People v. Martinez CA2/1

CourtListener 10768312Calctapp2 de jan. de 2026

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Filed 1/2/26 P. v. Martinez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B338886

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA007125)
v.

LENIN ARRENDONDO
MARTINEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Richard H. Kirschner, Judge. Conditionally affirmed with
directions.
Jennifer Peabody and Keilana Truong, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
Defendant and appellant Lenin Arrendondo Martinez—whom
a jury convicted of first degree murder in 1992—appeals the trial
court’s order denying his Penal Code1 section 1172.6 resentencing
petition at the prima facie stage. Martinez contends he is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on his petition because the jury might
have convicted him as a mere participant—rather than as the
actual killer—under a felony murder theory of liability.
The record of conviction, however, reveals no path permitting
the jury to convict Martinez as anything other than the actual
killer. And Martinez puts forth no “specific facts that identify
someone else as the direct perpetrator.” (People v. Patton (2025)
17 Cal.5th 549, 567 (Patton).) Nor does he challenge any other
elements of his conviction. (See People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 462 [a section 1172.6 petition “puts at issue all elements of the
[challenged homicide] offense under a valid theory”].) We therefore
conclude the court properly denied the petition.
“[O]ut of an abundance of caution,” however, we grant
Martinez’s request for an opportunity on remand to plead additional
relevant facts in support of his petition. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 569; accord, People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 925
(Glass) [granting petitioner 30 days to plead additional facts
on remand, but otherwise conditionally affirming denial of his
section 1172.6 petition].) Accordingly, we conditionally affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
For context, we provide the following account of the offense
from our opinion in Martinez’s direct appeal. But we do not rely
on this factual account in resolving the present appeal.

1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
“The 60-year-old victim, Claridge Kingsmore, went to the
supermarket one evening [in November 1990]. [Martinez] had
been hanging around outside the supermarket for several hours,
watching people come and go. Precisely what transpired when
[Martinez] shot the victim is unknown, except for [Martinez’s] out-
of-court statements. A witness heard a shot and saw the assailant
standing near the driver’s side of the victim’s car. The shooter
moved away from the car and the victim got into the car and drove
away. Mr. Kingsmore drove himself to the hospital, but died from
massive bleeding. A bag of groceries was found in his car.
“Circumstantial evidence connected [Martinez] to the murder,
including two of his friends who testified that [Martinez] told them
he shot an old man who refused to surrender his car. Evidence was
introduced that [Martinez] had told his brother he shot the man
after the man ignored [Martinez’s] demand to get out of the car.
[Martinez] said to the man, ‘ “You think I’m kidding,” ’ and shot
when the man still failed to get out of the car. Mr. Kingsmore
was hard of hearing.” (People v. Martinez (Jan. 29, 1993, B066394)
[nonpub. opn.].)
In 1991, the district attorney charged Martinez, as the sole
defendant, with Kingsmore’s murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). At trial,
the court instructed the jury on first and second degree murder
with malice aforethought and on first degree felony murder. But
the court did not instruct on any other theories of imputed malice,
such as the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Nor did
the court instruct on any aiding and abetting principles.
The jury convicted Martinez of first degree murder
and found true that “in the commission . . . of the . . . offense, . . .
Martinez . . . personally used a firearm within the meaning of . . .
[s]ection 12022.5.” (Capitalization omitted.) The verdict form
reflected the jury found that Martinez murdered Kingsmore

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“willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought.” The court
sentenced Martinez to 30 years to life in prison. On appeal, we
modified Martinez’s custody and conduct credits, but otherwise
affirmed the judgment. (See Martinez I, supra, B066394.)
Twenty-five years after Martinez’s trial, the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015), “which abolished liability for murder based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or imputed malice
predicated solely on one’s participation in a crime.” (Glass, supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at p. 926.) As relevant here, the bill “significantly
limited the scope of the felony-murder rule,” but left intact liability
for a defendant convicted as the actual killer under a felony murder
theory. (People v. Nino (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 844, 852 (Nino); see
id. at p. 856; § 189, subd. (e)(1)-(3).)
Via section 1172.6, the Legislature “offered relief to
those convicted under [now-invalid] homicide theories.” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 556.) “Petitioners seeking relief under
section 1172.6 must, first, file a facially valid petition that states
the statutory requirements for relief [citation], and second, make
a ‘prima facie showing’ [citation], before a court must issue an order
to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on the ultimate
question of resentencing at which the People will bear the burden
of defending a conviction under the amended law [citation].” (Ibid.)
“If a petitioner who files a facially valid petition fails, at the second
step, to make a prima facie showing, then the court denies the
petition and provides no relief. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 562.)
“In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief, the sentencing court ‘looks beyond the face of the
petition’ to the record of conviction, which ‘ “necessarily inform[s]
the . . . inquiry . . . , allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” ’ [Citation.]”

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(Nino, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 853.) “ ‘[I]n reviewing any
part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a
[sentencing] court should not engage in “factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.” ’ [Citations.]”
(Ibid.) But as our Supreme Court recently clarified in Patton,
“a petitioner who offers only conclusory allegations of entitlement
to relief under section 1172.6, in response to a record of conviction
that demonstrates the petitioner’s conviction was under a still-valid
theory, has not, thereby, made a prima facie showing.” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 557.) “For example, if the record shows the
petitioner was convicted as the direct perpetrator, a dispute may
arise if the ‘petitioner points to specific facts that identify someone
else as the direct perpetrator. . . . But absent specific facts, no such
dispute arises . . . from mere latent, speculative possibilities; that
is, a hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator cannot be conjured
from thin air or a legal conclusion.’ ” (People v. Venancio (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 593, 605, quoting Patton, supra, at p. 567.)
In May 2023, Martinez filed a pro se petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. In the petition, he alleged “the trial
court used the theory of ‘natural and probable consequences
doctrine’ to obtain the conv[ic]tion” (capitalization omitted), and
that he was “in Mexico and in Mexico’s police custody during the
period of the alleged murder.” (Capitalization omitted.) Following
receipt of the petition, the court appointed counsel to represent
Martinez in the section 1172.6 proceedings.
The district attorney’s office filed a written opposition to
the petition, arguing in pertinent part: “[Martinez] was prosecuted
as the actual killer of the murder victim. As the actual killer in a
felony-murder prosecution, [Martinez] is not eligible for relief as

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a matter of law.” The opposition included as exhibits copies of the
jury instructions and verdict form.2
In his written reply, Martinez did not dispute that, at trial,
the prosecution theorized he was the actual killer. But he argued
the jury still might have convicted him as a mere participant in
the murder, rather than as the direct perpetrator, because “the
jury was instructed, pursuant to CALJIC [No.] 2.11.5, . . . there
had been evidence of unjoined perpetrators of the same crime.”
Martinez, however, did not identify any specific facts or evidence
supporting that someone else actually killed the victim.
At the two June 2024 hearings on the petition, the
prosecution reiterated its argument that, in light of the trial
theory and the jury instructions, “the only options for the jury
[were] either [to] convict [Martinez] as the actual killer in this case
or acquit him.” Martinez’s counsel submitted on his written reply
brief, again failing to identify any specific facts supporting that
someone other than Martinez was the actual killer.
The court denied the petition, explaining: “[T]he jury
was instructed on first-degree felony murder. The jury was not
instructed on aiding and abetting a first-degree felony murder,
nor were there any instructions on general aiding and abetting. . . .
[¶] Mr. Martinez was prosecuted as the actual killer. . . . [¶]
As the actual killer, . . . Martinez is not eligible for the relief as a
matter of law. . . . He could be convicted as the law exists today.”
Martinez timely appealed.

2 The prosecution initially included a copy of our opinion
in Martinez I, supra, B066394, as an exhibit to the opposition, but
later withdrew the exhibit.

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DISCUSSION
Martinez contends we must reverse the denial of his
resentencing petition because the jury might have convicted him
as a mere participant in a felony murder, rather than as the actual
killer. Applying de novo review (see People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52 (Harden)), we disagree.
The record discloses no path available to the jury to convict
Martinez as anything other than the direct perpetrator. Martinez
does not dispute the prosecution argued at trial that he personally
killed the victim. Further, the court instructed the jury, in
pertinent part, that “[e]very person who unlawfully kills a human
being with malice aforethought or during the commission of . . .
a robbery is guilty of the crime of murder.” (Italics added.) The
court did not instruct on aiding and abetting or on any theories of
imputed malice apart from felony murder. And as reflected in the
verdict form, the jury found that Martinez “willfully, unlawfully,
and with malice aforethought, murder[ed] . . . Kingsmore.” (Italics
added.) The unrefuted record here thus establishes the jury
convicted Martinez as the actual killer with malice aforethought.
We therefore conclude the court properly denied his resentencing
petition at the prima facie stage and did not, as Martinez contends,
violate his due process rights in doing so. (See Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 557.)
But even if we assume the jury might have convicted
Martinez under a felony murder theory, his argument concerning
a hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator does not alter our
conclusion. Martinez is correct that the court instructed the
jury concerning evidence of unjoined perpetrators with CALJIC
No. 2.11.5, which provides:
“There has been evidence in this case indicating that a person
other than defendant was or may have been involved in the crime

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for which the defendant is on trial. [¶] There may be many reasons
why such person is not here on trial. Therefore, do not discuss
or give any consideration as to why the other person is not
being prosecuted in this trial or whether he has been or will be
prosecuted. Your duty is to decide whether the People have proved
the guilt of the defendant on trial.” (CALJIC No. 2.11.5 (1989 rev.)
(5th ed. 1988).)
“The purpose of this instruction,” however, “is to discourage
improper conjecture.” (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.)
Standing alone, “it does not provide the jury with a path to convict
[a defendant] of felony murder on a theory other than . . . being
the actual killer.” (Ibid.) To demonstrate the availability of such
a path here, Martinez would have to “point[ ] to specific facts that
identify someone else as the direct perpetrator.” (Venancio, supra,
114 Cal.App.5th at p. 605, quoting Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 567.) Martinez fails to do so.
And Martinez’s failure to identify specific facts supporting the
possibility of an alternate direct perpetrator distinguishes this case
from People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, on which Martinez
relies. In Lopez, the record included evidence—in the form of the
defendant’s trial testimony—that the defendant’s friend actually
killed the victim. (Id. at p. 9.) We therefore reject Martinez’s
challenge to the order denying his section 1172.6 petition.
We, however, grant Martinez’s alternative request for an
opportunity on remand to plead additional relevant facts in support
of his petition. During the section 1172.6 proceedings before the
trial court, Martinez did not have the benefit of Patton’s guidance
concerning the showing a section 1172.6 petitioner must make
at the prima facie stage. Accordingly, we remand this matter
with directions that, if Martinez files an amended petition for
resentencing within 30 days after remand that pleads additional

8
relevant facts, the trial court shall vacate its order denying the
original petition and consider the additional facts in determining
whether Martinez has made a prima facie case for relief under
section 1172.6. We otherwise conditionally affirm the order denying
his resentencing petition. (See Glass, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
p. 925.)

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DISPOSITION
The order denying Martinez’s resentencing petition is
conditionally affirmed. If Martinez files an amended petition for
resentencing within 30 days after remand that pleads additional
relevant facts, the court shall vacate its order denying the
original petition and consider the additional facts in determining
whether Martinez has made a prima facie case for relief under
section 1172.6; if Martinez fails to file an amended petition, the
order denying the resentencing petition shall be final.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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