People v. Young CA2/2

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Filed 1/14/26 P. v. Young CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B336400

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XSWA929027)
v.

JEROME WILLIAM YOUNG,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kelly M. Kelley, Judge. Affirmed with
instructions.
Jeffrey Manning-Cartwright, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Jerome William Young appeals the trial court’s
order resentencing him pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75
for convictions he suffered in 1990.
Young’s original sentence was 15 years plus 7 to life. He
has fully served the determinate term but remains incarcerated
for the indeterminate term. As required by section 1172.75, the
trial court struck Young’s one-year “prison prior” enhancement
imposed pursuant to section 667.5, former subdivision (b),
reducing his sentence to 14 years plus 7 to life. However, it
declined to strike two other enhancements he asked the court to
strike under section 1385. The court also did not strike, as Young
did not ask it to strike, 14 additional enhancements that were
either stayed or ran concurrently with his completed determinate
term.
On appeal, Young contends the trial court should have
stricken all of the 17 total enhancements. Additionally, he
contends sentences for eight of his convictions, which he served
concurrently with his completed determinate term, should have
been stayed under section 654.
We will order stayed those punishments barred by
section 654. We will affirm the order in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
We draw the facts from Young’s opening brief.2

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Young’s publicly available opening brief quotes extensively
from a sealed probation report. It is unclear why counsel did not
file his brief in redacted and unredacted form pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.46(g)(2)(A) and (B). As they are

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Early one morning in June 1989, Young was driving around
Torrance in a stolen car with another man. He rear-ended
another car, which was occupied only by its female driver. When
the woman got out of her car, Young and his accomplice forced
her into the stolen car. Using Young’s gun, the accomplice held
the victim there at gunpoint while Young stole the victim’s purse
and radio from her car.
Next, Young and the accomplice took turns digitally
penetrating the victim’s vagina and raping her as they drove
around.
Afterwards, they forced her to withdraw money from an
automated teller machine and took that money from her.
Young and the accomplice then drove the victim around a
bit more before leaving her with the stolen car. She drove it off to
find help.
Young and the accomplice were identified by fingerprints
left on the stolen car and later arrested.
Young was charged with 17 counts and 16 corresponding
enhancements pertaining to the use of a firearm. He was also
charged with enhancements for a prior serious felony conviction
(§ 667, subd. (a)) and prior prison term (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)).
He pled guilty to 16 of these counts and their 15 related firearm
enhancements, as well as the prior serious felony and prior
prison term enhancements. He was sentenced as follows
(boldfaced terms are those contributing to his aggregate term):

now public, we refer to facts from the probation report recited in
Young’s opening brief. In any event, substantially all the same
factual content is disclosed in the unsealed portion of the record.

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Ct. Section Term Enhancement Yrs. Running
2 209(b) 7 to life 12022.5(a) 2* Consecutive
3 211 5 12022.5(a) 2 Concurrent
4 289 6 12022.3(a) 3 Concurrent
5 264.1 5 12022.3(a) 3 Concurrent
6 289 6 12022.3(a) 3 Concurrent
7 264.1 5 12022.3(a) 3 Concurrent
8 289 6 12022.3(a) 3 Concurrent
9 264.1 5 12022.3(a) 3 Concurrent
10 261(2) (fmr.) 6 12022.3(a) 3 Concurrent
11 264.1 5 12022.3(a) 3 Concurrent
12 289 6 12022.3(a) 3 Concurrent
13 264.1 5 12022.3(a) 3 Concurrent
14 261(2) (fmr.) 6 12022.3(a) 3 Consecutive
15 264.1 5 12022.3(a) 3 Concurrent
16 211 5 12022.5(a) 2 Concurrent
17 12021(a) 3 -- -- Concurrent
-- -- -- 667(a) 5 Consecutive
-- -- -- 667.5(b) (fmr.) 1 Consecutive
* Stayed.
Pursuant to section 1172.75, the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation identified Young as eligible for resentencing
because he “was serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement” under section 667.5, former subdivision (b). (See
§ 1172.75, subd. (b).)
After an initial resentencing order was vacated, Young filed
a motion and brief for resentencing in the trial court. In his brief,
he asserted he was entitled to have his one-year “prison prior”
enhancement stricken. He further asserted he was entitled to a
full resentencing. Pursuant to that entitlement and sections 1385
and 12022.53, subdivision (h), he asked that the court strike the

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two other enhancements for which he was sentenced to
consecutive terms: the three-year section 12022.3, subdivision (a)
firearm enhancement to count 14; and the five-year section 667,
subdivision (a) prior serious felony enhancement.
The trial court struck only the one-year prison prior.
Young timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Young makes two main arguments on appeal that his
revised sentence is improper, and seeks relief well beyond what
he sought before the trial court.
First, he asserts every enhancement should be stricken
under section 1385. He raises the same two grounds argued
below for striking the count 14 firearm and section 667,
subdivision (a) enhancements. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B), (C).) But
he also argues all enhancements should be stricken because of
claimed mental health disorders (id., subd. (c)(2)(D)), a claim not
made below.
Second, Young asserts eight of his terms which ran
concurrently with others should have been stayed pursuant to
section 654. This argument, too, is raised for the first time on
appeal.
Before turning to Young’s substantive arguments, we first
address the question of mootness. Young argues his appeal is not
moot even though he has fully served all sentences he attacks on
appeal.
A claim for relief is not moot only if: (i) the claimant is
suffering an ongoing harm; and (2) the harm is redressable by the
relief the claimant seeks. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.)
Young claims harm by the affront to his “dignity” posed by
a criminal record showing he “was sentenced to more punishment

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than he legally should have been.” He argues this harm is
cognizable and redressable by analogy to suffering a wrongful
conviction, challenges to which are not mooted by the completion
of the sentence imposed therefor. (See In re Byrnes (1945)
26 Cal.2d 824, 827, superseded by statute on another ground as
stated in People v. Lyons (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.)
Young acknowledges adverse authority but seeks to distinguish
it.3 We decline to reach the issue unaided by a response from the
People.4 We have discretion to overlook the mootness of an
appeal. (See In re D.P., supra 14 Cal.5th at p. 282 [“Even when a
case is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to
reach the merits of the dispute.”].) To the extent the appeal is
moot, and under the particular circumstances of this case, we
exercise that discretion here.

3 In particular, Young acknowledges People v. DeLeon (2017)
3 Cal.5th 640, 645–646, in which our Supreme Court rejected a
similar attempt to establish a live controversy by analogy to post-
release conviction appeals and concluded the right to clear one’s
record of a conviction presents a special case because of the
practical consequences a conviction carries.
4 The People’s brief is deficient in several ways. In addition
to failing to address many of Young’s points, including the entire
argument based on section 654, it contains citations to pages that
do not exist in the record, facts that are not present in the case,
makes patent factual mischaracterizations of Young’s opening
brief and the trial court’s order, and argues a split of authority
that our Supreme Court resolved in People v. Walker (2024) 16
Cal.5th 1024 (Walker) more than a year before the People filed
their brief. Put simply, the People’s brief is of negligible value in
resolving any issue raised in this appeal.

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I. Young Forfeited His Arguments Under Section 1385
Young correctly notes he was entitled to a full resentencing
under section 1172.75 with the benefit of current sentencing
rules which were liberalized since his original sentencing. (Id.,
subd. (d)(2).)
To urge that all his enhancements be stricken, Young relies
on section 1385, which is applicable to enhancements, generally,
and specifically made applicable to firearm enhancements by
section 12022.53, subdivision (h).
Section 1385 affords trial courts discretion to strike
enhancements in the furtherance of justice. (Id., subd. (c);
Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.) In exercising that
discretion, “the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any [enumerated]
mitigating circumstances . . . are present. Proof of the presence of
one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety [as
defined in the statute].” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Among the
enumerated mitigating circumstances are “[m]ultiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case” (id., subd. (c)(2)(B)),
“[t]he application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of
over 20 years” (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)), and “[t]he current offense is
connected to mental illness” (id., subd. (c)(2)(D)).
Young’s argument is premised on the trial court’s
purported failure to give “great weight” to the circumstances in
mitigation, and urges us to consider not just the circumstances
raised below but also the circumstance of his claimed mental
illness, raised for the first time on appeal.
By its terms, section 1385 does not require a trial court to

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give “great weight” to mitigating circumstances if dismissal of an
enhancement would endanger public safety. (People v. Mazur
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438, 445; see also Walker, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1029 [“[I]f the court does not find that dismissal
would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated
mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of
an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors . . . .”].) The trial court
expressly declined to discretionarily strike the enhancements as
Young requested because he “remains a danger to the public.”
For the first time on appeal, Young argues the trial court
was obligated to give “great weight” to the mitigating
circumstances because “creation of danger to the public is
impossible” where striking the enhancements would not affect his
release date. Young offers that this is “a point to which the
prosecutor adverted at one of the court dates preceding the
sentencing.” But the prosecutor did not connect this to the
question of public endangerment under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), and neither did Young’s trial counsel. Indeed,
in Young’s motion before the trial court, he had only this to say
on the subject of public endangerment: “there is no evidence to
support the contention that [Young] is of any threat or risk that
would ‘endanger public safety’ so as to prohibit the court from
dismissing the enhancements under § 1385(c).” When the trial
court declined to strike any enhancements under section 1385
because “[Young] remains a danger to the public,” Young’s
counsel did not object. We deem this issue forfeited.
“A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise ‘claims
involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate
its discretionary sentencing choices’ if the party did not object to

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the sentence at trial. [Citation.] The rule applies to ‘cases in
which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular
case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred because it
double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the
various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient
number of valid reasons . . . .’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2003)
31 Cal.4th 745, 751.)
People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215 is
informative on this point. There, the court considered whether
Gonzalez waived the same issue Young raises now: the function
of the “endanger public safety” gate to “weigh[ing] greatly”
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)’s mitigating circumstances.
(Gonzalez, at pp. 221, 225–226.) The Gonzalez court found the
issue was not waived because “both in the sentencing position
memorandum and during the resentencing hearing, defense
counsel advocated for the same legal standard that Gonzalez now
advances on appeal.” (Id. at p. 225.)
Here, Young failed to argue to the trial court that striking
the enhancements would not endanger the public when the court
concluded Young’s present danger was a sufficient basis on which
to deny his request. And, in his resentencing brief, he argued only
that he (as opposed to the striking of the enhancements) was not
“of any threat or risk that would ‘endanger public safety’ ” (an
assertion the trial court rejected based on evidence before it and
which Young does not challenge on appeal). Trial counsel is
“charged with understanding, advocating, and clarifying
permissible sentencing choices at the hearing.” (People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.) Trial counsel having failed to do so,
Young cannot raise the issue on appeal. (Ibid.)
Because Young failed to preserve the issue of whether the

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trial court had to “weigh[] greatly” section 1385,
subdivision(c)(2)’s mitigating circumstances, we need not consider
his arguments about the effect they should have had if so
weighed.
We note Young’s argument, offered in the context of his
claim trial counsel should have argued his mental illness, that he
may have received ineffective assistance of counsel in advocating
for relief under section 1385. Young does not raise this point as to
trial counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s endangerment
to public safety conclusion. Even if he had, we would not be
inclined to find ineffective assistance of counsel because we are
unpersuaded Young could have been prejudiced by any omission
having no effect on the term of his incarceration. As Young notes,
the right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and the test for prejudice flowing
form ineffective assistance of counsel comes from Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688. As the Supreme Court
has since observed, “[e]ven though sentencing does not concern
the defendant’s guilt or innocence, ineffective assistance of
counsel during a sentencing hearing can result in Strickland
prejudice because ‘any amount of [additional] jail time has Sixth
Amendment significance.’ ” (Lafler v. Cooper (2012) 566 U.S. 156,
165.) The corollary to this observation is that any shortcoming of
counsel during sentencing that does not result in additional
custodial time (or other incremental punishment) lacks Sixth
Amendment significance.
II. We Will Stay Some of Young’s Already Served
Concurrent Sentences
In contrast to errors in exercising sentencing discretion,
“the waiver doctrine does not apply to questions involving the

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applicability of section 654. Errors in the applicability of
section 654 are corrected on appeal regardless of whether the
point was raised by objection in the trial court or assigned as
error on appeal.” (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 549, fn. 3.)
“In general, a person may be convicted of, although not
punished for, more than one crime arising out of the same act or
course of conduct. ‘In California, a single act or course of conduct
by a defendant can lead to convictions “of any number of the
offenses charged.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Section 954 generally
permits multiple conviction. Section 654 is its counterpart
concerning punishment. It prohibits multiple punishment for the
same ‘act or omission.’ When section 954 permits multiple
conviction, but section 654 prohibits multiple punishment, the
trial court must stay execution of sentence on the convictions for
which multiple punishment is prohibited.” (People v. Reed (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226–1227.) “Imposition of concurrent sentences
is not the correct method of implementing section 654, because a
concurrent sentence is still punishment.” (People v. Alford (2010)
180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468.)
An appellant who raises section 654 for the first time on
appeal lacks the benefit of any specific factual findings directed to
its application. “We cannot remand a case to the trial court for
the purpose of trying an issue raised for the first time on appeal.”
(People v. Sparks (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 306, 311.) Therefore,
consistent with our general presumption that the trial court
properly performed its official duties (Evid. Code, § 664; Ross v.
Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913), when considering a
section 654 claim for the first time on appeal, we assess the
record to determine if it contains facts that would support a
lawful decision to impose separate sentences without violating

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the proscription against multiple punishment.
Young argues he was subjected to impermissible multiple
punishments for two sets of convictions: (1) kidnapping for
robbery (count 2) and two counts of robbery (counts 3 & 16); and
(2) the 12 sex offense counts (counts 4–15) when only six criminal
sex acts appear in the record in support of his convictions.
Of these convictions, the sentences for count 2, kidnapping
for robbery (seven years to life), and count 14, forcible rape (nine
years inclusive of its enhancement) ran consecutively, and Young
does not challenge this on appeal. The sentences on all the other
robbery and sex crime convictions ran concurrently. He contends
only that some of the sentences which ran concurrently should
have been stayed.
Again, Young seeks relief which will have no effect on the
length of his term. Indeed, even if he had not already served the
sentences, it would not have had any effect on the length of his
term because there is “little practical difference between
imposing concurrent sentences . . . and staying [a concurrent]
sentence . . . .” (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353.)
Nevertheless, “the law is settled that the sentences must be
stayed to the extent that section 654 prohibits multiple
punishment.” (Ibid.)
We agree with Young that the sentence on the first robbery
count (count 3) should have been stayed as being part of the same
course of conduct as the kidnapping for robbery. Young
kidnapped the victim in order to rob her and, immediately after
doing so, did, in fact, rob her of her purse and car radio. (See
People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639 [“Defendant was
convicted of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and for the
commission of that very robbery. We are compelled to the

12
conclusion as a matter of law that on the record here both crimes
were committed pursuant to a single intent and objective . . . .”].)
However, we disagree the second robbery count (count 16),
occurring after the sex crimes, could not be separately punished.
The record contains facts that would support a lawful separate
sentence for the second robbery. In People v. Green (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 1076, the court affirmed separate punishments
for robbery and carjacking where, like here, the defendant
kidnapped and drove the victim from the location of the original
robbery, sexually assaulted her, and then stole from her a second
time. It reasoned, “[b]ecause the carjacking was . . . separated in
time and place from the initial robbery of [the victim’s] purse and
was interrupted by the sexual attack . . . , the record contains
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s explicit finding the
taking of the purse and the taking of the vehicle were separate
incidents which merited separate and additional punishment.”
(Id. at p. 1085.)
Finally, we turn to the terms imposed concurrently for
Young’s 12 sex crime convictions. Section 667.6, subdivision (c)
represents an exception to section 654 in that it permits discrete
punishment for each sex crime enumerated in section 667.6,
subdivision (e) occurring on the same occasion with the same
victim. (See People v. Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 784, 792.) In effect,
section 667.6, subdivision (c) eliminates for enumerated offenses
the interpretation of “act or omission” in section 654 as
embracing multiple acts committed incident to one objective (so
as to constitute an indivisible course of conduct). The sex crimes
for which Young was convicted are each among those enumerated
in section 667.6, subdivision (e). Thus, Young does not dispute
separate punishment is permitted for each act supporting his

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convictions even though they were arguably part of a single
course of conduct. What he does dispute is his susceptibility to
more than one punishment for each act. Young’s point is well
founded.
Section 667.6, subdivision (c), does not allow multiple
punishment of discrete criminal acts. (People v. Siko (1988)
45 Cal.3d 820, 826.) Here, Young was subjected to 12 unstayed
punishments for his 12 sex crime convictions: six counts of rape
in concert (§ 264.1), four counts of sexual penetration (§ 289), and
two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, former subd. (2)). However, as
Young observes, the record only describes a total of six acts by
him and his accomplice (four acts of digital vaginal penetration
and two acts of rape) to support these convictions. Young should
not have been subjected to two unstayed sentences for each of
these six acts. (People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 333
[where two men committed “only a single indivisible act of
intercourse” on their victim, “the trial court erred in imposing
sentence[s] for both forcible rape in concert . . . and forcible
rape”].)
Accordingly, we agree Young’s concurrent sentences for his
sex crime convictions on counts 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 12 should have
been stayed.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to modify the abstract of
judgment to show the sentences for counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 12
as stayed under section 654, not concurrent. In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J. CHAVEZ, J.

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