In re A.G. CA2/7

CourtListener 10782869Calctapp2 de fev. de 2026

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Filed 2/2/26 In re A.G. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
In re A.G., a Person Coming B344167 c/w B344789
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_______________________________ (Los Angeles County Super.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Ct. No. 21CCJP01718A)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Daniela S. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants,

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, D. Brett Bianco, Judge. Affirmed.
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Daniela S.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Joshua S.
Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, County
Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen
Wong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Daniela S. (Mother) and Joshua S. (Father) appeal from an
order terminating their parental rights under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Mother contends the juvenile
court abused its discretion when it failed to find the beneficial
parental relationship exception applied to prevent termination of
her parental rights.2 (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We conclude
the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Initial Dependency Proceedings Resulting in A.G. Being
Placed With Mother
When these proceedings began in early 2021, Mother was
16 years old, Father was 17 years old, and their daughter, A.G.
(born in 2020) was five months old. The Department received a
referral after Father accused Mother of infidelity, grabbed her by
her hair, and punched her in the face in front of two-month-old
A.G.
The Department filed a section 300 petition, alleging a
history of domestic violence between the parents and that
Father’s violence toward Mother endangered A.G., and that
Mother failed to protect A.G. by allowing Father unrestricted
access to her. At the detention hearing in April 2021, the
juvenile court ordered A.G. detained from both parents. After
sustaining the section 300 petition as pleaded, in July 2021 the

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 Father joins Mother’s arguments on appeal and does not
advance any separate arguments. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.200(a)(5).)

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court declared A.G. a dependent of the court, removed her from
Father’s custody, and placed her with Mother on the condition
that Mother reside with the maternal grandmother and comply
with her case plan.

B. A.G. Is Removed from Mother’s Custody But Returned
Six Months Later
In September 2021 the juvenile court detained A.G. from
Mother and placed her in a foster home after the Department
filed a section 387 petition alleging that the parents engaged in a
violent altercation in August 2021 and that Mother violated the
court’s order not to be present during Father’s visits. The court
sustained the section 387 petition, removed A.G. from Mother’s
custody, ordered family reunification services for Mother, and
allowed monitored visits.
From November 2021 through February 2022, Mother had
“frequent and consistent” visits with A.G. twice a week for two to
three hours each visit. Mother was attentive to A.G.’s needs and
came prepared with “food, toys, diapers, and clothes.” The social
worker stated Mother and A.G. had a strong bond. The
Department also observed A.G. had a “good bond” with her
caregivers and was “thriving in the placement.”
In April 2022 the Department liberalized Mother’s visits to
unmonitored. By May, the Department reported that Mother
remained consistent and prepared during visits and that her
bond with A.G. remained strong. At the six-month review
hearing on May 6, 2022, the juvenile court ordered A.G. be
returned to Mother’s care and set the matter for a section 364
hearing.

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C. A.G. Is Removed Again and Reunification Services Are
Terminated 18 Months Later
Several months after A.G.’s return to Mother, the
Department filed a section 342 petition, alleging Father
committed domestic violence in June and August 2022 that
endangered A.G., and Mother failed to protect A.G. and violated
court orders by allowing Father unrestricted access to her. At the
detention hearing in August 2022, the juvenile court again
ordered A.G. detained from Mother, with monitored visits for
Mother three times per week.
At the October 2022 adjudication hearing, the court
sustained both counts of the section 342 petition and ordered
A.G. removed from Mother with monitored visitation. A.G. was
placed with the maternal grandmother. Between November 2022
and March 2023, Mother visited A.G. 27 times, averaging five to
six visits a month. She missed some visits and arrived late to
others. Between April and September 2023, Mother visited A.G.
fairly consistently. The social worker and babysitter observed
Mother and A.G. had a strong bond and Mother was attentive to
her.
In July 2023 Mother gave birth to another child, E.S. In
February 2024 the Department removed E.S. from Mother due to
allegations of general neglect and placed him in a foster home.
Between mid-November 2023 and early April 2024, Mother
visited A.G. four times, and she missed all visits between
December 6, 2023 and March 6, 2024. In February 2024 the
maternal grandmother reported Mother’s inconsistent visits were
negatively affecting A.G.’s behavior. A.G. often cried and
exhibited defiant behaviors when Mother did not visit. Although
Mother was appropriate and prepared during visits that took
place, her bond with A.G. was weakening.

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In March 2024 the maternal grandmother asked the
Department to remove A.G. from her care and place her with E.S.
in foster care. E.S.’s caregiver, Cathy B., was willing to adopt
both children. In April 2024 the juvenile court terminated
reunification services for both parents and set the matter for a
section 366.26 hearing.
Mother maintained somewhat consistent visitation—
one visit in April 2024, five visits in May, six visits in June, and
two visits in July 2024. The Department observed Mother had a
loving relationship with minor A.G. but struggled to manage
A.G.’s behaviors and needs.
From June through September 2024, Mother’s visitation
was inconsistent. Mother visited five times in August and once in
September. Cathy reported that “inconsistency in visitation with
[the] parents . . . ha[d] caused [A.G.] [a] lot of confusion and hard
feelings. [Cathy] describe[d] observing child [A.G.] having an
increase in fearful behaviors when informed she will be visiting
with one of her parents. . . . It [wa]s challenging when [Mother]
indicated she would be visiting with [A.G.] and her brother and
then she does not arrive or arrives late. [Cathy] stated the break
down in routine negatively affects child [A.G.].”
By October 2024 A.G. was “thriving” in her placement and
had “developed a strong bond and attachment” to Cathy. She
was enrolled in an Early Head Start program and attended
therapy. Cathy reported that A.G. struggled with separation
anxiety and nightmares related to her parents’ domestic violence.
Mother visited twice in October and four times in November.
As of November 2024, A.G. had become hypersensitive and
angry. She would throw things and hit Cathy, E.S., the family
dog, and her therapist. She had nightmares and was “afraid
[Cathy] will leave and men will take her away.” A.G. cried and

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had tantrums when told that she would be taken for family visits
and woke up sad from naps at school. Her therapist reported she
struggled with anxiety and rejection from previous caregivers and
had challenges when Mother and Father inconsistently visited,
but Cathy was doing an “amazing job” at providing consistency
and support.

D. The Reports on the Bond Between Mother and A.G.
In its section 366.26 report, the Department stated Mother
“has a bond with [A.G.] and has been consistent in her
visitation. . . . However, [A.G.’s] attachment to her mother
continues to display areas of concern due to the recurring
separation from [Mother] and inconsistencies in visitation at the
beginning of this review period. [A.G.] recognizes her mother and
enjoys her time during visits but continues to be confused about
her relationship with her mother. It is the Department’s
assessment that with the above factors mentioned, [A.G] does
have [a] bond with her mother, but the bond and attachment is
rooted in insecurities that have been disruptive to [A.G.].” Most
of Mother and A.G.’s interactions were positive, but A.G. cried
when she felt Mother was not paying attention to her or was
spending more time with E.S. Mother tried to give [A.G.] more
attention and attempted to soothe and comfort her, but it was
“visible that [Mother] becomes overwhelmed when managing
[A.G.’s] attention seeking behaviors.”
A.G. displayed “an array of emotions and behaviors” when
visiting with Mother. At times, she cried, said she did not want
to see Mother, and needed reassurance that she would be
returned to Cathy. Often, however, she would be happy and
excited to see Mother. At the end of visits, A.G. would
occasionally cry and say she wanted to go back to Cathy. Other

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times, she would hug and kiss Mother and say she wanted to
stay, visit, and live with her. The Department opined that her
fluctuations in behavior stemmed from her insecure attachment
with Mother. A.G.’s therapist agreed that while A.G. wanted to
have more time with Mother, “the inconsistency in their family
bonding time continued to create insecurities in the attachment
[A.G.] has with [Mother].” A.G. referred to Mother as “mom” or
“mama” and to Cathy as “mama Cathy.” She viewed Mother as a
parent but also viewed her maternal grandmother and Cathy as
mother figures. During visits, A.G. played and talked to the
social worker and strangers as much as she did to Mother.
The Department acknowledged A.G. had a bond with
Mother and concluded that A.G. would be affected negatively if
A.G.’s relationship with Mother was severed. However, it opined
that “[A.G.’s] insecure attachment with [Mother] would be more
challenging for [A.G.] to comprehend [than] a complete severing
of the relationship.” The Department opined that “the length of
time that [A.G.] has remained separated from [Mother] has
created confusion and insecurities for [A.G.].” A.G. became
distressed when she did not see Mother and showed signs of
increased anxiety. At four years old, A.G. had been out of
Mother’s care for most of her life. She had been in Cathy’s care
for over six months. Cathy was supportive of A.G.’s needs and
attended all her medical appointments. The Department
assessed that it would be more detrimental to A.G. to be removed
from a stable placement than to lose her parents.
In January 2025, when a social worker asked A.G. if she
enjoyed visits with Mother, A.G. “nodded her head no.” When the
social worker asked A.G. where she wanted to live, she
responded, “with Mama Cathy” and said she did not want to live
with Mother. A.G. was excited to be around Cathy and did not

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want to leave her. Cathy observed A.G. seemed more excited to
see the maternal grandmother than Mother during visits. Cathy
reported that A.G.’s nightmares, tantrums, and occasional hitting
increased when Mother began visiting more consistently.
However, the social worker believed these behaviors were age
appropriate. Cathy reported A.G. was jealous of the parents’
“clear preference” for E.S.—A.G. said she wanted to cut her hair
like E.S. and have a penis.
Later that month, the foster family agency reported that
“[a]lthough [A.G.] arrived with some trepidation and anxiety and
challenges are present . . . , [A.G.] has adapted well to her
resource home and continues demonstrating an overall positive
adjustment to the resource home thus far, including developing a
bond and attachment with the resource parent.” Cathy was
“ensuring [A.G.] receives consistent love and care, including a
safe environment, prompt tending to her needs, routine, affection,
and frequent interactions.” A.G. was comfortable with Cathy and
responded positively to her engagement, “such as by smiling,
laughing, engaging, and asking questions,” and viewed Cathy as
a “sense of safety and security.” A.G. loved school and “thrived
with consistency and predictability.” A.G. was upset when she
was picked up early for the parents’ visits, stating, “ ‘I don’t want
to go, I want to stay in school.’ ”
The foster family agency stated Mother had been
“somewhat consistent in her family time participation, with
periods of consistency and inconsistency.” Mother was generally
appropriate, but there were times when she struggled to balance
tending to both children. She also had difficulty keeping
promises, such as forgetting to bring A.G. birthday and
Christmas gifts after promising them. A.G. had trouble sharing
with her brother and would become upset, one time hitting

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Mother and E.S. until a social worker intervened to help calm
A.G. down. When that happened, A.G. cried and stated, “ ‘I want
mama Cathy.’ ”

E. The Termination of Parental Rights
At the section 366.36 hearing in February 2025, the court
found that Mother visited “somewhat regularly.” The court
stated, “[T]he court does not find that the bond has been
established . . . to the extent that we would expect it to be in
order for the parental bond exception to be met as to Mother. In
any event the court finds any benefit accruing to [A.G]. from her
relationship with the parents is outweighed by the physical and
emotional benefit she would receive through the permanency and
stability of adoption, and adoption would be in her best
interest. . . . [T]here is no exception to adoption in this case.”
The court designated Cathy as A.G.’s prospective adoptive
parent.
Mother and Father timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The purpose of section 366.26 selection and implementation
hearings is “to provide stable, permanent homes” for dependent
children after the juvenile court has terminated reunification
services for the parents. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) “If the court has
decided to end parent-child reunification services, the legislative
preference is for adoption.” (In re Elizabeth M. (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 768, 780; accord, In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th
45, 53 [“if the child is adoptable . . . adoption is the norm”].)
“When the court finds . . . the child is likely to be adopted, the

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statute mandates judicial termination of parental rights unless
the parent opposing termination can demonstrate one of
six enumerated exceptions applies.” (Elizabeth M., at pp. 780-
781; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); accord, In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 631, 630-631 (Caden C.).)3
One of those six exceptions is the beneficial parental
relationship exception under section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). A parent may avoid termination of
parental rights under that exception if the parent establishes by
a preponderance of the evidence “that the parent has regularly
visited with the child, that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship, and that terminating the
relationship would be detrimental to the child. [Citations.] The
language of this exception, along with its history and place in the
larger dependency scheme, show that the exception applies in
situations where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but
where severing the child’s relationship with the parent, even
when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home,
would be harmful for the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at

3 Mother argues the Department improperly opposed legal
guardianship as the permanent plan for A.G. without explaining
why that would be detrimental to her. ~(Mother AOB 40-42)~
However, the Department was not required to provide any
justification for its decision not to recommend guardianship as
the permanent plan. “ ‘Guardianship, while a more stable
placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus falls short
of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind
for the dependent child.’ ” (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at
p. 53.) Adoption is the statutorily preferred permanency plan.
(See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)

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pp. 629-630; accord, In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1225.)
“[A] parent must prove all three components of the beneficial
relationship exception,” and a “failure of proof on any one of them
is fatal.” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 322,
fn. 10.) The exception applies only in “ ‘exceptional
circumstances.’ ” (Caden C., at p. 631.)
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on the first
two elements for substantial evidence. [Citation.] We review its
ruling on the third element under a hybrid standard, reviewing
its factual determinations concerning the detriment analysis for
substantial evidence but its ultimate weighing of the relative
harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for an abuse of
discretion.” (In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1068; see
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.)

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Concluding Mother Failed To Establish the Beneficial
Parental Relationship Exception
It appears the court found Mother satisfied the visitation
element of the beneficial parental bond exception to adoption.
Thus, we focus on the second and third elements of the analysis.4
The second element requires that “ ‘the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th

4 The Department argues Mother forfeited her challenge to
the second and third elements of the beneficial relationship
exception by failing to object to the Department’s and the foster
family agency’s reports. However, Mother objected to the
termination of parental rights and argued the parental benefit
exception applied. She thus adequately preserved her right to
dispute the weight and interpretation of the evidence relevant to
this issue.

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at p. 632; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) “[P]arents ‘must show
more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with
the child, or pleasant visits.’ ” (In re Andrew M. (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 803, 816.) The “focus is the child,” and “the
relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age
of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Caden C.,
at p. 632.) Substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion
that Mother failed to establish this requirement.
Mother argues she and A.G. shared a strong bond and that
A.G.’s therapist reported A.G. wanted more time with Mother.
While at times A.G. would be excited to see Mother and say she
wanted to visit and live with Mother, A.G. showed a mix of
emotional and behavioral responses to those visits. (See Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [directing courts to focus on “how
children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their
parents”].) She sometimes cried, said she did not want to see
Mother, and needed reassurance that she would be returned to
Cathy. Most recently, in January 2025, A.G. said she did not
enjoy visits with Mother, wanted to live with Cathy, and did not
want to live with Mother. The Department and A.G.’s therapist
concluded A.G.’s fluctuating responses to Mother suggested she
had an insecure attachment to Mother. (See id. at pp. 632-633
[crediting expert psychologists as “an important source of
information about the psychological importance of the
relationship for the child.”]; In re M.V. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
486, 513 [beneficial relationship exception did not apply where
relationship between child and parents “was complicated and
sometimes negative”].) Although A.G. viewed Mother as a
parent, she viewed several people in her life as maternal figures,

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including her maternal grandmother and Cathy. During visits,
she engaged equally with Mother, the social worker, and even
strangers. Cathy observed that A.G. seemed more excited to see
maternal grandmother than Mother during visits.
Furthermore, by the time of the section 366.26 hearing,
four-year-old A.G. had been out of Mother’s care for over
three years of her life. The court reasonably concluded Mother
failed to show that A.G. would benefit from continuing the
relationship.5
In evaluating the third element—“whether ‘termination
would be detrimental to the child due to’ the relationship . . .

5 Mother argues reversal is required because the juvenile
court failed to identify what factors it relied on in determining
Mother did not meet the second and third Caden C. elements.
However, there is no requirement that the court recite specific
findings relative to its conclusions regarding the beneficial
parental relationship exception. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
1131, 1156.) Rather, we presume juvenile courts know and apply
the correct statutory and case law. (Ibid.)
Mother also contends the court erred by “adopting” minor’s
counsel’s reasoning as to what was in the best interests of A.G.
During the hearing, minor’s counsel questioned whether Mother
would be able to provide A.G. with long-term security and
permanence. Mother claims that in adopting minor’s counsel’s
reasoning, the court relied on improper considerations such as
whether Mother could ever care for A.G. (See Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 634 [“courts should not look to whether the
parent can provide a home for the child” in deciding whether
beneficial parental relationship exception applies].) But the
record shows the court adopted minor’s counsel’s reasoning only
in finding it was not in A.G.’s best interest to grant Mother’s
section 388 petition heard simultaneously with the section 366.26
hearing—not in ruling on the beneficial relationship exception.

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[and] whether it would be harmful to the child to sever the
relationship and choose adoption” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 633)—the court must determine “how the child would be
affected by losing the parental relationship” (ibid.). The court
must determine whether “the benefit of placement in a new,
adoptive home outweigh[s] ‘the harm [the child] would experience
from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship’ ”
with the parent. (Ibid.) The juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that any benefit A.G. might receive
from continuing contact with Mother was outweighed by the
stability and permanency of adoption.
It is true the Department noted A.G. could be negatively
affected if her relationship with Mother were severed. But the
Department also determined that “[A.G.’s] insecure attachment
with [Mother] would be more challenging for [A.G.] to
comprehend [than] a complete severing of the relationship.” The
record contained ample evidence that adoption would provide
A.G. with stability, security, and consistent emotional support—
benefits the court could reasonably find outweighed the potential
harm. A.G. had lived in Cathy’s care for over six months, and
their relationship was consistently described as loving, stable,
and secure. A.G. was “thriving” in Cathy’s home and had
“developed a strong bond and attachment” to Cathy. Cathy
supported A.G.’s emotional, medical, educational, and
therapeutic needs. For example, Cathy attended all of A.G.’s
medical appointments and ensured she was enrolled in an Early
Head Start program and therapy. A.G.’s therapist reported A.G.
struggled with anxiety and rejection from prior caregivers, but
Cathy was doing “an amazing job” providing stability and
support. By contrast, the Department observed that although
Mother was attentive and loving, she struggled to manage A.G.’s

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needs—especially while also caring for E.S. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the court’s order, we conclude it did
not abuse its discretion by deciding any harm from terminating
A.G.’s relationship with Mother did not outweigh the benefits of
obtaining a final, stable, and permanent custody arrangement.
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
determining the beneficial parental relationship exception does
not apply in this case. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.

STONE, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

FEUER, J.

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