People v. Robles CA2/3

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Filed 1/28/26 P. v. Robles CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B337577

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. XWESA059334-01

DAVID ROBLES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Sam Ohta, Judge. Affirmed.

Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
David Robles appeals the superior court’s order denying
his Penal Code section 1172.61 resentencing petition at the
prima facie stage. Robles contends the superior court erred
because the conspiracy instructions given at his trial allowed
the jury to convict him of murder and attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine and without
finding he acted with malice. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The crimes, convictions, and appeal
In 2006, the People charged Robles, along with his
co-defendant Jessie Garcia, with the murders of Michael Juarez
and Anthony Juarez, as well as the attempted murders of
Matthew Vaughn and Frank Juarez. The People alleged the
murders were “a special circumstance within the meaning of
Penal Code Section 190.2(a)(3),” multiple murder. The People
also alleged the defendants committed the crimes for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal
street gang and—as to Garcia—that a principal used and
discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury to
the victims. The People alleged Robles had several prior strikes,
including robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and false
imprisonment with a gun.
As the facts of Robles’s crimes are irrelevant to our
analysis, we summarize them only briefly.2 Robles and Garcia

1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code.
2 We take judicial notice of the file in Robles’s direct appeal,
People v. Robles et al. (February 25, 2014, B232828) [nonpub.
opn.] (Robles I). As the truth of the facts of the crimes recited
in Robles I are not necessary for our resolution of this appeal,

2
were cousins, roommates, and gang members. Frank Juarez
had a clothing store in Santa Monica; his co-owner, Arturo Arce,
was a gang member. On October 27, 1998, Frank was at the
store preparing for its grand opening. His cousins Michael and
Anthony Juarez were with him, along with an acquaintance,
Matthew Vaughn. “Just before noon, three masked men entered
the store and fired multiple rounds” “randomly.” (Robles I.)
“The gunmen then fled to a waiting car.” (Ibid.) Michael had
been shot 13 times and died. “Anthony, who had suffered five
gunshot wounds, was still breathing but died minutes later.”
(Ibid.) Frank and Vaughn both were wounded but survived.
Witnesses at a fast food restaurant across the street “heard
multiple gunshots fired in rapid succession” and “saw three men,
wearing long coats and carrying long guns,” come out of the store
and run to a waiting car that sped away. (Ibid.) Robles later was
identified as the driver. (Ibid.)
The case went to trial in 2011. The trial court instructed
the jury on direct aiding and abetting (CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and
3.01), first and second degree murder (CALJIC Nos. 8.00, 8.10,
8.20, and 8.30), and conspiracy to commit murder (CALJIC Nos.
6.10.5, 6.11–6.14, and 6.16–6.21). The court did not instruct
the jury on the felony-murder rule or aiding and abetting under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The jury convicted Robles and Garcia of the first degree
murders of Michael and Anthony Juarez as well as the attempted
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murders of Vaughn
and Frank Juarez. The jury found the special circumstance

we summarize them only for the basis of Robles’s conviction.
(See People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 459–460.)

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allegation true. The trial court sentenced Robles to life without
the possibility of parole on the Anthony Juarez murder, 25 years
to life on the Michael Juarez murder, and seven years to life
on each of the attempted murders, all to be served consecutively.
A different panel of this court affirmed Robles’s convictions.
(Robles I.)
2. Robles’s first resentencing petition
After Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) took effect, Robles filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6.3 The petition essentially recited the
language of the statute. The court issued a minute order denying
Robles’s petition. The court stated, “Petitioner claims that he
was convicted on the natural and probable consequences theory.
The record of conviction, however, belies that claim. The jury
was not instructed on either felony-murder or the natural
and probable consequence[s] doctrine.”
On appeal, Robles argued the superior court erred in
denying his petition without appointing counsel. A different
panel of this court affirmed the order, explaining any errors
the superior court committed were harmless because the record
of conviction showed Robles is ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law.4 We noted the jury in the underlying trial was
not instructed on either the natural and probable consequences

3 Robles filed the petition under former section 1170.95,
which was later renumbered to section 1172.6. For the sake
of simplicity, we refer only to section 1172.6.
4 We take judicial notice of our opinion in Robles’s appeal
of the denial of his first petition, People v. Robles (September 27,
2021, B306498) [nonpub. opn.] (Robles II).

4
doctrine or the felony-murder rule. Therefore, the instructions
conclusively demonstrated Robles could not show he could not
be convicted because of the changes to section 188 or 189 made
by Senate Bill 1437. (Robles II.)
3. Robles’s second resentencing petition
On November 18, 2022—after Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775) took effect—Robles filed a new
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. In this petition,
Robles checked a box stating an information had been filed
against him “that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation
in a crime . . . .” He also asserted he could “not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes
made” to sections 188 and 189.
The People opposed the petition, arguing the jury was
not instructed on felony murder, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any other theory in which malice
could be imputed to Robles based solely on his participation in a
crime. Robles responded that the jury instructions on conspiracy
—CALJIC Nos. 6.10.5, 6.11, and 6.16—allowed the jury to
convict him under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or some other theory of imputed malice. He noted that,
although the conspiracy instructions required the jury to find
two or more people agreed to commit murder, they did not specify
that Robles had to be one of those people.
The superior court considered the petition at an April 2024
hearing and determined Robles failed to make a prima facie
showing that he is entitled to relief. The court rejected Robles’s

5
arguments related to the conspiracy instructions, explaining
vicarious liability under a conspiracy theory is not the same
as under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The
court also noted the instructions required the jury to find Robles
harbored express malice to convict him, even under a conspiracy
theory.
The court acknowledged one of the jury instructions—
CALJIC No. 6.16—used the phrase “natural and probable
consequence[ ].” However, the court explained the instruction
provided a limitation on extending liability to conspirators
beyond the agreed upon crime to be committed; it did not allow
the jury to impute liability under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
The court concluded the “only viable theories given to
the jury” to convict Robles of murder and attempted murder
required it to find he harbored express malice. Therefore, the
record of conviction refutes Robles’s allegation that he could
not be convicted because of the changes to sections 188 and 189.
Accordingly, the court denied the petition without issuing an
order to show cause.
Robles timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Relevant law and standard of review
Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a theory of murder liability and limited
the scope of the felony murder rule. (See generally People v.
Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986; People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957, 959 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842–843.) Senate Bill 1437 also provided an avenue for a
person convicted under the former law to petition the sentencing

6
court to vacate his conviction and be resentenced if he could
no longer be convicted under the amended law. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708–709; Lewis, at pp. 959–960.)
Senate Bill 775, effective January 1, 2022, extended
resentencing eligibility to individuals convicted of attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1(a).) It also extended eligibility to
individuals convicted of murder under any “theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.” (Id. at § 2.)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the court must appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner if requested. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962–963;
see § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (3).) The prosecutor must then file
a response to the petition, the petitioner may file a reply, and the
court must hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, the court takes the
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled
to relief if his factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 971; see People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463–464
(Curiel).) The court may consider the record of conviction, which
will “necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry
under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions
with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.”
(Lewis, at pp. 971–972; see Curiel, at pp. 463–464; People

7
v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.) The jury
instructions and verdicts are part of the record of conviction.
(See People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731.) “In
reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis,
at p. 972; see People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)
But if the record of conviction contains facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition, the trial court is justified
in rejecting them. (Eynon, at p. 975; see Lewis, at p. 971.)
We independently review the denial of a resentencing
petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Beaudreaux (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238.)
2. The conspiracy jury instructions
The trial court instructed Robles’s jury with modified
versions of the standard CALJIC instructions. Those
instructions allowed the jury to convict Robles of murder
and attempted murder under three theories: (1) as a direct
perpetrator; (2) as a direct aider and abettor; or (3) as a member
of a conspiracy. Robles’s arguments on appeal concern only
the conspiracy theory of liability.
As relevant to this appeal, the trial court’s CALJIC No.
6.10.5 instruction told the jury a “conspiracy is an agreement
between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to
commit the crime of murder, and with the further specific intent
to commit that crime, followed by an overt act committed . . .
by one or more of the parties for the purpose of accomplishing
the object of the agreement.”
The court’s CALJIC No. 6.11 instruction told the jury
“[e]ach member of a criminal conspiracy is liable for each act

8
and bound by each declaration of every other member of the
conspiracy if that act or declaration is in furtherance of the object
of the conspiracy.”5
The court’s CALJIC No. 6.16 instruction told the jury,
“[w]here a conspirator commits an act or makes a declaration
which is neither in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy
nor the natural and probable consequence of an attempt to attain
that object, he alone is responsible for and is bound by that act
or declaration, and no criminal responsibility therefor attaches
to any of his confederates.”
Finally, the court’s CALJIC No. 6.19 instruction told the
jury “[e]very person who joins a conspiracy after its formation
is liable for and bound by the acts committed and declarations
made by other members in pursuance and furtherance of
the conspiracy during the time that he is a member of the
conspiracy.”
3. Robles failed to make a prima facie showing
with respect to the murder conviction
Robles contends the trial court erroneously found he failed
to make a prima facie showing with respect to one of his murder

5 The standard CALJIC No. 6.11 instruction also stated a
“member of a conspiracy is not only guilty of the particular crime
that to his knowledge his confederates agreed to and did commit,
but is also liable for the natural and probable consequences
of any crime/act of a co-conspirator to further the object of the
conspiracy, even though that crime/act was not intended as a
part of the agreed upon objective and even though he was not
present at the time of the commission of that crime/act.” The
trial court omitted that language from the instruction it gave
to Robles’s jury. Robles did not raise that issue in his direct
appeal of the judgment. Nor does he raise it in this appeal.

9
convictions.6 Robles does not challenge our determination in
Robles II that the trial court did not instruct the jury on murder
under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Instead, he argues there was an
ambiguity in the court’s conspiracy instructions that allowed
the jury to convict him of murder by imputing malice to him.
Robles points to the trial court’s CALJIC No. 6.10.5
instruction, which told the jury a “conspiracy is an agreement
between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to
commit the crime of murder, and with the further specific intent
to commit that crime . . . .” Robles notes the instruction did
not expressly require the jury to find he was one of the “ ‘two
or more persons’ ” with the intent to commit murder. Therefore,
Robles argues, it allowed the jury to find he was a member of
a conspiracy to commit murder without having to find he acted
with the specific intent to murder. If so, the jury could have
convicted him of murder by imputing malice to him.
Robles asserts the instructions at issue in People v.
Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663 (Petznick) contained a
comparable ambiguity. In Petznick, the People charged the
defendant with conspiring to commit murder with three other
people. (See id. at p. 668.) During deliberations, the jury
asked the court if conspiracy to commit murder requires all
four coconspirators to have harbored express malice. (Id. at
pp. 678–679.) The jury explained it was asking the question

6 Robles concedes the multiple-murder special circumstance
finding conclusively shows the jury did not impute malice to him
with respect to one murder conviction. However, he contends
the finding did not preclude the jury from imputing malice as to
the other conviction.

10
because the court’s CALJIC No. 6.11 instruction “ ‘indicates that
members of a conspiracy are liable for the natural and probable
consequences of the act without all 4 participants having
expressed malice aforethought.’ ” (Petznick, at p. 679.) The
trial court responded that, to convict the defendant of conspiracy
to commit murder, the jury had to find “ ‘[t]wo or more persons
entered into an agreement to kill’ ” and “ ‘[a]t least two of the
persons to the agreement’ ” intended to kill. (Id. at pp. 678–680.)
The trial court apparently took this language from a version of
CALJIC No. 8.69 intended for situations where there is a feigned
accomplice, such as a government agent. (See Petznick, at p. 680,
fn. 3.) The jury ultimately convicted the defendant. (Id. at
p. 668.)
On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court’s response
improperly allowed the jury to convict him of conspiracy to
commit murder without finding he possessed an intent to kill.
(Petznick, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 678.) The court agreed,
explaining, “to be guilty of the crime of conspiring to commit
murder, [the defendant] had to have been one of the participants
who harbored the specific intent to kill. [Citation.] The [trial
court’s response] does not say that. It says only that ‘at least
two’ of the participants must have intended to kill and does not
specify that defendant must have been one of them. Since the
jury was aware that there were four participants, the instruction
erroneously permitted the jury to find defendant guilty of
conspiracy to commit murder without regard to whether or not
he personally intended to kill so long as they found that at least

11
two of the other participants harbored that intent.” (Id. at
pp. 680–681.)7
Robles’s reliance on Petznick is misplaced. The trial court
in Petznick told the jury conspiracy to commit murder requires
an agreement to kill by two or more persons and a specific intent
to kill by “at least two” of those persons. (Petznick, supra, 114
Cal.App.4th at pp. 678–680.) This language was misleading
because it implied a person could be a member of a conspiracy
to commit murder without possessing an intent to kill.
Therefore, it left open the possibility—however unlikely—
that the jury would convict the defendant of conspiracy to
commit murder because he entered into an agreement to kill
without having intended to kill.
Here, the trial court did not instruct Robles’s jury it must
find “at least two” members of the conspiracy intended to commit
murder. Instead, the court’s CALJIC No. 6.10.5 instruction told
the jury a conspiracy to commit murder requires “an agreement
between two or more persons with the specific intent . . . to
commit . . . murder.” This language does not differentiate
between members of the conspiracy who merely agree to murder,
and those who also intend to murder. Instead, it implies every
member of the conspiracy must agree to murder and do so with
the intent to commit murder.

7 The California Supreme Court cited Petznick for the
proposition that “[a]sking the jury to find specific intent for
‘at least two’ conspirators in a conspiracy with more than
two members, none of whom is feigning involvement, could
potentially lead a jury to find an individual conspirator guilty
without finding that he or she possessed a specific intent to agree
or to kill.” (People v. Garton (2018) 4 Cal.5th 485, 516.)

12
Accordingly, for the jury to find Robles was a member of a
conspiracy to commit murder under CALJIC No. 6.10.5, it had to
find he agreed to murder with the intent to murder. Because the
court’s CALJIC No. 8.10 instruction defined murder as a killing
with malice aforethought, the jury would have understood it
could convict Robles under a conspiracy theory only if it found
he joined the conspiracy with malice. In other words, the
instructions did not allow the jury to convict Robles of murder
under a conspiracy theory without having found he personally
acted with malice. Therefore, the superior court properly
determined Robles failed to make a prima facie showing with
respect to the murder conviction. (See People v. Medrano (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 177, 181, 185 & fn. 4 (Medrano) [defendant failed
to make prima facie showing where the trial court instructed
the jury with CALJIC No. 6.10, which is identical to CALJIC
No. 6.10.5 in all relevant respects].)
4. Robles failed to make a prima facie showing with
respect to the attempted murder convictions
Robles contends he made a prima facie showing under
section 1172.6 with respect to his convictions for attempted
murder. According to Robles, the trial court’s conspiracy
instructions—specifically CALJIC Nos. 6.11, 6.16, and 6.19—
allowed the jury to convict him of attempted murder if it found:
(1) he was a member of a conspiracy to commit murder;
(2) during the commission of the murder, a coconspirator
committed attempted murder; and (3) the attempted murder
was in furtherance of, and a natural and probable consequence
of, the conspiracy to commit murder. Therefore, Robles argues,
the jury could have convicted him of attempted murder under the

13
natural and probable consequences doctrine and without having
to find he personally acted with malice.
Even assuming the jury understood the instructions in the
way Robles suggests, they did not allow the jury to convict him
under a natural and probable consequences theory. In order to
apply CALJIC No. 6.11, 6.16, or 6.19, the jury first had to find
Robles was a member of a conspiracy. The court’s CALJIC No.
6.10.5 instruction defined “conspiracy” as an “agreement between
two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to commit
the crime of murder, and with the further specific intent to
commit that crime.” The court did not instruct the jury on
a conspiracy to commit any other crime. Therefore, the only
conspiracy Robles could have been a member of was a conspiracy
to commit murder.
According to the California Supreme Court, where a
defendant is “charged with conspiracy to murder, not conspiracy
to commit a lesser crime that resulted in murder,” there is
“no possibility” the defendant was “found guilty of murder
on a natural and probable consequences theory.” (People v.
Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 645; see Medrano, supra,
68 Cal.App.5th at p. 184 [where defendant was convicted of
conspiracy to commit first degree murder, jury conclusively did
not rely on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
convict him of murder].) The same is true of Robles’s convictions
for attempted murder. (See People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 860, 867 [“the natural and probable consequences
instruction as applied to a conspiracy . . . is problematic [for
purposes of section 1172.6] only where a defendant is convicted
of murder or attempted murder based on a conspiracy to commit

14
‘a lesser crime that resulted in murder’ ”], review den. July 24,
2024.)
Nor did the conspiracy instructions otherwise allow
the jury to convict Robles by imputing malice to him based
solely on his participation in a crime. People v. Nguyen (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 668, review denied September 18, 2024
(Nguyen), is instructive. In that case, a jury convicted the
defendant of three counts of first degree murder after he and
a group of gunmen killed three members of a rival gang. (Id. at
pp. 672, 673–674.) The defendant petitioned for resentencing
on the ground that the standard CALJIC conspiracy instructions
allowed the jury to convict him of murder by imputing malice
to him. (Id. at pp. 672–673, 678.) The defendant pointed
to language in CALJIC No. 6.11 stating each member of a
conspiracy is liable for a coconspirator’s acts in furtherance of
the object of the conspiracy. (Nguyen, at pp. 674–675, 678.)
According to the defendant, that instruction allowed the jury
to convict him under an imputed malice theory if it found he
joined a conspiracy to murder one victim, and his coconspirators
independently killed the other victims solely as acts in
furtherance of the conspiracy. (Id. at p. 678.)
The Nguyen court rejected the defendant’s argument
and held he failed to make a prima facie showing under section
1172.6. (Nguyen, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 673.) The court
explained the defendant wrongly assumed “that if he intended
to kill one person, but another person whom he did not intend
to kill was killed in furtherance of the conspiracy, the jury could
not have convicted him of murdering that other person without
imputing malice to him. This misconceives the nature of malice.
Express malice does not mean an intent to kill a specific person;

15
it is defined as the intent to unlawfully kill a person. . . .
Accordingly, liability for express malice murder does not require
a finding that the defendant specifically intended to kill the
deceased victim(s). ‘A defendant can be liable for the unlawful
killings of both the intended victims and any unintended
victims.’ ” (Id. at p. 679.)
The Nguyen court further explained that “[s]ections
1172.6 and 188 both circumscribe liability for murder based on
malice that is ‘imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.’ [Citations.] Whether the jury relied
on a theory of conspiracy to commit murder, . . . the jury could
not have convicted [the defendant] of first degree murder without
finding he personally harbored an intent to kill unlawfully. And
while participation in a conspiracy to commit murder constitutes
‘participation in a crime,’ a jury can find a defendant harbored
express malice without finding the defendant participated in a
conspiracy. Because the jury’s finding of malice was not based
solely on [the defendant’s] participation in any crime, the jury
did not impute malice to [the defendant] in any way that would
be impermissible under the plain language of section 1172.6
or section 188.” (Nguyen, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 685.)
People v. Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, review denied
January 31, 2024 (Allen), is even more on point. In Allen, the
defendant and other members of his gang drove into a rival
gang’s territory, looking for people to shoot in retaliation for
an earlier shooting. They shot two men whom they wrongly
believed were members of a rival gang, killing one. (Id. at
p. 392.) The trial court instructed the jury it could convict the
defendant of murder and attempted murder under a conspiracy
theory. On the attempted murder count, the court specifically

16
instructed the jury it could convict the defendant if he was
a member of a conspiracy to commit murder, a coconspirator
committed attempted murder to further the conspiracy, and
attempted murder was a natural and probable consequence
of the conspiracy to commit murder. The jury convicted the
defendant of both offenses. (Id. at pp. 392–394.)
The defendant filed a petition for resentencing, which
the trial court denied at the prima facie stage. (Allen, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 394.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding
the defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Id. at
pp. 395, 398.) The court reasoned, to “convict [the defendant] of
the attempted murder . . . as a coconspirator, the trial court told
jurors that they had to conclude that [the defendant] conspired
to commit murder. That, in turn, required them to find that he
harbored the intent to kill.” (Id. at p. 396.) The court explained
it was irrelevant that the jury did not have to find the defendant
intended to kill the specific victims, because “ ‘the “intent to kill
need not be directed at a specific person.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “The
social harm of murder is the ‘killing of a human being by
another human being.’ ” ’ [Citation.] . . . Thus, under current
California law, ‘conspiracy to commit murder may be based on
an agreement to kill “ ‘a human being’ ” who is not specifically
identified.’ [Citation.] That [the defendant] and his
coconspirators did not conspire to kill [the victims] specifically
is not relevant.” (Ibid.)
Here, as in Nguyen and Allen, the trial court instructed
Robles’s jury only on a conspiracy to commit murder. As we
discussed above, to find Robles joined such a conspiracy, the
instructions required the jury to find he agreed to commit murder
with malice. Accordingly, to convict Robles of an attempted

17
murder under a conspiracy theory, the jury had to find he acted
with malice. That theory of attempted murder remains valid
under current law. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 462
[Senate Bill 1437 “sought to limit murder liability to established
theories that incorporated the requisite intent” of personal
malice].) The fact that Robles’s malice might have been directed
at someone other than the victims of the attempted murders
is irrelevant. Robles’s “liability as a member of a conspiracy
to commit . . . murder required the jury to find [he] possessed
malice aforethought, and his liability for any coconspirators’ acts
in furtherance followed.” (Nguyen, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 681.)
Because the trial court instructed the jury only on theories
of attempted murder that remain valid after Senate Bill 1437,
the record of conviction conclusively refutes Robles’s allegation
that he could not be convicted because of the changes to sections
188 and 189. Accordingly, the superior court properly denied
Robles’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (See
Allen, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 395 [a petitioner is ineligible
for relief “if the record of conviction shows that their conviction
was based on a theory of liability that remains valid under
Senate Bill 1437”]; see also Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463
[a petitioner fails to make a prima facie showing where the
jury’s findings refute the allegation that he could not currently
be convicted of murder because of the statutory changes].)

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying David Robles’s petition for
resentencing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

HANASONO, J.

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