CourtListener 10767623•Irons v. Charter Communications CA2/5
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Filed 12/31/25 Irons v. Charter Communications CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
SHANNON IRONS, B336763
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23SMCV01882)
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,
INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
Shannon Irons, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Seyfarth Shaw, Kristina M. Launey, and Michelle L.
DuCharme for Defendant and Respondent.
Defendant Charter Communications, Inc. (Charter) denied
plaintiff Shannon Irons’s (Irons) application for Internet service
because he had no physical address. Irons sued Charter alleging
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.
(Unruh Act)), and the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200 (UCL)). The trial court sustained Charter’s
demurrer without leave to amend. We are asked to decide
whether Irons can properly state constitutional and statutory
causes of action for Charter’s denial of service.
I. BACKGROUND1
A. Irons’s Federal Court Claims Against Charter
In September 2022, Irons, for himself and “all others
similarly situated,” filed suit against Charter in federal district
court. Irons averred he was “technically ‘Homeless’” in that he
did not have a “‘fixed location’ or Physical Address as a
Residence.” He alleged that when he applied for an Internet
services contract with Charter, his application was “immediately”
rejected because he could not provide a physical address.
Irons maintained the rejection constituted illegal
discrimination. He asserted a cause of action for injunctive relief
pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, section 1983 for
violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment and for damages and/or injunctive relief under the
1
Our factual recitation is drawn from the operative
complaint’s allegations and public records judicially noticed by
the trial court. (See generally Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage
Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924 & fn. 1.)
2
Unruh Act and Title 42, United States Code, section 2000a.
Charter moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court
granted Charter’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend, finding,
among other things, that the Fourteenth Amendment cause of
action was legally flawed because Charter was not alleged to be a
state entity or a private entity acting under color of state law.
In his first amended complaint, which he brought solely on
his own behalf, Irons deleted all references to the Fourteenth
Amendment, dropped his Title 42, United States Code, section
2000a cause of action, reasserted his Unruh Act cause of action,
and added causes of action for deprivation of rights pursuant to
Title 18, United States Code, section 242 and the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45 (FTCA)). Irons also added an
allegation that he previously had an Internet service contract
with Charter when he had a physical address.
The district court dismissed the federal causes of action
with prejudice, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the Unruh Act cause of action, and “dismiss[ed] the case
without prejudice such that [Irons] may pursue his state causes
of action in state court if he so desires.”
B. Irons’s State Court Complaint and Charter’s
Demurrer
In May 2023, less than a week after the federal action was
dismissed, Irons filed a complaint against Charter in state court.
Based largely on the same facts as those alleged in his amended
federal pleading, he asserted four causes of action: a due process
claim arising under the Fourteenth Amendment; an unfair trade
practices claim brought pursuant to the FTCA, a discrimination
3
claim based on the Unruh Act; and an unfair business practices
claim under the UCL.
Charter demurred to the complaint. Charter maintained
the Fourteenth Amendment cause of action in his state court
complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because he
did not replead it in his amended complaint in Federal court.
Similarly, Charter contended the FTCA cause of action was
precluded because an identical claim was dismissed with
prejudice in the federal case. Charter additionally argued Irons
could not state a cause of action under the Unruh Act, because
homelessness is not a protected class, and Irons lacked standing
to bring his UCL cause of action because he had not suffered an
injury in fact: he had not lost money or property as a result of the
alleged unfair business practice.
Irons opposed the demurrer. Although he conceded his
FTCA cause of action “need[ed] to be removed,” Irons argued the
demurrer should be overruled with respect to the other three
claims. He maintained the Fourteenth Amendment cause of
action was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata because
“‘privity’ is different” in state court. Irons argued his Unruh Act
cause of action was viable because the language of the statute
could be read to include homelessness as a protected class. He
contended further he had standing to allege a violation of the
UCL because Charter’s refusal to provide him with Internet
service required him to “travel every day to a business which
offers wireless services or WiFi whenever [he] needed to use the
Internet,” which “cost[ed] [him] money.”
4
C. The Trial Court’s Ruling
In November 2023, the trial court held a hearing on
Charter’s demurrer.2 The court considered argument from the
parties and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The
court found (1) the Fourteenth Amendment and FTCA causes of
action were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, (2) the class of
persons protected by the Unruh Act does not include those who
are homeless (reasoning this classification was “impermissibly
vague”), and (3) the UCL claim failed because Irons could not
allege a cognizable loss of money or property.
II. DISCUSSION
All three of Irons’s causes of action are legally infirm.3
Irons’s Fourteenth Amendment cause of action, which was
2
The appellate record does not include a reporter’s
transcript of the hearing. The record also does not include a
ruling expressly granting Charter’s request for judicial notice,
but we presume the request was granted because the trial court’s
written ruling refers to documents submitted in Charter’s request
for judicial notice, because the documents at issue were properly
subject to judicial notice, and because the record contains no
indication the request was denied (Evid. Code, § 456 [“If the trial
court denies a request to take judicial notice of any matter, the
court shall at the earliest practicable time so advise the parties
and indicate for the record that it has denied the request”]; see
also Aaronoff v. Martinez-Senftner (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 910,
918-919.)
3
Consistent with his position in the trial court, Irons does
not contend that the trial court erred in dismissing his FTCA
cause of action.
5
previously raised and then abandoned in his federal court action
and involved the same parties as those in his state court action,
is barred by claim preclusion principles.4 Irons’s Unruh Act
discrimination cause of action fails because homelessness is not a
statutorily protected class and his lack of a physical address is a
factor Charter may consider in deciding whether he has the
ability to pay for service provided. Irons’s UCL cause of action
fails because he did not allege an economic loss arising out of his
unconsummated business dealings with Charter.
A. Standard of Review
We review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo.
(Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net
of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010; Morales v. 22nd
Dist. Agricultural Assn. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 504, 537.) “[W]e
accept the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the
operative complaint, but not contentions, deductions, or
4
Although the parties use the term “res judicata” to describe
the relevant basis for Charter’s demurrer and the trial court’s
ruling, we will use the term “claim preclusion.” (DKN Holdings
LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 [“we will follow the
example of other courts and use the terms ‘claim preclusion’ to
describe the primary aspect of the res judicata doctrine and ‘issue
preclusion’ to encompass the notion of collateral estoppel”];
accord, Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326 [“We now
refer to ‘claim preclusion’ rather than ‘res judicata’”]; Kim v.
Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 91 [“The
claim preclusion doctrine, formerly called res judicata, ‘prohibits
a second suit between the same parties on the same cause of
action’”].)
6
conclusions of fact or law. We may also consider matters subject
to judicial notice. [Citation.]” (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at
924, fn. omitted.) “‘[T]he plaintiff has the burden of showing that
the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the
cause of action and overcoming all of the legal grounds on which
the trial court sustained the demurrer, and if the defendant
negates any essential element, we will affirm the order
sustaining the demurrer as to the cause of action.’” (Rossberg v.
Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1490-1491.)
B. Irons’s Fourteenth Amendment Cause of Action Is
Barred by Claim Preclusion Doctrine
Claim preclusion “describes the preclusive effect of a final
judgment on the merits.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002)
28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) It “acts to bar claims that were, or should
have been, advanced in a previous suit involving the same
parties.” (DKN Holdings, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 824.) “Claim
preclusion arises if a second suit involves: (1) the same cause of
action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final judgment on
the merits in the first suit. [Citations.] If claim preclusion is
established, it operates to bar relitigation of the claim
altogether.” (Ibid.) “Under this doctrine, all claims based on the
same cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not
brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date.”
(Mycogen, supra, at 897.)
Irons’s Fourteenth Amendment cause of action was
previously asserted against Charter in his initial pleading in the
federal action. Although the district court dismissed the initial
complaint with leave to amend, Irons elected not to replead his
Fourteenth Amendment cause of action in his amended pleading,
7
“effectively abandoning” that cause of action. (First Resort, Inc. v.
Herrera (9th Cir. 2017) 860 F.3d 1263, 1274; accord, Lacey v.
Maricopa County (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 896, 928 [holding that
“claims [that are] voluntarily dismissed” are “waived if not
repled” in an amended complaint].) When the district court
subsequently dismissed with prejudice the federal causes of
action asserted in Irons’s amended pleading, it resulted in a
judgment on the merits. (See, e.g., Federated Department Stores,
Inc. v. Moitie (1981) 452 U.S. 394, 399, fn. 3; Boccardo v. Safeway
Stores, Inc. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1042.) That means Irons
is precluded from re-asserting the claim in this action.
(Franceschi v. Franchise Tax. Bd. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 247, 257-
263 [holding state court action was barred by claim preclusion
principles following dismissal of prior federal court action
between same parties concerning the same primary right].)
C. Irons’s Unruh Act Cause of Action Fails to State a
Claim
The Legislature enacted the Unruh Act in 1959 to secure
equal access to public accommodations and prohibit
discrimination by business establishments. (Harris v. Capital
Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1150.) The Unruh
Act provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll persons within the
jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what
their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status,
sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration
status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd.
8
(b); see also id., subd. (c) [“This section shall not be construed to
confer any right or privilege on a person that is conditioned or
limited by law or that is applicable alike to persons of every sex,
color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical
condition, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary
language, or immigration status, or to persons regardless of their
genetic information”].)
Though the list of protected classes in the Unruh Act is
long, it does not extend to unhoused status. Precedent has held
that an omission from the statutory list of protected classes is not
necessarily determinative (In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 212 [the
discrimination identified in the Unruh Act’s text is illustrative
and the proscription against arbitrary discrimination extends
beyond these enumerated classes]), but precedent also recognizes
the Unruh Act does not prohibit all discrimination (see, e.g.,
Candelore v. Tinder, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1145).
Instead, the scope of Unruh Act has been construed as limited to
forms of discrimination similar to the statutory characteristics—
such as “‘a person’s geographical origin, physical attributes, and
personal beliefs.’” (Ibid., quoting Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at
1160; accord, Semler v. General Electric Capital Corp. (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 1380, 1392 [a discrimination claim under the Unruh
Act “must be based on a personal characteristic similar to those
listed in the statute”].)
Irons’s invocation of unhoused status is not so similar.
Because Charter’s requirement of a physical address has a
rational (even if attenuated) connection to a customer’s financial
circumstances and creditworthiness, we cannot say it is a basis
for discrimination sufficiently similar to the categories identified
in the Unruh Act as prohibited. (Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at 1161
9
[holding business establishments may treat people differently
based on their “financial status or capability”].) As Harris
explains in terms equally applicable here: “Many . . . businesses,
including lending institutions and retail and wholesale sellers,
are in the position of extending money, goods, or services in
exchange for promises to pay or repay in the future. They use
minimum income policies as well as other financial criteria to
make risk-oriented decisions regarding what customers to deal
with and on what terms . . . . [¶] For these reasons, the economics
of credit practices, whether those of landlords or other
businesses, have traditionally been left to the guidance of market
forces or to specific legislative and administrative action designed
to address particular grievances. . . . In the absence of clear
legislative direction, which the general antidiscrimination
provisions of the Unruh Act do not provide, we are unwilling to
engage in complex economic regulation under the guise of judicial
decisionmaking.” (Id. at 1167-1168.)
D. Irons’s UCL Cause of Action Fails to State a Claim
“The UCL prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair
competition, which it defines as ‘any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice.’ ([Bus. & Prof.
Code, ]§ 17200.) Its purpose ‘is to protect both consumers and
competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets
for goods and services.’ [Citations.]” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior
Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 320.)
As our Supreme Court has explained, standing under the
UCL is limited to those individuals who had “‘business dealings
with a defendant and . . . lost money or property as a result of the
defendant’s unfair business practices.’” (Kwikset, supra, 51
10
Cal.4th at 321, quoting Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th
758, 788; see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204 [“a person who has
suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result
of the unfair competition” has standing under the UCL].) The
plaintiff’s injury must be “‘an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, [citations]; and
(b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”’”
(Kwikset, supra, at 322.) The injury must “‘affect the plaintiff in
a personal and individual way’” (id. at 323), and it must be
economic (ibid.).
As alleged in the operative complaint, Irons attempted to
enter into a business arrangement with Charter but Charter
declined because he lacked a physical address. Irons accordingly
did not suffer any economic loss as a result of Charter’s
decision—Charter did not acquire any of Irons’s money or
property that could be restored to him through restitution.5
Because Irons did not allege an economic loss, he failed to state a
claim under the UCL.
5
At most, Irons alleged he suffered only damages (i.e., the
costs he incurred driving to locations where he could receive free
Internet services as a result of Charter’s denial of service), and
damages are insufficient to confer UCL standing.
11
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, all
parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
12
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