CourtListener 10774954•People v. Lara CA4/3
Texto completo
Filed 1/15/26 P. v. Lara CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064109
v. (Super. Ct. No. 94CF3382)
JESUS ISRAEL LARA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
In 1996, a jury convicted Jesus Israel Lara of, among other
things, the murder of Juan Granados and attempted murder of Enrique
1
Granados. In October 2022, Lara filed a petition for resentencing under
2
Penal Code section 1172.6. Following an evidentiary hearing based on the
transcript of the original trial, the trial court denied Lara’s petition. On
appeal, Lara argues the court should have excluded testimony from an officer
recounting a statement made by Enrique while in an emergency room after
being shot. We disagree. Thus, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
THE INFORMATION
In a 1995 information, Lara was charged with five counts.
Count 1 alleged the murder of Juan (§ 187, subd, (a)); counts 2 and 3 alleged
second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (b), 213, subd. (a)(2)); count 4
alleged the attempted murder of Enrique (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)); and count 5
alleged street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The information also alleged a
felony-murder special circumstance for the murder of Juan under
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(i). The information further alleged Lara
committed the crimes alleged in counts 1 to 4 for the benefit of a criminal
street gang, he inflicted great bodily injury upon Enrique during the
1
Because Juan and Enrique Granados share the same last name,
we refer to them by their first names for clarity.
2
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Lara’s petition cited former section 1172.95, but “[e]ffective June 30,
2022, . . . section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in
text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)” (People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
444, 446, fn. 1.) In this opinion, we generally refer to the current Penal Code
section.
2
attempted murder, and he personally used a firearm during all the alleged
crimes. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b), 12022.7, 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5,
subd. (a).)
II.
THE TRIAL AND PRIOR APPEAL
Following a mistrial, the case proceeded to a jury trial in
September 1996, at which numerous witnesses testified. Among them was
police officer Daniel Beaumarchais, who first responded to the scene.
Beaumarchais testified he responded to a call of shots fired early in the
morning on January 23, 1994. He saw a truck in the alley and two
individuals, Juan and Enrique, lying face up on the ground. Enrique had a
gunshot wound to the stomach and Juan had three gunshot wounds; both
men appeared to be conscious. Paramedics transported them to two different
hospitals.3 Five bullet casings were found at the scene that appeared to be
the same ammunition.
J.S. testified he, Juan, and Enrique had been driving to where
Enrique lived. But their truck ran out of gas in the alley and, after pouring
some gas into the tank, J.S. and Enrique pushed the truck, with Juan in the
driver’s seat. While J.S. was still outside of the truck, a man came up to him,
put a gun to his head, demanded his money, and took money from his wallet.
The man then took Enrique’s wallet. Juan got out of the truck and told the
man he already had the money and not to shoot, but he nevertheless started
shooting. J.S. said Juan was hit by the gunfire, and when Enrique ran to
Juan, he was also hit. J.S. noticed another man at the entrance to the alley,
3
Juan subsequently bled to death as a result of the gunshot
wound to his abdomen.
3
who then ran away with the shooter. J.S. could not see either of the two men
well, but he said the nonshooter’s build was similar to defendant Lara’s,
whereas the gunman “was a little bit thinner.”
Tony Avila is another police officer who responded to the alley
that morning. He testified that, by the time he arrived, the paramedics were
beginning to load the victims into an ambulance to transport them to the
hospital. Avila speaks fluent Spanish and was dispatched to the scene
because there was a need for a Spanish speaking officer. Avila spoke to J.S.
at the scene and then went to the hospital to speak with Enrique. Avila said
he spoke to Enrique “maybe an hour, hour and 15 minutes after arriving at
the scene,” while Enrique was lying on a gurney in the emergency room and
blood was still visible in his stomach area. Avila said Enrique was “alert,
conscious[,] and able to answer [his] questions,” although he was “sure
[Enrique] had some pain.”
Avila testified he asked Enrique what had happened, and
Enrique told him the following.4 Enrique said there were two individuals, one
who approached the truck with a gun and another who was approximately
100 feet away. The individual that came to the truck had a silver semi-
automatic gun, put the gun to J.S.’s back, and robbed him. Then the gunman
pointed the gun at Enrique and demanded Enrique’s wallet, and Enrique
surrendered it. Juan exited the truck and walked toward them, and the
gunman fired at Juan. The gunman then began to run away, but the person
4
Enrique did not testify at trial; he apparently died prior to trial
in an unrelated accident. Lara objected to the testimony regarding what
Enrique had told Avila, and the prosecution argued it should be admitted
under Evidence Code section 1240 (which provides an exception to the
hearsay rule for spontaneous statements). The trial court overruled Lara’s
objection.
4
at the entrance to the alley said “‘[s]hoot him or they’ll know us,’” and the
gunman then turned and fired the shot that hit Enrique. Enrique could not
5
provide a description of the person at the entrance of the alley.
Additionally, there was testimony and videos played to the jury
regarding Lara’s interaction with a confidential informant during an
undercover drug operation that occurred in the days after the shooting on
January 24 and January 26, 1994. Lara told the informant, among other
things, “I killed a guy,” and that he had shot two people when he tried to rob
them and one of the guys had pulled out a gun. Additionally, Lara gestured to
the alley where the shooting occurred and told the confidential informant
that is where he “killed the guy.”
The jury convicted Lara on all counts. It also found true the gang
allegations and the special circumstance of murder while engaged in the
commission of a robbery. The jury, however, found not true the allegations
Lara personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury.
The court sentenced Lara to life without the possibility of parole for special
circumstances murder, and it stayed the sentence on the other counts and
enhancements.
Lara appealed, and a panel of this court affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Lara (May 22, 1998, G020937) [nonpub. opn.].) Among other
things, the court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting Enrique’s statement to Avila at the hospital under Evidence Code
section 1240. (People v. Lara, supra, G020937.)
5
Avila documented Enrique’s statements in a report he later
prepared at the police station.
5
III.
THE PETITION UNDER SECTION 1172.6
In October 2022, Lara filed a petition for resentencing. The
prosecution and Lara each filed briefs addressing whether Lara had made a
prima facie showing for relief. In March 2023, the trial court found Lara had
made a prima facie showing and issued an order to show cause.
In April 2024, Lara filed a brief in advance of the evidentiary
6
hearing. He argued, among other things, Enrique’s statement to Avila in the
emergency room should have been excluded because it violated the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and, additionally, it did not qualify as a spontaneous statement
under Evidence Code section 1240. The prosecution filed its own pre-hearing
brief, as well as a reply to Lara’s brief. It disputed Lara’s argument that
Enrique’s emergency room statement to Avila should have been excluded.
In May 2024, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing, at
which the prosecution conceded Lara was not the shooter. The court received
into evidence Lara’s exhibits and the prosecution’s exhibits (which included
the reporter’s transcript and a portion of the clerk’s transcript from Lara’s
direct appeal). The court found the admission of Enrique’s emergency room
statement to Avila did not violate the Confrontation Clause because “the
officers needed to get more information to meet an ongoing emergency” and
the statement was admissible under Evidence Code section 1240. The court
also found Lara was in the alley given the amount of information he had
about the shooting, even though some of his statements to the confidential
6
Lara submitted as exhibits Avila’s report and transcripts from
police interviews with Enrique that took place on January 24 and
January 26, 1994.
6
informant were not accurate. The court explained Enrique’s statement
establishes Lara possessed the requisite intent to be convicted of murder and
attempted murder under current law. The court further noted “it would be on
the theory of being an aider and abett[or] who acted with intent to kill, and
also as being a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference.” The court denied Lara’s petition for resentencing.
Lara appeals from the denial of his petition.
DISCUSSION
I.
SECTION 1172.6
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill
No. 1437 . . . . The Legislature amended sections 188 and 189, which
substantially narrowed the liability of accomplices to murder: ‘It is a bedrock
principle of the law and of equity that a person should be punished for his or
her actions according to his or her own level of individual culpability.’”
(People v. Ramos (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 174, 183 (Ramos).) “‘With this
purpose in mind, [the Legislature] “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”’”
(Ibid.) “The Legislature also added former section 1170.95, which created a
process for those convicted of murder under now obsolete accomplice liability
theories to seek vacatur and resentencing. Effective January 1, 2022, the
Legislature revised former section 1170.95 through the passage of Senate Bill
No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) . . . . Petitioners who were convicted of
7
attempted murder and manslaughter under now obsolete theories may also
seek relief.” (Ibid.)
As our Supreme Court has explained, “the path to resentencing
under section 1172.6 involves three stages. It begins with a facially valid
petition that entitles petitioner to counsel, continues with asking whether
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, and, if so, proceeds to an
evidentiary hearing on the ultimate question of whether petitioner should be
resentenced.” (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 562.)
At the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).) Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) further provides: “The
admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code,
except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness
testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The court may
also consider the procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate
opinion. However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary
hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 872 shall be excluded from the
hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another
exception to the hearsay rule. The prosecutor and the petitioner may also
offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens. A finding
that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the
prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any
8
allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated
and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.)
Generally, we review a trial court’s “‘“‘“factual findings for
substantial evidence and the application of those facts to the statute de
novo”’”’” in determining whether the court erred in denying a section 1172.6
petition after an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 451, 457.) “Issues of statutory interpretation are pure questions
of law that we review de novo.” (Ramos, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 182.)
Additionally, “we independently review whether a statement was testimonial
so as to implicate the constitutional right of confrontation.” (People v. Nelson
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1466 (Nelson).)
II.
LARA’S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL
A. Enrique’s Emergency Room Statement
On appeal, Lara argues the trial court erred in admitting Avila’s
testimony regarding Enrique’s statement in the emergency room because
(1) it was not a spontaneous statement under Evidence Code section 1240,
and (2) its admission violated the Confrontation Clause. We reject both
arguments.
1. Spontaneous Statement Exception to Hearsay Rule
“Hearsay evidence is generally ‘understood as an out-of-court
statement offered for the truth of its content.’ [Citation.] Hearsay evidence is
normally excluded under the hearsay rule. [Citation.] However, there are
numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule within the Evidence Code, and there
are other hearsay exceptions located outside of the Evidence Code.” (Ramos,
9
supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 188.) Evidence Code section 1240 provides one
such exception for spontaneous statements.
Lara argues Enrique’s statement in the emergency room is not
admissible under Evidence Code section 1240. According to Lara, Enrique’s
statement was made “in response to police questioning” and not
spontaneously, and “although the statements by Enrique pertained to the
shooting that had previously occurred, it is clear that they came several
hours after the shooting and only after Enrique had both the time and
opportunity to reflect upon the incident.” (Underscoring omitted.) As noted
above, a panel of this court determined on Lara’s direct appeal the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting Enrique’s statement under Evidence
Code section 1240. (People v. Lara, supra, G020937.)
Lara’s argument on this appeal fails because he has not asserted
(much less shown) that the law regarding the spontaneous statement
exception to the hearsay rule has changed since this issue was decided during
his trial and on direct appeal.7 “Under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3),
evidence from ‘any prior hearing or trial’ may be admitted at the evidentiary
7
Lara appears to assert the prosecution failed to argue at the
evidentiary hearing that Lara could not relitigate the admissibility of
Enrique’s statement under Evidence Code section 1240. Our review of the
briefing, however, shows the prosecution did sufficiently raise this issue in
the trial court. In its reply to Lara’s brief, the prosecution included a section
arguing “the issue of spontaneity was decided by the Court of Appeal, and no
authority has been cited that gives this court authority to disregard that
ruling.” (Boldface and some capitalizations omitted.) In that same section, the
prosecution “acknowledge[d] that had there been a change in the law between
the court’s exercise of its direction in 1996 and the present day in 2024, this
[c]ourt would be charged with determining if the evidence would be
admissible under the current law,” but it asserted Lara “provides no
authority for the proposition that the law of spontaneity has changed.”
10
hearing, with a restriction that the evidence must also be ‘admissible under
current law.’” (Ramos, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 184, italics omitted.)
“That is, there may be some evidence that was admitted at a prior hearing or
trial that would not be admissible under current law due to intervening
changes in the law. (See, e.g., People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665,
686 . . . [under current law, a gang expert cannot relate case-specific hearsay
to support the expert’s opinion].)” (Ibid.) Thus, although there may be
instances where testimony previously admitted would no longer be
admissible because of an intervening change in law, Lara has not shown
there was any intervening change in the law regarding Evidence Code section
1240. Lara cannot relitigate whether the court at his trial and the prior panel
of this court on the direct appeal erred in concluding Enrique’s statement was
admissible under Evidence Code section 1240.
2. Confrontation Clause
Lara argues the admission of Enrique’s statement in the
emergency room violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution,8 which provides that, “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . . . .” Unlike his argument regarding spontaneous
statements, Lara does point to an intervening change in law regarding the
confrontation clause—specifically, Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S.
36, which was decided after Lara’s trial and direct appeal.
“The Crawford court ‘“dramatically departed’” from confrontation
clause precedent, which had generally permitted statements of unavailable
8
Lara also refers to the California Constitution but includes no
separate analysis of its provisions or their application here.
11
witnesses to be admitted at trial so long as these statements were reliable
enough.” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1195.) Instead, “Crawford
held the confrontation clause ‘prohibits “admission of testimonial statements
of . . . witness[es] who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.”’” (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1288 (Chism).)
In Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, the United States
Supreme Court elaborated on what constitutes a testimonial statement:
“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate
that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.” (Id. at p. 822.) As the California Supreme Court has
noted, the United States Supreme Court “has emphasized that ‘“not all those
questioned by the police are witnesses” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment
and not all “‘interrogations by law enforcement officers’ [citation], are subject
to the Confrontation Clause.”’” (Chism, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1288–1289.)
“Although the court in Crawford ‘did not offer an exhaustive
definition of “testimonial” statements,’ the court has since clarified that ‘a
statement cannot fall within the Confrontation Clause unless its primary
purpose was testimonial’ [citation]—that is to say, unless the statements are
given in the course of an interrogation or other conversation whose ‘“primary
purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution[.]”’” (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1214,
citing Ohio v. Clark (2015) 576 U.S. 237.) The California Supreme Court has
12
“identified six factors to consider in determining whether statements made in
the course of police questioning were for the ‘“primary purpose of creating an
out-of-court substitute for trial testimony” that implicates the confrontation
clause.’” (Chism, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1289.) “These are (1) an objective
evaluation of the circumstances of the encounter and the statements and
actions of the individuals involved in the encounter; (2) whether the
statements were made during an ongoing emergency or under circumstances
that reasonably appeared to present an emergency, or were obtained for
purposes other than for use by the prosecution at trial; (3) whether any
actual or perceived emergency presented an ongoing threat to first
responders or the public; (4) the declarant’s medical condition; (5) whether
the focus of the interrogation had shifted from addressing an ongoing
emergency to obtaining evidence for trial; and (6) the informality of the
statement and the circumstances under which it was obtained.” (Ibid.)
Even assuming Lara can raise his Confrontation Clause
challenge in the context of a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing,9 we conclude
the trial court did not err by admitting Enrique’s emergency room statement
because it was nontestimonial and did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
When Enrique made the statement, he was lying on a gurney in the
emergency room with a gunshot wound to his stomach and blood still in his
stomach area. Although Enrique was no longer in immediate danger from the
shooter when he made the statement, the circumstances reasonably appeared
9
The Attorney General argues Lara cannot raise his
Confrontation Clause argument because the Sixth Amendment does not
apply to a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. We need not decide that issue
given our conclusion that Lara’s Confrontation Clause argument is
unavailing.
13
to be an ongoing emergency: two people had recently been shot in an alley in
the course of a robbery and the assailants apparently were still unidentified
10
and at large. On these facts, there was still a possibility the unidentified
assailants would attempt other armed robberies, would kill (or attempt to
kill) other potential victims to avoid being identified, and thus “could pose an
immediate threat to other persons.” (See Nelson, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1467 [“Although [declarant] was no longer in immediate danger from the
shooter, there was still a possibility that the unidentified shooter could pose
an immediate threat to other persons”].) Thus, we conclude Enrique’s
emergency room statement was nontestimonial and the circumstances here
objectively indicate the primary purpose of Avila’s questioning was to meet
an ongoing emergency. We recognize approximately an hour and fifteen
minutes had elapsed since the shooting when Enrique spoke to Avila in the
emergency room, but that fact alone does not transform Enrique’s statement
into a testimonial statement under these circumstances.
Lara argues the circumstances of People v. Cage (2007) 40
Cal.4th 965 (Cage) are analogous to those here. In that case, a deputy sheriff
was “dispatched to a residence on a report of a family fight,” and the deputy
found the defendant mother picking up broken glass with two small cuts on
her hand. (Id. at p. 971.) About an hour later, the deputy found the
defendant’s son sitting on a curb about a mile or two away with a large cut on
the side of his face. (Ibid.) The son was taken to a hospital by ambulance, and
10
Lara does not argue that he or the shooter had been identified
and arrested by the time Enrique made his emergency room statement. Nor
would the record support such an argument. The record shows Lara had not
yet been arrested when Enrique spoke to Avila, because Lara’s incriminating
statements to the confidential informant were not made until several days
later.
14
the deputy “went to the hospital ‘at a later point.’” (Ibid.) While the son was
still in the emergency room, the deputy asked what had happened between
the son and his mother, and the son said he and his mother had gotten into
an argument, she began pushing him, he fell over a coffee table and the glass
broke, and his mother cut him with a piece of glass while his grandmother
held him. (Id. at pp. 971–972.) The son did not testify at his mother’s trial, at
which she was convicted of aggravated assault. (Id. at pp. 970, 973.)
The California Supreme Court held the son’s statement to the
deputy at the hospital was testimonial. (Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 984–
986.) The Court noted, “by the time [the deputy] spoke with [the son] in the
hospital, the incident that caused [the son’s] injury had been over for more
than an hour,” and “[t]he alleged assailant and the alleged victim were
geographically separated, [the son] had left the scene of the injury, and he
thereafter had been taken to a remote location to receive medical treatment.”
(Id. at p. 985.) The Court explained the deputy’s “clear purpose in coming to
speak with [the son] at this juncture was not to deal with a present
emergency, but to obtain a fresh account of past events involving defendant as
part of an inquiry into possible criminal activity. Indeed, the form of [the
deputy’s question assumed that [the mother] might be the perpetrator of [the
son’s] injury.” (Ibid.)11
Although Cage also involved a victim’s statement to an officer in
an emergency room, the circumstances here are distinguishable. Notably, the
deputy in Cage already had identified the mother as the suspect and had
spoken with her. (Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 971, 985; see also Nelson,
11
The California Supreme Court also concluded the victim’s
statement to a physician treating him at the hospital was not testimonial.
(Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 970–971, 986.)
15
supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467 [distinguishing Cage as “involving a
domestic disturbance . . . , where the assailant was identified and the
geographic separation of the victim and the assailant would suggest the
immediate threat to both the victim and the public was over”].) Unlike the
circumstances of Cage, the identities and locations of the assailants here
were unknown at the time of Enrique’s statement, and there was no
indication the assailants knew either of the two individuals that had been
shot.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Lara argues that, if Enrique’s statement is excluded, the
remaining evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment against him.
Given our conclusion that the trial court did not err by admitting Enrique’s
statement, we need not reach that issue.
Additionally, Lara has not disputed on appeal the sufficiency of
the evidence of his intent to kill if Enrique’s emergency room statement is
admissible. But he appears to assert the evidence was insufficient to show he
was the accomplice in the alley. According to Lara, his incriminating
statements to the confidential informant “were false and likely made to
impress the informant or gain credibility within the gang,” and although they
“clearly fell within certain exception(s) to the rule against hearsay, they were
clearly unreliable and subject to exclusion under Evidence Code section 1391,
subdivision (a)(4).” We find this argument unavailing. Lara failed to assert a
developed argument on appeal that his incriminating statements to the
confidential informant should have been excluded, as the only authority he
cites for this argument is “Evidence Code section 1391, subdivision (a)(4),”
which does not exist. (See People v. Ramirez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 315,
329–330 [“to the extent that [defendant] may be arguing that [an officer] used
16
excessive force, this argument has been forfeited because [defendant] has not
cited any relevant legal authority to support this claim, nor has he developed
a cogent legal argument”].) Further, even assuming Lara may properly
dispute whether he actually was the accomplice in the alley at the section
12
1172.6 evidentiary hearing, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding. Lara’s incriminating statements were substantial evidence he was
the accomplice, even if some aspects of his statements may have been
embellished or inaccurate.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Lara’s petition is affirmed.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
MOORE, J.
12
The Attorney General argues it was improper for Lara to
contest the sufficiency of the evidence of his identity at the section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing. We need not address that issue given our conclusion.
17
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.