People v. Doucet CA1/2

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Filed 1/8/26 P. v. Doucet CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170327
v.
RYAN MICHAEL DOUCET, (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No.
CR2300962-A)
Defendant and Appellant.

In April of 2023, a search of defendant Ryan Michael Doucet’s residence
revealed two assault rifles as well as four homemade explosive devices.
Doucet went to trial on 11 counts arising out of the search, pleaded guilty to
five of them after the close of evidence, and was then found guilty of five of
the other six, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, possession of
an assault weapon, possession of an assault weapon for sale, child
endangerment, possession of an explosive device, and possession of the
ingredients to make an explosive device. The trial court subsequently
sentenced him to 14 years in prison.
Doucet appeals, arguing that his sentence on two of the firearm
possession convictions and one of the explosive convictions should have been
imposed and stayed pursuant to Penal Code1 section 654—an argument with

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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which the Attorney General agrees—and that the trial court erred in failing
to give a unanimity instruction with respect to the child endangerment count.
We agree with the parties that the three sentences at issue should have been
stayed under section 654, and exercise our authority to modify the judgment
accordingly. We otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
On September 20, 2022, in Humboldt County Superior Court, Doucet
pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11378) (No. CR2202468). On October 18, he was placed on two years
formal probation.
The Searches
On April 1, 2023, Detective Brian Buihner and Deputy Sheriff
Jonathan Waxler, along with two other members of the Humboldt County
Sheriff’s Department, conducted a search of Doucet’s residence on Garden
Lane in Bayside. Detective Buihner described the residence as a “single-
width mobile home trailer attached to a more permanent wooden structure”
with a roof, and “a raised, wooden patio.” Outside, Detective Buihner found
“clutter and trash everywhere,” including “bikes, power tools, . . .
refrigerators, freezers, [and] power cables.” After announcing themselves,
Detective Buihner and Deputy Waxler were let into the residence by Doucet’s
wife, Kathleen Ellis, who was inside with the couple’s son, John Doe.2
Detective Buihner described the interior of the residence as
“[e]xtremely dirty,” with “clutter [and] trash everywhere,” including “cables
all over the ground” and a “floorboard [that] was broken.” Directly across
from the front door, he observed an “open[] wooden cabinet” approximately

2 Detective Buihner testified that John Doe was six years old, while
Deputy Waxler testified that Doe was “around seven years old.”

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three feet tall, in which he located eight “4-by-5[] zip-top baggies,” five of
which contained a substance he believed to be fentanyl. On a desk next to
the cabinet was a working digital scale with “multiple different powdery
residue[s] on top of it.” Another deputy located $1,191 in cash in a pair of
coveralls hanging on the front door.
Deputy Waxler likewise found what he described as “fairly hazardous
conditions” in Doucet’s residence, including “power tools laying about,”
“copious amounts of trash buildup,” “mold, animal feces,” and “several five-
gallon buckets” that appeared as though “they were being utilized as latrines
or toilets.” He also observed drugs and drug paraphernalia “in plain view.”
On the only mattress in the main bedroom—which Deputy Waxler testified
was shared by Doucet, Ellis, and Doe—he observed “piles of boxes and
clothing, trash,” drug paraphernalia, and drugs, in particular, “fentanyl and
methamphetamine.”
Deputy Waxler measured John Doe’s height at four feet, one inch tall.
Doe’s hair was “unkempt,” “tattered and messy,” and the deputy “couldn’t
even estimate the last time it had been washed or cleaned.” Doe also
appeared to have “an infection on his thumb.”
Doucet was placed under arrest. After a search of his cellphone
revealed information suggesting that there was more evidence at his property
that the deputies had not located—including text messages from March of
2023 in which Doucet indicated that he “ha[d] three ghost ARs” and could
“make legit dynamite”—the deputies returned to Doucet’s property that same
evening to conduct a further search. This time, on the shoulder of the road
approximately 50 feet from the house, they located a “U-haul style truck”
that “looked like it hadn’t been driven in some time” but had a “brand new
lock on it.” After cutting the lock, the deputies found inside “[m]ultiple soft

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shell rifle cases”; “multiple ammo cans full of different calibers of
ammunition,” including high-capacity magazines and “tracer rounds” (i.e.,
bullets whose tip “burns or creates a flare effect so that the shooter can see
where the projectile is going”); two silencers; two completed firearms, a
“Bushmaster AR-15” and a “Ruger Mini-14”; three “partially completed” AR-
style rifles; “body armor”; a “ballistic helmet”; a plastic container with
“roughly half a pound” of fentanyl inside; and items they “believed were being
used for bomb-making,” including “hard, cylindrical cardboard tubes.”
Deputy Waxler placed a call to the bomb squad.
Deputy Sheriff Luke Mathieson, a certified hazardous explosives device
technician, responded to the call and examined the materials on a blanket at
the scene. There he found four “M-type devices” (a cardboard tube that is
filled with “pyrotechnics, flash powder or other explosive materials to create
basically, a large firecracker”); as well as tubes, plugs, “a couple rolls of . . .
cannon . . . or hobby fuse”; fine dust aluminum powder (“used as a sensitizer
for explosives” to make them “burn hotter and create[] a bigger explosion”);
and iron oxide (for “coloring effect”). Whereas a normal consumer firecracker
contains 50 milligrams of flash powder, the cardboard tubes containing the
four M-type devices were “full” and could hold 30 grams (or 30,000
milligrams) of flash powder each, the equivalent of a quarter stick of
dynamite. However, according to testing performed by Deputy Mathieson,
the M-type devices had been mixed incorrectly and would not have functioned
as explosives.
The Charges
On September 15, 2023, the District Attorney filed an information
charging Doucet with two counts of possession of an explosive device
(§ 18710, subd. (a)), to wit, “explosives” and “tracer rounds” (counts 1 and 2);

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possession of ingredients to make an explosive device (§ 18720) (count 3);
felony child endangerment, together with Kathleen Ellis (§ 273a, subd. (a))
(count 4); felon in possession of a firearm with a prior, “to wit, an AR-10 rifle,
a purple AR-15 rifle, and a blue AR-15 rifle with short barrels, bolt assembly,
and charging handles” (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) (count 5); possession of an
assault weapon, based on the same firearms described in count 5 (§ 30605,
subd. (a)) (count 6); felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1))
(count 7); possession of a silencer (§ 33410) (count 8); possession of an assault
weapon for sale, “to wit, assault style rifles” (§ 30600, subd. (a)) (count 9);
possession of fentanyl for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351) (count 10); and
possession of a large-capacity magazine (§ 32310, subd. (a)) (count 11).3
The Trial
Doucet was tried by jury on November 15 and 16, 2023. Detective
Buihner, Deputy Waxler, and Deputy Mathieson testified, some of which
testimony is described above. Doucet testified in his own defense as follows.
He had lived at the residence on Garden Lane with Kathleen Ellis and John
Doe for “roughly” seven years. However, around April 1, 2023, Kathleen Ellis
“was moving out” and her “dad ha[d] been in town for the last few weeks and
they [had] been staying over in Valley West in a hotel.” They had been gone
from the house for “[a] week solid and before that, off and on for another

3 The information further alleged several aggravating factors under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), including that “the defendant was convicted
of other crimes for which consecutive sentences could have been imposed
[and] for which concurrent sentences are being imposed; the manner in which
the crime was carried out indicates planning, sophistication, or
professionalism; the crime involved a large quantity of contraband; the
defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile
delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness; [and] the
defendant was on probation, mandatory supervision, post-release community
supervision, or parole when the crime was committed.”

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week.” The night before April 1, Doucet “got home late” because he was
cutting firewood until “2:00, 3:00 in the morning.” He had his own door to the
residence, with a “separate room from them, separate side of the house,” so
he “went in and went to sleep.” He did not realize that that Ellis and John
Doe were in the residence until the next day, when he saw “on the camera”
the arrival of police officers, went outside, and saw his father-in-law’s van.
Although there was no formal custody arrangement, Doucet testified
that Kathleen Ellis “pretty much . . . raised” and “raises” John Doe, although
he was an “active as a father in his life.”
Doucet answered, “Yes” when asked if he would describe himself “as an
addict,” with his “drug of choice” being fentanyl, which he had been using,
along with methamphetamine, for the past two years. Before that, he used
“heroin, Suboxone and crystal meth, probably, off and on, since I moved out
here, like, nine years ago.”
Although Doucet knew that he was not permitted to possess firearms
after his conviction for selling methamphetamine, he had been in possession
of certain firearms for four years, and he “stored them locked away in the box
truck” after his conviction because he knew they were “valuable.” He had
received his tax return of “5,000-something” dollars two weeks before April 1,
which he used to purchase the almost half a pound of fentanyl found in the
box truck. When asked how he would explain his behavior and judgments
that led to the charges against him, Doucet answered that “use of drugs, you
know, definitely played a part,” and that fentanyl is “lousy” and “makes you
an addict.”
Doucet admitted that everything in the box truck was his, but claimed
that what Deputy Waxler had described as two silencers were an “oil filter”
and a “Maglite.” He denied any intention to make destructive devices,

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indicating that he instead intended to make “M-80s or cherry bombs”—“big
firecrackers for fireworks for the 4th of July”—which he acknowledged “may
have been illegal” in California. He was not aware that the ingredients for
the “fireworks” could be used to make destructive devices, “wasn’t trying to
destruct anything,” and had “no intentions of bombs for sure.”
The Plea, Verdict, and Sentence
On November 16, after the close of evidence but before the jury was
instructed and closing arguments began, Doucet entered a plea of guilty to
counts 5, 6, 7, 9, and 11.4
The next day, the jury found Doucet guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10,
and not guilty on count 8.
On April 11, 2024, the trial court sentenced Doucet to an aggregate
term of 14 years in prison, comprised as follows: the upper term of 8 years on
count 9 (§ 30600), which the trial court designated as the base term; the
upper term of three years on count 1; 8 months on count 2 (§ 18710); one year
(one-third the middle term of three years) on count 3 (§ 18720); 16 months
(one-third the middle term of four years) on count 4 (§ 273a); the upper term
of three years on count 5 (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)); 8 months (one-third the
middle term of two years) each on counts 6 (§ 30605) and count 7 (§ 30305;
one year (one-third the middle term of three years) on count 10 (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11351); and eight months (one-third the middle term of two
years) on count 11. The sentence on each count was to run consecutively to
count 9, except for count 1 (as to which “concurrent sentencing is
appropriate” because it involved “essentially, the same course of conduct,

4 The abstract of judgment erroneously indicates that Doucet’s conviction
on count 11 was by jury and not by plea. We will order the abstract of
judgment corrected. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–187.)

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which is alleged in Count Three”), count 5 (because “it’s the same firearms
that are alleged” in count 6), and count 11 (“based on the convictions for
ammunition, the firearms and the other charges that Mr. Doucet has been
convicted of”).
The trial court also revoked probation in Case No. CR2202468 and
imposed a sentence of 8 months (one-third the middle term of two years) for
Doucet’s 2022 conviction for possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11378).
Doucet filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Section 654 Requires that the Sentence on Counts 1, 5, and 6 Be
Stayed
Counts 5, 6, and 9
Doucet argues that his sentence violates the prohibition on multiple
punishment set forth in section 654 in two ways: first, his sentences for being
a felon in possession of a firearm, possession of an assault weapon, and
possession of an assault weapon for sale (counts 5, 6, & 9) were each based on
his possession of the same firearms; and second, because the M-type devices
were not capable of exploding, his sentences for possession of a destructive
device and possession of ingredients to make a destructive device (counts 1 &
3) were based on the same conduct. The Attorney General concedes both
arguments and agrees that the sentences imposed on counts 1, 5, and 9 must
be stayed under section 654. We agree with the parties.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act
or omission be punished under more than one provision.”

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“Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under
section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an
‘act or omission’ may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course
of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective.
[Citations.] We first consider if the different crimes were completed by a
‘single physical act.’ [Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be punished
more than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more
than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that
course of conduct reflects a single ‘intent and objective’ or multiple intents
and objectives.” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.)
“ ‘ “Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives
rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the
intent and objective of the actor.” . . . [¶] “Whether the facts and
circumstances reveal a single intent and objective within the meaning of
Penal Code section 654 is generally a factual matter; the dimension and
meaning of section 654 is a legal question.” ’ (People v. Dowdell (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 1388, 1414.) ‘When a trial court sentences a defendant to
separate terms without making an express finding the defendant entertained
separate objectives, the trial court is deemed to have made an implied finding
each offense had a separate objective.’ (People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
116, 129.) We review for substantial evidence a trial court’s implied finding
that a defendant had separate intents and objectives for different offenses.
(Dowdell, at p. 1414.)” (In re L.J. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 37, 43.)
Doucet’s sentences on each of counts 5, 6, and 9 were based on his
simultaneous possession of two completed assault rifles, and we assume that
such possession can constitute two physical acts for the purposes of section
654. (See People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 358 (Jones) [suggesting

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“ ‘simultaneous possession of different items of contraband’ ” are separate
acts for purposes of section 654].) Even so, multiple punishment can be
imposed consistent with section 654—on two of the three counts5—only if
substantial evidence in the record supports an implied finding that he had a
“ ‘separate objective’ ” in possessing one firearm versus the other. (In re L.J.,
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 43.) Our review of the record reveals no such
evidence. Instead, Doucet testified that he kept both firearms because he
knew they were “valuable” and that “when I was legally having them, they
cost a lot of money. So, I wasn’t just trying to give them to somebody . . . for
free.” Accordingly, Doucet’s sentence on two of counts 5, 6, and 9 must be
stayed pursuant to section 654.6
As noted, Doucet received an upper term sentence of 8 years on count
9—the principal term—a concurrent three-year sentence on count 5, and a
consecutive eight month sentence on count 6. Given that count 9 was the
base term as to which the trial court imposed the upper term sentence, we
think it clear that it would stay the sentences on counts 5 and 6 were we to
remand for resentencing. Accordingly, in the interests of judicial economy,
and given that the parties agree on this remedy, we will modify the judgment

5 Under Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th 350, “[s]ection 654 prohibits multiple
punishment for a single physical act that violates different provisions of law.”
(Jones, p. 358.)
6 Indeed, at sentencing the prosecutor indicated, at least with respect to
count 6, that “it would be incapsulated [sic] as being a part of Count Nine,”
and “when I had charged them, I had contemplated that . . . there were
different guns for different aspects . . . but I don’t know if . . . there was
actually a distinction there. So, I do believe that Count Six, in fairness,
should be 352 to Count Nine, which would take eight months off of the
sentence bringing it down by eight months.” In response to a question from
the trial court, the prosecutor quickly clarified that by “352,” he meant
section 654.

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to stay the sentences on counts 5 and 6 rather than remand for resentencing.
(See § 1260 [authority to modify unauthorized sentence]; People v. Burns
(1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1184 [“staying execution of the penalty imposed”
is the preferred remedy [for section 654 error] where the “reduction in
sentence would be relatively minor” because “[i]n such cases, it would not
serve the interests of justice or judicial economy to require remand”].)
Counts 1 and 3
Doucet’s next argument is that section 654 prohibits multiple
punishment for both possession of an explosive device (§ 18710, subd. (a))
(count 1) and possession of ingredients to make an explosive device (§ 18720)
(count 3), because the “explosives” he possessed were not actually capable of
exploding, and thus “identical evidence supported counts 1 and 3.” The
Attorney General concedes that “the convictions on counts 1 and 3 involve the
same conduct,” and that “the term on count 1 should be stayed instead of run
concurrently.” Again, we agree.
The jury instructions on count 3 defined an “explosive” as follows: “An
explosive is any substance, or combination of substances, (1) whose main or
common purpose is to detonate or rapidly combust and (2) which is capable of
a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat. [¶] An explosive
is also any substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other
substances to create a new substance that can release gas and heat rapidly or
relatively instantaneously.” In order to find Doucet guilty on count 1, the
instructions required the jury to conclude that he knowingly possessed a
“destructive device,” defined as “[a]ny bomb, grenade, explosive, missile, or
similar device,” or (2) “[a]ny projectile containing any explosive or incendiary
material or any other chemical substance, including but not limited to, that
which is commonly known as tracer or incendiary ammunition, except tracer

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ammunition manufactured for use in shotguns.” (See CALCRIM No. 2570.)
The instruction on counts 1 and 2 then indicated that the prosecution alleged
Doucet possessed two “destructive devices”: “1. Explosives” and “2. Tracer
Rounds.” With respect to count 3, the instructions required the prosecution
to prove: “1. The defendant possessed a substance, material, or combination
of substances and materials; [¶] AND [¶] 2. When the defendant possessed
those items, he intended to make an explosive or a destructive device.”7
Doucet argues that because the ingredients as he mixed them were not
“capable of a relatively instantaneous or rapid release of gas and heat,” the
evidence supported “only the second definition of ‘explosive,’ i.e., any
substance whose main purpose is to be combined with other substances to
create a substance that can release gas and heat rapidly,” and thus “identical
evidence”—i.e., his possession of the ingredients with the intent to make an
explosive or destructive device—supported both counts 1 and 3. He is correct.
Both counts 1 and 3 were based on Doucet’s possession of the
ingredients in the box truck, at the same time and place, and under the same
circumstances. And again, rather than making any express or “ ‘implied
finding’ ” that Doucet had “ ‘a separate objective’ ” (In re L.J., supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at p. 43) with respect to counts 1 and 3, the trial court expressly
acknowledged that both counts were based on “essentially, the same course of
conduct,” which explained its decision to run the sentence on count 1
concurrently.

7 In his closing argument, the prosecutor explained that “[c]ount One
refers to these four completed devices, the four M-type devices, that Deputy
Mathieson talked about,” and that count 3 was “pretty self-explanatory . . .
Deputy Mathieson talked about it was all there. There were still fuses, the
powder, it’s in the same workshop in the box truck . . . .”

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In any event, there is no substantial evidence in the record to support
an implied finding that Doucet possessed the M-type devices and their
ingredients with any “separate intent[] and objective.” (In re L.J., supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at p. 43.) As noted, he testified that he was intending to make
“cherry bomb” firecrackers, while the prosecution argued, based on his text
messages, that his intention was to sell the devices as “legit dynamite.” But
there was no evidence that he harbored any different intent with respect to
the devices and their ingredients. The trial court therefore should have
imposed and stayed sentence on one of counts 1 and 3 pursuant to section
654.
As noted, Doucet received a concurrent upper-term sentence of three
years on count 1 and a consecutive one-year (one-third the middle term of
three years) sentence on count 3. The parties agree that the proper remedy
for the section 654 error is to stay the sentence on count 1. Given that the
trial court imposed a concurrent sentence on count 1 because it involved
“essentially, the same course of conduct” as count 3, and the fact that staying
the sentence on count 1 will not change Doucet’s aggregate sentence, we will
exercise our authority to modify the judgment to stay the sentence on count 1
rather than remand for resentencing. (See § 1260; People v. Alford (2010) 180
Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473 [exercising authority to modify judgment to impose
and stay sentence under section 654 rather than remand for resentencing
“that will not change [defendant’s] actual prison time”].)

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No Unanimity Instruction Was Required With Respect to the
Child Endangerment Count
Doucet’s final argument is that the trial court erred in failing to give a
unanimity instruction to the jury with respect to the child endangerment
count. We disagree.
“In a criminal case, a jury verdict must be unanimous. [Citations.] . . . .
Additionally, the jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a
specific crime. [Citation.] Therefore, cases have long held that when the
evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must
elect among the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the
same criminal act. [Citations.]
“This requirement of unanimity as to the criminal act ‘is intended to
eliminate the danger that the defendant will be convicted even though there
is no single offense which all the jurors agree the defendant committed.’
[Citation.] . . . . ‘The [unanimity] instruction is designed in part to prevent
the jury from amalgamating evidence of multiple offenses, no one of which
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant must have done something sufficient to
convict on one count.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124,
1132 (Russo); see People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 145.)
“There are, however, several exceptions to this rule. For example, no
unanimity instruction is required if the case falls within the continuous-
course-of-conduct exception,[8] which arises ‘when the acts are so closely

8 In People v. Leuth (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 189, the Court of Appeal
observed that the “ ‘continuous-course-of-conduct exception’ . . . is a catch-all
term, which, somewhat confusingly, embraces two wholly distinct principles,”
and that with respect to the “exception” for closely connected acts that form
one transaction, “it is not at all clear that this is truly an exception. It would

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connected in time as to form part of one transaction’ (People v. Crandell
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 875), or ‘when . . . the statute contemplates a
continuous course of conduct or a series of acts over a period of time.’ (People
v. Thompson (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 220, 224.) There also is no need for a
unanimity instruction if the defendant offers the same defense or defenses to
the various acts constituting the charged crime. (People v. Carrera (1989) 49
Cal.3d 291, 311–312.)” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679.)
“The key to deciding whether to give the unanimity instruction lies in
considering its purpose. The jury must agree on a ‘particular crime’
[citation]; it would be unacceptable if some jurors believed the defendant
guilty of one crime and other jurors believed her guilty of another. But
unanimity as to exactly how the crime was committed is not required. Thus,
the unanimity instruction is appropriate ‘when conviction on a single count
could be based on two or more discrete criminal events,’ but not ‘where
multiple theories or acts may form the basis of a guilty verdict on one discrete
criminal event.’ [Citation.] In deciding whether to give the instruction, the
trial court must ask whether (1) there is a risk the jury may divide on two
discrete crimes and not agree on any particular crime, or (2) the evidence
merely presents the possibility the jury may divide, or be uncertain, as to the
exact way the defendant is guilty of a single discrete crime. In the first
situation, but not the second, it should give the unanimity instruction.”
(Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1134–1135.)
“Even absent a request, the court should give [a unanimity] instruction
‘where the circumstances of the case so dictate.’ ” (People v. Riel (2000) 22
Cal.4th 1153, 1199, quoting People v. Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 311, fn.

seem more accurate to say that, in this situation, a unanimity instruction is
required, but the failure to give one is harmless.” (Id. at p. 196.)

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8.) And whether a jury has been properly instructed, including the question
of whether the trial court should have given a unanimity instruction sua
sponte, is a question of law that we review de novo. (People v. Fish (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 730, 741–742 (Fish); People v. Hernandez (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 559, 568.) In doing so, we consider “ ‘ “whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied” ’ ” the law
in light of the lack of instruction, considering both “ ‘ “the entire charge of the
court” ’ ” and “ ‘the arguments of counsel in assessing the probable impact’ ”
of the lack of instruction on the jury. (Fish, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp.
742–743.)
Doucet argues that an instruction on unanimity was required on the
child endangerment count because the prosecution relied on five “different
types of harm” to support it, namely that: (1) “the residence was generally
filthy and unsanitary,” (2) it “was in disrepair,” (3) “John Doe’s person
reflected a lack of personal hygiene and medical care,” (4) “fentanyl was
accessible in the master bedroom and living room,” and (5) “firearms and
explosive materials were kept on the premises.” For the proposition that the
prosecution relied on each of these circumstances in support of the child
endangerment count, Doucet points to the prosecutor’s statement during
closing argument that “So, not only do we have a circumstance where the
child has an active infection, that there are hazardous circumstances around
the house, such as Detective Buihner testified to, a broken floorboard, power
tools throughout the house, those kinds of things, that, in fact, there was
fentanyl in the main first area of the home in a low cabinet, the top of the
cabinet being about three feet tall.”
The Attorney General responds that Doucet’s conviction was “not
supported by distinct, separate acts, but rather by a single course of

16
conduct—namely, allowing John Doe to live in a home under the conditions
the officers observed”—and that “the conditions of the house were simply the
myriad ways that proved the house was, in fact, dangerous,” thus supporting
“a single theory of crime.” We agree with the Attorney General.
Section 273a, subdivision (a) punishes, as relevant here, “[a]ny person
who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or
death, . . . having the care or custody of any child, . . . willfully causes or
permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or
health is endangered.” And so the jury was instructed, pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 821, that in order to find Doucet guilty of child endangerment,
the prosecution had to prove that he, “while having care or custody of a child,
willfully caused or permitted the child to be placed in a situation where the
child’s person or health was endangered,” “under circumstances or conditions
likely to produce great bodily harm or death,” and that he “was criminally
negligent” when he did so. (See CALCRIM No. 821; § 273a, subd. (a).)
Given the statute’s language describing a singular “situation”
presenting “circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm
or death,” the Attorney General has the better of the argument as to whether
each of those conditions was a separate act of child endangerment. Moreover,
we cannot accept Doucet’s argument that a unanimity instruction was
required for the more fundamental reason that we disagree with its premise,
i.e., that the prosecution relied on each of the conditions described above to
prove the child endangerment count.
Turning first to the “firearms and explosive materials . . . kept on the
premises,” the prosecutor’s closing argument with respect to child
endangerment made not a single mention of them, and as discussed, the
evidence showed that they were locked in a box truck some 50 feet from the

17
residence, and were not capable of actually exploding. And there was neither
argument nor evidence that the condition of the residence, or John Doe’s
“lack of personal hygiene and medical care,” were “likely to produce great
bodily injury or death.” (§ 273a, subd. (a).) The single sentence of the
prosecutor’s closing argument relied on by Doucet, in which the prosecutor
mentioned John Doe’s “active infection” and the “hazardous circumstances” in
the residence, goes on to note that “there was fentanyl in the main first area
of the home in a low cabinet, the top of the cabinet being about three feet
tall.” The balance of the prosecutor’s closing argument regarding child
endangerment—an argument that spans some four pages of the reporter’s
transcript—concerned the easily-accessible fentanyl in the residence,
including specific reference to Deputy Waxler’s testimony that just two
milligrams of fentanyl can be a fatal dose. And in his rebuttal, in response to
defense counsel’s argument that the condition of the residence and John
Doe’s infection did not present circumstances likely to produce great bodily
injury or death, the prosecutor expressly told the jury that “it’s not the
People’s argument that infection is going to kill [John Doe] or that he being
unke[m]pt is going to kill him,” which circumstances were “just indicators
about what’s happening in this house.” Rather, the prosecutor argued that
the circumstance likely to produce great bodily injury or death was that there
was “fentanyl everywhere” in the house, including “in [John Doe’s] bed,” and
that it was “logical . . . to go from fentanyl strewn about the residence to a
child being harmed, to a child dying.”
In short, this is not a case in which Doucet’s conviction “could be based
on two or more discrete criminal events,” nor do we perceive any risk that the
jury may have “divide[d]” without agreeing as to whether it was the disrepair
of the residence, John Doe’s infection and his personal hygiene, or the easily-

18
accessible fentanyl that presented the circumstances likely to produce great
bodily injury or death necessary to sustain the child endangerment count.
(Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1135.) The evidence and the arguments of
counsel show that the circumstance that could—and did—form the basis for
the child endangerment count was the presence of what the evidence showed
were at least five “4-by-5[] zip-top baggies” of fentanyl within arm’s reach of
John Doe throughout his home.
In any event, we conclude that the alleged error was harmless under
any standard because Doucet “offer[ed] the same defense or defenses to the
various acts constituting the charged crime.”9 (People v. Jennings, supra, 50
Cal.4th at p. 679, citing People v. Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 311–312.)
As noted, Doucet testified he was an “addict” with fentanyl his “drug of
choice,” admitted that the explosives in the box truck belonged to him, and
did not dispute the state of his residence as law enforcement found it on April
1, 2023. Instead, his defense focused on the element of child endangerment
requiring that he “have care or custody of the child” and the mental state
required to commit it, telling the jury that Ellis “raised” and “raises” John
Doe, and that he was chopping firewood until late in the night before the
deputies arrived on April 1 and did not know John Doe was present on the
premises. And in closing argument, after stating that he was “not condoning
the condition of Mr. Doucet’s residence” and acknowledging that “conditions

9 Recent decisions of this district have evaluated prejudice from failure to
give a unanimity instruction under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, although there
appears to be a split of authority in the Courts of Appeal on this question.
(See People v. Smith (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1545 & fn. 7; People v.
Jones (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1096; Fish, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p.
738.)

19
were bad there,” defense counsel argued that Doucet “didn’t even know the
child had come home that night before with Ms. Ellis,” asked the jury to “look
at the relative culpability of the people involved,” and noted there was
“testimony they were being evicted” and “that the child had been staying in a
hotel room for the past several days with the maternal grandfather and
mother.”
Given that the jury evidently rejected these arguments—which
depended in large part on Doucet’s credibility—he offers no basis to conclude
that the result would have been any different had the jury been given a
unanimity instruction with respect to the child endangerment count. (See,
e.g., People v. Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 577 [where “the
defendant offered the same defense to all criminal acts and ‘the jury’s verdict
implies that it did not believe the only defense offered,’ failure to give a
unanimity instruction is harmless error”]; People v. Thompson (1995) 36
Cal.App.4th 843, 853 [“[w]here the record indicates the jury resolved the
basic credibility dispute against the defendant and therefore would have
convicted him of any of the various offenses shown by the evidence, the
failure to give the unanimity instruction is harmless”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to stay the sentences on counts 1, 5, and 6
under Penal Code section 654. The trial court is directed to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment reflecting these modifications, as well as the
fact that defendant’s conviction on count 11 was by plea and not by jury, and
to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

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RICHMAN, J.

We concur.

STEWART, P. J.

DESAUTELS, J.

(A170327N)

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