CourtListener 10778887•Moses v. Rok Drinks CA2/3
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Filed 1/23/26 Moses v. Rok Drinks CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JEFF MOSES, B339392
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC718405)
v.
ROK DRINKS LTD., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephanie Bowick, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Taylor-Copeland Law, James Taylor-Copeland and Max
Ambrose, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Jason A. Pollack, Jason A. Pollack, for
Defendants and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff Jeff Moses appeals from postjudgment orders
awarding attorney fees to defendants Rok Drinks Ltd. (Rok
Drinks), Rok Stars PLC (Rok Stars) (together, Rok Defendants),
and Jonathan Kendrick. Moses also appeals from an order
denying his request for attorney fees. We reverse the orders and
remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2015, Moses agreed to sell a majority interest in a wine
company to Rok Drinks. The agreement was memorialized in a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU included an
arbitration clause which provided: “In the event of a dispute
between the Parties regarding this MOU, the dispute will be
finally resolved by neutral arbitrator. . . . The arbitrator SHALL
award costs including arbitration fees and reasonable attorney’s
fees to the prevailing party.”
Moses sued the Rok Defendants in 2018 for breach of
contract and several other causes of action. The complaint
alleged that the Rok Defendants wrongfully obtained his assets
and refused to pay him his rightful share of profits. Moses
amended his complaint to add Jonathan Kendrick, the co-founder
and chairman of the Rok Defendants, as a defendant. The
operative complaint brought only noncontractual claims against
Kendrick.
The court granted Kendrick’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, reasoning that the complaint did not allege facts
sufficient to support that Kendrick was personally liable or liable
under an alleged alter ego theory. The court dismissed the
claims against Kendrick with prejudice.
Four claims against the Rok Defendants proceeded to a
jury trial. The jury found the Rok Defendants liable for breach of
2
an implied-in-fact contract, fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation, and awarded Moses $587,500 in damages. It
found the Rok Defendants not liable for breach of a written
contract.
After trial, the Rok Defendants moved for attorney fees.
The motion relied on Civil Code section 1717,1 which provides
that in an action “on a contract . . . the party prevailing on the
contract” is entitled to attorney fees, even if he or she was not a
party to the contract. The motion asserted that the Rok
Defendants were the prevailing parties “on a contract” because
they defeated Moses’s breach of contract claim.
The trial court granted the Rok Defendants’ motion for
attorney fees. It reasoned that the Rok Defendants were the
prevailing party because they prevailed on the only cause of
action “ ‘on a contract,’ ” i.e., the breach of a written contract
claim. The court concluded that the other claims that were
litigated at trial were irrelevant because they were not actions
“ ‘on a contract.’ ”
Moses also requested attorney fees. His motion argued
that the MOU required the court to award attorney fees to the
party prevailing overall on the contractual and noncontractual
claims that proceeded to trial. The trial court denied Moses’s
motion, incorporating by reference the analysis in its order
awarding fees to the Rok Defendants.
Kendrick also requested attorney fees pursuant to section
1717. Although the complaint did not allege that Kendrick
breached a written contract, Kendrick’s motion argued that he
was entitled to attorney fees because he defeated Moses’s alter
ego theory, which would have exposed Kendrick to liability for
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
3
the Rok Defendants’ alleged breach of the MOU. The court
agreed with Kendrick’s argument and granted his fee request.
Moses timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Moses argues that the trial court erred by awarding
attorney fees to defendants and denying his fee request.
Specifically, Moses asserts that the trial court misinterpreted the
attorney fee clause in the MOU and misapplied section 1717. For
the reasons discussed herein, we agree and reverse.
I. Standard of review
An appellate court ordinarily reviews an award of attorney
fees after trial for abuse of discretion. (Mountain Air Enterprises,
LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751
(Mountain Air).) However, where, as here, the appeal challenges
the legal basis for the trial court ruling by challenging its
interpretation of a contract and the application of law to
undisputed facts, our review is de novo. (Ibid.)
II. The attorney fee provision in the MOU encompasses
noncontractual claims arising from any dispute
“regarding” the MOU
A. Legal principles
“Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by
statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of
the parties . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.) “If a contractual
attorney fee provision is phrased broadly enough . . . it may
support an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an
action alleging both contract and tort claims: ‘[P]arties may
4
validly agree that the prevailing party will be awarded attorney
fees incurred in any litigation between themselves, whether such
litigation sounds in tort or in contract.’ ” (Santisas v. Goodin
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 608 (Santisas).)
In litigation based on a contract, a nonparty to the contract
may be entitled to attorney fees pursuant to section 1717.2
However, “ ‘[b]efore section 1717 comes into play, it is necessary
to determine whether the parties entered an agreement for the
payment of attorney fees, and if so, the scope of the attorney fee
agreement.’ ” (Mountain Air, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 752.) “If the
attorney fee provision does encompass noncontractual claims, the
prevailing party entitled to recover fees normally will be the
party whose net recovery is greater, in the sense of most
accomplishing its litigation objectives, whether or not that party
prevailed on a contract cause of action.” (Maynard v. BTI Group,
Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 984, 992 (Maynard).)
To determine whether a contract permits the prevailing
party to recover attorney fees for noncontractual claims, we
“apply traditional rules of contract interpretation.” (Mountain
Air, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 752.) “Accordingly, we first consider
the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract
providing for attorney fees was formed. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) Our
initial inquiry is confined to the writing alone.” (Mountain Air, at
2 Section 1717 provides that “[i]n any action on a contract,
where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and
costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be
awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party,
then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on
the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the
contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in
addition to other costs.” (§ 1717, subd. (a).)
5
p. 752.) If the meaning of the contractual language is
unambiguous, we apply that meaning. (Ibid.) We interpret
contracts de novo. (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 132, 142.)
B. The attorney fee provision in the MOU
The MOU provides: “In the event of a dispute between the
Parties regarding this MOU, the dispute will be finally resolved
by neutral arbitrator. . . . The arbitrator SHALL award costs
including arbitration fees and reasonable attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party.”3 The parties agree that attorney fees may be
recovered if they were incurred during “ ‘a dispute between the
Parties regarding this MOU.’ ”
Moses argues that this phrase must be interpreted broadly
to include any contractual or noncontractual claim relating to or
concerning the MOU. We agree. The word “dispute” “ ‘is a . . .
general term that includes any conflict or controversy,’ including
but not limited to ‘a conflict giving rise to an action.’ ” (GoTek
Energy, Inc. v. SoCal IP Law Group, LLP (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
1240, 1249 (GoTek).) The term “ ‘regarding’ ” is also broad. It
means “ ‘WITH RESPECT TO: Concerning.’ (Webster’s New
Internat. Dict. (3d ed.1993) p. 1991.)” (Skrbina v. Fleming
Companies (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1369, fn. 10.)
Similar language in attorney fee provisions has been
interpreted to encompass both contract and tort claims. (GoTek,
supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1249 [“ ‘relating to this agreement’ ”];
Moallem v. Coldwell Banker Com. Group, Inc. (1994) 25
3 The parties chose to litigate their dispute, and they agree
that the prevailing party in the litigation was entitled to attorney
fees.
6
Cal.App.4th 1827, 1831 (Moallem) [same]; Cruz v. Ayromloo
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1277 [“ ‘in connection with this
Agreement’ ”]; Thompson v. Miller (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 327,
332, 337 [“dispute under” a contract]; Lerner v. Ward (1993) 13
Cal.App.4th 155, 160 [“ ‘arising out of this agreement’ ”
encompassed fraud claims].) And in a parallel context, an
agreement to arbitrate “disputes ‘regarding’ ” a contract
encompassed “both tort and contractual claims as long as the
claims are rooted in the relationship created by the contract.”
(Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 1092, 1096.)
Citing Exxess Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp. (1998) 64
Cal.App.4th 698 (Exxess), respondents argue that the MOU only
permits recovery of attorney fees based on claims to “ ‘enforce the
terms of the contract’ ” or to “ ‘declare rights thereunder.’ ” These
are quotes from the contract at issue in Exxess, which has no
bearing on our interpretation of the MOU. Respondents similarly
assert that the MOU only permits recovery of attorney fees
“ ‘incurred to enforce [the] contract.’ ” This language comes from
section 1717. As we have discussed, before we consider whether
section 1717 applies, we must interpret the attorney fee clause in
the first instance, and section 1717 does not guide our analysis.
(Maynard, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 990.) Respondents also
contend that the court was within its “discretion” to interpret the
phrase “ ‘regarding this MOU’ ” as applying solely to contractual
claims. But “we do not defer to the trial court’s interpretation of
the disputed phrase” in a contract, because our review is de novo.
(Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166.) Respondents
otherwise do not offer any contrary interpretation of the MOU,
7
nor have they identified any legal authority analyzing similar
contractual language.
We conclude that the phrase “dispute between the Parties
regarding this MOU” encompasses both contractual and
noncontractual claims, so long as they relate to the MOU. With
this interpretation in mind, we turn next to the dispute between
Moses and the Rok Defendants.
II. Moses was the prevailing party in his dispute with
the Rok Defendants4
Moses proceeded to a jury trial against the Rok Defendants
on claims for breach of a written contract, breach of an implied
contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. To determine
which party prevailed in the “dispute between the Parties
regarding [the] MOU,” we must assess which of these claims were
“regarding” the MOU.
There is no dispute that the written contract claim, based
on the MOU itself, was “regarding this MOU.” The implied-in-
fact contract claim was based in part on “[t]he terms and
negotiation of the MOU” and “the compensation set forth in the
MOU.” It also alleged that the Rok Defendants agreed to pay
Moses $250,000 under the implied contract, which is the amount
he was owed under the MOU.5 Similarly, the claims for fraud
4 Rok Stars was not a party to the MOU. No party has
argued that Rok Stars’s nonsignatory status has any impact on
this appeal. We assume without deciding that the Rok
Defendants may be treated the same for purposes of our analysis.
5 Respondents argue that the implied contract claim is not
“regarding” the MOU because Moses argued, and the trial court
8
and negligent misrepresentation both alleged that the Rok
Defendants falsely represented that they would pay Moses
$250,000 plus a monthly fee, i.e., the monetary terms of the
MOU. These causes of action all stem from a dispute over the
Rok Defendants’ failure to comply with the terms of the MOU,
meaning the claims that proceeded to trial were “regarding” the
MOU. The prevailing party on those claims, overall, was entitled
to attorney fees.
The jury returned a split verdict. It found the Rok
Defendants liable for breach of an implied contract, fraud, and
negligent misrepresentation, but also found that the Rok
Defendants did not breach a written contract. However, the jury
awarded Moses $587,500, and the Rok Defendants took nothing.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 specifies that the
“ ‘Prevailing party’ includes the party with a net monetary
recovery” in a lawsuit. That party is entitled to attorney fees if
authorized by contract. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10);
Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 606–609.) Thus, despite the
split verdict, Moses was the prevailing party because he obtained
a net monetary recovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4);
Michell v. Olick (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1199.)
Citing section 1717, respondents argue that the Rok
Defendants prevailed because they defeated the sole claim for
breach of a written contract. For purposes of section 1717, the
concluded, that the implied contract was necessarily separate
from the MOU. But as we have discussed, the phrase “regarding
this MOU” is broad enough to encompass claims that merely
relate to the MOU. The implied contract included several of the
same terms as the MOU; it related to and was therefore
“regarding” the MOU.
9
prevailing party is “the party who recovered a greater relief in
the action on the contract.” (§ 1717, subd. (b)(1).) But section
1717 only applies when the contract at issue “specifically
provides” for attorney fees “incurred to enforce [a] contract.”
(§ 1717, subd. (a).) Section 1717 is narrowly applicable, and does
not “supersede or limit the broad right of parties pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 to make attorney fees
agreements.” (Xuereb v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc. (1992) 3
Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342.) The parties to the MOU broadly agreed
that attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party in any dispute
“regarding” the MOU would be recoverable, and that
agreement—not section 1717—governs our analysis.
Maynard, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th 984 is instructive. There,
the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract and several
torts. The contract provided that the prevailing party in any
dispute was entitled to attorney fees. (Id. at p. 989.) The
plaintiff won a net monetary recovery based on a negligence
claim, but the factfinder found for the defendant on all contract-
based claims. (Ibid.) The court awarded attorney fees to the
plaintiff, and the appellate court affirmed. It reasoned that when
“the attorney fee provision does encompass noncontractual
claims, the prevailing party entitled to recover fees normally will
be the party whose net recovery is greater . . . whether or not that
party prevailed on a contract cause of action.” (Id. at p. 992.)
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that section 1717
applied, reasoning that the statute does not “authorize[ ] an
award to a party who has prevailed in defending a breach of
contract cause of action but has been held liable on other related
causes of action.” (Maynard, at pp. 990, 993–994.) The court also
rejected the defendant’s contention that he could obtain fees
10
incurred in defending against the contract claims, even while the
plaintiff recovered fees on its tort claims. (Id. at p. 994.) It
reasoned that this result was untenable because “there may be no
more than one prevailing party with respect to the resolution of a
single dispute, regardless of the number of theories of recovery
that were advanced.” (Id. at p. 995.)
Like the plaintiff in Maynard, Moses brought claims
against the Rok Defendants for breach of contract and several
torts. The MOU broadly allows for recovery of attorney fees
based on any contractual or noncontractual dispute regarding the
contract. Moses won a net monetary recovery. As such, Moses
was the prevailing party on the claims “regarding” the MOU, and
he was entitled to attorney fees. Under these circumstances,
section 1717 did not authorize a fee award to the Rok
Defendants, even though they successfully defended against the
claim for breach of a written contract.
The orders awarding attorney fees to the Rok Defendants
and denying Moses’s fee request are reversed, and the matter
remanded so that the court may determine the appropriate
amount of attorney fees to which Moses is entitled based on his
dispute with the Rok Defendants.6
6 Because we reverse the order granting the Rok Defendants’
motion for attorney fees, we do not reach the parties’ arguments
regarding the reasonableness of the award or the appropriateness
of a deduction under section 1717, subdivision (c).
11
III. Kendrick was the prevailing party in his dispute
with Moses, but he is not entitled to attorney fees
pursuant to section 1717
Because this case involves multiple parties, we must
separately assess what party, if any, was entitled to attorney fees
based on the dispute between Moses and Kendrick. (Burkhalter
Kessler Clement & George LLP v. Hamilton (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
38, 45 (Burkhalter).)
Kendrick obtained a judgment on the pleadings on all
claims against him, and the court dismissed those claims.
Kendrick is the prevailing party in his dispute with Moses
because Kendrick is “a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is
entered.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4); Santisas, supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 606.)
Kendrick was not a party to the MOU and could not claim
contractual attorney fees. The trial court nonetheless concluded
that he was entitled to attorney fees under section 1717, which
provides “a reciprocal remedy for a nonsignatory defendant, sued
on a contract as if he were a party to it, when a plaintiff would
clearly be entitled to attorney’s fees should he prevail in
enforcing the contractual obligation against the defendant.”
(Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 128.)
Moses argues that Kendrick was not entitled to fees under
section 1717 because Moses did not bring a breach of contract
claim against Kendrick.7 We agree.
7 Respondents argue that Moses should be estopped from
raising this point, but they fail to cite any legal authority in
support of this position. (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075 [appellant’s burden is to support
arguments with “citations to authority”].)
12
Section 1717 sometimes allows a nonparty to a contract to
collect attorney fees incurred in an action “on a contract.” But
the phrase “ ‘on a contract’ ” does not encompass all claims
“arising out of or related to” the contract. (Moallem, supra, 25
Cal.App.4th at p. 1830.) Rather, “section 1717 applies only to
actions that contain at least one contract claim.” (Santisas,
supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 615; Exxess, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p.
708 [“section 1717 does not apply to tort claims”].) Although we
have determined that many of Moses’s claims were “regarding”
the MOU, we must separately assess whether any of his claims
against Kendrick were “on a contract.”
Moses brought claims against Kendrick for promissory
estoppel, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unfair business
practices under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and
intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic
relations. A fraud action is not on a contract. (Cussler v.
Crusader Entertainment, LLC (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 356, 366.)
Nor is a claim for promissory estoppel. (Douglas E. Barnhart,
Inc. v. CMC Fabricators, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 230, 249.)
“ ‘[A]n action for negligent misrepresentation is not an action to
enforce the provisions of a contract,’ ” and is not on a contract
within the meaning of section 1717. (Reyes v. Beneficial State
Bank (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 596, 620.) A UCL claim also is not
on a contract. (Shadoan v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (1990)
219 Cal.App.3d 97, 108.) And although the parties have not
identified any authority directly addressing claims for intentional
and negligent interference with prospective economic relations,
tort claims generally are not on a contract within the meaning of
section 1717. (Orozco v. WPV San Jose, LLC (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 375, 408.)
13
Respondents argue that Kendrick may nonetheless recover
reciprocal attorney fees under section 1717 because the operative
complaint alleged that he was the Rok Defendants’ alter ego.
Thus, although Moses did not bring a breach of contract claim
against Kendrick, respondents contend that Kendrick could have
been liable for breach of contract if the alter ego allegation had
been accepted. We disagree. The operative complaint did not
bring a breach of contract claim against Kendrick. Unless Moses
amended the complaint or brought a separate action against
Kendrick, there was no way that Kendrick could have been held
liable for breach of contract, even if the court had accepted
Moses’s alter ego theory.
Respondents cite several cases in which attorney fees were
awarded to nonsignatory alter egos, but each is distinguishable.
In 347 Group, Inc. v. Hawkins (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 209, the
plaintiff sued a corporation and an individual for breach of
contract, and alleged that the individual was an alter ego. (Id. at
p. 212.) Although the individual was not a party to the contract,
he was permitted to collect attorney fees under section 1717.
(347 Group, at p. 215.) But unlike in 347 Group, Moses did not
name Kendrick as a defendant in his breach of contract claim.
In MSY Trading Inc. v. Saleen Automotive, Inc. (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 395, the plaintiffs obtained a judgment on a breach
of contract claim and then sought to enforce the judgment against
an alter ego. (Id. at p. 398.) Although the alleged alter ego was
not a signatory to the contract, the court concluded that he was
entitled to attorney fees under section 1717, reasoning that “a
postjudgment, independent action to establish alter ego liability
for a judgment on a contract is itself an action on the contract.”
(MSY Trading, at p. 403.) Similarly, in Westwood Homes, Inc. v.
14
AGCPII Villa Salerno Member, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 922,
the plaintiffs won an arbitration award and obtained a judgment
on claims under a set of covenants, conditions, restrictions, and
easements, which included a prevailing party attorney fee
provision. (Id. at p. 925.) The plaintiffs moved to amend the
judgments to add two alter ego judgment debtors. The court
denied the motions and also denied the alleged alter egos’
motions for attorney fees. (Id. at p. 926.) On appeal, the court
determined that the alleged alter egos were entitled to section
1717 attorney fees under MSY Trading at page 404. But these
cases are inapposite, because Moses did not seek to enforce a
judgment against Kendrick based on a breach of any contract.
Because Moses did not bring a breach of contract claim
against Kendrick, section 1717 does not apply. (Santisas, supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 615.) Kendrick has not identified any other basis
to affirm the order awarding him attorney fees. The order must
be reversed.8
8 On appeal, Moses argues generally that he was the
prevailing party in the underlying litigation. However, the
prevailing party in the dispute between Moses and Kendrick
must be examined separately from the dispute between Moses
and the Rok Defendants. (Burkhalter, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at
p. 45.) To the extent Moses means to assert that he prevailed in
his dispute with Kendrick, we reject the argument as forfeited,
because Moses has not articulated any reasoned argument to
support it. (Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28
Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 [appellate court will not develop
appellant’s arguments].)
15
DISPOSITION
The orders awarding attorney fees to the Rok Defendants
and to Kendrick are reversed. The order denying Moses’s motion
for attorney fees is also reversed, and the matter is remanded for
the trial court to calculate Moses’s attorney fees. Moses is
awarded his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
16
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