CourtListener 10774428•In re M.S. CA2/8
Texto completo
Filed 1/14/26 In re M.S. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re M.S. et al., Persons Coming B345724
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. Nos. 23LJJP00112A–B)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Michelle R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Debra L. Gonzales, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Shaylah Padgett-Weibel, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Michelle R. (Mother) appeals from the orders terminating
parental rights over her two minor children under Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 366.26. On appeal, Mother argues the
juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parental
relationship exception to the termination of her parental rights.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) She also asserts the juvenile court
and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the inquiry requirements
of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.) and related California law. We conclude that neither of
Mother’s arguments has merit, and accordingly, affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Section 300 petition
Mother and Michael S. (Father) are the parents of M.S., a
boy born in March 2020, and J.S., a girl born in February 2021.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
On April 6, 2023, DCFS filed a dependency petition for M.S.
and J.S. under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), alleging that
the children were at substantial risk of harm based on Father’s
history of domestic violence against Mother, and Mother’s failure
to protect the children from Father’s conduct. While
investigating the domestic violence allegations, DCFS learned
that Mother had been recently arrested for driving a stolen
vehicle and evading arrest. DCFS also learned that, a few days
after Mother’s release from jail, then three-year-old M.S.
1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
wandered away from the home while Mother was sleeping, and
was found unattended on a street by a bystander.
At the April 20, 2023 detention hearing, the juvenile court
detained the children from both Mother and Father, and granted
them monitored visitation pending adjudication of the petition.
The following day, DCFS placed the children in the home of their
paternal great-grandmother, Sheila R., and paternal great-aunt,
Monique J. Mother began having in-person visits with the
children four to five times per week and daily telephone calls.
On August 21, 2023, the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. The court sustained the
petition as pled, declared M.S. and J.S. dependents of the court
under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), and removed the
children from both parents. The court granted the parents family
reunification services, including monitored visitation with the
children. Mother’s case plan included on-demand drug testing, a
domestic violence support group, an anger management program,
a parenting education program, and individual counseling to
address case issues.
2. Termination of reunification services
Over the next six months, Mother had multiple arrests and
periods of incarceration. After serving 120 days in jail for grand
theft, she was released in October 2023. She was again
incarcerated in December 2023, and was released in January
2024. While in jail, Mother enrolled in parenting education and
anger management classes. She also participated in a domestic
violence support group, but did not attend individual counseling.
Mother tested positive for marijuana on a few occasions, and
failed to appear for a number of other drug tests. When Mother
was not incarcerated, she attended in-person visits with the
3
children, and was attentive and appropriate during the visits.
The children consistently greeted Mother with hugs and kisses,
and enjoyed spending time with her. During this period, the
children remained placed with their paternal great-grandmother
and great-aunt, and developed a strong and nurturing bond with
them.
At a six-month review hearing held on February 20, 2024,
the juvenile court found that the parents were not in substantial
compliance with their case plans, and that continued jurisdiction
over the children was necessary. The court ordered an additional
period of reunification services for both parents.
During the next six months of services, Mother was again
incarcerated on a grand theft charge. As a result, she did not
have any in-person visits with the children. She did, however,
maintain telephone contact with them three times per week.
As of August 2024, Mother had completed a parenting education
course and recently enrolled in a drug treatment program, but
had not participated in any other court-ordered services. During
this period, the children continued to do well in the home of their
paternal great-grandmother and great-aunt, and remained
closely bonded with their caregivers.
On August 14, 2024, the juvenile court held a contested
12-month review hearing. The court found that neither Mother
nor Father substantially complied with their case plans, and that
return of the children to their custody would create a substantial
risk of detriment. The court terminated the parents’
reunification services, and set the matter for a section 366.26
permanency planning hearing.
4
3. Termination of parental rights
In November 2024, DCFS filed a permanency planning
report for the children, and recommended adoption by their
paternal great-grandmother and great-aunt as the permanent
plan. DCFS reported the children had formed a significant bond
with their caregivers and were happy in their home. The
caregivers were able to meet the children’s physical, mental, and
emotional needs, and to provide them with love, support, and
stability. The caregivers were also deeply committed to the
children and wanted to provide them with permanency through
adoption.
In a status review report filed in January 2025, DCFS
indicated that Mother was incarcerated in a federal prison, and
as a result, was unable to have in-person visits with the children.
Mother continued to have telephone contact with the children on
a frequent basis. However, after their calls with Mother, the
children tended to have tantrums and difficulty calming down.
In a supplemental report filed in March 2025, DCFS
continued to recommend adoption as the children’s permanent
plan. At the time of the report, M.S. was five years old and J.S.
was four years old, and the children had been residing with the
paternal great-grandmother and great-aunt for almost two years.
They were deeply bonded with their caregivers, and appeared
happy and secure in their home. The caregivers continued to
maintain a safe, loving, and stable home environment for the
children and were committed to providing them with a
permanent home through adoption.
In its supplemental report, DCFS noted that Mother had
been incarcerated since February 2024. Prior to her
incarceration, Mother had consistent in-person visits with the
5
children. She was observed to be attentive and affectionate
toward the children during the visits, and would comfort,
nurture, feed, and read to them. The children enjoyed these
visits with Mother and responded well to her. Since her
incarceration, Mother maintained frequent telephone contact
with the children. She called them on the telephone almost every
day, and recently had two video calls with them. The caregivers
reported that Mother was appropriate with the children during
the calls, and would sing with them and help them recite their
ABCs. However, the caregivers also observed that the children
would act out after the calls as if they were angry that they could
not see Mother, and that they had less tantrums when they did
not have contact with her.
In its report, DCFS assessed that the children shared a
significant attachment to Mother, but that Mother’s repeated
periods of incarceration negatively affected the children and
prevented her from providing them with stability. In assessing
whether terminating Mother’s parental rights would be
detrimental to the children, DCFS noted that “Mother’s long-
term incarceration and prior criminal behavior which led to her
incarceration on multiple occasions makes termination of
parental rights less detrimental.” DCFS further noted that the
fact that the “caregivers have repeatedly stated that they intend
to allow the children to maintain in-person and telephone contact
with the parents [also] . . . makes termination of parental rights
less detrimental.”
On April 21, 2025, the juvenile court held the
section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. Mother’s counsel
asked the court not to terminate parental rights over the children
based on the beneficial parental relationship exception. Her
6
counsel argued that Mother had maintained regular contact with
the children when she was not in custody, and that the children
had a close bond with her. Mother’s counsel also asserted that, in
deciding whether to terminate parental rights, the court could
not consider the caregivers’ statements that they would allow
continued contact between Mother and the children. Counsel for
DCFS and counsel for the children joined in requesting that the
court terminate parental rights. Counsel for DCFS argued that
the children had been in the home of their current caregivers for
two years, and that the children’s relationship with Mother did
not outweigh their need for permanency through adoption.
After hearing the argument of counsel, the juvenile court
found that the beneficial parental relationship exception to the
termination of parental rights did not apply. Citing the three-
factor test in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), the
court stated: “With regard to visitation, and I will say that the
report acknowledges that Mother, when she was not
incarcerated, did have regular visitation with the minors, and
even when she was incarcerated, she made sure to have
telephonic contact with the children almost every[]day. So I
think that she does meet that first prong of having regular
visitation. Unfortunately, she created the barriers herself to not
being able to have in-person visitation by engaging in conduct
that caused her to be incarcerated. [¶] And although there is
some bond, clearly, between the mother and the children, I don’t
find it to be the kind of bond that is so beneficial to the children.
They have been out of her care for two years. Based on all of the
information that I see in all of the reports, they are—it is the
court’s assessment that although there is some bond with the
mother, that they are very bonded to the caregivers. And so even
7
if Mother were to meet the second prong of Caden C., I must find
that the termination of parental rights is outweighed by the
benefit of these very—still very young children to have
permanency with the—that would be provided by adoption. [¶] So
for those reasons, I find that terminating the parent/child
relationship will not be detrimental to the children, and,
therefore, . . . that no exception to adoption applies in this case.”
The court terminated parental rights over M.S. and J.S., and
ordered adoption by the caregivers as the children’s permanent
plan.
Mother filed a timely appeal from the orders terminating
her parental rights.
4. ICWA inquiry and findings
In their initial interviews with DCFS in March 2023, both
parents denied having any Indian ancestry. At their first
appearances before the juvenile court, each parent submitted a
Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020) form in which
they indicated that they had no known Indian ancestry. At those
hearings, the juvenile court also inquired whether the parents
had any Indian ancestry, and both Mother and Father denied
that they did. At the April 20, 2023 detention hearing, the
juvenile court found it had no reason to know that ICWA applied,
but directed DCFS to interview any known maternal and
paternal relatives regarding ICWA as part of its ongoing duty of
inquiry.
In May 2023, DCFS interviewed the children’s maternal
grandmother, Michelle C., and the paternal great-grandmother,
Sheila R. Both of these relatives reported that there was no
Indian ancestry in their family. The maternal grandmother
further indicated that she had no contact with the maternal
8
grandfather and believed he was incarcerated. DCFS also
reinterviewed Mother, who again denied any Indian ancestry.
In addition to these interviews, DCFS also attempted to contact
Father and the paternal grandmother, O.S., regarding ICWA, but
was unable to reach them. At the August 21, 2023 jurisdictional
and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found that, based on
the interviews conducted by DCFS, there was still no reason to
know that ICWA applied, but directed the agency to provide any
new information regarding ICWA in its next report.
In January 2024, prior to the six-month review hearing,
DCFS again inquired of Mother, the maternal grandmother, and
the paternal great-grandmother regarding ICWA. Each of these
individuals continued to deny any known Indian ancestry in their
family. At that time, DCFS also made another attempt to inquire
of the paternal grandmother, but her phone had been
disconnected.
On August 27, 2024, following the setting of the
section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court signed an order
prepared by counsel for DCFS, directing DCFS to interview all
known and available extended family members regarding ICWA,
and to report on the results of its interviews prior to the
section 366.26 hearing. In each subsequent report that it filed
with the court, DCFS included a summary of the efforts that it
made to interview extended family members regarding ICWA in
May 2023 and January 2024. However, there is no indication in
the record that DCFS attempted to conduct any additional
interviews regarding ICWA prior to the section 366.26 hearing.
At the April 21, 2025 section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court
again found there was no reason to know that ICWA applied to
the case.
9
DISCUSSION
1. Beneficial parental relationship exception
Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it found the
beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply to the
termination of her parental rights. Mother claims the exception
applied because the evidence showed that she maintained regular
contact with the children, they had a positive bond, and
termination of that bond would be detrimental to the children.
We conclude the juvenile court did not err in finding the
exception did not apply.
1.1. Governing law
At a hearing under section 366.26, the juvenile court must
select and implement a permanent plan for a dependent child,
with the express purpose of providing the child a “stable,
permanent” home. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Where there is no
probability of reunification with a parent, adoption is the
preferred permanent plan. (Id., subd. (b)(1).) For the court to
implement adoption as the permanent plan, it must find, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the child is likely to be adopted if
parental rights are terminated. (Id., subd. (c)(1).) Then, in the
absence of evidence that a guardianship should be considered, or
that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child under one of six enumerated exceptions, the court “shall
terminate parental rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) These “ ‘statutory
exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances
[citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which
remains adoption.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), the beneficial
parental relationship exception applies when the juvenile court
determines that the termination of parental rights would be
10
detrimental to the child because “[t]he parents have maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Ibid.) In Caden C.,
the California Supreme Court held that a “parent asserting the
parental benefit exception must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, three things. The parent must show regular visitation
and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of
visitation permitted. Moreover, the parent must show that the
child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the
parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship. And the parent must
show that terminating that attachment would be detrimental to
the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit
of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
We review the juvenile court’s findings for the first two
elements—whether the parent has maintained regular visitation
with the child and whether the child has a beneficial relationship
with the parent—for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) We review the third element—
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child due to the child’s relationship with the parent—for
abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) The reviewing court will find
an abuse of discretion “only when ‘ “ ‘the [juvenile] court has
exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
1.2. The juvenile court did not err in finding the
beneficial parental relationship exception did
not apply
In considering the applicability of the beneficial parental
relationship exception to this case, the juvenile court found that
11
Mother satisfied the first element of the Caden C. test because
she maintained regular contact with the children to the extent
permitted by her periods of incarceration. However, the court
found that Mother did not satisfy the remaining two elements
because she failed to show that the children shared a substantial
bond with her, or that it would be detrimental to sever that bond
when balanced against the benefits of adoption. On appeal,
Mother asserts the juvenile court erred in finding that the
exception did not apply because the court failed to conduct a
careful, fact-specific inquiry into the children’s relationship with
Mother and whether the termination of that relationship would
be detrimental to them. We disagree. Even assuming Mother
established the first and second elements of the exception, we
conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the third element was not satisfied.
In evaluating the third element—whether termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child—the juvenile
court must determine whether “the benefit of placement in a new,
adoptive home outweigh[s] ‘the harm [the child] would experience
from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship’ ”
with the parent. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) “The
court makes the assessment by weighing the harm of losing the
relationship against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive
home.” (Id. at p. 640.) “ ‘If severing the natural parent/child
relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of
a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[]’ the child, the
court should not terminate parental rights.” (Id. at p. 633.)
Although the evidence showed that the children had an
emotional attachment to Mother, the juvenile court reasonably
12
could find that the benefits the children would derive from a
permanent, adoptive home outweighed any harm they would
experience from the loss of that bond. At the time of the April
2025 section 366.26 hearing, M.S. was five years old and J.S. was
four years old, and the children had been out of Mother’s care for
two years. Shortly after the children were detained from Mother,
they were placed with the paternal great-grandmother and great-
aunt, and they remained in their care throughout the dependency
proceedings. The evidence further showed that the children were
closely bonded with their caregivers, readily sought them out for
comfort and affection, and relied on them to meet their needs.
The caregivers ensured the children had a safe, stable, and loving
home environment, and they were committed to providing the
children with permanency through adoption. Even though the
children enjoyed the time they spent with Mother, they had not
had any in-person visits with her since February 2024 due to her
incarceration, and their contact was instead limited to daily
telephone calls. Therefore, while the children may have had
positive interactions with Mother, the evidence demonstrated
that they spent a significant portion of their lives outside of her
care and did not have the kind of beneficial parent-child
relationship that would outweigh “ ‘the security and the sense of
belonging a new family would confer.’ ” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
In arguing that the juvenile court erred in ruling on the
applicability of the beneficial parental relationship exception,
Mother suggests that the court may have improperly relied on
the caregivers’ statements that they would allow postadoption
contact between the children and Mother. “Because terminating
parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child
13
to maintain the relationship, courts must assume that
terminating parental rights terminates the relationship.” (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Here, DCFS repeatedly noted in
its supplemental permanency planning report that the caregivers
had stated that they intend to permit the children to maintain
contact with Mother. But there is no indication in the record that
the juvenile court considered these statements by the caregivers
in its ruling, or otherwise based its decision to terminate parental
rights on the possibility that the children would have any future
contact with Mother.
Mother also claims that the juvenile court improperly
considered her failure to progress in services in deciding that the
beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply. She
specifically points to the court’s statement that Mother “created
the barriers herself to not being able to have in-person visitation
by engaging in conduct that caused her to be incarcerated.”
However, as our Supreme Court has recognized, “[i]ssues such as
those that led to dependency often prove relevant to the
application of the exception” because “[a] parent’s struggles may
mean that interaction between parent and child at least
sometimes has a ‘ “negative” effect’ on the child.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 637.) In this case, the court’s statement
about Mother’s criminal conduct was relevant to the Caden C.
analysis because Mother’s resulting incarceration impacted the
children’s ability to maintain a substantial, positive attachment
to her through regular in-person visits. Contrary to Mother’s
claim, the record does not show that the juvenile court based its
ruling on Mother’s lack of progress with her services. Nor did the
court compare Mother’s attributes as a caregiver to those of the
prospective adoptive parents. Rather, the record reflects that the
14
court properly based its decision on whether severing the
children’s relationship with Mother “would harm the child[ren] to
an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new,
adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 634.)
Based on the totality of the evidence before it, the juvenile
court reasonably could find that Mother failed to establish that
her relationship with the children was “so important to the
child[ren] that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t
outweigh its loss.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
The juvenile court accordingly did not err in finding that the
beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply.
2. ICWA inquiry
Mother asserts the juvenile court erred in finding that
ICWA did not apply because DCFS failed to comply with its
initial duty of inquiry as to the children’s paternal extended
family. We conclude the juvenile court’s ICWA finding was
supported by substantial evidence.
2.1. Governing law
ICWA mandates that “[i]n any involuntary proceeding in
a [s]tate court, where the court knows or has reason to know that
an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s
tribe” of the pending proceedings and the right to intervene.
(25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) Similarly, California law requires notice to
the child’s parent, Indian custodian, if any, and the child’s tribe if
there is “reason to know . . . that an Indian child is involved” in
the proceeding. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) Both juvenile courts and
child welfare agencies “have an affirmative and continuing duty
to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300
15
. . . may be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 14.)
At the first appearance of each party, the court must
inquire whether that party “know[s] or ha[s] reason to know that
the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) Additionally,
whenever a child welfare agency takes a child into temporary
custody, it must inquire of a nonexclusive group that includes the
child, the parents, and extended family members “whether the
child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Extended
family members include adults who are the child’s grandparent,
aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law,
niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent. (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)
“If the [juvenile] court makes a finding that proper and
adequate further inquiry and due diligence . . . have been
conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an
Indian child, the court may make a finding that [ICWA] does not
apply to the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency
of the evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) We generally review the
juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the substantial evidence
test. (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)
2.2. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile
court’s finding that ICWA did not apply
Mother argues DCFS failed to make an adequate ICWA
inquiry as to the paternal side of the children’s family, and
identifies three paternal relatives that DCFS did not interview
regarding ICWA: (1) the paternal grandmother, O.S.; (2) the
paternal grandfather; and (3) a paternal aunt named Sky.
The record reflects that DCFS interviewed Father and the
paternal great-grandmother, Sheila R., about ICWA, and that
16
they both denied that there was any Indian ancestry on the
paternal side of the children’s family. The record further reflects
that DCFS twice attempted to contact the paternal grandmother,
O.S., to inquire about ICWA, but was unable to reach her on each
occasion. In May 2023, the dependency investigator called and
left messages for the paternal grandmother, but did not receive a
response. Then, in January 2024, the case social worker tried
calling the paternal grandmother about ICWA, but her phone
had been disconnected.
In challenging the adequacy of DCFS’s ICWA inquiry,
Mother notes that, in August 2024, the paternal grandmother
contacted the supervising case social worker about the denial of
her RFA application, but she was not asked about ICWA at that
time. Mother also notes that, prior to the April 2023 detention
hearing, DCFS visited Father’s home to serve him with a removal
order and was greeted at the door by a paternal aunt, Sky, but
did not ask her about ICWA. In addition, Mother asserts that
DCFS did not make any effort to locate the paternal grandfather
as part of its ICWA inquiry.
However, “section 224.2 ‘does not require the [child welfare]
agency to “find” unknown relatives and others who have an
interest in the child, merely to make reasonable inquiries. The
operative concept is those people who are reasonably available to
help the agency with its investigation into whether the child has
any potential Indian ancestry should be asked.’ ” (In re Dezi C.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1140.) “Agencies are already tasked with
investigating the circumstances underlying the child’s removal
and identifying and locating the child’s extended family members
[citation]; it is a rather simple task to ask those family members
about Indian ancestry in this process.” (Id. at p. 1143.) Our
17
review of DCFS’s inquiry is “not a mechanistic analysis of
whether the record supports a finding of literal compliance with
the statute, but ‘whether the ICWA inquiry conducted has
reliably answered the question at the heart of the ICWA inquiry:
Whether a child involved in a proceeding “is or may be an Indian
child.” ’ ” (In re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 720.) “In
answering this question, we must also consider the limitations on
[DCFS’s] ability to carry out its inquiry under the particular facts
of the case. . . . ‘[W]e cannot ask [DCFS] to intuit the names of
unidentified family members or to interview individuals for
whom no contact information has been provided.’ ” (Ibid.)
In this case, DCFS satisfied its duty of inquiry by asking
known and available extended family members for whom it had
contact information about ICWA. During the dependency
proceedings, DCFS inquired of Mother, Father, the maternal
grandmother, and the paternal great-grandmother. Each of
these family members denied any Indian ancestry. DCFS also
made reasonable efforts to inquire of the paternal grandmother.
Although DCFS missed opportunities to inquire of the paternal
grandmother in the case, the agency did attempt to reach on at
least two occasions in May 2023 and January 2024 to ask about
ICWA, but she did not return these calls. While no inquiry was
made of paternal grandfather, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that this relative was known to DCFS given that he is
not referenced in any of the agency’s reports, and none of the
family members that DCFS contacted over the course of the case
ever mentioned him. (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.)
DCFS did briefly speak with the paternal aunt, Sky, while
attempting to serve a removal order on Father at his home, but
there is no indication that the agency had any further
18
communication with Sky about the case or was in possession of
her contact information. (Id. at p. 1143.) Further, DCFS
inquired of Sky’s brother (Father) and Sky’s grandmother
(paternal great-grandmother), so the agency spoke to both a
contemporary and an elder for Sky in the family tree about
ICWA.
Moreover, given that the paternal great-grandmother
denied there was any Indian ancestry in the family, we cannot
conclude that DCFS’s failure to inquire of these other paternal
relatives demonstrated error. As the people closest to the past,
elders generally know more family history than younger people,
and are usually the ones to educate younger family members
about family ancestry. On this record, the juvenile court had an
adequate basis on which to conclude DCFS fulfilled its inquiry
obligations, and that neither DCFS nor the court had reason to
know or believe that M.S. or J.S. was an Indian child. The
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply was thus
supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights over
M.S. and J.S. are affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
I CONCUR:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
19
DCFS v. Michelle R. - B345724
UZCATEGUI, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
I concur with the majority’s determination that the juvenile
court did not err in finding the beneficial parental exception did
not apply to the termination of Mother’s parental rights.
However, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) conducted an adequate inquiry into the potential Indian
ancestry of the minors, M.S. and J.S.
The record reflects that only two paternal relatives were
asked about the minors’ potential Indian ancestry, Father and
the paternal great-grandmother, Sheila R. However, DCFS had
contact information for the paternal grandmother and
communicated with her on at least five occasions, but there is no
indication that the paternal grandmother was asked about
potential Indian ancestry. DCFS argues that the paternal
grandmother became “difficult to reach” as the case went on.
But the record reflects that the paternal grandmother was
interviewed at the inception of the case, on March 2, 2023.
DCFS again spoke to the paternal grandmother on April 4 and
19, 2023. The paternal grandmother was evaluated for
emergency placement of the minors in April 2023 and again in
August 2024. Despite these repeated contacts with the paternal
grandmother, it does not appear that she was ever asked about
potential Indian ancestry.
“At the first contact with the child and each family
member, including extended family members, the county welfare
department or county probation department has a duty to inquire
whether that child is or may be an Indian child.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) Here, DCFS did not comply with its
obligation to inquire with the paternal grandmother regarding
Indian ancestry at first contact with the paternal grandmother,
or at any of the other repeated contacts. “Where, as here, the
[family member] is readily available, [Welf. & Inst. Code] section
224.2, subdivision (b)(2), requires an inquiry into the child’s
Indian ancestry.” (In re Claudia R (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76, 90,
fn. 6.) This is not a situation where DCFS is asked to “ ‘ “find”
unknown relatives. . . . The operative concept is those people who
are reasonably available to help the agency with its investigation
into whether the child has any potential Indian ancestry should
be asked.’ ” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1140.)
Because DCFS did not “interview all reasonably available
extended family members,” I would conditionally reverse the
juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and remand for
ICWA compliance. (In re Claudia R., supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at
p. 81.)
UZCATEGUI, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
2
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.