Fishman v. Advisors CA2/7

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Filed 1/15/26 Fishman v. Advisors CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

JORDAN FISHMAN et al., B334179

Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV19615)
v.

ADVISORS LLP et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment and postjudgment order of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Douglas W. Stern and
Stephen P. Pfahler, Judges. Affirmed.
Yadegar, Minoofar & Soleymani, Navid Yadegar and Navid
Soleymani for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Miller Barondess and James Goldman for Defendants and
Appellants.
________________________
INTRODUCTION

This matter involves an arbitration between David Joe and
his former law firm, Advisors LLP, and its principals, Leigh
Morris and Robert Plotkowski (collectively, Advisors). Joe,
Jordan Fishman, and Tony Lee (collectively, Plaintiffs) were
employed by Advisors and left to form their own law firm. When
Advisors sought to enforce a noncompete clause against them,
Plaintiffs sued it for damages and declaratory and injunctive
relief, alleging they were misclassified as nonequity partners
rather than as employees of Advisors. Advisors, in turn, filed a
cross-complaint against Plaintiffs and moved to compel
arbitration, which the trial court granted.
Three separate arbitration proceedings ensued with three
different arbitrators. In the Fishman arbitration, which was
completed first, neither side recovered on its claims. The
Fishman arbitrator also ordered each side to bear its own
attorney fees and costs. After the Fishman arbitrator issued his
interim award, Advisors settled with Joe and Lee, agreeing to
pay each of them $5,000 for dismissal of their respective claims.
After the settlement, Joe and Lee each sought attorney fees and
costs on the ground they were prevailing parties entitled to
statutory fees under the Labor Code. Morris and Plotkowski also
filed a motion for attorney fees and costs. The Lee arbitrator
declined to award attorney fees to any party but awarded Lee
$4,184.03 in costs. The Lee and Fishman arbitration awards are
not at issue in this appeal, but form the backdrop for the two
appeals relating to the Joe arbitration.
The Joe arbitrator found Joe to be the prevailing party and
awarded him statutory attorney fees totaling $220,817 plus
$5,024 in costs. Advisors moved to vacate the Joe attorney fees
award in superior court. The court denied the motion to vacate

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and issued a judgment confirming the award. The court
subsequently denied Joe’s motion seeking attorney fees he
incurred in connection with the vacatur proceedings. Advisors
appeals from the judgment confirming the arbitration award. Joe
cross-appeals from the trial court’s order denying his request for
postarbitration attorney fees and costs. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs worked at Advisors as attorneys. They each
became nonequity partners during their tenure at the firm and
each signed a nonequity partnership agreement that contained
noncompete and arbitration provisions. Morris and Plotkowski
were the only equity partners at Advisors. In 2020, Plaintiffs
resigned from Advisors to form their own law firm. Plaintiffs
sued Advisors for declaratory and injunctive relief when Advisors
attempted to enforce the noncompete provision against them,
alleging they were misclassified and were actually employees of
the firm. Plaintiffs also alleged Advisors failed to pay Plaintiffs
for work performed, in violation of the Labor Code. Advisors filed
a cross-complaint against Plaintiffs for breach of contract, breach
of the duty of loyalty, conversion, false promise and declaratory
relief. The superior court granted Advisors’s petitions to compel
arbitration over Plaintiffs’ objections.

A. Arbitration Proceedings
As stated, Plaintiffs each signed separate nonequity
partnership agreements. The three agreements contained two
different arbitration provisions. Joe’s and Lee’s arbitration
provision stated: “Any dispute, claim or controversy arising out
of or relating to this Agreement or the breach, enforcement,

3
interpretation or validity thereof, including the determination of
the scope or applicability of this agreement to arbitrate, shall be
determined by arbitration in Los Angeles, California before one
arbitrator. The arbitration shall be administered by JAMS
pursuant to its Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures
and in accordance with the Expedited Procedures in those Rules.
Judgment on the award may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction.”
Fishman, on the other hand, signed an arbitration
agreement that provided, in relevant part, that the parties
agreed to submit to binding arbitration within one year from the
date the dispute arose and “[b]inding arbitration conducted
pursuant to this policy shall be held in Los Angeles, California,
pursuant to the National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes of the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’), before
an arbitrator selected by both parties from the AAA Labor and
Employment Arbitrators Panel.” As a result, AAA conducted
Fishman’s arbitration and JAMS conducted Joe’s and Lee’s
arbitrations.
In 2021, Joe and Lee filed their arbitration demands with
JAMS. The demands stated each claimant “intend[ed] to
challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitrator” and that the
arbitration “must be governed by the JAMS Employment
Arbitration Rules. Claimant asserts he was an employee of
Respondent and the claims are based on his non-waivable rights
as an employee under the Labor Code.” JAMS notified the
parties that its Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures
(Comprehensive Rules) would apply but that according to its
Policy on Employment Arbitration, Minimum Standards of
Procedural Fairness (Minimum Standards), Joe and Lee, as

4
alleged employees, were only required to pay $400 of the filing fee
and Advisors was required to pay the remaining arbitration fees
and costs. Advisors did not object to application of the Minimum
Standards.
On March 1, 2021, JAMS again notified the parties that:
“Upon review of the Demand and accompanying documents
JAMS has determined that JAMS Policy on Employment
Arbitration Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness applies.
Please carefully review the enclosed Minimum Standards as
JAMS requires that the parties comply with them in order to
proceed. The Minimum Standards will apply notwithstanding
any contrary provisions in the parties’ pre-dispute arbitration
agreement. The parties’ agreement to proceed constitutes
agreement to the foregoing. Any further issue about whether the
Minimum Standards apply should be directed to the arbitrator
once he or she is appointed. After hearing from the parties, if the
arbitrator believes JAMS should revisit the issue, the arbitrator
may advise JAMS accordingly. JAMS will then review the issue,
taking the arbitrator’s position into consideration, and will make
a final determination.” Advisors again did not object to the
Minimum Standards.
On May 27, 2021, the parties appeared before the Joe
arbitrator for a preliminary hearing. The arbitrator noted, “the
parties could not agree on whether to use the JAMS Employment
Arbitration Rules & Procedures or the JAMS Commercial
Arbitration Rules & Procedures, and, at the request of
Respondents’ counsel, the Arbitrator agreed to make no decision
on the matter until after the hearing on the Motion referenced
below.” The arbitrator stated in its report that “[a]rbitration
proceedings will be governed by the JAMS Policy on Employment

5
Arbitration, Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness, the
Arbitration Agreement, and, to the extent not inconsistent
therewith, the JAMS Rules to be selected at a later date.” The
arbitrator thus understood that Advisors objected only to which
rules were to be applied but did not object to the application of
the Minimum Standards.
On June 2, 2021, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed Advisors that
Plaintiffs would not challenge the arbitrators’ jurisdiction “based
on the determination by JAMS that they are not responsible for
the arbitrator fees.” Specifically, Joe stated that he decided to
proceed with the arbitration “because (1) JAMS has decided to
apply JAMS Policy on Employment Arbitration, Minimum
Standards of Procedural Fairness, regarding the payment of the
arbitrator fees, and (2) Respondents have agreed to permit
discovery consistent with the California Discovery Act.”
Advisors did not object to Joe’s characterization of who
would pay the arbitrator’s fees or that the Minimum Standards
applied, but requested Plaintiffs agree to resolve the claims in
one arbitration to limit arbitration-related fees and avoid the
possibility of inconsistent adjudications. Plaintiffs rejected the
request. The parties all agreed, however, to coordinate discovery
such that a deposition taken or other discovery produced in one
arbitration could be used in the others.
AAA conducted Fishman’s arbitration in April 2022. On
July 25, 2022, the AAA arbitrator issued an interim arbitration
award against Fishman as to his claims against Advisors and
against Advisors as to their counterclaims against Fishman. The
arbitrator later adopted the interim award as his final award. He
declined to award any relief to any party. The Fishman

6
arbitrator further specified, “No party is awarded reasonable
attorney’s fees or litigation costs.”
On July 18, 2022, JAMS demanded a “deposit” from
Advisors for the Joe arbitrator’s services in the amount of
$93,600. It demanded a deposit in a similar amount for the Lee
arbitrator’s services. In an August 10, 2022 letter to JAMS
regarding both the Lee and Joe arbitrations, Advisors’s counsel
complained about the burden of paying for the arbitration.
Counsel suggested either JAMS consolidate the cases or “require
Lee and Joe to pay for one-half of the arbitrator’s fees in their
cases.” Advisors did not set out what authority would allow
JAMS to require Lee or Joe to pay an equal share of the fees.
The same day, Advisors moved to consolidate the Joe and Lee
arbitrations.
Five days after their motion to consolidate, and before
JAMS issued any ruling on it, Advisors offered to settle with Joe
and Lee under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 for $5,000
each.1 Advisors’s counsel explained they were forced to choose
between “two equally ruinous outcomes:” pay $172,000 in
arbitration fees to recover nothing from Joe or Lee, similar to the
outcome in the Fishman arbitration, or refuse to pay the fees and
face the possibility of a default award.
Joe accepted Advisors’s settlement offer the next day and
gave notice to JAMS. As part of his notice, Joe “request[ed] that
the arbitrator ‘promptly render an award accordingly,’ subject to
post-award proceedings, including [Joe’s] application for recovery
of costs, including statutory attorneys’ fees.” Lee accepted an

1 All undesignated references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise specified.

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identical $5,000 settlement offer from Advisors and provided
JAMS with an identical notice of settlement.
In an August 22, 2022 letter to JAMS, with a copy to
counsel for Joe and Lee, Advisors’s counsel retracted the
settlement offer because Joe’s and Lee’s acceptance was
“materially inconsistent with the offer.” Advisors’s counsel
stated, “However, my clients are still willing to settle, but only on
the terms stated in the offer. This means that the claims against
all of my clients must be dismissed with prejudice; upon
dismissal of all of Claimant’s claims, one of my clients, Advisors,
will pay Claimant $5,000. There will be no recovery against nor
payment to be made by either of my other two clients, Morris and
Plotkowski. The dismissal award cannot designate the prevailing
party, much less authorize Claimant to recover his fees and costs.
Any such determinations must be made via separate proceedings.
In that regard, all of my clients’ rights are reserved.”
In written submissions to their respective arbitrators, Joe
and Lee argued that, “Under well-established California law,
when a section 998 offer is silent as to attorney’s fees, the
prevailing party has the right to recover available fees, even
where the offer includes, as did this one, a provision for a ‘full
and complete satisfaction of all claims alleged by the parties.’”
Joe and Lee also opposed consolidation, arguing it was moot due
to the settlement.
JAMS denied the consolidation request on the ground Joe
and Lee each had “the right to participate in the selection of the
arbitrator(s).” JAMS noted that different arbitrators were
selected in the separate arbitrations, and “[c]onsolidation of these
matters would negate one Claimant’s participation in the
selection of the arbitrator and thus would undermine Standard

8
No. 2 of the [applicable rules].” JAMS also reminded the parties
that it “advised the parties that the Minimum Standards ‘will
apply notwithstanding any contrary provisions in the parties’
pre-dispute arbitration agreement. The parties’ agreement to
proceed constitutes agreement to the foregoing.” JAMS
explained, “Where the Minimum Standards apply, JAMS bills the
company (employer or putative employer) for all fees above $400
irrespective of which set of arbitration rules apply (e.g., JAMS
Comprehensive Arbitration Rules, JAMS Employment
Arbitration Rules, etc.). Accordingly the arbitrator’s
determination regarding which arbitration rules apply will not
affect JAMS billing in these matters. So long as the Minimum
Standards apply, JAMS will bill Respondent for all fees above
$400.”
On August 22, 2022, the parties notified the arbitrator they
had settled pursuant to section 998 but that there existed
continuing disputes regarding whether attorney fees and costs
were recoverable and whether the Joe and Lee matters should be
consolidated.
Advisors argued the arbitrators lacked authority to issue
an award of attorney fees or conduct further proceedings because
the terms of the settlement called for an immediate dismissal
with prejudice of the actions. According to Advisors, once the
matter was dismissed, the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to
proceed. Advisors alternatively argued that if the arbitrator
nevertheless decided to proceed, all parties—not just Joe and
Lee—should be permitted to seek attorney fees and costs.
Accordingly, on January 18, 2023, Morris and Plotkowski filed
their own request with the arbitrator for attorney fees as the
prevailing parties.

9
Lee filed a motion seeking $243,830.50 in attorney fees and
$5,024 in costs. The arbitrator in Lee’s case denied Lee’s request
for attorney fees, concluding that the Labor Code sections
authorizing attorney fees required a finding that Lee was an
employee. Because the matter had been settled and there was no
such finding, Lee was not entitled to a fee award. Additionally,
the arbitrator found neither party “prevailed” for purposes of a
fee award. According to the arbitrator, Lee was not a prevailing
party because the $5,000 settlement represented only 5 percent of
the $100,000 in damages sought by Lee. The arbitrator, however,
found Lee was entitled to his costs and ordered Advisors to pay
$4,184.03 in costs in addition to the $5,000 section 998
settlement. Neither Lee nor Advisors challenge this award.
In February 2023, JAMS sought an additional $10,640
deposit in fees for the Joe arbitrator to address the mutual
attorney fees and costs motions. It was then that Advisors
requested “the Arbitrator reconsider the decision regarding the
allocation of JAMS’s fees or refer the issue to JAMS” and
“reconsider its decision to apply its Minimum Standards in this
case.” JAMS declined to do so. JAMS explained the nonequity
partnership agreement, including the arbitration clause, provided
that it would be governed by California law. “In California,
‘“Employee” means any current employee, former employee, or
applicant for employment. The term includes any person who is,
was, or who claims to have been misclassified as an independent
contractor or otherwise improperly placed into a category other
than employee or applicant for employment.’ Cal. Code of Civ.
Proc. § 1280(f).” (Emphasis added.) Because Joe claimed he was
an employee, JAMS relied on Armendariz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 (Armendariz) to

10
comply with California law on the financial burden imposed on
employees in arbitration and thus, it applied the Minimum
Standards.2 JAMS stated it additionally relied on the
Comprehensive Rules to determine the fees each party was to
pay.
Subsequently, the arbitrator in Joe’s case issued her final
decision. The Joe arbitrator ordered Advisors to pay Joe $5,000
pursuant to the section 998 settlement agreement plus $220,817
in attorney fees and $5,024 in costs. The arbitrator’s order
stated: “Section 998 specifically applies to arbitration
proceedings, and the law is clear that, if an accepted Section 998
offer is silent on costs, the prevailing party is entitled to seek to
recover its costs, including attorneys’ fees, if otherwise authorized
by statute. See DeSaulles v. Community Hospital of Monterey
Peninsula (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1140, 1154 (‘DeSaulles’). By
stipulating that the accepted offer was a Section 998 offer,
Respondents gave the Arbitrator no discretion to refuse to
consider the parties’ requests for fees and costs.”
The arbitrator determined Joe was the sole prevailing
party because he obtained a monetary recovery and thus was
entitled to costs under section 1032. The arbitrator further
determined Joe was entitled to recover attorney fees as a part of

2 Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at page 110, concluded the
imposition of substantial fees on an employee is contrary to
public policy, and “is therefore grounds for invalidating or
revoking an arbitration agreement and denying a petition to
compel arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281
and 1281.2.”

11
costs pursuant to section 1033.5, because attorney fees were
authorized under Labor Code section 218.5.3

B. The Motion To Vacate the Joe Arbitration Award
Advisors moved to vacate the Joe arbitration award in the
superior court. Advisors argued JAMS exceeded its authority by
applying the Minimum Standards rather than the
Comprehensive Rules and by ignoring its own rules on
consolidation, resulting in a “fundamentally unfair proceeding.”
Advisors also argued the arbitrator exceeded her authority when
she conducted proceedings after the parties had settled, decided
the attorney fees issue without conducting a hearing and without
a contractual or statutory basis for fees, and failed to resolve

3 Section 1032, subdivision (b), provides: “Except as
otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is
entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or
proceeding.” Section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10), in turn, provides
that attorney fees authorized by statute, contract, or law are
recoverable as costs under section 1032.
Labor Code section 218.5, subdivision (a), provides, in
pertinent part: “In any action brought for the nonpayment of
wages, fringe benefits, or health and welfare or pension fund
contributions, the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs to the prevailing party if any party to the action
requests attorney’s fees and costs upon the initiation of the
action. However, if the prevailing party in the court action is not
an employee, attorney’s fees and costs shall be awarded pursuant
to this section only if the court finds that the employee brought
the court action in bad faith.” There is no dispute that Advisors
and Plaintiffs sought attorney fees in their complaint and cross-
complaint. Advisors’s position, however, was that Plaintiffs were
not employees and not entitled to attorney fees under Labor Code
section 218.5.

12
Morris and Plotkowski’s motion for fees and costs. The superior
court denied the motion to vacate and confirmed the arbitration
award. The court observed “the main reason” for the motion to
vacate is that Advisors “disagree with the arbitrator’s decision.”
The court noted it had little authority to review the legal and
factual decisions of the arbitrator. The superior court found the
challenged rulings were determinations of law, which were not
reviewable by the superior court even if erroneous. (See
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 13 (Moncharsh).)
The superior court issued an order confirming the Joe
arbitration award. It entered judgment in favor of Joe in the
amount of $225,841 plus $6,842.98 in prejudgment interest. The
judgment further stated, “Nothing herein precludes the parties,
or any of them, from filing or opposing a motion for attorneys’
fees and costs with respect to fees and costs, and to seek to
amend the Judgment accordingly.” Advisors timely appealed
from the judgment.
Joe subsequently moved for $155,071.14 in postarbitration
attorney fees on the ground he was entitled to the costs he
incurred to oppose Advisors’s motion to vacate the arbitration
award. According to Joe, these costs included statutorily
authorized attorney fees pursuant to Labor Code section 218.5.
Advisors opposed.
The superior court denied Joe’s motion, relying on Ling v.
P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1242,
1263-1264 (Ling), disapproved on different grounds by Naranjo v.
Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 93, 117. Ling
rejected the argument that Labor Code section 218.5 could be
applied to award attorney fees in a special proceeding to confirm
or vacate an arbitration award.

13
Joe timely appealed from the postjudgment order.

DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Properly Denied Advisors’s Motion To
Vacate the Arbitration Award
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“[T]he Legislature has expressed a ‘strong public policy in
favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means
of dispute resolution.’ [Citations.] Consequently, courts will
‘“indulge every intendment to give effect to such proceedings.”’”
(Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 9.) “Because the decision to
arbitrate grievances evinces the parties’ intent to bypass the
judicial system and thus avoid potential delays at the trial and
appellate levels, arbitral finality is a core component of the
parties’ agreement to submit to arbitration.” (Id. at p. 10.) In
Moncharsh, the California Supreme Court held judicial review of
an arbitral award is precluded even where there is an error of
law or fact that is apparent on the face of an award causing
substantial injustice. (See id. at p. 28.) “Thus, it is the general
rule that, with narrow exceptions, an arbitrator’s decision cannot
be reviewed for errors of fact or law.” (Id. at p. 11; Ajida
Technologies, Inc. v. Roos Instruments, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
534, 541 (Ajida Technologies) [“‘It is well settled that the scope of
judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow.’”].)
The “narrow exceptions” to arbitral finality are codified in
section 1286.2, subdivision (a). (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at
p. 11.) As relevant here, section 1286.2, subdivisions (a)(1) and
(a)(4), state: “the court shall vacate the award if the court
determines any of the following: [¶] (1) The award was procured

14
by corruption, fraud or other undue means. [and] (4) The
arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be
corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the
controversy submitted.”
An award is procured by “undue means” under
section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1), where the arbitration was
conducted so as to deprive a party of a fair hearing to his
prejudice. (Maaso v. Signer (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 362, 371-372
(Maaso).) Although section 1286.2 does not define “undue
means,” the court in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003)
112 Cal.App.4th 810, 827 (Pour Le Bebe) explained that “[i]f the
Legislature intended to permit an arbitration award to be
vacated whenever the prevailing party engages in tactics that
might in any way seem unfair, it would not have used the specific
examples of fraud and corruption to describe the type of ‘undue
means’ it had in mind.” In Maaso, for example, the court
affirmed the trial court’s vacatur of an arbitration award because
one party submitted an ex parte letter on a key undecided issue.
(Maaso, at p. 375; see also Pour Le Bebe, at p. 827 [conflicted
representation of a party by counsel may constitute undue means
and a ground for vacating an arbitration award].) Additionally,
“‘the moving party needs to demonstrate a nexus between the
award and the alleged undue means used to attain it.’” (Maaso,
at p. 374.) That is, there is a causal limitation on this statutory
ground for vacating an arbitration award.
In determining whether the arbitrators exceeded their
authority within the meaning of section 1286.2,
subdivision (a)(4), we give “substantial deference to the
arbitrators’ own assessments of their contractual authority.”
(Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362,

15
373 (Advanced Micro Devices).) Arbitrators typically exceed their
authority where they award a remedy that conflicts with the
express terms of the arbitration provision. For example, an
arbitrator was without power to award an employer damages
against a union where the collective bargaining agreement did
not expressly provide for remedies against a union, but only
arbitration of grievances between employers and employees. (See
id. at p. 382, citing to Carpenter Local 1027 v. Lee Lumber &
Bldg. Material (7th Cir. 1993) 2 F.3d 796, 798-799.) Thus,
parties must set out limitations to an arbitrator’s authority
“explicitly and unambiguously in the arbitration clause” if they
wish the arbitrator’s remedial authority to be specially restricted.
(Advanced Micro Devices, at p. 383.)
“‘“On appeal from an order confirming an arbitration
award, we review the trial court’s order (not the arbitration
award) under a de novo standard. [Citations.] To the extent that
the trial court’s ruling rests upon a determination of disputed
factual issues, we apply the substantial evidence test to those
issues.”’” (Roussos v. Roussos (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 962, 973;
accord, Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 383.)
Thus, “we review the superior court’s order de novo, while the
arbitrator’s award is entitled to deferential review.” (Ajida
Technologies, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 541; see Advanced
Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 376, fn. 9.) Whether the
arbitrator exceeded his or her authority is a legal question we
review de novo. (See Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th
909, 918, fn. 1.)

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2. The Arbitration Award Does Not Fall Within the
Narrow Exceptions for Vacatur Specified in
Section 1286.2
Advisors contends the Joe arbitration award must be
vacated based on two of the narrow exceptions listed in
section 1286.2, subdivision (a). Advisors essentially argues that:
(1) JAMS exceeded its authority by applying a different set of
rules from what was specified in the arbitration agreement
(§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4)); (2) the arbitrator exceeded her authority
when she awarded attorney fees and costs to Joe (ibid.); and
(3) the arbitration award was procured by undue means (id.,
subd. (a)(1)) because it was “unfair.” Advisors also argues the
arbitrator failed to resolve the material issue of whether Morris
and Plotkowski were entitled to attorney fees (§ 1283.4). We
conclude these arguments lack merit.

a. Advisors waived its arguments relating to
JAMS’s application of the Minimum Standards
First, Advisors contends JAMS exceeded its authority when
it applied a different set of rules to the arbitration, the Minimum
Standards, rather than what was specified in the arbitration
provision, the Comprehensive Rules. The record shows that, by
its conduct, Advisors consented and waived its objection to
application of the Minimum Standards.
JAMS notified Advisors on March 1, 2021, that the
“Minimum Standards will apply notwithstanding any contrary
provisions in the parties’ pre-dispute arbitration agreement. The
parties’ agreement to proceed constitutes agreement to the
foregoing.” JAMS directed the parties to take up “[a]ny further
issue about whether the Minimum Standards apply” with the

17
arbitrator, who had not yet been appointed. At the May 27, 2021
preliminary hearing with the arbitrator, however, the parties
disputed only “whether to use the JAMS Employment Arbitration
Rules & Procedures or the JAMS Commercial Arbitration Rules
& Procedures,” and not whether to use the Minimum Standards.
Thus, the arbitrator decided the proceedings would be
governed by the Minimum Standards, the arbitration agreement,
and “to the extent not inconsistent therewith, the JAMS Rules to
be selected at a later date.” When Joe decided not to challenge
the arbitrator’s jurisdiction because, among other things, “JAMS
has decided to apply the [Minimum Standards] regarding the
payment of the arbitrator fees,” Advisors did not object to
application of the Minimum Standards or challenge Joe’s
assertion that he would not be responsible for the arbitrator’s
fees. It was not until 2023, after the parties had settled, that the
Lee arbitrator had made her decision, and that Advisors was
faced with an additional $10,640 deposit to arbitrate the attorney
fees issue in this matter that Advisors raised the matter.
Advisors then requested JAMS reconsider its decision to apply
the Minimum Standards. Under these circumstances, Advisors
has waived its challenge to application of the Minimum
Standards. (See Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 31 [applying
waiver principles in arbitration]; United Health Centers of San
Joaquin Valley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 63,
85 [holding party may forfeit or waive deficiencies in the
arbitrator’s disclosures where the “attorneys had actual
knowledge of a ground for disqualification before the arbitration
commenced”]; Dornbirer v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 831, 846 [same]; see JAMS
Comprehensive Rule 27 [“If a Party becomes aware of a violation

18
of or failure to comply with these Rules and fails promptly to
object in writing, the objection will be deemed waived, unless the
Arbitrator determines that waiver will cause substantial injustice
or hardship.”].)

b. The arbitrator did not exceed her authority
Although it now challenges the arbitrator’s authority to
decide postsettlement attorney fees and costs, at the outset, we
note that Advisors submitted its own request for attorney fees
and costs to the arbitrator (albeit as an alternative request). In
all events, Advisors now contends the arbitrator exceeded her
authority by: (1) conducting proceedings even after the parties
had settled and agreed to dismiss the action; (2) purportedly
awarding fees incurred in other proceedings (i.e., the Fishman
and Lee arbitrations and the prearbitration superior court
proceedings); (3) awarding fees that were not statutorily
authorized under section 998 or the Labor Code, and
(4) purportedly issuing an award inconsistent with the terms of
the settlement.
As to contention (1), the express terms of Joe’s nonequity
partnership agreement authorize the arbitrator to decide
attorney fees and costs even after the parties’ settlement. The
parties agreed to submit “[a]ny dispute, claim or controversy
arising out of or relating to” the nonequity partnership
agreement to arbitration. Whether a party may recover attorney
fees incurred as a result of a dispute over the terms of the
nonequity partnership agreement falls within the scope of the
arbitration agreement. “Absent an express and unambiguous
limitation in the contract or the submission to arbitration, an
arbitrator has the authority to find the facts, interpret the

19
contract, and award any relief rationally related to his or her
factual findings and contractual interpretation.” (Gueyffier v.
Ann Summers, Ltd. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1179, 1182.) This principle
extends specifically to attorney fees and costs: If the parties’
agreement does “not limit the issues to be resolved through
arbitration, the issue of [a party’s] entitlement to attorney fees
and costs, as requested in his complaint, [is] subject to
determination in arbitration proceedings.” (Corona v. Amherst
Partners (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 701, 706 (Corona); accord
Heimlich v. Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 358 (Heimlich).)4
Additionally, the express terms of the arbitration provision
grant the arbitrator power to determine the scope of the
arbitration, including whether she may conduct proceedings after
the parties have settled. The arbitration agreement authorized
the arbitrator to decide a “dispute, claim or controversy arising
out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach, enforcement,
interpretation or validity thereof, including the determination of
the scope or applicability of this agreement to arbitrate.” With
this expansive language, the parties permitted the arbitrator to
decide whether the issue of statutory attorney fees fell within

4 We are not persuaded by Advisors’s arguments based on
Thompson v. Jespersen (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 964, 968. That
case held that an arbitrator exceeded her authority by awarding
attorney fees without a contractual basis for it. Thompson is
distinguishable because the arbitrator here found a statutory
basis for the award, Labor Code section 218.5. Further,
Thompson was decided before Heimlich, a California Supreme
Court decision that permits an arbitrator to decide the issue of
attorney fees and costs unless the arbitration agreement
expressly states otherwise. (See Heimlich, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 358.)

20
“the scope . . . of this agreement to arbitrate.” (See Lindemann v.
Hume (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 556, 569 [“‘[T]he scope of
arbitration “is, of course, a matter of agreement between the
parties.”’”]; Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th
1413, 1438 [“‘“‘“an arbitrator is authorized to determine all
questions which he needs to determine in order to resolve the
controversy submitted to him, and the arbitrator himself decides
which questions need to be determined”’”’”].) Given the terms of
the arbitration provision, the arbitrator did not exceed her
authority when she decided the attorney fees and costs issue
after settlement.
We are not persuaded that the parties’ settlement deprived
the arbitrator of authority to conduct further proceedings. As
stated, Advisors submitted its own request to the arbitrator for
attorney fees and costs, which recognizes the arbitrator had
authority to make such an award. Additionally, the cases
Advisors cites do not support its position. Cooper v. Lavely &
Singer Profession Corp. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1, at pages 15 to
16, and Severtson v. Williams Construction Co. (1985)
173 Cal.App.3d 86, at pages 95 to 96 hold that an arbitrator lacks
jurisdiction to revise a final award to include attorney fees where
he or she declined to award fees in the first instance. Here, the
arbitrator did not revise her final award after it was issued. The
final award included an award of attorney fees and costs.
After examining Advisors’s remaining contentions—that
the arbitrator (2) improperly awarded fees incurred in the other
proceedings, (3) awarded fees that were not statutorily
authorized by section 998 or the Labor Code, and (4) issued an
award inconsistent with the terms of the settlement—we
conclude that these are all purported errors of law or fact that are

21
unreviewable under Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 11.
Although Advisors attempts to recast its arguments as challenges
to the arbitrator’s authority, we are unpersuaded that they
constitute more than unreviewable assertions of error. We have
determined that under the express terms of the parties’
arbitration provision the arbitrator had the authority to conduct
postsettlement proceedings. Whether she made factual or legal
errors in such proceedings is not a subject for our review under
Moncharsh. “Having submitted the fees issue to arbitration,
plaintiffs cannot maintain the arbitrators exceeded their
powers . . . by deciding it, even if they decided it incorrectly.”
(Moore v. First Bank of San Luis Obispo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 782,
787.) “[A]rbitrators do not ‘exceed[ ] their powers’ . . . merely by
rendering an erroneous decision on a legal or factual issue, so
long as the issue was within the scope of the controversy
submitted to the arbitrators.” (Moshonov v. Walsh (2000)
22 Cal.4th 771, 775.)

c. The arbitration award was not procured by
undue means
Advisors also contends the arbitration award was procured
by “undue means” pursuant to section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1),
because (1) JAMS denied consolidation “based on inapplicable
standards,” (2) the arbitrator chose not to conduct a hearing on
attorney fees and costs, and (3) the arbitrator purportedly based
her final award on arguments that Advisors did not have an
opportunity to address. These circumstances, whether
considered separately or together, do not demonstrate the award
was procured by undue means.

22
First, Advisors asserts its “primary concern” with the
denial of its request to consolidate is that JAMS allowed
Plaintiffs a third opportunity to seek the same attorney fees and
costs that had previously been denied in the Fishman and Lee
arbitrations, and it increased the costs to Advisors. Advisors
additionally argues JAMS erred when it denied the request for
consolidation because a JAMS attorney, not the arbitrator,
decided the issue; Lee and Joe confirmed they were not
employees when they agreed to dismiss their misclassification
claims with prejudice, thus they were not entitled to attorney fees
as employees under the Labor Code; and consolidation was
permitted under the JAMS Employment Rules. Even if we
accepted Advisors’s multiple arguments of error, Advisors fails to
demonstrate a causal nexus between JAMS’s denial of its
consolidation request and an unfair arbitration award in Joe’s
favor. (See Maaso, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 374 [“‘[T]he
moving party needs to demonstrate a nexus between the award
and the alleged undue means used to attain it.’”].)
In Maaso, for example, the court concluded an ex parte
letter on a material issue “caused the award to issue in favor of”
one party. (Maaso, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 375.) Advisors
makes no similar showing. Advisors does not, for example,
contend the arbitrator was unfairly influenced by JAMS’s
decision not to consolidate or that denying consolidation
otherwise led to the arbitrator issuing an improper award.
Advisors instead primarily argues that the failure to consolidate
increased their arbitration expenses and allowed Plaintiffs three
separate opportunities to seek attorney fees and costs. Advisors
cites no case authority supporting vacating an arbitration award
where a purported employer is subject to increased expenses and

23
where three separate arbitrators decided the fees and costs issue
in three separate arbitrations for three separate claimants.5
Further, such consequences resulting from JAMS’s denial of
Advisors’s request to consolidate do not amount to undue means.
Indeed, the cost of arbitration did not appear to be out of
proportion to a case in which the Plaintiffs each sought $100,000
in damages and Advisors’s counterclaims against Plaintiffs were
estimated to be $676,387.
Nor do Advisors establish that the lack of a hearing on the
attorney fees and costs issue means the arbitrator’s award was
the result of undue means. According to Advisors, a “hearing is
especially important for the party opposing a motion where the
moving party includes new points or evidence in his or her reply,
as was the case here, where Joe requested additional fees in his
reply and the arbitrator granted it without affording the Advisors
Parties an opportunity respond.” The record establishes Advisors
did not request oral argument and waived this issue. (See JAMS
Comprehensive Rule 23 [“The parties may agree to waive the oral
Hearing and submit the dispute to the Arbitrator for an Award
based on written submissions and other evidence as the Parties
may agree.”]; see also JAMS Rule 22 [“The Arbitrator will
ordinarily conduct the Arbitration Hearing in the manner set

5 Advisors seems to suggest that if the Joe and Lee matters
had been consolidated, the result would have mirrored Lee’s and
Fishman’s award, that is, neither side recovered its attorney fees.
There is no indication, however, that the arbitrator for the
consolidated action would have been Lee’s arbitrator or would
have decided the issue similarly. As a result, Advisors has failed
to demonstrate prejudice arising from the failure to consolidate.

24
forth in these Rules. The Arbitrator may vary these procedures if
it is determined to be reasonable and appropriate to do so.”].)
On May 12, 2023, Advisors’s counsel acknowledged, “It is
true that I did not request a hearing on or opportunity to brief
the reasonableness of the 15 hours [the additional fees sought by
Joe in his reply].” Advisors also waived its challenge to the lack
of a hearing in general. This is because Advisors’s counsel stated
that the arbitrator determined “any motions for fees would be
decided solely on the papers, i.e., without a hearing.” He then
stated his “clients don’t want to pay even [ ] more fees for an
unauthorized hearing on issues over which the Arbitrator has no
jurisdiction” and thus he requested the parties “split” the fees for
deciding these motions.
In all events, “the arbitrator’s obligation ‘to hear evidence’
does not mean that the evidence must be orally presented or that
live testimony is required. . . . An arbitrator ‘hears’ evidence by
providing a ‘legal hearing,’ that is, by affording an ‘opportunity
to . . . present one’s side of a case.’ . . . An arbitrator also ‘hears’ a
matter by ‘consider[ing] a motion upon presentation thereof by
counsel.’” (Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1995)
40 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1105.)
Finally, the record belies Advisors’s assertion it was denied
the opportunity to respond to three points purportedly raised by
the arbitrator for the first time in her final award: “(1) Joe was
the prevailing party for both costs and attorneys’ fees purposes
because he obtained a ‘net monetary recovery’ pursuant to the
settlement; and (2) even though Joe was not entitled to attorneys’
fees under Labor Code sections 226, 1194, and 1198.5 because Joe
was not an Advisors employee, he was entitled to attorneys’ fees
under [Labor Code] Section 218.5 because he alleged he was an

25
employee; and (3) Joe was entitled to 100% of what he requested,
without making any allocation between his claims under
Section 218.5 and his claims under Labor Code sections 226,
1194, and 1198.5 because Joe’s claims under the Labor Code were
all ‘inextricably intertwined.’”
In Joe’s motion for attorney fees and costs, he argued, “Joe
is the prevailing party because he obtained ‘a net monetary
recovery.’” While Joe made the net monetary recovery argument
in connection with his contention that he was entitled to costs, he
later linked the basis for costs and attorney fees by arguing that
“attorneys’ fees are recoverable by the prevailing party as ‘costs’
if authorized by statute.” Joe also argued he was entitled to
attorney fees under Labor Code section 218.5. Lastly, Joe
argued, “It would be improper to apportion fees by causes of
action because the issues are inextricably intertwined.” Contrary
to Advisors’s assertion, these issues were raised by Joe in his
motion and Advisors had the opportunity to respond to all these
arguments in their opposition.

d. The arbitrator decided all material issues
Lastly, Advisors argues the arbitrator failed to decide
whether Advisors’s principals, Morris and Plotkowski, were
entitled to attorney fees. Contrary to Advisors’s contention, the
final award stated, “only Claimant [Joe] is a prevailing party.
Respondents are not prevailing parties.” The final award also
specified that “[a]ll claims not expressly granted herein are

26
hereby denied.” Given this language in the final award, this
argument lacks merit.6

B. The Superior Court Properly Denied Joe’s Motion for
Postarbitration Attorney Fees
Joe appeals from the superior court’s postjudgment order
denying his motion for attorney fees. Joe contends he is the
prevailing party on Advisors’s motion to vacate the arbitration
award, and thus he is entitled to a mandatory award of costs
under section 1293.2, including statutory attorney fees under
Labor Code section 218.5. “Generally, a trial court’s
determination that a litigant is a prevailing party, along with its
award of fees and costs, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
(Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332.) But our
review is de novo when the prevailing party determination is
based on undisputed facts. (See Khan v. Shim (2016)
7 Cal.App.5th 49, 55; Burkhalter Kessler Clement & George LLP
v. Hamilton (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 38, 43-44.)

6 Joe has requested this court impose sanctions because
Advisors filed a frivolous appeal. While we do not find merit in
Advisors’s arguments in its appeal, they are not so frivolous as to
warrant the imposition of sanctions. “‘[A]n appeal should be held
to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper
motive—to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an
adverse judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when
any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally
and completely without merit.’” (Citizens for Amending
Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1159,
1194-1195 [denying motion for sanctions on appeal where issues
were “arguable”], quoting In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982)
31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) Joe’s request for sanctions is denied.

27
Section 1293.2 provides, “[t]he court shall award costs upon
any judicial proceeding under this title [governing arbitration] as
provided in Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 1021) . . . of this
code.” Section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A), provides that items
recoverable as costs include attorney fees when authorized by
contract, statute, or law. “The award of costs pursuant to
section 1293.2, including attorney fees when authorized by
contract, is mandatory.” (Marcus & Millichap Real Estate
Investment Brokerage Co. v. Woodman Investment Group (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 508, 513 (Marcus & Millichap); accord, Cohen v.
TNP 2008 Participating Notes Program, LLC (2019)
31 Cal.App.5th 840, 877-878 (Cohen); see Corona, supra,
107 Cal.App.4th at p. 707 [“[a] court must award costs in a
judicial proceeding to confirm, correct or vacate an arbitration
award”]; Carole Ring & Associates v. Nicastro (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 253, 260 (Carole Ring) [“the superior court was
required to award [the prevailing party] reasonable attorney fees
and costs for postarbitration judicial proceedings, pursuant to the
statutory scheme governing arbitration”].)
Joe does not argue he is entitled to attorney fees based on
the parties’ contract. Instead, he contends the plain language of
sections 1293.2 and 1033.5 entitle him to postarbitration attorney
fees because attorney fees are authorized by statute pursuant to
Labor Code section 218.5. Joe relies on the arbitrator’s
determination that he was entitled to attorney fees under Labor
Code section 218.5.
Advisors, on the other hand, relies on Ling, supra,
245 Cal.App.4th at page 1263, which rejected the argument that
statutory attorney fees under Labor Code section 218.5 could
extend past a substantive Labor Code claim to include a petition

28
to vacate the claim in superior court. In Ling, the plaintiff sued
her former employer for unpaid overtime wages, waiting time
penalties, and failure to provide meal and rest periods. The
matter was sent to arbitration, and the arbitrator found the
employer was the prevailing party in all but a “minor” issue
relating to missed meal periods during the plaintiff’s training.
(Ling, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1248.) The arbitrator
awarded the employer attorney fees as the prevailing party and
denied the plaintiff’s attorney fees motion. (Ibid.)
The plaintiff moved to vacate the arbitration award. The
superior court granted the plaintiff’s motion in part, concluding
she was entitled to attorney fees incurred in the arbitration
because she prevailed on the missed meal periods issue. It
remanded the matter to the arbitrator to determine the amount
of fees. While the matter was pending in arbitration, the
California Supreme Court held that attorney fees were not
recoverable for missed meal period claims under the applicable
Labor Code provision. (See Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc.
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1245.) Relying on Kirby, the arbitrator
again denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney fees, and the
plaintiff moved to vacate the arbitrator’s decision in superior
court. The court denied the motion to vacate. The plaintiff then
moved for attorney fees incurred in the first and second motions
to vacate. The court granted the motion in part, awarding
attorney fees related to the first petition (in which the plaintiff
prevailed) but denying fees related to the second petition. (Id. at
p. 1251.) The employer appealed from that order.
As here, the Ling plaintiff argued she was entitled to
attorney fees as a matter of law under Labor Code section 218.5
because she had prevailed on her Labor Code meal periods claim.

29
(Ling, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1263.) The court of appeal
rejected that argument, reasoning, “the arbitration agreement
does not provide a basis for the court’s fee award. It provides
that each party pay its own attorney fees ‘subject to any remedies
to which that party may later be entitled under applicable law.’
Code of Civil Procedure section 1293.2 provides that the
prevailing party on a motion to confirm, correct, or vacate an
arbitration petition is entitled to a mandatory award of costs, but
no applicable law provides for an award of attorney fees. Plaintiff
argues she is entitled to attorney fees under [Labor Code]
section 218.5, but she cites no authority supporting the notion
that a statutory attorney fees provision applying to a substantive
claim extends to a petition to vacate an arbitration award
resolving that claim, and we know of none.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, in Villinger/Nicholls Development Co. v. Meleyco
(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 321, 327-328 (Villinger), the court held a
statute authorizing attorney fees did not extend to a proceeding
to confirm an arbitration award. There, a dispute over a
remodeling contract was sent to arbitration. The arbitrator
found in favor of the contractors. (Id. at p. 325.) The contractors
moved to confirm the award and requested costs, “‘including
reasonable attorney’s fees, necessarily incurred in connection
with this petition.’” (Id. at p. 326.) While the remodeling
contract did not contain an attorney fees provision, the
contractors relied on former Civil Code section 3176, which
provided in pertinent part, “‘In any action against an owner or
construction lender to enforce payment of a claim stated in a
bonded stop notice, the prevailing party shall be entitled to
collect from the party held liable by the court for payment of the

30
claim, reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs and in
addition to any liability for damages.’” (Ibid.)
Villinger observed, “Judicial remedies are divided into two
classes: actions and special proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 21.)
‘Hearings to confirm an arbitration award are “special
proceedings” as contrasted with “actions.” ([Code Civ. Proc.,]
§§ 22 and 23.)’” (Villinger, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 327, fn.
omitted; see Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County
of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 784 [discussing the
difference between actions and special proceedings].) Villinger
concluded a petition to confirm an arbitration award was not an
“action” within the meaning of former Civil Code section 3176. It
reasoned, “Absent evidence of the Legislature’s intent to award
attorney fees to the prevailing party in an arbitration or special
proceeding to confirm the arbitration award arising from the
same claim as stated in a bonded stop notice, we decline to
interpret ‘action’ as used in [former] Civil Code section 3176
broadly to include special proceedings.” (Villinger, at p. 329.)
Here, it is undisputed the parties’ contract does not contain
an attorney fees provision. Accordingly, to obtain attorney fees
relating to the vacatur proceedings under section 1293.2, Joe
must rely on a “statute or law” authorizing such fees. Joe asserts
Labor Code section 218.5 provides the necessary statutory
authority. Ling holds otherwise, and Villinger supports Ling’s
holding. Joe does not cite any authority contrary to Ling or
Villinger.
Further, although the arbitrator determined Joe was
entitled to attorney fees under Labor Code section 218.5 as to his
substantive claims, we are not bound by the arbitrator’s decision
in judicial proceedings determining whether Joe is entitled to

31
fees. Like former Civil Code section 3176, which authorizes
attorney fees for an “action,” Labor Code section 218.5 also
authorizes attorney fees “[i]n any action brought for the
nonpayment of wages, fringe benefits, or health and welfare or
pension fund contributions.” Under Ling and Villinger, Labor
Code section 218.5 does not extend to a special proceeding to
vacate an arbitration award.
We are not persuaded by the cases cited by Joe to argue the
superior court was required to award reasonable attorney fees
and costs to the prevailing party in a postarbitration proceeding
under section 1293.2. (See Cohen, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 878-879; Marcus & Millichap, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at
p. 513; Carole Ring, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 260.) Each of
those cases was based on a contractual attorney fees provision,
which is not present here. Nor are we persuaded to depart from
settled case law to fulfill the public policy objectives Joe contends
are thwarted by Ling.

DISPOSITION

The judgment and postjudgment orders are both affirmed.
The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J. STONE, J.

32

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