CourtListener 10777530•People v. Johnson CA2/5
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Filed 1/21/26 P. v. Johnson CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B343764
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA100181)
v.
NIESIIA JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J.
Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Niesiia Johnson challenges the trial court’s order finding
her prima facie ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code1
section 1172.6. The court denied Johnson’s petition in a minute
order without first appointing counsel or holding a hearing on the
ground that she was found guilty as the actual killer. The parties
agree that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel, but
disagree regarding whether the error was harmless.
We agree with the parties that the trial court erred, but
conclude that the error was harmless. The record shows that
Johnson’s jury was not instructed on aiding and abetting, natural
and probable consequences murder, felony murder, or any other
theory that is no longer valid because it imputes malice to the
defendant to impose liability for murder. The jury necessarily
convicted Johnson as the actual killer, so she is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2015, the jury found Johnson guilty of second degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and assault resulting in a
child’s death (§ 273ab, subd. (a), count 3). The trial court
sentenced Johnson to 25 years to life in state prison.
In 2024, Johnson filed a petition for vacatur of her murder
conviction and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. Johnson
utilized a standard form and attested to the following:
“A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against
me that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in
a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Pen. Code, § 1170.95, subd. (a)(l).)
“I was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or I accepted a plea offer in lieu
of a trial at which I could have been convicted of murder or
attempted murder. (Pen. Code, § 1170.95, subd. (a)(2).)
“I could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes made to penal code §§ 188 and 189,
effective January 1, 2019. (Pen. code, § 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).)”
In the petition, Johnson requested that the trial court
appoint counsel to represent her.
In a minute order dated January 7, 2025, the trial court
summarily denied Johnson’s petition without appointing counsel.
The court found that Johnson was found guilty as the actual
killer and was therefore ineligible for relief.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
As pertinent here, section 1172.6, subdivision (a) permits a
defendant convicted of murder to seek vacatur of their conviction
if the conviction rests on “the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.”
Upon receipt of a facially sufficient petition, the trial court
will appoint counsel, if requested. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 967; § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) “After the parties have
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had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a
hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Within 60
days of issuance of the order to show cause, the trial court shall
hold a hearing “to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to
relief.” (Id., subd. (d)(1) & (3).)
The court’s failure to appoint counsel is a violation of state
law, which we review for error under People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 973.) The
error is harmless if the record of conviction refutes the
petitioner’s prima facie showing and establishes as a matter of
law that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. (See People v.
Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947, 957 [summary denial of
petition without appointing counsel was harmless error where
trial court correctly concluded that the jury’s true finding on
felony murder special circumstance allegation precluded relief as
a matter of law]; People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887,
891–893 [trial court’s failure to appoint counsel was harmless
error where court correctly concluded that record of conviction
demonstrated petitioner was “the attempted murderer”].)
In assessing whether a defendant seeking relief under
section 1172.6 is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a trial court
must take the petition’s factual allegations as true and ask
“ ‘ “whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if [those]
allegations were proven.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 971.) “ ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own
documents [from the record of conviction, including the jury
instructions,] “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in
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the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner” ’ ” and denying the
petition without an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.) Where, as here,
we are reviewing the jury instructions in the record of conviction,
our review is de novo.2 (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
988.)
B. Analysis
Johnson contends, and the People concede, that because
she filed a facially sufficient petition, the trial court violated
section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(3) by refusing to appoint counsel to
represent her. She further contends that the court’s error was
not harmless because, if true, the facts she pled in her petition
would entitle her to relief. The People argue that the error is
harmless because Johnson is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law.
We agree with the parties that the court’s refusal to
appoint counsel was error, but conclude that the error was
harmless. The record demonstrates that the jurors were not
instructed on aiding and abetting, natural and probable
consequences murder, felony murder, or any other theory that is
no longer valid because it imputes to the defendant liability for
murder. Johnson makes no effort on appeal to identify anything
else in the record of conviction that could suggest a now invalid
theory of murder was presented to the jury at trial, and our
review of the record confirms there was no such improper theory.
2 The jury instructions are not contained in the record on
appeal. We take judicial notice of the record in the prior appeal,
People v. Johnson (Apr. 13, 2017, No. B269062).
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The jury necessarily convicted Johnson as the actual killer;
Johnson is therefore ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
(People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205 [petitioner is
prima facie ineligible for relief where the jury was not instructed
on any theory of liability for murder that required malice to be
imputed to him].)
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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