In re T.C. CA6

CourtListener 10774028Calctapp13 de jan. de 2026

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Filed 1/13/26 In re T.C. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re T.C., a Person Coming Under the H053171
Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 23JD027629)

SANTA CLARA COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND
CHILDREN’S SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.C. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Appellants T.C. (Father)1 and S.R. (Mother) appeal from the juvenile court’s order
terminating their parental rights as to their three-year-old child T.C., under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.2 The sole issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court
and the Santa Clara County Department of Children and Family Services (Department)
failed to comply with their initial inquiry obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). We conclude the initial inquiry in this case

1 Father was found to be the presumed father of T.C. at the initial hearing. There
is no question as to paternity.
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.
was deficient and therefore conditionally reverse the order terminating parents’ parental
rights and remand the matter for the juvenile court and the Department to comply with
the initial inquiry requirements of ICWA.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In early November 2023, the Department took custody of then one-year-old T.C.
after Mother was arrested for child abuse and several drug related offenses.3 At the time
of Mother’s arrest, Father was incarcerated in the Monterey County jail. On the day of
Mother’s arrest, a social worker asked Mother and maternal grandmother whether they
had Native American ancestry and both denied having any. The next day, the Department
filed a petition seeking to assert dependency jurisdiction over T.C., on the grounds that
Mother’s substance abuse put the child at substantial risk of harm and that neither Mother
nor Father could care for the child. The Department attached an Indian Child Inquiry
form (ICWA-010(A)) indicating that its inquiry gave no reason to believe that T.C. was or
may be an Indian child.
A few days later, a social worker asked Mother whether Father had any Native
American ancestry and Mother responded he did not. Mother also stated Father was
adopted, did not talk about his family, and indicated she did not know of any other
paternal family members who would have more information about Father’s heritage. The
social worker attempted to interview Father in jail via telephone but was unable to do so
before the initial hearing.
At the initial hearing, the juvenile court questioned Mother and maternal
grandmother about their heritage, and both responded they did not have any Indian
ancestry. Mother also completed a Parental Notification of Indian Status form (ICWA-

3 “ ‘In accord with the usual rules on appeal, we state the facts in the manner most
favorable to the dependency court’s order.’ [Citation.] In light of the limited scope of
this appeal, we provide an abbreviated summary of the dependency proceedings.” (In re
D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1046 (In re D.S.).)

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020) indicating she did not have any Native American heritage. The juvenile court asked
Mother if she knew about Father’s ancestry, and she responded: “I don’t know a hundred
percent of what his background is, but I do know that there’s no Indian or native heritage
in his family. . . .” Based on its inquiry, the juvenile court found there was no reason to
believe T.C. had Native American heritage or that T.C. was an Indian child. However, the
juvenile court ordered the Department to interview any available relatives regarding
possible Indian heritage and directed the parents to disclose to the social worker the
names and contact information of any of T.C.’s maternal or paternal relatives.
A couple days later, a social worker interviewed father at the Monterey County jail
and Father stated he did not have any Native American ancestry. Father made his first
appearance at the November 2023 jurisdiction and disposition hearing but the juvenile
court did not inquire about Father’s Indian ancestry at the hearing. That same day, a
social worker again asked Father about his ancestry and Father reiterated he did not have
any Native American heritage.
Subsequently, a social worker interviewed Mother and Father about their family
history. Mother stated she was raised by her aunt and uncle (not identified) “off and
on”—the record is unclear as to whether they were maternal or paternal relatives—and
that she had a younger brother (not identified). According to the Department’s December
2023 disposition report, Father was removed from his mother’s care at a young age and
adopted (adoptive parents not identified) at age five after his mother failed to successfully
reunify with him. Father “described his childhood with his adopted family as good,” but
the report also notes that Father stated he was “rais[ed] in the foster care system.” The
report does not specify when or why Father was raised in foster care nor does it indicate
whether Father is in touch with his biological, adoptive, or foster family. Father has a
child from a prior relationship and a social worker later interviewed the mother of that
child about Father’s ancestry, who stated that to her knowledge, Father did not have any
Native American heritage.

3
Thereafter, a social worker again interviewed Mother about her ancestry. Mother
stated she did not have contact with her aunt and uncle who raised her and therefore, the
Department reported it could not conduct an ICWA inquiry with the aunt and uncle.
At the continued February 2024 jurisdiction and dispositional hearing, the trial
court found there was no reason to believe or know that T.C. was an Indian child and that
ICWA did not apply.
In December 2024, Mother and Father had another child together (Sibling), and
the Department placed the child into protective custody due to the parents’ untreated
substance abuse issues. At the initial hearing in Sibling’s case, the juvenile court asked
both parents about their ancestry and both denied having Indian heritage.4 Father also
completed a Parental Notification of Indian Status form (ICWA-020) in Sibling’s case
affirming he did not have any Native American heritage. Based on that inquiry, the
juvenile court found there was no reason to believe Sibling was an Indian child.
In March 2025, the juvenile court conducted a section 366.26 permanency hearing.
Following the contested hearing, the juvenile court ordered Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights terminated and selected a permanent plan of adoption for T.C. In its
section 366.26 order, the juvenile court found there was no new information indicating a
reason to believe or know T.C. was an Indian child based on renewed inquiry by the court
and the Department.
Father and Mother timely appealed the order terminating parental rights.

4 We grant the Department’s request for judicial notice of (a) Father’s Parental
Notification of Indian Status form (ICWA-020) in Sibling’s case and (b) the January 7,
2025 minute order from the initial hearing in Sibling’s dependency case indicating the
juvenile court questioned Mother and Father regarding their Native American ancestry
before concluding that ICWA did not apply. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459,
subd. (a).)

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II. DISCUSSION
Father and Mother5 contend the juvenile court erred in finding that ICWA did not
apply because the Department failed to comply with its initial duty of inquiry under
ICWA since it did not adequately inquire of either parent or extended relatives about
T.C.’s possible Indian ancestry. The Department asserts it conducted a proper and
adequate inquiry of all reasonably available family members and therefore, substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that T.C. was not an Indian child.
A. General Legal Principles
“Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in response to ‘rising concern in the mid–
1970’s over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of
abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian
children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually
in non-Indian homes.’ [Citations.]” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1128
(Dezi C.).) To address this concern, “ICWA establishes minimum standards for state
courts to follow before removing Indian children from their families and placing them in
foster care or adoptive homes and does not prohibit states from establishing higher
standards.” (Id. at p. 1129.) “An ‘Indian child’ is defined as ‘any unmarried person who
is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) To increase compliance with federal regulations, California
enacted—and later amended—legislation that adopted various procedural and substantive
provisions of ICWA. (Id. at pp. 1130-1131.)

5 Mother joins Father’s arguments pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
8.200(a)(5). Mother contends that if we conditionally reverse the order terminating
Father’s parental rights, we must also conditionally reverse the order terminating
Mother’s parental rights. (See In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569, 594.)

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The juvenile court and the Department “have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty’
in every dependency proceeding to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring
whether a child is or may be an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131-
1132, quoting § 224.2, subd. (a).) “This continuing duty can be divided into three phases:
the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal
ICWA notice.” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) Only the initial duty of
inquiry is at issue here.
“ ‘The duty of initial inquiry applies in every dependency proceeding.’
[Citation.]” (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 597.) “The duty to inquire begins
with the initial contact with the reporting party, and it continues with the [Department]’s
‘first contact with the child and each family member, including extended family
members.’ ” (In re Claudia R. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76, 84, quoting § 224.2,
subd. (b)(1); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1) [the department “must ask . . . the
parents, . . . extended family members, . . . [and] others who have an interest in the
child, . . . whether the child is or may be an Indian child”].) An “extended family
member” includes “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian
child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece
or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see § 224.1,
subd. (c) [adopting same definition].) Additionally, “[u]nder California law, ‘an adopted
person and the adopting person are, by law, in a parent-child relationship the same as a
natural parent and child’ [citation] . . . .” (D.S. v. Superior Court (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
383, 391 (D.S.).) As such, the Department’s duty of inquiry is not limited to only
biological relatives. (Ibid.)
The Department “has the obligation to make a meaningful effort to locate and
interview extended family members to obtain whatever information they may have as to
the child’s possible Indian status.” (In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709.)
However, “ ‘the obligation is only one of inquiry and not an absolute duty to ascertain or

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refute Native American ancestry.’ [Citation.] Agencies are already tasked with
investigating the circumstances underlying the child’s removal and identifying and
locating the child’s extended family members (§ 309, subds. (a), (e)); it is a rather simple
task to ask those family members about Indian ancestry in this process.” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1143; see § 309, subd. (e)(1) [if a child is removed, “the social worker
shall conduct, within 30 days, an investigation in order to identify and locate all
grandparents, parents of a sibling of the child, . . . adult siblings, [and] other adult
relatives of the child . . .”].) “In most dependency cases, the children will not be found to
be Indian children, but that determination rests exclusively with the tribes and absent a
reasonable inquiry at the outset, the opportunity to gather information relevant to the
inquiry is often missed entirely.” (In re K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 615.) Thus,
“ensuring adequacy and accuracy at this first step is critical if the rights of tribes under
ICWA and California law are to be meaningfully safeguarded, as was intended by
Congress and our state Legislature.” (Id. at p. 591, fn. omitted.)
The juvenile court also has a duty of inquiry. “[O]n the first appearance upon a
petition, ‘the court shall ask each participant present in the hearing whether the
participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child.’ ” (In re
Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1099 (Kenneth D.), quoting § 224.2, subd. (c); see
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2).) The juvenile court may conclude that ICWA does
not apply if it finds that the Department’s “inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and
adequate,’ and the resulting record provide[s] no reason to know the child is an Indian
child . . . .” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) “In
order for the court to make a determination whether the notice requirements of . . . ICWA
have been satisfied, it must have sufficient facts as established by the [Department],
about the claims of the parents, the extent of the inquiry, the results of the inquiry, the
notice provided any tribes and the responses of the tribes to the notices given. Without
these facts, the juvenile court is unable to find, explicitly or implicitly,

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whether . . . ICWA applies. [Citations.]” (In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183,
1198.) A juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply in a proceeding implies the
Department fulfilled its duty of inquiry and that neither the Department nor the court had
a reason to know or believe the subject child is an Indian child. (In re Josiah T. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.) However, even if the juvenile court makes such a finding, it
must “reverse its determination if it subsequently receives information providing reason
to believe that the child is an Indian child and order the social worker or probation officer
to conduct further inquiry . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) Thus, “[w]hile this duty of
inquiry is sometimes referred to as the initial duty of inquiry, this is a bit of a misnomer,
as the duty ‘continues throughout the dependency proceedings.’ [Citations.]” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132, see In re K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 597, fn. 10
[acknowledging that it is “somewhat inaccurate” to refer to the Department’s duty as an
initial duty of inquiry].)
B. Standard of Review
“The juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not apply is ‘subject to
reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.) With respect to a juvenile court’s conclusion that an inquiry was
adequate and proper, “[s]ome courts apply a straightforward substantial evidence test”
while “ ‘other courts have used a hybrid standard, reviewing for substantial evidence
whether there is reason to know a minor is an Indian child, and reviewing a finding of
due diligence and proper inquiry for abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Although
the Supreme Court in Dezi C. did not resolve the split in authority as to what standard of
review applies to these findings, it acknowledged that “the juvenile court’s fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is a ‘quintessentially

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discretionary function’ [In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1005] subject to a
deferential standard of review.” (Id. at p. 1141.)
“ ‘ “On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to
determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the
specific facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the more limited that
discretion necessarily becomes.” ’ [Citations.]” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141;
accord Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1101-1102.) “If, upon review, a juvenile
court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are
found to be supported by sufficient evidence and record documentation as required by
California law [citation], there is no error and conditional reversal would not be
warranted even if the [Department] did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the
child. On the other hand, if the inquiry is inadequate, conditional reversal is required so
the [Department] can cure the error and thereby safeguard the rights of tribes, parents,
and the child.” (Dezi C., at p. 1141.)
When reviewing the juvenile court’s finding that the Department’s “inquiry and
due diligence were ‘proper and adequate’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134,
quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), we are “not concerned with the outcome, but rather with
the protection of tribal rights, including the tribes’ right to determine whether a child is an
Indian child.” (Id. at p. 1144, fn. omitted.) This is because the “inquiry is not outcome
oriented; rather, it is geared to ensuring that tribal heritage is acknowledged and inquired
about in dependency cases. Focusing on whether there is information bearing on the
outcome of the inquiry before an adequate inquiry has even been made frustrates the
purpose of ICWA and ignores that ‘tribes have a compelling, legally protected interest in
the inquiry itself.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1148.)

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C. The Department Failed to Conduct an Adequate Initial ICWA Inquiry
Based on our thorough review of the record, we conclude the juvenile court’s
implied finding that the Department’s ICWA inquiry was proper and adequate is
erroneous under either the substantial evidence or abuse of discretion standard.
With respect to the inquiry of T.C.’s maternal relatives, the Department did not
exercise due diligence in attempting to identify or contact extended maternal family
members who may have information about Mother’s ancestry. Following the initial
hearing, the juvenile court ordered the Department to interview any available relatives
regarding possible Indian heritage. However, the record does not demonstrate that the
Department thereafter endeavored to expand the scope of its inquiry to comply with its
continuing duty of inquiry. The Department interviewed Mother and maternal
grandmother on several occasions, but it appears the questioning never went beyond
asking either relative whether they had any Indian ancestry. Additionally, while the
Department indicated it was unable to reach Mother’s aunt and uncle because Mother
could not provide their contact information, it potentially had other avenues to obtain
such information that it failed to pursue. Even though the Department was in contact
with maternal grandmother from the outset of the case, there is no indication it attempted
to obtain contact information for Mother’s aunt and uncle from her. (See In re Elizabeth
M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 787 [“the [Department] must pursue all reasonable
investigative leads”].) Further, the Department does not appear to have requested that
either Mother or maternal grandmother identify Mother’s brother or have requested his
contact information. We also note that the record is unclear as to whether Mother has
any other family members besides maternal grandmother, a brother, a deceased sister,
and an aunt and uncle.
Nor does it appear that the Department asked either Mother or maternal
grandmother whether they could identify any other family members who might have
information about potential Native American ancestry. The Department already had a

10
duty to investigate whether T.C. had other relatives under section 309, and therefore,
asking Mother and maternal grandmother whether they could identify other family
members who could have information pertaining to the ancestry of Mother’s paternal or
maternal relatives would have been “ ‘slight and swift.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1143, quoting In re S.S. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 694, 698.) Instead, the Department
appears to have relied on Mother’s and maternal grandmother’s denials regarding their
Indian ancestry, without exercising due diligence to pursue reasonable investigative
leads. While it is true that the Department “is not required to ‘cast about’ for
information,” it also cannot escape its duty of inquiry by simply failing to investigate. (In
re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053, quoting In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
191, 199, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re B.E. (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 932, 940.) Our conclusion would be different on a record demonstrating
there was no one beyond Mother and maternal grandmother to ask, or if “they refused to
provide any information and the [Department] exercised due diligence but was unable to
identify and locate anyone else to ask.” (In re K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 604.)
But here, there is no indication the Department made a meaningful effort to identify or
contact any of Mother’s extended family members. Therefore, the Department’s initial
inquiry as to Mother’s potential Indian ancestry was deficient.
We similarly conclude the Department did not make a meaningful effort to locate
or identify any paternal family members who might have information about Father’s
potential Native American heritage. When the Department questioned Father about his
family history, Father stated he was adopted at age five and “described his childhood
with his adopted family as good.” Yet, the Department did not ask for the names of
Father’s adoptive parents, whether Father was in contact with his adoptive parents, or if
he could provide or obtain their contact information. (See D.S., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 391 [the Department’s “duty of inquiry under ICWA . . . is not excused simply
because . . . family members may be related by adoption”].) Nor does the record indicate

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if the Department asked Father whether he had any knowledge about the ancestry of
either his biological or adoptive parents. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) [defining “parent” as
“any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has
lawfully adopted an Indian child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom”].)
There is also no indication that the Department asked Father whether he knew anyone
who may have information about his ancestry. While the Department did ask Mother
whether she knew anyone who may have information about Father’s ancestry, the
Department should have asked Father directly since he was available for inquiry and a
better source for that information. Lastly, it is undisputed that the juvenile court failed to
inquire as to Father’s ancestry when he made his first appearance at the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing.6 As such, the Department’s initial inquiry regarding Father’s
potential Indian ancestry was inadequate.
Finally, we note Father does not identify on appeal whether there are any family
members who may have information about his ancestry. We acknowledge the possibility
that Father may not have any information about his biological or adoptive family given
he was adopted at a young age and later raised in foster care. Similarly, it is possible that
neither Mother nor maternal grandmother can provide contact information for any other

6 As to this point, the Department relies on In re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 793,
801-802 to argue that, even though the juvenile court did not question Father about his
ancestry at his initial appearance, the court nonetheless properly found that ICWA did not
apply because it asked Father about his potential Indian ancestry in Sibling’s case, which
occurred prior to the section 366.26 hearing in the instant case. In Father’s reply brief—
which Mother joins and adopts pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5)—
he concedes the juvenile court’s inquiry in Sibling’s case satisfies its duty under section
224.2, subd. (b)(1). Even assuming In re C.R. stands for the proposition for which the
parties assert, bare reliance on a parent’s representations regarding their Native American
ancestry does not suffice. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1150 [“nothing in the
statutory scheme permits the required inquiry to be halted or short circuited when a
parent denies Indian ancestry”].) The Department still had an independent duty to
conduct a proper and adequate inquiry, and its failure to do so cannot be cured by
Father’s denials about his Indian ancestry in a related case.

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maternal relatives, and that Mother may not have any other relatives besides those briefly
mentioned in the record. However, when as here, the Department fails to conduct a
thorough and good faith investigation, we cannot readily preclude the possibility that
there may be other reasonably available extended family members who may have
information about Father’s and Mother’s potential Indian ancestry. (See In re Jerry R.
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 388, 428 [“There may be cases in which there is no one else to ask
beyond the parents, but, if that is so, the record must be developed to reflect that fact and
supported by documentation”], citation omitted.)
In sum, on this record the Department’s inquiry is insufficient to support the
juvenile court’s implied finding that the Department’s initial inquiry was proper and
adequate under either the substantial evidence or abuse of discretion standard.
Accordingly, we hold “conditional reversal is required so the [Department] can cure the
error and thereby safeguard the rights of tribes, parents, and the child.” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
III. DISPOSITION
The order terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights is conditionally
reversed and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with instructions to order the
Department to comply with the inquiry requirements of ICWA. If thereafter the juvenile
court finds that T.C. is an Indian child, the juvenile court shall conduct a new section
366.26 hearing and proceed in accordance with ICWA. If not, the juvenile court shall
reinstate the original section 366.26 order.

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_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________
Danner, J.

______________________________________
Bromberg, J.

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