CourtListener 10777535•People v. Cervantez CA2/6
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Filed 1/21/26 P. v. Cervantez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B341866
(Super. Ct. No. 2020008715)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
RENE RAY CERVANTEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
This is the second appeal in this case. In 2024, we reversed
Cervantez’s convictions for animal cruelty and remanded for
retrial of those counts or resentencing. (People v. Cervantez (July
19, 2024, B327570) as mod. on den. of rehg. Aug. 6, 2024 [nonpub.
opn.] 2024 WL 3465020.) Cervantez contends the trial court
erred by resentencing him without his personal presence, failing
to conduct a full resentencing, and miscalculating his credits for
time served. The Attorney General concedes the denial of
Cervantez’s right to personal presence at the resentencing
requires we vacate the sentence and remand again for
resentencing. We agree.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cervantez was found guilty following a jury trial of
possession of heroin and fentanyl for sale (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11351; counts 1 and 8), possession of a controlled substance
with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 2),
felon in possession of ammunition (Pen. Code,1 § 30305, subd.
(a)(1); counts 4 and 6), felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 5), sale of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352,
subd. (a); count 7), and cruelty to animals (§ 597, subd. (b); counts
9 and 10). The jury also found true an allegation that Cervantez
was armed with a firearm in the commission of count 1 (§ 12022,
subd. (c)). He admitted he had suffered a prior strike conviction
(§§ 667, subds. (c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1)), and
that he committed the offenses while released on bail (§ 12022.1,
subd. (b)).
In February 2023, the court sentenced Cervantez to 15
years in state prison, consisting of consecutive sentences of: six
years for count 1 (midterm of three years, doubled for strike); low
term of three years for the firearm enhancement for count 1; two
years, eight months for count 7 (one-third of midterm of four
years, doubled for strike); two years for count 8 (one-third of
midterm of three years, doubled for strike); and one year, four
months for count 10 (one-third of midterm of two years, doubled
for strike). The court imposed concurrent sentences for counts 4
and 9, and stayed sentences pursuant to section 654 for counts 2,
5, and 6. The court dismissed the on-bail allegations pursuant to
section 1385. The court also imposed a consecutive sentence of
one year, four months for a violation of Health and Safety Code
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
section 11378 in case 2017011288.
In the first appeal, we reversed the animal cruelty
convictions based on instructional error. We also concluded the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to dismiss
the prior strike pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We ordered: “Appellant’s
convictions on counts 9 and 10 are reversed. On remand, the
People may retry those counts. If the People elect not to retry
counts 9 and 10, the trial court shall resentence Cervantez
consistent with this opinion. The clerk shall prepare an amended
abstract of judgment and forward a copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.” (People v. Cervantez, supra, 2024 WL
3465020 at p. *5.)
At the October 2024 resentencing hearing, the court noted
defense counsel’s appearance and stated, “Mr. Cervantez is at the
Department of Corrections, so he’s not present.” Although the
minute order states counsel appeared with section 977 authority,
there is no written waiver and no mention in the reporter’s
transcript regarding a waiver of personal appearance.
The prosecution elected not to retry counts 9 and 10, and
those counts were dismissed on the People’s motion. The
prosecutor advised the court, “[T]he new sentence is 13 years, 8
months.” The court modified the previous sentence, stating, “As
to the new sentence now, it will be 13 years, 8 months pursuant
to the Court of Appeal decision.” There was no discussion
regarding any other part of the sentence.
An amended abstract signed October 29, 2024, deleted the
sentence for counts 9 and 10 (for a total of 13 years eight months
on the current case), and showed the consecutive sentence of one
3
year four months in case 2017011288. But it incorrectly
calculated the total time for both cases as 13 years eight months
rather than 15 years. It also incorrectly showed execution of
sentence was imposed “at resentencing per recall of commitment
(PC 1172.1)” rather than “at resentencing per decision on
appeal,” and gave the original sentencing date rather than the
resentencing date. And it also failed to update Cervantez’s
custody credits.
A new amended abstract signed November 18, 2024, failed
to reflect the new sentence and incorrectly included a concurrent
sentence of four years and a consecutive sentence of one year four
months for the dismissed animal cruelty convictions in counts 9
and 10, respectively.2 With the consecutive sentence of one year
four months in case 2017011288, the abstract calculated the total
as 16 years four months (rather than 15 years). It again
misstated the reason for resentencing, did not reflect the
resentencing date, and failed to update custody credits.
DISCUSSION
Right to appear
Cervantez contends the case must be remanded for a new
resentencing hearing because he was denied his right to be
present at resentencing. The Attorney General correctly
concedes.
“A defendant, of course, has a constitutional right to be
present at all critical stages of the criminal prosecution, i.e., ‘all
stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness
of the proceedings.’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253,
260.) The defendant’s right to be present includes at a
2 This amended abstract was signed after filing of the
notice of appeal but was included in the record on appeal.
4
resentencing hearing. (Ibid. [right to presence following remand
to consider dismissing strike]; People v. Cutting (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 344, 348 (Cutting).)
Section 977 requires that a felony defendant “shall be
physically present . . . at the time of the imposition of sentence.”
(§ 977, subd. (b)(1).) It allows a defendant to waive their physical
presence only for “other proceedings.” (Ibid.) Cervantez was not
physically present at the resentencing hearing.
Even if section 977 is interpreted to permit a waiver of
personal presence for sentencing, the record does not show a valid
waiver here. As in People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663
(Velasco), the minute order for resentencing showed the
defendant waived his presence, but “there is no corresponding
writing in the record” and “no evidence that he or his attorney
previously entered a valid waiver on the record.” (Id. at p. 674.)
And neither Cervantez nor his attorney gave the required
confirmation “that the defendant has been advised of the right to
be physically or remotely present for the hearing at issue.”
(§ 977, subd. (b)(2)(A) & (B).)
Notwithstanding section 977, waiver of personal
appearance at felony sentencing is permitted by section 1193 if
“the defendant, in open court and on the record or in a notarized
writing, requests that judgment be pronounced against them in
their absence.” (§ 1193, subd. (a)(1).) This provision applies to
resentencing following an appellate court remand. (Cutting,
supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 345–346; People v. Sanchez (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1414.) But Cervantez did not waive his
right to be present at sentencing in open court or by a notarized
writing. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it resentenced
Cervantez without his personal presence.
5
Harmless error
Because resentencing Cervantez in his absence violated his
“federal constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of the
proceedings, we review the error under Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 . . ., to determine if it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt,” i.e., “ ‘only if we can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not affect the outcome
of the proceeding.’ ” (Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 348;
Velasco, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 674; but see People v.
Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 902 [absence at evidentiary
portion of trial without waiver subject to less rigorous harmless
error analysis of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836].)
The resentencing here required more than the ministerial
subtraction of the sentence for counts 9 and 10. “[W]hen part of a
sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full
resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed
circumstances.’ ” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)
Here, the court could have reconsidered various aspects of the
sentence such as selection of the middle term for count 1,
imposition of the firearm enhancement, and imposition of
consecutive sentences. Although we concluded in the first appeal
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the
motion to dismiss the strike pursuant to Romero, supra, 13
Cal.4th 497, the trial court on resentencing had jurisdiction to
reconsider that ruling. (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
340, 364; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 260.) At
resentencing, the court may consider “ ‘any pertinent
circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was
imposed.’ ” (Buycks, at p. 893.)
6
Because the resentencing was conducted by a judge other
than the trial judge, and Cervantez was represented by a
different attorney, they may not have been familiar with
potentially mitigating information. If Cervantez had been
present at resentencing, he “may have offered mitigating factors
that arose after his original sentencing; he may have expressed
remorse; he may have made a plea for leniency.” (Cutting, supra,
42 Cal.App.5th at p. 350.) Accordingly, “we cannot conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that his presence at the hearing would
not have affected the outcome.” (Ibid.)
Because the defendant’s absence at the resentencing
hearing requires a remand at which the trial court may
reconsider all its sentencing choices, we need not determine if
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to ask the trial
court to do so.
Credits
At the resentencing, the trial court failed to update
Cervantez’s custody credits. The amended abstract must include
credit for actual days in custody after the original sentencing
until the date of resentencing. (People v. Sanchez, supra, 245
Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.) On remand, the trial court must
calculate the actual time in prison; the determination of prison
conduct credits is left to the prison administration. (People v.
Honea (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 842, 845, disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Johnson (2004) 32 Cal.4th 260, 268, fn. 3.)
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the
trial court for a resentencing hearing at which Cervantez is
present unless he waives his presence in accordance with Penal
Code section 1193. At resentencing the court may reconsider all
7
its sentencing choices. We express no opinion as to how the court
should exercise its discretion on remand. After resentencing, the
trial court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment that
correctly reflects the counts for which sentence is imposed, the
total sentence, and credit for time served, and forward a copy to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
KELLEY, J.
Judge of San Luis Obispo County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
8
Paul W. Baelly, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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