Arbit v. Zuckerberg CA2/8

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Filed 2/2/26 Arbit v. Zuckerberg CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

STANISLAV ARBIT, B340261

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23TRCP00474)
v.

MARK ZUCKERBERG,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County. Douglas W. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.
Stanislav Arbit, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, Eric A. Shumsky and
Elizabeth A. Bixby for Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Stanislav Arbit, a former employee at Facebook,
Inc., filed a complaint alleging defendant Mark Zuckerberg
stalked and defamed him through a network of agents around
Stanislav’s home and work. The trial court sustained
Zuckerberg’s demurrer and denied Arbit leave to amend. We
affirm the order because Arbit alleges fanciful theories with no
basis in fact.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. The Complaint
On December 18, 2023, Arbit filed his complaint against
Zuckerberg. Arbit alleges he was a former employee at Facebook,
Inc. who Zuckerberg targeted because he was a former employee.
Arbit further explains that “the defendant is a principal in a fifth-
column network that conspires to target Americans, who do not
have utility to them, to remove them from society by any
available means, including murder.” He elaborated that
Zuckerberg agitates his targets for a year to frighten them. Then
after a year, “they force the victim, or in this case, they forced me
out of housing and employment.” “The goal, and eventual result,
is to have the victim’s savings drained, all credit exhausted, and
for the victim’s resume to have a long gap in employment.” In
addition, “[d]efendant spies on the plaintiff and reflects gathered
intelligence in his choreographed field performances and
inauthentic interactions with Plaintiff.” Arbit articulates two
causes of action against Zuckerberg: (1) stalking under Civil
Code section 1708.7, and (2) defamation under Civil Code
sections 44 through 47.

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2. Arbit’s motion to disqualify the trial judge
On April 25, 2024, Arbit filed an ex parte application and
motion to disqualify the trial court judge, claiming that the judge
stated he did not care about Arbit’s case and then intimidated
Arbit by having an armed deputy stand by Arbit at a hearing.
Arbit also alleges the armed deputy followed him to the elevator,
and that the trial judge inappropriately denied his motions
because he was biased toward the billionaire defendant,
Zuckerberg. The same day it was filed, the trial court declined to
consider the motion on an ex parte basis, and indicated it would
follow the regular procedure under Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.3, subdivision (c)(3). Thereafter, on May 1, 2024, the
trial court struck the statement of disqualification, ruling the
motion was based on “[p]laintiff’s conclusions and speculation
about the assigned judge and his motivations, based on bias and
the appearance of bias, and based on conduct by individuals other
than the assigned judge.” The docket notes that a certificate of
mailing of the court order was filed on May 2, 2024.
3. Zuckerberg’s demurrer
On June 7, 2024, Zuckerberg filed a demurrer seeking an
order sustaining his demurrer without leave to amend.
Zuckerberg argued that the complaint’s allegations were
implausible and conclusory. Arbit did not file an opposition to
the demurrer, and on July 25, 2024, Zuckerberg filed a reply
brief, noting that Arbit failed to oppose his demurrer. On
August 1, 2024, the trial judge presided over a hearing on
Zuckerberg’s demurrer. The trial court posted a tentative ruling
for the demurrer prior to hearing argument. Arbit did not appear
at the hearing while Zuckerberg submitted on the trial court’s
tentative ruling. The trial court adopted its tentative ruling and

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sustained Zuckerberg’s demurrer without leave to amend. The
trial court ruled that Arbit’s causes of action for stalking and
defamation failed because Arbit’s allegations were conclusory.
For both causes of action, the trial court ruled “[p]laintiff has not
shown how he can amend.”
Arbit appealed on August 6, 2024.
DISCUSSION
Arbit presents two issues on appeal. First, we find that
Arbit cannot appeal the trial court’s order striking his motion to
disqualify the trial judge. Second, we find no error in the trial
court denying him leave to amend.
1. Motions to disqualify trial judges are not
appealable
Arbit moved to disqualify the trial judge prior to the trial
court hearing Zuckerberg’s demurrer. On appeal, Arbit contends
that the trial judge should not have ruled on Zuckerberg’s
demurrer because the trial judge should have been disqualified
prior to ruling on the demurrer. Relatedly, Arbit contends his
motion was meritorious and argues the trial court erred in
striking it. We, however, decline to reach the merits of this
argument as a motion to disqualify a trial judge is not
appealable. Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d)
provides, “The determination of the question of the
disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be
reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of
appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the
decision and only by the parties to the proceeding.” (People v.
Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 444.) Our Supreme Court has
further elaborated that “the statute means what it says: Code of
Civil Procedure 170.3, subdivision (d) provides the exclusive

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means for seeking review of a ruling on a challenge to a judge.”
(Ibid.)
Here, Arbit never sought writ review. The clerk provided
notice on May 2, 2024, and Arbit did not file his appeal until
August 6, 2024. Thus, we cannot reach the merits of Arbit’s
arguments as the order striking the disqualification motion is not
appealable. (People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 444.)
Moreover, the time to file a writ lapsed long before Arbit filed this
appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d).)
2. The trial court did not err in denying leave to
amend
2.1 Legal standard
Generally, we independently review a trial court’s rulings
on demurrer. (Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081,
1100.) However, “when, as here, the only [] aspect of the court’s
ruling challenged on appeal is its denial of leave to amend, our
review is limited to determining whether the court erred in
denying the plaintiff an opportunity to cure the deficiency.”
(Sierra Palms Homeowners Assn. v. Metro Gold Line Foothill
Extension Construction Authority (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1127,
1132 (Sierra Palms).) In this context, we review whether the
trial court abused its discretion in denying amendment. (Ibid.)
“Generally, sustaining a demurrer to a party’s first complaint and
refusing leave to amend is unwarranted if there is some
probability that the complaint may be amended to state a cause
of action.” (Agostini v. Strycula (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 804, 805.)
“ ‘The plaintiff has the burden of proving that [an] amendment
would cure the legal defect, and may [even] meet this burden [for
the first time] on appeal.’ ” (Sierra Palms, at p. 1132.) Relatedly,
per statute, a plaintiff can seek amendment on appeal even if the

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plaintiff did not request amendment in the trial court. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 472c, subd. (a).) In reviewing the underlying order,
we affirm the judgment based on any grounds argued in the
demurrer regardless of the basis of the trial court’s order. (Shaw
v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 740,
754.)
In addition, California “ ‘appellate courts possess the . . .
inherent power to summarily dismiss any action or appeal which
. . . is based upon . . . frivolous grounds.’ ” (Huang v. Hanks
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 179, 182.) We have this authority because
“ ‘California courts possess the inherent authority to dismiss
cases that are fraudulent or “vexatious.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
2.2 The trial court did not err in denying
amendment
Arbit does not challenge the trial court’s ruling on the
demurrer, and instead more narrowly appeals the trial court’s
decision to deny amendment. Arbit argues, “If allowed to amend
the complaint, [plaintiff] can cure the deficiencies in the original
complaint by pleading facts not in the original complaint.”
As an initial matter, we reject Zuckerberg’s argument that
Arbit waived amendment by failing to raise the issue in the trial
court. As we already noted, a plaintiff can argue for leave to
amend on appeal for the first time. (Code Civ. Proc., § 472c,
subd. (a).) Thus, we address whether the trial court erred in
denying leave to amend.
2.3 Arbit’s stalking claim
Stalking requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) “[t]he defendant
engaged in a pattern of conduct the intent of which was to follow,
alarm, place under surveillance, or harass the plaintiff”; (2) “[t]he
plaintiff reasonably feared for his or her safety, or the safety of

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an immediate family member” or “the plaintiff suffered
substantial emotional distress, and the pattern of conduct would
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress”; (3) as part of the pattern of conduct, the defendant
made a credible threat with the intent to place plaintiff “in
reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of an
immediate family member”; and (4) the plaintiff must have
“clearly and definitively demanded that the defendant cease and
abate his or her pattern of conduct and the defendant persisted”
unless “exigent circumstances” make the demand “impractical or
unsafe.” (Civ. Code, § 1708.7, subd. (a).)
Here, Arbit filed extensive factual allegations in both his
opening and reply briefs to establish how he would amend his
complaint if given an opportunity. First, we note it is generally
an abuse of discretion for a trial court to deny a plaintiff at least
one opportunity to amend a complaint. (Agostini v. Strycula,
supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at p. 805.) Here, however, the trial court
correctly sustained the demurrer because the fanciful allegations
here cannot support causes of action. (Huang v. Hanks, supra,
23 Cal.App.5th at p. 182.)
For example, Arbit alleges “defendant is a principal in a
fifth-column network that conspires to target Americans . . . to
remove them from society by any available means, including
murder.” However, these allegations describe “ ‘ “fantastic or
delusional [or fanciful] scenarios” ’ ” and cannot form the basis of
viable claims. (Huang v. Hanks, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 182.)
In his opening brief, Arbit offers additional facts to support
amendment including that “inauthentic behavior is constant,
often involving poorly acted out skits designed to manipulate,
foreshadow or suggest future threats; some are distractions; some

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are biological attacks with sick people purposely targeting
Appellant-Plaintiff with viral loads, including trespassing into
private spaces . . . .” Arbit in his reply brief offers additional
details such as Zuckerberg’s agents began frequenting his
neighborhood in San Francisco, with one disguised as a homeless
drug dealer. However, Arbit’s further fantastic scenarios share
the same flaw as his initial ones, and Arbit has not carried his
burden of showing he can cure the legal defect by alleging a claim
with an arguable basis. (Ibid.)
2.4 Arbit’s defamation claim
Arbit also seeks to amend his defamation cause of action
against Zuckerberg. Defamation requires “ ‘ “(1) a publication
that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a
natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” ’ ”
(Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1259.) In
his complaint, Arbit alleges “Defendant, Mark Elliott Zuckerberg,
is a principal in a conspiracy to defame the plaintiff, Stanislav
Arbit. [¶] The defamation was planned and executed with
Defendant’s vast network.”
Here, as above, Arbit’s theory is that Zuckerberg controls a
vast network of people who harass Arbit. Most of Arbit’s factual
allegations are more closely associated with a stalking theory
than a defamation claim. Regardless, as we discussed above,
these fanciful allegations do not support further amendment as
they are without merit. (Huang v. Hanks, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th
at p. 182.)
2.5 Arbit proposes an amended complaint beyond
the record and additional theories
Arbit has proposed an amended complaint that he has
uploaded to a private website that is not properly before us. It is

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not anywhere in the record, and we will not go beyond the record
here. “Appellate review is generally limited to matters contained
in the record.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89,
102.) Regardless, as we indicated above, the record is sufficient
for us to evaluate Arbit’s proposed amendments, and any
amendments here would not address the fanciful nature of his
theories.
Arbit also seeks leave to amend to add additional causes of
action. Arbit seeks to amend his complaint to allege: (1) cause of
action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) under 18 U.S.C. § 1962; (2) a cause of
action for aiding and abetting under RICO; (3) a cause of action
because the Threads app restrains trade in violation of
California’s Cartwright Act and the federal Sherman Antitrust
Act; (4) a cause of action because the Threads app aids and abets
in restraining trade in violation of California’s Cartwright Act
and the federal Sherman Antitrust Act; (5) a cause of action for
conspiracy to stalk; and (6) a cause of action for aiding and
abetting stalking. However, these additional causes of action
suffer from the same defect as his initial theories, as they are
fanciful theories with no legal or factual basis. (Huang v. Hanks,
supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 182.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment and order are affirmed. The parties shall
bear their own costs on appeal.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

SCHERB, J.

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