People v. Hartman CA4/3

CourtListener 10780777Calctapp28 de jan. de 2026

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Filed 1/28/26 P. v. Hartman CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064489

v. (Super. Ct. No. 17NF2189)

TODD CHRISTIAN HARTMAN, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gassia Apkarian, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Remanded
with directions.
Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Ksenia Gracheva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
* * *
A jury found Todd Christian Hartman guilty of eight counts of
child molestation, and one count of possessing child pornography. The jury
also found true various sentencing enhancements under California’s “One
Strike” sentencing scheme. (Pen. Code, § 667.61.) 1 The trial court sentenced
Hartman to a determinate prison term of four years and four months,
followed by an indeterminate term of 120 years to life.
Hartman claims the police violated his constitutional rights by
remotely searching his home computer before obtaining a search warrant. We
disagree. Under the Fourth Amendment, a “search” is a governmental
intrusion into an area where a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 350 (Katz).) Here,
Hartman had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he possessed child
pornography files on his computer that were remotely accessible to the public
(and to the police) through a peer-to-peer file sharing network.
Hartman also claims that as to three of the child molestation
counts the jury was not properly instructed and did not find true the multiple
victim allegations of the One Strike law. We disagree. The jury was properly
instructed, and the jurors found true the relevant One Strike allegations.
Finally, Hartman claims that as to one of the counts the trial
court improperly imposed an upper term sentence (three years). We agree.
The aggravating facts were found true by the judge rather than by the jury.
Thus, we shall vacate the upper term sentence. On remand, the People may
elect to retry the aggravating facts; if not, the court may proceed to
resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

1
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code. We shall also largely omit the word subdivision or its abbreviation.

2
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2009, Hartman committed sex offenses against
Stephanie P. (then 12 years old) and Alexis C. (then 14 years old). Hartman’s
crimes were reported to the police in January 2010, but the district attorney
did not file charges at that time.
Six years later, in an unrelated child pornography investigation,
the police found lewd photos of sisters Elizabeth F. (then 11 years old) and
Sonja F. (then nine years old) on Hartman’s computer. Further investigation
revealed Hartman had committed sex offenses against both sisters starting
when they were under 10 years old.

Stephanie P. and Alexis C.
On December 29, 2009, Alexis was sleeping over at Stephanie’s
grandmother’s home in Fullerton. There were four adults present in the
home. At about 11:00 p.m., Alexis and Stephanie were alone in the family
room with Hartman, a family friend. Hartman closed the curtains, which a
neighbor later testified was unusual. Hartman was on a recliner and asked
the girls to sit on his lap.
Hartman began touching Alexis on her back, stomach, shoulders,
and chest. Hartman slipped his hand under her pants. Although Alexis tried
to stop him, Hartman rubbed Alexis’s vagina. Alexis then got off the recliner
and went to a nearby couch. Hartman unbuttoned Stephanie’s pants and slid
his hand down inside. Hartman’s hand went under Stephanie’s underwear
and made contact with her vagina. Stephanie yelled at Hartman to stop, and
he pulled his hand out. Hartman then went to the nearby couch while
Stephanie fell asleep on the recliner.

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On the couch, Alexis had wrapped a blanket around herself,
which Hartman forcibly removed. Hartman kissed Alexis’s neck, chest, and
stomach, and again rubbed her bare breast and nipples. At one point, Alexis
felt Hartman’s erect penis rubbing against her thigh. Eventually, Alexis fell
asleep, and the following morning “we pretended that nothing happened.”
Alexis was embarrassed and afraid.
On December 30, 2009, Hartman again stayed the night at
Stephanie’s grandmother’s house, which was unexpected. Hartman said that
his allergy medication prevented him from driving home. That evening,
similar sexual conduct again occurred in the family room. Hartman slipped
his hand inside Alexis’s underwear, and he touched the outside of her vagina
with his fingers. Stephanie did not remember anything about what happened
on the second night.

Elizabeth F. and Sonja F.
In 2010, Elizabeth was about six years old, and her sister Sonja
was about two years younger. Hartman was a trusted friend of the family,
who attended the same church in Anaheim, and would often visit the family
home over a period of years. Although Hartman was much older than
Elizabeth, she thought of him as her friend. While Elizabeth was sitting on
his lap, Hartman repeatedly touched her chest and nipples under her clothes.
Elizabeth estimated that this occurred 100 times. Hartman also repeatedly
touched the inside of Elizabeth’s vagina under her clothes. Elizabeth
estimated that this occurred 150 times, and most of those incidents occurred
when she was under 10 years old.
Sonja also occasionally sat on Hartman’s lap while he tickled her,
even though there was a family rule prohibiting the girls from having

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physical contact with Hartman. Sometimes Sonja asked Hartman to stop, but
he did not listen. Hartman took pictures of Sonja when she was about eight
years old. In one picture Sonja had her legs up in the air. Sonja was unaware
that Hartman had taken the “inappropriate” picture. Another picture showed
Sonja sitting on the couch in her living room with Hartman, with the camera
zoomed in on her vaginal area.

Police Investigation
In February 2015, Anaheim Police Detective David Syvock filed
an affidavit in support of a search warrant. Syvock averred that as part of an
ongoing multi-agency child pornography investigation, he used law
enforcement software (Peer Spectre) to identify Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses linked to EDonkey2000, a peer-to-peer file sharing program.
Syvock stated that users of EDonkey2000 download the program onto their
computers for the purpose of sharing child pornography.
Detective Syvock had identified two IP addresses that displayed
six video files containing known and verified images of child pornography. By
contacting Hartman’s internet service provider, Time Warner Cable, Syvock
linked the two IP addresses to Hartman’s home address.
A magistrate approved the search warrant, which allowed the
police to seize and search all electronic devices located within Hartman’s
home. The police executed the warrant and seized Hartman’s computer and
hard drive, which contained thousands of child pornography files, including
the video files that Detective Syvock had identified in the affidavit. The police
also found lewd pictures of Elizabeth and Sonja on Hartman’s computer.

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Court Proceedings
The People filed a nine-count information charging Hartman
with: 1) sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger (Elizabeth);
2) sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger (Elizabeth); 3) lewd
act upon a child under the age of 14 years old (Elizabeth); 4) lewd act upon a
child under the age of 14 years old (Elizabeth); 5) lewd act upon a child under
the age of 14 years old (Sonja); 6) lewd act upon a 14-year-old child (Alexis);
7) lewd act upon a 14-year-old child (Alexis); 8) lewd act upon a child under
the age of 14 years old (Stephanie); and 9) possession of child pornography.
The People further charged two multiple victim (One Strike) allegations.
Prior to a jury trial, Hartman filed a motion to suppress evidence
and a motion to quash the search warrant (the relevant proceedings will be
summarized in the discussion section of this opinion).
A jury found Hartman guilty of the charged crimes and found
true the allegations. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 120 years to
life, plus four years and four months.

II.
DISCUSSION
Hartman claims: A) the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress evidence and to quash the warrant; B) the jury was not properly
instructed and did not find true certain One Strike allegations; and C) the
court erred by imposing an upper term sentence without a jury finding.

A. Motion to Suppress Evidence and Quash the Warrant
Hartman claims that “the police illegally hacked into appellant’s
computer, in violation of appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights, in order to

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support the affidavit for the search warrant.” (Capitalization omitted.) We
disagree. Hartman had no reasonable expectation of privacy given that the
child pornography files on his computer were readily accessible to the public
(and to the police) through a peer-to-peer child pornography file sharing
network (EDonkey2000).
In this part of the discussion, we shall: 1) review the relevant
legal principles; 2) summarize the trial court proceedings; and 3) analyze the
relevant legal principles as applied to the facts in this case.

1. Relevant Legal Principles
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)
A “search” is a governmental intrusion into an area where a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. (Katz v. United States, supra,
389 U.S. at p. 350.) Consequently, there is no “search” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment unless a person had a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and that expectation was violated by an unreasonable governmental
intrusion. (Katz, supra, 389 U.S. at p. 353.) “What constitutes a ‘reasonable’
expectation of privacy depends on the circumstances . . . .” (In re Deborah C.
(1981) 30 Cal.3d 125, 137.)
A defendant may move to suppress evidence obtained as the
result of a search on the ground that there was not probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant. (§ 1538.5(a)(1)(B)(iii).) If the defendant moves to
quash the warrant, “the court should proceed to determine whether, under

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the ‘totality of the circumstances’ presented in the search warrant affidavit
. . . there was ‘a fair probability’ that contraband or evidence of a crime would
be found in the place searched pursuant to the warrant.” (People v. Hobbs
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 975.)
“The magistrate’s determination of probable cause is entitled to
deferential review.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1041.) “‘“Although
in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit
demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or
marginal cases . . . should be largely determined by the preference to be
accorded to warrants.”’” (People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1082–1083.)
Generally, evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search may
not be used to establish probable cause for a search warrant. (People v.
Roberts (1956) 47 Cal.2d 374, 377.) In reviewing whether the trial court
properly denied a suppression motion made on the ground that the evidence
used to support the warrant was obtained from an illegal search, appellate
courts apply a well-established standard of review: “‘We defer to the trial
court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial
evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent
judgment.’” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 384.)
Ordinarily, under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained as a
result of an illegal search must be excluded from the prosecution’s case-in-
chief. (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906.) However, the Supreme
Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained
by the police when they acted in objective reasonable reliance on a valid
search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, even if the warrant was later
found to be unsupported by probable cause. (Id. at pp. 919–920.)

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2. Trial Court Proceedings
On April 25, 2024, Hartman filed a motion “to suppress evidence
observed and collected by remote digital access . . . in violation of the
defendant’s . . . Fourth Amendment rights, and to suppress all evidence
generated thereafter that was the fruit of that poisonous tree.” Hartman
alleged that prior to obtaining a warrant, “the police used proprietary
software to exploit another program installed on Defendant’s computer and to
thereby remotely and surreptitiously search the contents of its hard drive,
select media files and other data thereon, and download copies of those files
directly to law enforcement machines. The police did not seek or receive any
judicial approval for their actions.”
On April 29, 2024, Hartman filed a supplemental motion to
quash the search warrant. Hartman claimed: “A search warrant obtained on
information acquired by an illegal search is itself illegal.” Hartman alleged
Detective Syvock “conducted illegal searches of Defendant’s personal property
and data by remote access to machines in his home, then included that
illegally searched and seized data as the sole justification for the search
warrant affidavit.”
Attached to the motion was a copy of Detective Syvock’s affidavit
in support of the warrant (the statement of probable cause). After listing his
training and experience, Syvock averred, in part:
“Peer-to-Peer networks are frequently used in the trading of child
pornography. I know that one such network is known as the Edonkey2000.
The Edonkey2000 network is being used to trade digital files, including still
images and movie files, depicting child pornography.”
“During the default installation of the EDonkey2000 software
program, settings are established which configure the host computer to share

9
files. A feature known as browsing may also be turned on. Depending upon
the client program used, a user may have the ability to reconfigure some of
these during installation or after the installation . . . . Typically, the Peer-to-
Peer software can be configured to establish the location of one or more
directories of folders whose contents (files) are made available for distribution
or sharing to other EDonkey2000 peers.”
“[A]n investigator is able to compare the EDonkey2000
signatures of files being shared on the network to previously identified child
pornography EDonkey2000 signatures. Using . . . publicly available
EDonkey2000 software, an investigator can select the EDonkey2000
signature of a known file as they attempt to locate and download the known
file on the EDonkey2 network.”
“By receiving either a browsed file list or portions of a download
file from a specific IP address, the investigator can conclude that a computer,
in his jurisdiction, is running a EDonkey2000 software and is processing,
receiving and/or distributing specific and known visual depictions of child
pornography.”
“Peer Spectre reads the publicly available advertisement from
computers that are identifying child sexual abuse images available, for
distribution, in a consistent and reliable manner.” “Peer Spectre automates
the search process but conducts and reports the search in the same manner
that has previously been done by individual investigators. Peer Spectre does
not report details which are not also discoverable by the general public using
Internet available software.”
At the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence and quash the
warrant, Detective Syvock testified that a version of the Peer Spectre
software is also known as Shareaza LE (law enforcement). Syvock testified

10
that by using the law enforcement software prior to obtaining the warrant, he
downloaded six child pornography publicly available video files associated
with two IP addresses, which traced back to Hartman’s home address
through Hartman’s internet service provider Time Warner Cable.
During his testimony, Detective Syvock was asked, “What’s a
hacker?” Syvock said, “My understanding of a hacker is somebody that hacks
other computers to gain access to information that is not readily available to
the public.” Syvock testified that he did not believe that the law enforcement
software that he used meets this definition because it “found files that were
being [made] readily available.”
During the hearing, a forensic computer examiner, Michele Bush,
testified on behalf of the defense. Bush had examined Hartman’s computer,
and located the six child pornography files that had been identified in
Detective Syvock’s search warrant affidavit. Bush said that the six video files
were located in a single folder associated with peer-to-peer software (eMule),
along with over 4,000 other files (child pornography images and videos). Bush
testified that eMule operates within the EDonkey2000 network.
Bush said that two of the six child pornography video files
identified by Detective Syvock were marked as available for sharing, while
four of the files had not been marked as available for sharing. Based on this,
Bush opined that the law enforcement software used by Syvock was
potentially able to access (hack) private files on Hartman’s computer.
However, Bush testified that the four files marked as not available for
sharing were likely downloaded from the peer-to-peer file sharing network;
therefore, the four files may have been accessible to the public at some point.
At the end of the hearing, Hartman’s counsel argued the remote
search of Hartman’s computer through the law enforcement software was

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equivalent to entering his home: “They kicked the door in and went walking
around and looked all over the place and found these things.” The trial court
disagreed and stated: “It’s a legal search because they are using a public
peer-to-peer website.”
After further argument, the trial court ruled:
“All right. Well, I don’t believe there’s any expectation of privacy
in the information that was retrieved in this case.
“The defendant utilized public sharing peer-to-peer websites, the
software, the eDonkey, eMule, and I think there were a couple others that
were mentioned. In any event, all [the law enforcement software] did is
search for IP addresses and utilize those public sharing programs, [to see]
whether there was files that fit the description they were looking for, namely
child pornography. [¶] And when [the law enforcement software] did find files
that are associated with utilizing this public network, it found out where
those files were and which IP addresses they were associated with and
provided those IP addresses to the police, who then followed up on that.
“So in utilizing . . . these peer-to-peer sharing websites, operating
in those areas, I don’t think there’s any expectation of privacy. [¶] As far as
the—especially as to two of the files were actually marked for sharing.
There’s definitely no expectation of privacy in [those] particular file[s]. And I
don’t agree with [defense counsel’s] kicking down the door routine, . . . I don’t
think it would apply to this type of case where you’re looking for files that are
being associated back and forth or traded back and forth, because these files
were traded back and forth on the Internet at some point.
“Even if I was to exclude four of those [child pornography files]
. . . there would still be sufficient probable cause to issue the search warrant.
[¶] So the motion to suppress is denied as well as the motion to quash.”

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3. Application and Analysis
“Computer users generally have an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of their personal computers.” (People v.
Evensen (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1020, 1026 (Evensen).) “But there are
exceptions . . . , and one of them is that computer users have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of a file that has been downloaded to a
publicly accessible folder through file-sharing software.” (Ibid.)
Law enforcement software that remotely searches publicly
available peer-to-peer file sharing networks for child pornography does not
violate a computer user’s reasonable expectation of privacy. (Evensen, supra,
4 Cal.App.5th a pp. 1028–1029.) In Evensen, the police used law enforcement
software to search publicly available peer-to-peer file sharing networks in
order to identify “known and verified digital files of child pornography.” (Id.
at p. 1024.) Defendant had “used a peer-to-peer network called eDonkey,
which he accessed through a program called eMule.” (Id. at p. 1023.) Using
the law enforcement software, the police identified over 200 child
pornography files that returned to an IP address, which eventually traced
back to defendant. (Id. at p. 1024.) After obtaining a warrant, the police
searched defendant’s computer, finding over 200 video files and images of
child pornography. (Id. at p. 1025.) Defendant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, contending “that the use of the [law enforcement software]
amounted to an unconstitutional search.” (Ibid.) The trial court denied the
motion and the appellate court affirmed. (Id. at pp. 1025, 1030.) The Court of
Appeal rejected defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim, holding that
defendant “had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his shared folder
associated with the peer-to-peer network.” (Id. at p. 1030, italics added.)
Here, the facts are remarkably similar to the facts in Evensen,

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and our analysis reaches the same conclusion. The evidence was undisputed
that Hartman had downloaded the EDonkey2000 program onto his home
computer. According to Detective Syvock, EDonkey2000 is a peer-to-peer file
sharing network utilized to process, receive, and/or distribute depictions of
child pornography among its peers (users). Syvock testified that by utilizing
law enforcement software (Peer Spectre/Shareaza LE), which identified
known and verified child pornography, Syvock was able to remotely access six
child pornography files on Hartman’s computer that were located within a
shared folder associated with the EDonkey2000 network. Syvock then traced
the IP addresses to Hartman’s home address.
We find that the facts and information in the affidavit
established probable cause for the warrant. That is, there was probable cause
to believe that Hartman’s computer contained evidence that he had
committed a felony offense, namely the possession of child pornography.
Further, just as in Evensen, because Hartman utilized the
EDonkey 2000 peer-to-peer child pornography file sharing program that was
remotely accessible to the public (and to the police), we find that Hartman
“had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his shared folder associated with
the peer-to-peer network.” (See Evensen, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 1030,
italics added.) Thus, we affirm the trial court’s ruling, which denied
Hartman’s motion to suppress evidence and quash the search warrant.
Hartman argues that during the hearing on the motions he
“presented uncontroverted evidence that 4 of the 6 files that Syvock
downloaded were not being publicly shared.” We disagree.
It is true that the defense expert testified that four of the six
child pornography video files identified by Detective Syvock in his affidavit
were marked as not publicly available for sharing. But that defense evidence

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was controverted by Syvock’s testimony, as well as his sworn affidavit, in
which he averred that all six files within the folder on Hartman’s computer
were publicly available through the EDonkey2000 peer-to-peer child
pornography file sharing program.
In any event, assuming Hartman had marked four of the six files
as unavailable for sharing, two of the files were undisputedly marked as
available for sharing. Further, even if Hartman may have had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the four files he purportedly marked as unavailable
for sharing, we do not think his expectation was objectively reasonable.
To determine whether a person’s expectation of privacy is
reasonable, courts employ a two-part test: first, the person must demonstrate
an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; second, society must recognize
that expectation as objectively reasonable. (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th
225, 255.)
Detective Syvock testified that the only apparent purpose of the
EDonkey2000 peer-to-peer file sharing program was to share and distribute
child pornography files among its users, a patently illegal enterprise. In
short, we do not think that it was objectively reasonable for Hartman to
expect that any sort of privacy protections in the EDonkey2000 program
would be scrupulously honored or adhered to, either by the child pornography
program itself, or by its other users. (Compare People v. Daggs (2005) 133
Cal.App.4th 361, 364–365 [no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone
defendant “locked” but dropped in a store during a robbery].)
Finally, even if the search warrant lacked probable cause, the
suppression of the evidence under the exclusionary rule is not required. This
is because Detective Syvock and the other officers who seized and examined
Hartman’s computer acted in apparent good faith reliance on a facially valid

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search warrant signed by a neutral magistrate. (See United States v. Leon,
supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 919–920.)
To reiterate and conclude, we find no violation of Hartman’s
Fourth Amendment rights.

B. One-Strike Sentencing
Hartman claims: “This court should reduce the terms on counts 3,
4 and 5 from 25 years to life to 15 years to life because the jury was not
instructed on, and did not specifically find true, the [One Strike] allegation.”
(Capitalization and boldface omitted.) We disagree. The record reveals that
jury was properly instructed, and the jurors found the relevant One Strike
allegations true beyond a reasonable doubt.
A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218.) Hartman’s remaining claims involve pure legal
questions, which we also review de novo. (See, e.g., People v. Garcia (2016) 62
Cal.4th 1116, 1122.)
In this part of the discussion, we shall: 1) review the relevant
legal principles; 2) summarize the trial court proceedings; and 3) analyze the
relevant legal principles as applied to the facts in this case.

1. Relevant Legal Principles
The One Strike law is an alternative sentencing scheme for sex
offenders that generally requires a court to impose a life sentence. (§ 667.61
(a) & (b).) The law applies when a defendant is convicted of a specified sex
offense (e.g., sodomy, lewd or lascivious act upon a minor), and the defendant
committed the offense under specified circumstances (e.g., the defendant
kidnapped the victim during the commission of the specified sex offense, the

16
defendant was convicted of committing a specified sex offense against more
than one victim in the present case). (§ 667.61 (c)(8), (e)(1) & (4).)
The One Strike law states: “The penalties provided in this section
shall apply only if the existence of any [specified] circumstance . . . is alleged
in the accusatory pleading . . . , and is either admitted by the defendant in
open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.” (§ 667.61 (o).) That is, the
circumstance must ordinarily be pleaded, proved, and found true by the trier
of fact. (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 743.)
Ordinarily, the One Strike law calls for a default minimum
sentence of 15 years to life. (§ 667.61 (b) & (e).) But a minimum One Strike
sentence may be 25 years to life, or life without the possibility of parole,
depending upon the specified sex offenses and circumstances. (§ 667.61 (j)(1).)
In cases where (1) a victim is under the age of 14, (2) the specified sex offense
is lewd and lascivious conduct, and (3) the multiple victim circumstance is
pleaded and proved, a minimum sentence of either 15 years to life or 25 years
to life may be alleged. (§ 667.61 (b), (e) & (j)(2).)
The One Strike multiple victim circumstance applies when the
“offenses are prosecuted ‘in the present case or cases.’” (People v. Stewart
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 163, 171.) The trial court may not impose a sentence
under the One Strike law relying on the multiple victim circumstance unless
the jury has specifically made a finding that this circumstance has been
proven true. (People v. Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 743.)
“‘The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general
principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence . . . .’” (People v.
Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 115.) This sua sponte duty includes “a duty to
instruct on the elements of the one strike circumstances.” (People v. Jones
(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 709.) However, “at least some of the jury’s

17
findings on the one strike circumstances [may] necessarily [have] followed
from its findings on other issues.” (Ibid.)

2. Trial Court Proceedings
Again, the People filed a nine-count information charging
Hartman with: 1) sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger
(Elizabeth); 2) sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger
(Elizabeth); 3) lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years old (Elizabeth);
4) lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years old (Elizabeth); 5) lewd act
upon a child under the age of 14 years old (Sonja); 6) lewd act upon a 14-year-
old child (Alexis); 7) lewd act upon a 14-year-old child (Alexis); 8) lewd act
upon a child under the age of 14 years old (Stephanie); and 9) possession of
child pornography.
The information also included two separate multiple victim (One
Strike) allegations:
“As to Count (s) 3, 4 and 5, it is further alleged pursuant to
Penal Code sections 667.61 (j)(2) / (e)(4), that in the commission of the above
offense, defendant TODD CHRISTIAN HARTMAN committed an offense
specified in Penal Code section 667.61 (c) against more than one victim and
the victim was a minor under 14 years of age.
“As to Count(s) 3, 4, 5 and 8, it is further alleged pursuant to
Penal Code sections 667.61 (b)/(e) that in the commission of the above offense
defendant TODD CHRISTIAN HARTMAN committed an offense specified in
Penal Code section 667.61 (c) against more than one victim.” (Italics added).
The trial court instructed the jury: “If you find the defendant
guilty of two or more sex offenses, as charged in Counts 3, 4, 5 and 8, you
must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation

18
that those crimes were committed against more than one victim in this case.
The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that this
allegation has not been proved.” (CALCRIM No. 3181.)
The jury found Hartman guilty as to all of the charged counts,
including counts 3, 4, 5, and 8 (lewd act upon a child under the age of 14). As
to each of these counts, the jury also signed the following verdict forms:
“We, the Jury in the above-entitled action, having now found the
Defendant, TODD CHRISTIAN HARTMAN, GUILTY of the crime of LEWD
ACT UPON A CHILD UNDER 14 as charged in Count[s] [3, 4, 5, and 8] of
the Information, do further find the other allegation alleged; TO WIT: that
Defendant, TODD CHRISTIAN HARTMAN, committed an offense specified
in Penal Code section 667.61 (c) against more than one victim pursuant to
Penal Code section 667.61 (b)/(e) and 667.61 (j)(2)/(e)(4) to be: [¶] TRUE.”
The trial court imposed a sentence of 120 years to life, plus four
years and four months: 15 years to life as to counts one, two, and eight; 25
years to life as to counts three, four, and five; three years as to count six
(upper term), eight months as to count seven (one-third the midterm), and
eight months as to count nine (one-third the midterm).2

3. Analysis and Application
In this case, the People alleged two multiple victim (One Strike)
allegations in the information. As to counts three, four, and five, the People

2
The designated sentence for sexual penetration of a minor 10
years old or younger (counts one and two) is 15 years to life, irrespective of
the One Strike law. (§ 288.7 (b).)

19
alleged a specified sex offense (lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child
under the age of 14), and a multiple victim circumstance against victims who
were under the age of 14 (Elizabeth and Sonja). (§ 667.61 (j)(2).) As to counts
three, four, five, and eight, the People alleged a specified sex offense (lewd
and lascivious conduct upon a child under the age of 14), and a multiple
victim circumstance against victims without respect to their ages (Elizabeth,
Sonja, and Stephanie).3 (§ 667.61 (b) & (e).)
The trial court instructed the jury as to the alleged multiple
victim circumstances as to counts three, four, five, and eight using the
pattern jury instruction. (CALCRIM No. 3181.) The jury found true as to each
allegation (counts three, four, five, and eight) that Hartman committed the
crime of lewd and lascivious conduct against a child under the age of 14, and
that the crimes were committed against multiple victims. As to counts three,
four, and five the court imposed a 25 years to life sentence, and as to count
eight, the court imposed a 15 years to life sentence.
In sum, we find the trial court properly instructed the jury as to
the multiple victim (One Strike) allegations, and they were properly pleaded
and proved. (See People v. Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 743.) Thus, we
find no errors, and we affirm the judgment as to any One Strike issues.
Hartman argues: “Appellant’s jury was never given any
instructions on the section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) allegation.” We disagree.
Hartman’s argument is belied by the record.

3
This pleading allowed the trial court to choose between a 15
years to life sentence as to counts three (Elizabeth), four (Elizabeth), and five
(Sonja), or a 25 years to life sentence as to those counts. Based on the
pleading, the court could only impose a 15 years to life sentence as to count
eight (Stephanie). It is unclear why the People chose not to allege a 25 years
to life sentence as to count eight (Stephanie was also under the age of 14).

20
Section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) provides: “A person who is
convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c) under one of the
circumstances specified in subdivision (e), upon a victim who is a child under
14 years of age, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 25
years to life.”
While the official pattern jury instruction used by the trial court
did not duplicate the precise language in section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2), the
court instructed the jurors in layman’s terms: “If you find the defendant
guilty of two or more sex offenses, as charged in Counts 3, 4, 5 and 8, you
must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation
that those crimes were committed against more than one victim in this case.”
(CALCRIM No. 3181, italics added.)
The specified sex offenses in section 667.61 subdivision (c) include
the charges alleged in counts three, four, five, and eight: a lewd or lascivious
act upon a child under the age of 14. (§ 288 (a).) And the specified
circumstances subdivision (e) include whether those crimes were committed
“against more than one victim.” (§ 667.61 (e)(4).) Thus, we find that the trial
court effectively instructed the jury on section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2), and
necessarily fulfilled its “duty to instruct on the elements of the one strike
circumstance.” (See People v. Jones, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 709 [“at least
some of the jury’s findings on the one strike circumstances [may] necessarily
[have] followed from its findings on other issues”].)
Hartman also argues “the jury never made a specific finding on
counts 3, 4 or 5 that appellant committed an enumerated sex offense under a
specified circumstance ‘upon a victim who is a child under 14 years of age’
within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2).” We disagree.
Hartman’s argument is again belied by the record.

21
By signing the verdict forms for the One Strike allegations as to
counts three, four, and five, the jury made a specific finding that Hartman
was “guilty of the crime of lewd act upon a child under 14 as charged” and
that Hartman committed the specified sex offense “against more than one
victim.” (Capitalization & boldface omitted.)
Finally, we note that in the respondent’s brief the Attorney
General argued at some length that Hartman was provided fair notice in the
information that he was subject to a 25 years to life sentence. (See In re
Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706.) However, in his reply brief, Hartman
confirmed that he “does not allege a pleading or a fair notice problem
regarding the section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) allegation.”
To reiterate and conclude, we find the trial court made no errors
as far as any aspect of the multiple victim (One Strike) allegations.

C. Upper Term Sentence as to Count Six
Hartman claims: “This court should reverse and remand for
resentencing because the trial court erred, in violation of Appellant’s
constitutional and statutory rights, by imposing the upper term on count 6
without any aggravating factor having been stipulated to by appellant, found
true by a jury, or found true by the trial court after a valid jury trial waiver.”
(Capitalization & boldface omitted.) We agree.4

4
Hartman also claims the trial court committed various errors
regarding his fines and fees, and the court did not properly record them in
the abstract of judgment. But given our disposition, we need not address
these claims. (See People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 34 [remand for
resentencing includes the imposition of “fines, fees, and restitution”].)

22
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court held that California’s
determinate sentencing law violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial. (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 293.) The former
determinate sentencing law generally allowed a judge, rather than a jury, to
find true various aggravating facts that could be used to elevate a defendant’s
sentence from the default midterm to an upper term sentence. (Former §
1170, subd. (b), enacted by Stats. 2007, ch. 3, § 2.)
In 2022, the Legislature ultimately amended the determinate
sentencing law: “The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant
or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by
the judge in a court trial. . . . . Trial on the circumstances in aggravation
alleged in the indictment or information shall be bifurcated from the trial of
charges and enhancements. The jury shall not be informed of the bifurcated
allegations until there has been a conviction of a felony offense.” (§ 1170
(b)(2); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, italics added.)
The California Supreme Court later held that when a trial court
imposes an upper term sentence by relying on aggravating facts not proven in
compliance with section 1170 (b)(2), the sentence must be vacated, and the
matter must be remanded for resentencing unless the reviewing court finds
that “the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as
to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term
sentence.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 744–775, italics added.)
Here, the trial court sentenced Hartman to determinate terms on
counts six, seven, and nine. The court imposed the upper term (three years)

23
as to count six (a lewd act committed upon Alexis on December 29, 2009). At
the sentencing hearing, the court relied on two aggravating facts to impose
the upper term sentence: 1) the court found that Hartman abused a position
of trust, and 2) the court found that the crime “require[d] planning and
sophistication on the part of Mr. Hartman.”
In this case there was a jury trial, but the aggravating facts were
not alleged in the information, they were not found true by the jury, and they
were not stipulated to by Hartman. Therefore, we must vacate the upper
term sentence as to count six and remand for resentencing. (See § 1170 (b)(2);
see also People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“when part of a sentence
is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all
counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion
in light of the changed circumstances’”].)
The Attorney General concedes the error, and concedes that the
error was prejudicial under the federal constitutional standard of review.
(See People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087.)
However, the Attorney General argues Hartman forfeited this
claim because he did not object to the error during the sentencing hearing.
We agree that Hartman has forfeited this claim. However, we will exercise
our discretion and not apply the forfeiture rule because it will “have the effect
of converting an appellate issue into a habeas corpus claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failure to preserve the question by timely objection.”5
(People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1128.)

5
For this reason, in a separate order, we are summarily denying
Hartman’s related petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which alleges
ineffective assistance by his trial counsel for failing to object to his upper
term sentence at the sentencing hearing (G065044).

24
III.
DISPOSITION
Hartman’s upper term sentence (three years) as to count six is
vacated. On remand, the People may elect to retry the aggravating facts in
conformity with section 1170 (b)(2); if not, the court may proceed to a full
resentencing hearing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOODING, J.

SCOTT, J.

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