People v. Windom CA1/2

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Filed 1/27/26 P. v. Windom CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170692

v. (Contra Costa County
ERIC WINDOM, Super. Ct. No. 01001976380)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Eric Windom pleaded no contest to attempted murder,
manslaughter, and robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an agreed-
upon term of 19 years’ imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, Windom
sought clarification on whether an “initial probation report” would be going to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and stated that, if so, he
“would be seeking” to strike a narrative about a shooting at a gas station
from the report.1 The trial court answered that it was not ordering that the
report be sent, and it was not striking the narrative from the report. Windom
now contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by not
striking the narrative. We find no error and affirm.

1 At Windom’s request, we have taken judicial notice of the report.

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BACKGROUND
On January 27, 2022, Windom and three codefendants were charged by
information with conspiracy to commit murder, the murder of Arnold Marcel
Hawkins, the attempted murder of Aaron Patterson, and criminal street gang
conspiracy.
On or about January 31, 2022,2 the probation department prepared a
document entitled “PROBATION OFFICER’S REPORT.” The probation
officer’s report lists the pending charges against Windom and identifies the
“DATE OF OFFENSE” as March 9, 2021.3 The portion of the probation
officer’s report at issue is a two and one-half-page section entitled
“INVESTIGATION,” which begins: “According [to] Antioch Police
Department report [number],” and then describes, apparently based on the
police report, the investigation of an attempted murder at a gas station on
February 27, 2021. (Capitalization omitted.) This section concludes: “This
police report does not indicate which defendant was identified as the shooter
or states [sic] when the defendants were arrested.” (Capitalization omitted.)
The probation officer’s report describes the criminal acts of the shooter and
does not suggest that any person aided or was present with the shooter.
In May 2024, in exchange for a sentence of 19 years in state prison,
Windom pleaded no contest to: (1) non-premeditated attempted murder, in

2 The probation officer’s report does not bear a date, but the declaration

in support of Windom’s motion for judicial notice of the probation officer’s
report represented that the probation officer’s report was “filed/dated” on
January 31, 2022. To the extent that the Attorney General disputes this
date, it is not relevant to our decision in this case.
3 The list of charges pending against Windom in the probation officer’s

report contains a typographical error; Windom was charged with criminal
street gang conspiracy in count 6 of the information, not count 4.

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violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 187, with an enhancement for use of
a firearm under Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a);
(2) manslaughter, in violation of Penal Code section 192, subdivision (a); and
(3) second degree robbery, in violation of Penal Code section 211, in another
case. It is undisputed that Windom waived referral to probation for the
preparation of a presentence report, and none was prepared.
Near the end of the sentencing hearing, Windom’s counsel raised, for
the first time, a concern about the probation officer’s report as follows: “The
other issue is that we waived a pre-sentencing probation report, but there
was an initial probation report prepared in this case and sometimes those
will go along with the Abstract of Judgment. In reviewing the case
yesterday, I realized that the narrative portion of the probation report here
contains the facts of the 76 Gas Station shooting for which only [codefendant]
Pugh was involved. So I would be concerned about a narrative about a crime
Mr. Windom did not have any involvement with going to prison. So I wanted
to clarify whether that document is going; and if so, I would be seeking to
have that narrative about the other crime stricken.” The trial court
answered: “I’m not going to strike anything that’s public record. I’m also not
ordering that that be sent along to the parole board. If . . . the parole board
orders it, then Mr. Windom, when the time comes, can address that on his
own. But I’m certainly not ordering that that probation report be sent, but
I’m not striking it from public record or the Court’s file.”
In response, Windom’s counsel stated: “I guess I just want to be very
clear for the record right now that . . . , at a future youthful offender parole
hearing, if the board is examining this record, there is an implication that
Mr. Windom was involved in the commission of a crime that he wasn’t
charged with and had no involvement with. [¶] . . . [¶] And this document

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produced by probation does not contain the facts of the homicide charge . . .
which . . . Mr. Windom has now resolved.” The trial court replied: “Okay.
You’ve made your record, and I’ll let the parole board sort that out when time
comes.”
Windom appealed.
DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, the Attorney General contends that we should
dismiss this appeal because Windom’s plea agreement included an appellate
waiver that encompasses the issue he now raises, and he failed to obtain a
certificate of probable cause from the trial court.4 Windom argues that his
appeal is based on matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the
validity of the plea (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)), and that the issue
on appeal is outside of the scope of the plea agreement’s appellate waiver.
We need not resolve which of these competing contentions is correct because,
in any event, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
not striking the narrative from the report.
“The purpose of a probation report is to assist the sentencing court in
determining an appropriate disposition. [Citation.] The court has the
unquestioned discretion to reject it in part or in toto. [Citation.] There is no
reason why the power to ‘strike’ a report should not similarly fall within the
discretionary province of the trial court.” (People v. Municipal Court (Lopez)
(1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 456, 459.) Accordingly, a trial court’s refusal to strike
part of a probation report is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. “This

4 On his plea form, Windom initialed the following statement: “I

understand that I have the right to appeal this sentence, conviction and any
rulings made by the Court in this case. I give up my right to appeal in
exchange for accepting this negotiated disposition.”

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standard is deferential.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162
(Williams).) “[I]t asks in substance whether the ruling in question ‘falls
outside the bounds of reason’ under the applicable law and the relevant facts
[citations].” (Ibid.)
Here, even assuming that Windom was not involved in the shooting
described in the narrative, the trial court’s decision not to strike the narrative
in the probation officer’s report did not fall outside the bounds of reason. As
we have described, the narrative appears to relate the substance of an
identified police report regarding the investigation of an attempted murder at
a gas station, and it does not erroneously identify Windom as the shooter who
committed the attempted murder at the gas station, which was alleged solely
against a codefendant. Rather, the narrative states: “This police report does
not indicate which defendant was identified as the shooter . . . .”
(Capitalization omitted.) Because the narrative does not contain any
factually unsupported allegation that Windom was the shooter and does not
mislead by suggesting that Windom aided or was even present with the
shooter, the trial court’s conclusion that it did not need to strike the narrative
did not “ ‘fall[] outside the bounds of reason.’ ” (See Williams, supra, 17
Cal.4th at p. 162.)
Furthermore, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that it
did not need to strike the narrative because, as the trial court noted, if at
some time in the future the parole board requests this particular report,
Windom could address it at that time. Penal Code section 3041.5, subdivision
(a)(1) provides: “At least 10 days before any hearing by the Board of Parole
Hearings, the inmate shall be permitted to review the file which will be
examined by the board and shall have the opportunity to enter a written
response to any material contained in the file.” Additionally, at all parole

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hearings, “[t]he inmate shall be permitted to be present, to ask and answer
questions, and to speak on his or her own behalf.” (Pen. Code, § 3041.5, subd.
(a)(2).) Furthermore, “[a]t any hearing for the purpose of setting, postponing,
or rescinding a parole release date of an inmate under a life sentence, the
inmate shall be entitled to be represented by counsel . . . .” (Pen. Code,
§ 3041.7.) Thus, Windom’s claim of future possible harm, which is
speculative in nature, is not without an administrative remedy, and there is
no reason to suppose that the narrative in the report would mislead any
administrative body into mistakenly believing that Windom committed,
aided, or was even present at the attempted murder at the gas station.
Moreover, should the need ever arise, Windom can submit the transcript of
the sentencing hearing, which contains the record that his counsel made on
this point.
Finally, we find no abuse of discretion because it is not clear that
Windom actually asked the trial court to strike such language. “A party on
appeal cannot successfully complain because the trial court failed to do
something which it was not asked to do . . . .” (In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161
Cal.App.3d 587, 603.) Here, counsel for Windom stated: “So I wanted to
clarify whether that document is going; and if so, I would be seeking to have
that narrative about the other crime stricken.” (Italics added.) Because the
trial court stated that it was not ordering that the report be sent to the parole
board, counsel’s explanation of what he would do “if” the report were sent
cannot be construed to be a request. Counsel for Windom went on to state he
“just want[ed] to be very clear for the record right now” that, if the report
were examined at a future parole hearing, “there is an implication that Mr.
Windom was involved in the commission of a crime that he wasn’t charged
with and had no involvement with.” While making a record that such an

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implication was incorrect, however, counsel for Windom did not make clear
that he wanted the trial court to strike the narrative even after the trial court
explained that it was not sending the report to the parole board. Windom
cannot now complain that the trial court abused its discretion by not doing
so.
Windom’s reliance on People v. Berry (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 184 and
People v. Taylor (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 831 for the broad proposition that
material not factually supported should be excluded from probation reports is
misplaced. Both cases narrowly addressed the exclusion of arrests from
probation reports. In Berry, the court noted that the probation report
“contains numerous arrests which, for various reasons, did not result in
adjudications or convictions” and concluded that “they could not be
considered” by the trial judge because they were “not factually supported.”
(Berry, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 191.) In Taylor, the court “emphasize[d]
. . . that arrests not factually supported should be excluded from” probation
reports. (Taylor, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 833.) Even if Berry and Taylor
could be broadly read to require that a trial court strike material not
factually supported from probation reports, and even assuming that this
report—which was not prepared to “assist the sentencing court in
determining an appropriate disposition” (see Lopez, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at
p. 459)—counts as a probation report, Windom fails to establish how the
narrative was not factually supported. As explained above, the report does
not contain any factually unsupported allegation that Windom was the
shooter and does not otherwise suggest that he was involved in the shooting.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Stewart, P. J.

_________________________
Richman, J.

A170692, People v. Windom

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