CourtListener 10771201•People v. Ast CA4/1
Texto completo
Filed 1/8/26 P. v. Ast CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085737
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE428671)
SETH EUGENE AST,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kathleen M. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Matthew Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Seth Eugene Ast of driving and receiving a stolen
vehicle and he was sentenced to six years in prison. Ast’s appellate counsel
filed a brief stating no arguable issues can be found. (See generally People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
738 (Anders).) We have independently reviewed the record and agree there
are no reasonably arguable issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Robert Bernay is a self-employed locksmith. One morning in early
November 2024, he went to his office and discovered that his Chevy box
truck—containing tools worth at least $50,000—was missing. He checked his
surveillance cameras and saw that the truck was driven away shortly after
11:00 p.m. the night before. The video did not clearly capture the person
entering or driving the truck.1 Bernay reported the theft to the police right
away.
Later that night, city cameras registered the box truck’s license plate
and notified police of its location. Nearby officers promptly located the truck
and initiated a traffic stop. The driver and sole occupant, Ast, was ordered
out of the truck and placed under arrest. After receiving his Miranda
advisements, Ast made a confusing series of statements to the police. He
said that he got the truck from his work, that his brother told him to take it,
and that he knew the owner’s brother.
When Bernay received the truck back a few days later, its air
conditioning unit had been removed from the roof—leaving a large hole—and
placed on the passenger seat. A railing was damaged and about half the tools
were missing. At trial, he confirmed that he does not know Ast and did not
give him permission to drive his truck. His brother had been deceased for
two years.
The prosecution presented evidence at trial that, in 2022, Ast was
pulled over driving a Chevy SUV that had been reported stolen two days
earlier. Ast told police that his brother gave him the vehicle. He was
arrested for driving a stolen vehicle.
1 Bernay did not save a copy of the video and it automatically erased
within 30 days (i.e., by early December 2024).
2
Ast was charged with unlawfully driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851,
subd. (a)) and receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code,2 § 496d). As to both
counts, the prosecution alleged that he was previously convicted of receiving
a stolen vehicle (§ 666.5, subd. (a)). It was further alleged that he suffered
one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12). A jury convicted
Ast on both counts. In bifurcated proceedings, he admitted the prior
conviction allegations. The trial court sentenced Ast to six years in prison on
the unlawful driving count, comprised of the midterm of three years, doubled
to six years for the strike prior. An identical sentence for receiving a stolen
vehicle was stayed pursuant to section 654.
DISCUSSION
Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436
and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738 indicating that he identified no reasonably
arguable issues for reversal on appeal. He asked this court to review the
entire record as mandated by Wende, paying particular attention to two
issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the 2022
arrest for possessing a stolen vehicle under Evidence Code section 1101,
subdivision (b)3; and (2) whether the court erred in declining to dismiss his
prior strike. Ast filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf, raising three
additional issues for our consideration: (1) whether he was denied his right
to a speedy trial; (2) whether his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance;
and (3) whether he was entitled to release on his own recognizance.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 Counsel also references a 2024 burglary conviction that the prosecution
moved to admit as impeachment evidence in the event Ast testified. But Ast
did not testify at trial, and so the evidence was never admitted.
3
Our review of the record as mandated by Wende and Anders has
disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues. We discern no abuse of
discretion in admitting the prior arrest evidence. Ast’s prior arrest was
relevant to show intent, lack of mistake, and knowledge. Similar to the
current incident, Ast was caught driving a Chevy that had been recently
reported stolen and claimed that his brother gave him the vehicle. (See
People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 827 [prior acts
evidence is admissible to show intent if there are “ ‘sufficient similarities to
demonstrate that in each instance the perpetrator acted with the same intent
or motive’ ”]; cf. People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 969–970, 973
[prior vehicle theft was sufficiently similar to current theft to show
knowledge, intent, and common plan where in both instances defendant
punched out the ignition with a flat-blade screwdriver].)
We likewise see no abuse of discretion in the trial court declining to
dismiss the prior strike. As the trial court noted, Ast has a lengthy criminal
history and he committed the first degree burglary offense underlying the
strike allegation less than one year before the current offenses. He had been
on parole for just a few months at the time. (See People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 378 [“the circumstances must be ‘extraordinary . . . by which a
career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme
within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and
continuous criminal record’ ”].)
For his part, Ast principally contends his right to a speedy trial was
violated. Section 1382—enacted to implement a defendant’s constitutional
right to a speedy trial (Rhinehart v. Municipal Court (1984) 35 Cal.3d 772,
776)—generally requires that a defendant in a felony case be brought to trial
within 60 days of arraignment on an information. (§ 1382, subd. (a)(2).)
4
Here, the record shows Ast was arraigned on the information immediately
after the preliminary hearing on November 27, 2024. Despite two
continuances, his jury trial timely began on January 27, 2025. (See People
v. Crary (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 534, 542 [when the 60th day falls on a
Sunday, trial may begin on Monday].) There was no speedy trial violation.
Relying on People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, Ast argues he was
entitled to release on his own recognizance because his preliminary hearing
took place more than 10 days after his arraignment on the complaint. Even
assuming this were true, Ast’s remedy would have been to file a petition for
writ of habeas corpus or other extraordinary relief seeking release. (See id.
at pp. 884, 887.) After trial and conviction, an appellant must generally show
that the error complained of resulted in prejudice at trial (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13; see, e.g., People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529–530), a
showing that Ast does not attempt to make here.
Finally, Ast appears to claim his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to present evidence of an incident that he claims
occurred before the current offenses, and that he reported to the police after
trial. We are unable to evaluate this claim because it is not clear what
incident Ast is referring to, and the record does not contain any information
as to why counsel might have declined to present such evidence. (See People
v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 [“On direct appeal, a conviction will be
reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission,
(2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All other claims of ineffective
assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding”].)
Competent counsel represented Ast on this appeal.
5
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
RUBIN, J.
6
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