Townsend v. Kang CA2/3

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Filed 1/21/26 Townsend v. Kang CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE

KALI JAMAL TOWNSEND, B345164

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV23323)
v.

BYUNG WOO KANG,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Steven Ellis, Judge. Affirmed.
Kali Jamal Townsend, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Law Office of Baruch C. Cohen and Baruch C. Cohen for
Defendant and Respondent.

_________________________
Plaintiff Kali Jamal Townsend appeals from the order
denying his motion to vacate or set aside the judgment entered
after the court granted defendant Byung Woo Kang’s unopposed
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that the trial
court ignored evidence of excusable neglect, failed to consider the
substance of his motion, and relied on procedural defects and
delays in denying his motion to set aside. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2021, plaintiff sued defendant for battery.
Although initially represented in the lawsuit, plaintiff became
self-represented less than two years into the litigation. In March
2024, defendant moved for summary judgment; plaintiff did not
file an opposition. At the August 2024 summary judgment
hearing, plaintiff appeared and moved for a continuance so that
he could obtain counsel. The trial court denied the continuance
and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The
court entered a judgment dismissing plaintiff’s lawsuit in
September 2024.
Plaintiff obtained counsel in October 2024, and a month
later, moved to set aside or vacate the judgment pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).1 The record
provided by plaintiff on appeal does not contain a copy of this
motion. We have gleaned this timeline from the case register,
two declarations filed in support of the motion, and the court’s
ruling, all of which are in the record.

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

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On January 29, 2025, the trial court denied plaintiff’s
motion. The trial court explained that plaintiff failed to show any
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to justify
discretionary relief under the statute. The court stated:
“[Plaintiff] was aware of his case, he was sent notice of the
various court proceedings, he does not state that he did not
receive these notices, he was aware of the pending motion for
summary judgment (and he appeared at the hearing), but the fact
remains that he did nothing to litigate his case for more than one
year and he did nothing to oppose a dispositive motion for five
months. Although the Court is aware of the difficulties that
Plaintiff and other self-represented litigants face in our civil
justice system, such difficulties—whether considered alone or
combined with the evidence presented in connection with this
motion—do not on this record constitute mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect.”
The trial court further explained: “To the extent that
Plaintiff is essentially arguing that the Court erred in not
granting his oral request for a continuance of the summary
judgment hearing (made for the first time at the hearing), the
Court notes that Plaintiff did not file a timely motion for
reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008—nor
could he have, as Plaintiff offers no facts that could not have been
presented to the Court in connection with a timely opposition to
Defendant’s summary judgment motion and/or a timely request
for a continuance of the hearing.”
Plaintiff timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the trial court ignored evidence of
excusable neglect, failed to consider the substance of his motion,

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and relied on procedural defects and delays in denying his motion
to set aside. He asserts that the court should have accounted for
“the challenges non-lawyers face” in exercising discretion, and
the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits supports
reversal. As we explain below, plaintiff has failed to show that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to
vacate or set aside the judgment.
I. Plaintiff Has Forfeited His Appellate Arguments
As a threshold matter, we conclude that plaintiff has
forfeited any challenge to the order denying his motion to vacate
or set aside due to his failure to provide an adequate record on
appeal and failure to cite the record in his briefs. “ ‘ “It is the
duty of an appellant to provide an adequate record to the court
establishing error. Failure to provide an adequate record on an
issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant.” ’ ”
(Mack v. All Counties Trustee Services, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th
935, 940; Estrada v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 618, 620,
fn. 1 [same].) Here, plaintiff appeals the denial of his motion to
vacate or set aside the judgment but did not include that motion
in the clerk’s transcript. This error is fatal to his appeal because
we cannot adequately review the trial court’s decision without
knowing his arguments in the motion.
Further, plaintiff failed to cite the record anywhere in his
briefs as required by the Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).
Allegations that are not supported by references to the record are
deemed forfeited. The court is not required to make an
independent search of the record and may disregard any claims
when no reference is furnished. (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745; Nwosu v. Uba (2004)

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122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; Duarte v. Chino Community
Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.)
II. Plaintiff’s Evidence Shows No Mistake,
Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect
Even if we were to address the merits of the court’s order
denying plaintiff’s motion, we find no abuse of discretion.
Section 473, subdivision (b) states: “The court may, upon any
terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or the party’s legal
representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other
proceeding taken against the party through the party’s mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. . . . [T]he court
shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six
months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is
accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to the
attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any
(1) resulting default entered by the clerk against the attorney’s
client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or
(2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against the
attorney’s client, unless the court finds that the default or
dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.”
The party moving under section 473, subdivision (b) bears
the burden of demonstrating entitlement to relief by providing a
satisfactory explanation—excusable mistake, surprise, or
neglect—for the judgment they seek to set aside. (Huh v. Wang
(2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1420, 1423 (Huh); Kendall v.
Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 623–624.) In that regard, it is
“simply not enough to assert a general state of misapprehension
or ignorance.” (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th
1401, 1410 (Hopkins).) Rather, the moving party must “specify

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the actual cause of his failure . . . and explain why that failure
should be excused.” (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s ruling on
the section 473, subdivision (b) motion for abuse of discretion.
(Huh, at p. 1419.)
Here, plaintiff’s new attorney submitted a declaration in
support of plaintiff’s motion but did not attest to his own mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, likely because
counsel was not involved in this case until after the judgment
was entered. Counsel’s declaration thus did not entitle plaintiff
to relief under section 473.
Plaintiff’s own declaration likewise provides no satisfactory
explanation for his failure to respond to the motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiff states that from May 2023 through
September 2024, he attempted to litigate in propria persona and
“diligently sought new representation” by contacting one attorney
who he named and other unnamed lawyers through several
websites. He attested that, “due to the fact that my vocation
requires me to drive to locations that are outside of Los Angeles
County and often out of the state of California while I supported
my family and attempted to self-medicate the trauma I suffered, I
was unable to find representation as I had little time to meet in
person with potential law offices and lawyers so that they would
genuinely understand my case.” Plaintiff provides no other
information about why he failed to respond to the motion for
summary judgment.
It is well established that “[t]he ‘naïveté’ of lay litigants in
‘rely[ing] on themselves to protect their substantial legal
interests’ does not afford a ground for relief from adverse results.
(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 979.)” (Hopkins,
supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414.) “The law does not entitle a

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party to proceed experimentally without counsel and then turn
back the clock if the experiment yields an adverse result. One
who voluntarily represents himself ‘is not, for that reason,
entitled to any more (or less) consideration than a lawyer. Thus,
any alleged ignorance of legal matters or failure to properly
represent himself can hardly constitute ‘mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect’ as those terms are used in section
473.’ (Goodson v. The Bogerts, Inc. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 32, 40.)
Rather, ‘when a litigant accepts the risks of proceeding without
counsel, he or she is stuck with the outcome, and has no greater
opportunity to cast off an unfavorable judgment than he or she
would if represented by counsel.’ (Burnete v. La Casa Dana
Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267.)” (Id. at p. 1413.)
The declarations that supported plaintiff’s motion to vacate
or set aside failed to provide any qualifying basis for relief.
Plaintiff’s assertions regarding his work schedule, personal
difficulties, and challenges in securing new counsel fall short of
the required showing. Case law makes clear that self-
representation and the difficulties attendant to it do not
constitute grounds for relief under section 473, subdivision (b),
and litigants who elect to proceed without counsel are bound by
the consequences of that choice. On this record, the trial court
acted well within its discretion in concluding that plaintiff failed
to demonstrate excusable neglect or any other statutory basis to
set aside the judgment.

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DISPOSITION
The court’s order is affirmed. Defendant Byung Woo Kang
is awarded his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

HANASONO, J.

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