doe to lie on his behalf during the phone calls.
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Rivera-Torres guilty of all three counts of contempt of
court. The jury acquitted Rivera-Torres on all the other counts. Prior to
sentencing, defense counsel requested the court impose a three-year term of
probation and a sentence of time served in county jail (230 days). The
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prosecution requested Rivera-Torres be sentenced to three years of probation
but sought a two-year jail sentence.
At the January 31, 2024 sentencing hearing, the court concluded Doe
was a victim of domestic violence within the meaning of Family Code section
6211 and, as a result, the minimum three-year term of probation required by
section 1203.097 applied. Accordingly, it imposed a three-year term of
probation subject to various terms and conditions mandated by section
1203.097, such as paying a domestic violence fine and attending a domestic
violence program. The court also ordered Rivera-Torres to serve 300 days in
county jail (with 232 days of custody credits) and issued a 10-year criminal
protective order as to Doe.
DISCUSSION
Rivera-Torres avers the trial court erred by imposing a three-year term
of probation under section 1203.097, asserting the court incorrectly found Doe
was a victim of domestic violence under Family Code section 6211. He also
seeks to raise a related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Unpersuaded, we shall affirm.
I. Section 1203.097 Applies to Rivera-Torres’s Probation Term
Section 1203.097 provides that, when a trial court grants probation for
a crime “in which the victim is a person defined in Section 6211 of the Family
Code,” various requirements apply, including a minimum three-year term of
probation. (§ 1203.097, subd. (a)(1).)
Section 1203.097 “does not apply only to defendants charged with
specified offenses; it encompasses defendants convicted of any crime of ‘abuse’
so long as the victim is a person identified in Family Code section 6211.”
(People v. Cates (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 545, 550 (Cates).) Thus, even if the
statute of conviction does not specifically refer to domestic violence, section
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1203.097 “applies to any person placed on probation for a crime if the
underlying facts of the case involve domestic violence.” (Cates, at p. 548.)
Family Code section 6211 defines “ ‘Domestic violence’ ” as “abuse
perpetrated against” various categories of persons, including a cohabitant or
former cohabitant and a past or present dating partner. (Fam. Code, § 6211,
subds. (b) & (c).)
The definition of “abuse” for purposes of Family Code section 6211 is
found in Family Code section 6203. (Cates, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 550.)
It is not limited to actual infliction of injury or assault; instead, it includes
various actions, including “engag[ing] in any behavior that has been or could
be enjoined [by a protective order] pursuant to [Family Code] Section 6320,”
which behavior includes telephoning, contacting, or coming within a specified
distance of a person. (Fam. Code, §§ 6203, subds. (a)(4) & (b), 6320,
subd. (a).)
Domestic violence offenses under section 1203.097 constitute an
exception to the otherwise applicable one-year limit on misdemeanor
probation terms. (See § 1203a, subds. (a) & (b) [one-year maximum term of
probation for misdemeanor offenses does not apply to an “offense that
includes specific probation lengths within its provisions”]; People v. Rodriguez
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 637, 644, 641 [holding “[a] domestic violence offense
under section 1203.097 . . . is ‘an offense that includes specific probation
lengths within its provisions’ ” for purposes of identically worded exception
applicable to felony probation].)
Rivera-Torres contends the trial court erred by concluding Doe was a
victim of abuse within the meaning of Family Code section 6211 and, as a
result, the court could only impose a maximum one-year term of probation
rather than the three-year term required by section 1203.097. Reviewing de
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novo whether section 1203.097 applies (see People v. Killion (2018) 24
Cal.App.5th 337, 341), we disagree.
We begin by addressing the Attorney General’s assertion that Rivera-
Torres forfeited his challenge to the trial court’s application of section
1203.097 by failing to raise an objection in the trial court. As Rivera-Torres’s
argument falls within an exception to forfeiture for claims that a sentence is
unauthorized, we turn to the merits. (See People v. Anderson (2020) 9
Cal.5th 946, 961–962.)
Rivera-Torres’s claim is premised on his assertion that the jury’s
acquittal of the remaining counts at trial (one count of injury to a cohabitant
or person with a past or present dating relationship and two counts of
dissuading a witness) amounted to a finding of fact that Doe was not a victim
of domestic violence, and he was therefore not convicted of any crime with a
nexus to domestic violence. He asserts the trial court was not permitted to
disregard that purported finding of fact and conclude, to the contrary, that
Doe was a victim of domestic violence under Family Code section 6211.
The premise of Rivera-Torres’s claim is misplaced as the issue of
whether section 1203.097 applies to a given offense is a question for the trial
court, not the jury. (See, e.g., Cates, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 550
[affirming trial court’s determination that section 1203.097 applied to
defendant’s conviction].) Rivera-Torres does not cite any caselaw for the
proposition that application of section 1203.097 is a factual finding for the
jury, and we find his reliance on the law governing collateral estoppel in the
context of double jeopardy inapposite. This case does not implicate double
jeopardy regarding the counts on which he was acquitted. Rather, we are
squarely presented with the issue of whether any of the contempt counts on
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which he was convicted was a “crime of ‘abuse’ ” on the basis that “the victim
is a person identified in Family Code section 6211.” (See Cates, at p. 550.)
We answer that question in the affirmative. Rivera-Torres’s contempt
of court convictions were based on his violations of the EPO—which
prohibited him from contacting Doe, going near her, or going to their home—
by calling Doe twice from jail and being at home when she went to pick up
her belongings. Based solely on these facts, the contempt convictions qualify
as “crime[s] of ‘abuse’ ” because Doe was a person identified in Family Code
section 6211. (See Cates, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 550.)
Specifically, Rivera-Torres telephoned, contacted, and went near Doe,
all of which was conduct expressly subject to being enjoined under Family
Code section 6320 (and was in fact enjoined by the EPO). (Fam. Code,
§ 6320, subd. (a).) As he “engage[d] in any behavior that . . . could be
enjoined” under that statute, his conduct plainly meets the definition of
“ ‘abuse’ ” for purposes of Family Code section 6211. (Fam. Code, § 6203,
subd. (a)(4).) Hence, the conduct underlying the contempt convictions
involved “abuse perpetrated against” a person within the meaning of Family
Code section 6211, as Doe is undisputedly a former cohabitant and past
dating partner. (Fam. Code, § 6211, subds. (b) & (c).) Therefore, the trial
court properly concluded section 1203.097 applies to Rivera-Torres. (See
Cates, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 548, 550.)
Finally, we readily dispose of Rivera-Torres’s cursory assertion that the
court’s imposition of the three-year probation term deprived him of due
process under Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343. The due process
concerns in that case stemmed from a specific Oklahoma state statute that
entitled a defendant to have his punishment fixed by a jury (id. at pp. 345–
346), which does not apply here. In any event, for the reasons already
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discussed, the trial court’s determination that Rivera-Torres is subject to a
three-year probation term under section 1203.097 was consistent with the
jury’s finding of guilt on the contempt of court convictions based on his
violations of the EPO.
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded section 1203.097 applies to
Rivera-Torres and, as a result, properly imposed the three-year term of
probation mandated by that statute. (§ 1203.097, subd. (a)(1).)
II. Rivera-Torres Fails To Show Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Rivera-Torres also seeks to raise a claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to argue for a one-year term of probation and instead
requesting a three-year term. This claim is without merit.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show both that “counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms,” as well as resulting prejudice. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986,
1009.) “[A] defense attorney who fails to adequately understand the available
sentencing alternatives, promote their proper application, or pursue the most
advantageous disposition for his client may be found incompetent.” (People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351.)
Rivera-Torres’s assertion that counsel provided deficient performance
is based on the same argument we have already rejected, i.e., that section
1203.097 does not apply to his case. However, as explained in section I, ante,
the trial court was required to impose a minimum three-year term of
probation under that statute. (§ 1203.097, subd. (a)(1).) Accordingly, defense
counsel’s request for the minimum term of probation was not objectively
unreasonable. (Cf. People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 351.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
PETROU, J.
WE CONCUR:
TUCHER, P. J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
A169827 / People v. Rivera-Torres
9
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