People v. Myrick CA4/1

CourtListener 10774953Calctapp15 de jan. de 2026

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 1/15/26 P. v. Myrick CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085127

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD298526)

ROBERT MYRICK,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Arlene A. Sevidal, Randal D. Einhorn, and Andrew Mestman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Robert Myrick appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of
two counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
(Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and one count of battery with serious bodily
injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) and found true an enhancement allegation for
personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The sole issue
he raises on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial
request for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. We find no error
and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because the only issue on appeal is the denial of Myrick’s pretrial
request for mental health diversion, we summarize the facts based on the
exhibits submitted by the parties on this issue. These exhibits consisted of
the preliminary hearing transcript, police reports, and the report of Dr. David
DeFrancesco.
A. Assault of Victim J.B.
On the evening of March 31, 2023, Myrick was with a group of several
other men on a street corner near Petco Park in downtown San Diego. J.B.
was walking nearby when he and Myrick got into a yelling match. Myrick
punched J.B. in the face several times. After the last punch, J.B.’s body went
stiff and he fell to the ground. J.B. hit the back of his head on the curb and
was knocked unconscious. He began bleeding from a three-inch laceration
to the back of his head. After police arrived, multiple witnesses identified
Myrick as the perpetrator. In a search incident to arrest, the police found a
glass pipe for smoking methamphetamine in his possession.
B. Assault of Victim R.S.
Later that same night, Myrick and inmate R.S. were both in the
booking area of the county jail. The booking clerk asked R.S. how many
times he had been arrested. After R.S. said it was his first time, Myrick

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
threw his shoulders back, clenched his fists, and said to R.S. in a threatening
manner, “What’s up?” According to R.S., Myrick had a “wild look in his eye.”
After they both completed the booking process, Myrick and R.S. were
placed in the same holding cell. R.S. sat down on a bench inside the cell.
Within 90 seconds, Myrick walked up to him and started punching him in the
face and head about 12 times. R.S. tried to cover his face and head with his
arms and did not fight back. R.S. suffered multiple fractures of the bones in
his head and face, including orbital and nasal fractures.
C. Pretrial Request for Mental Health Diversion
Myrick was charged with assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury for each of the two assaults (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); counts 1 &
3) and battery with serious bodily injury for the assault on J.B. (§ 243, subd.
(d); count 2.) As to count one, the information also alleged that Myrick
personally inflicted great bodily injury on J.B. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)
Before trial, Myrick filed a request for mental health diversion under
section 1001.36. In support, Myrick submitted a psychological evaluation
conducted by Dr. DeFrancesco.
According to Dr. DeFrancesco, Myrick qualified for mental health
diversion because: (1) he had qualifying mental disorders, specifically
unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder and
substance use disorders; (2) his mental disorders were significant factors
in the commission of the charged offenses; (3) his mental disorders would
respond to mental health treatment if he followed the recommendations of
his treatment team; and (4) he could be treated in the community without
engaging in acts of violence.
Dr. DeFrancesco’s report described Myrick’s background and
symptoms. Myrick was 30 years old. As a child, his mother was in and out

3
of prison mostly for drug-related offenses. He and his older brother were very
close and started to get into trouble together as juveniles. Myrick “went into
the juvenile justice system where he learned that he had to fight or he would
be victimized.” He also started using drugs. He used all sorts of drugs over
the years, continuing until the time of his arrest. He had trouble controlling
his usage, which increased during times of distress.
According to Dr. DeFrancesco’s report, Myrick was first arrested at
age 14 for carrying a weapon in Texas. His other juvenile offenses included
assault, obstruction, and robbery. He spent time in juvenile confinement

facilities.2 When Myrick was 18 years old, he was convicted of robbery in

Texas and sentenced to adult prison.3 He was released about eight years
later. After his brother was murdered, he started to have emotional
problems, began using drugs more regularly, and “started to fear people
whom he did not know.” “He got into trouble because he might carry a
weapon for self-protection and when he was threatened he would fight back.”
Dr. DeFrancesco explained that Myrick’s mental health symptoms
included hearing voices. Myrick had heard voices periodically over the years
but kept it from others because he did not want to go to the “crazy house.”
At the time of the psychological evaluation, he was still hearing voices “that
commented on him and his situation” and he was taking an antipsychotic
drug that was “partially effective.”

2 Dr. DeFrancesco’s report does not indicate which of Myrick’s juvenile
offenses resulted in an adjudication or commitment. The probation report
does not include any information about Myrick’s juvenile criminal history,
which apparently occurred in Texas.
3 Though not before the trial court at the time of its diversion ruling,
the probation report indicates that the Texas robbery conviction was for
aggravated robbery with use of a firearm.
4
Regarding the charged assault against J.B., Myrick told
Dr. DeFrancesco that “he was hanging out with some others and that there
was a lot of activity on the street. He recalled it being loud and there were a
lot of unfamiliar people. He admitted that he was on alert because he was
uncomfortable in the situation.” According to Myrick, however, “he never
assaulted anyone.”
Regarding the incident involving R.S., Myrick reported that R.S.
“appeared intoxicated and was making statements that he was sick and was
going to die.” According to Myrick, R.S. spit on him. Myrick “informed the
deputy yet he did nothing about it.” Myrick and R.S. “were placed together in
a holding cell.” Dr. DeFrancesco’s report did not indicate what Myrick said
happened after this.
Dr. DeFrancesco recommended placement in a residential substance
abuse treatment program with psychiatric medication, followed by continued
treatment in a sober home or on an outpatient basis with a combination of
support group meetings and individual therapy. Myrick also submitted a
letter from a substance abuse assessor, which stated that Myrick met the
medical criteria for residential treatment.
The People filed an opposition to Myrick’s request arguing he was
neither eligible nor suitable for mental health diversion. Among other
things, the People argued that Myrick posed an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety because he was likely to commit a “super strike” offense.
D. Hearing on Request for Mental Health Diversion
The court held a pretrial hearing on the request for mental health
diversion. At the hearing, the parties took opposing positions as to Myrick’s
eligibility and suitability for mental health diversion, including whether he

5
posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety or was likely to
commit a “super strike” offense.
The court denied the request for diversion. The court concluded
that Myrick was “eligible but not suitable for mental health diversion.”
Specifically, the court found that Myrick would pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety if treated in the community. The court based this
finding on Myrick’s criminal history, the violent nature of the charged
offenses, the injuries sustained by the victims, and Myrick’s symptomology,
including hallucinations and fear of others.
E. Trial and Sentencing
In a jury trial, Myrick was found guilty of all three charges and the
great bodily injury enhancement. The court sentenced him to five years in
state prison.
DISCUSSION
Myrick argues the trial court erred by denying his pretrial request for
mental health diversion. We disagree.
A. Applicable law and standard of review
Pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36 authorizes “the
postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point
in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until
adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health
treatment . . . .” (Id., subd. (f)(1).)
To qualify, the defendant must be both eligible and suitable for
diversion. A defendant is eligible for diversion if two criteria are met: (1) the
defendant has been diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder, and (2) the
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged
offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1), (2); Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98

6
Cal.App.5th 882, 891.) “If the defendant meets the two enumerated
eligibility requirements, ‘the court must consider whether the defendant
is suitable for pretrial diversion.’ (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)” (People v. Brown
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 120 (Brown).)
A defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if four criteria are met:
(1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s
symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating
the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) the
defendant consents to diversion and waives the right to a speedy trial; (3) the
defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and
(4) “[t]he defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, as defined in section 1170.18, if treated in the community.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-(4).)
As to the last of these suitability requirements, section 1170.18,
subdivision (c) defines an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” to
mean “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent
felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph
(2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.” Violent felonies that fall within this
meaning are “commonly referred to as super strikes.” (People v. Valencia
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351, fn. 3.) Included within this list is “[a]ny homicide
offense, including any attempted homicide offense.” (§ 667, subd.
(e)(2)(C)(iv).)
To find an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, “a trial
court necessarily must find the defendant is ‘likely to commit a super-strike
offense.’ ” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 450 (Moine).)
In another context, our Supreme Court has concluded that someone is
considered “likely” to commit an offense if “ ‘the person presents a substantial

7
danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk, that he or she will commit
such crimes if free in the community.’ ” (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th
979, 982 [construing Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1)].)
In determining whether the defendant poses an unreasonable risk of
committing a super-strike offense, the trial court may consider “the opinions
of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert”
as well as “the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and
criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that
the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
Even if a defendant satisfies the eligibility and suitability
requirements, the trial court may still exercise its discretion to deny mental
health diversion. (See People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080
[mental health diversion is ultimately discretionary, not mandatory, even
if all statutory requirements are met].)
On appeal, we review the court’s ultimate decision whether to grant
or deny a motion for mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. (Brown,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 121.) “The trial court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–
712, fns. omitted.) A court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong
legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings
that are not supported by substantial evidence. (Moine, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.)
B. Analysis
Myrick contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying mental
health diversion because its findings are not supported by substantial

8
evidence. Although Myrick raises several issues involving his eligibility for

mental health diversion, the trial court expressly found that he was eligible.4
Thus, the dispositive issue here is whether there is substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that Myrick was not suitable for mental
health diversion because he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety if treated in the community. Because we conclude there is substantial
evidence to support this finding, we affirm the judgment.
As we have explained, an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”
means “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit” a super-strike
offense (§ 1170.18, subd. (c)), which includes “[a]ny homicide” or “attempted
homicide offense.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).) Criminal homicide includes
either murder or manslaughter. (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935,
941.)
Taken together, Myrick’s criminal history, the nature of the charged
offenses, the injuries sustained by the victims, and Myrick’s mental health
symptoms support the trial court’s unreasonable risk finding. Myrick’s
juvenile offenses included carrying a weapon, assault, obstruction, and
robbery. As an adult, he served eight years in prison for robbery. The
charged assault offenses both involved violent and unprovoked attacks
targeting the head or face of unsuspecting victims and resulting in serious
injuries. Myrick’s assault on J.B. was forceful enough to knock him to the
ground and cause him to hit his head on the curb and lose consciousness.
If J.B. had died from the impact, these facts could have supported a

4 Specifically, Myrick argues he was not ineligible for diversion merely
because Dr. DeFrancesco believed further “clarification of his diagnostic
picture” was expected and one of Myrick’s test scores suggested possible
“malingering.” These issues are irrelevant to the basis for the trial court’s
ruling because it explicitly found Myrick had been diagnosed with a
qualifying mental disorder and was eligible for mental health diversion.
9
conviction for second degree, implied malice murder. (See People v. Cravens
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508–512 [upholding second degree murder conviction
where defendant punched victim in head causing him to fall and sustain fatal
injury hitting head on ground].) Myrick’s assault on R.S. involved about 12
punches to the head and face of an unresisting victim that were forceful
enough to cause multiple fractures of the bones, including orbital and nasal
fractures.
Myrick’s mental health symptoms included hearing voices that
“commented on him and his situation” and were not fully controlled with
antipsychotic medication. In the juvenile system, he had learned “he had
to fight or he would be victimized.” After his brother’s murder, Myrick
developed a “fear [of] people whom he did not know” and “got into trouble
because he might carry a weapon for self-protection and when he was
threatened he would fight back.” He admitted that at the time of the J.B.
assault, “there were a lot of unfamiliar people” around and “he was on alert
because he was uncomfortable in the situation.” For the other charged
assault, he accused R.S. of instigating the fight by spitting on him, even
though no other evidence supported this version of events.
When considered with Myrick’s criminal record, the level of force and
targeted body area in each of the charged assaults, and the severity of the
resulting injuries, these facts were sufficient for the trial court to conclude
there was an unreasonable risk that, if treated in the community, Myrick
would react to a perceived threat from a stranger with deadly force. Such a
killing could at least qualify as voluntary manslaughter, a super-strike
offense. (People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 674 [killing committed with
honest but unreasonable belief in need for self-defense is voluntary
manslaughter].)

10
Moreover, the statute also permitted the trial court to consider “the
opinions of the district attorney” in deciding whether Myrick posed an
unreasonable risk to public safety. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) The district
attorney expressed the opinion that he did pose such a risk.
We reject Myrick’s arguments to the contrary. First, Myrick contends
the trial court erred by referring to the violence of the charged assaults “as
though Myrick had already been convicted.” But the statute expressly
permits the court to consider “the current charged offense” in making this
determination. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Nothing in the statute “precludes a
trial court from relying primarily, or even entirely, on the circumstances of
the charged offense or offenses in denying a motion for diversion.” (People v.
Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 862.)
Second, Myrick contends “the court failed to take into account that [he]
had no previous criminal record and had never before committed a super
strike offense.” As we have discussed, however, he did have both a juvenile
and adult criminal record. Nor is it determinative that he has never actually
committed a super-strike offense before. (People v. Hall (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266.)
Finally, Myrick argues that his case is similar to Moine, supra, 62
Cal.App.5th 440, in which the court reversed an order denying mental health
diversion. We disagree. Moine is factually distinguishable because (1) the
charged offenses there involved only an ordinary fistfight and a verbal threat
(id. at pp. 444–445); (2) there is no indication Moine targeted the victim’s
head or face in the fistfight; (3) the victims of the charged offenses suffered no
serious or great bodily injury (ibid.); (4) Moine’s criminal record only included
misdemeanors and no prison time (id. at pp. 450–451); and (5) Moine had no

11
similar history of hearing voices, fearing strangers, carrying a weapon, or
getting into fights.
Moine is also distinguishable because the court there relied on the fact
that the defendant had been out of custody on bail for over two years before
the diversion hearing. (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447, 451.)
According to the Court of Appeal, this “indicate[d] the [trial] court necessarily
found that Moine was not likely to cause ‘great bodily harm to others’ if
released.” (Id. at p. 451.) The court explained: “It is logically inconsistent to
deny mental health diversion on the ground that Moine was likely to commit
a super strike offense, while simultaneously finding he was not likely to
inflict great bodily injury on persons in the community.” (Ibid.) The same is
not true here. Myrick was in custody at the time of the diversion hearing and
the trial court at the most recent bail review hearing had found “he seems to
be a danger to others.”
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that Myrick was not suitable for mental health diversion because he posed
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Myrick’s request for mental health diversion on this

ground.5

5 We also reject Myrick’s argument that the trial court “may have”
erroneously assumed he did not meet the criteria for residential care.
The trial court merely asked for and received clarification from defense
counsel on this point before making its ruling. Defense counsel then clarified
that Myrick “does meet the medical criteria for residential” treatment.
Immediately following this clarification, the court confirmed that “the plan
would be to set him up with an enhanced dual diagnosis mental health and
residential treatment program.” In its final ruling, the court did not question
the fact that Myrick met the criteria for such a program.
12
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

13

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.