Turner v. BBV Profit Sharing Plan CA1/1

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Filed 12/26/25 Turner v. BBV Profit Sharing Plan CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

BERNICE TURNER,
Cross-complainant and
Appellant, A170257

v. (San Mateo County
BBV PROFIT SHARING PLAN et Super. Ct. No. 22CIV04777)
al.,
Cross-defendants and
Respondents.

This case arises out of the nonjudicial foreclosure of Michael Turner’s
50 percent interest in property located in East Palo Alto (the “Property”).
Appellant Bernice Turner,1 Michael’s sister, owns the other 50 percent
interest in the Property but was not a party to the loan that was the basis for
the foreclosure.
The third parties who purchased Michael’s interest in the Property at
the foreclosure sale brought a partition action. Bernice filed a cross-
complaint in the partition action challenging the foreclosure. She alleged

1 As Bernice and Michael share the same last name, we shall refer to

them by their first names in the interest of convenience and clarity only. We
intend no disrespect.

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claims against cross-defendants BBV Profit Sharing Plan (BBV), Milestone
Financial, LLC (Milestone), Mortgage Lender Services (MLS), Bear Bruin
Ventures, Inc., William Stuart, Zoe Hamilton, and MERS Link 4 (collectively,
“cross-defendants”).
The trial court sustained cross-defendants’ demurrers without leave to
amend in part on the ground that Bernice lacks standing to assert claims
challenging the foreclosure. Bernice appeals the judgments entered in favor
of cross-defendants. We agree with the trial court that Bernice lacks
standing and affirm the judgments.2
I. BACKGROUND3
According to Bernice’s operative cross-complaint, Bear Bruin Ventures,
Inc. is doing business as Milestone, and Milestone is doing business as MERS
Link 4. Stuart is the owner and director of BBV and the president of Bear
Bruin Ventures, Inc. Hamilton is a licensed real estate salesperson employed
by Stuart.
In 2013, Bernice obtained full title to the Property. The following year,
she executed and recorded a grant deed gifting a 50 percent interest in the

2 We acknowledge that the potential sale of her residence in the

partition action has undoubtedly caused Bernice a lot of heartache. But
while we sympathize with Bernice, she has not met her burden as the
appellant to demonstrate that she has standing to challenge the foreclosure
of Michael’s 50 percent interest in the Property.
3 On March 3, 2025, Bernice filed a motion to consolidate this appeal

with the appeal in Turner v. BBV Profit Sharing Plan, case No. A168874, for
purposes of oral argument, or, in the alterative, to assign both appeals to the
same appellate panel “to promote judicial efficiency and ensure consistent
consideration of the overlapping factual and legal issues.” We agree that
argument should be calendared for the same date and the appeals assigned to
the same panel, and we will issue the opinions simultaneously to ensure a
uniform and consistent decision. However, we deny the motion to consolidate

2
Property to Michael. They held title in the Property as tenants in common
(or cotenants).
In 2017, Michael borrowed $220,000 from BBV. The loan was secured
by a deed of trust encumbering only his interest in the Property. BBV later
assigned the note and deed of trust to MERS Link 4.
In December 2021, after Michael defaulted on the loan, a notice of
default and election to sell was recorded against his interest in the Property,
commencing the nonjudicial foreclosure process. (See Civ. Code, § 2924,
subd. (a); Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830, disagreed with on
other grounds in Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th
1238, 1256, fn. 26.) MLS was the foreclosure trustee.
In 2022, third parties purchased Michael’s 50 percent interest in the
Property at the foreclosure sale. The third party purchasers then filed a
partition action.
In January 2023, Bernice filed a cross-complaint in the partition action
against the third party purchasers and cross-defendants. Bernice asserted
several claims, including fraud, negligence, wrongful foreclosure, and
violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL; Bus & Prof. Code, § 17200 et
seq.). Bernice alleged that cross-defendants “concealed” the foreclosure from

because the appeals do not involve common issues. (See Pacific Legal
Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 165, fn. 3.) One
appeal is from an order granting summary judgment in an action challenging
BBV’s conduct in making the loan for Michael, while the other appeal is from
an order sustaining a demurrer to a cross-complaint challenging the
subsequent foreclosure. (See Sampson v. Sapoznik (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d
607, 609 [denying motion to consolidate appeal from judgment with appeal
from an order granting a motion to correct the judgment because “the
question as to whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion has [no] relation to the issues to be raised in attack or defense of
the judgment on appeal”].)

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her and did not disclose the “details of the foreclosure,” and that they failed to
offer Michael protections under the Homeowner Bill of Rights (HBOR), which
applied because the Property was owner-occupied.
BBV and MLS separately demurred to the cross-complaint. The trial
court sustained their demurrers on the grounds that Bernice failed to state a
cause of action and that she lacked standing to challenge the foreclosure and
cross-defendants’ alleged non-compliance with the HBOR. The court granted
Bernice leave to amend.
Bernice filed a first amended cross-complaint (FACC) asserting claims
against cross-defendants for negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and
violation of the UCL. She alleged that in connection with the foreclosure,
cross-defendants falsely represented that the Property was not owner-
occupied in order to avoid the application of Civil Code4 section 2923.5, a part
of the HBOR. She further alleged that by recording documents stating that
the Property was not owner-occupied and by failing to contact her before
foreclosing on the Property, cross-defendants violated the “California
Financial Code (§50500 et seq.),” the Truth in Lending Act (TILA; 15 U.S.C.
§ 1601 et seq.), the HBOR, and the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures
Act of 1974 (RESPA; 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.). Her UCL claim was based on
the same alleged fraud and statutory violations. Attachments to the FACC
included the recorded notice of default and election of sale.
BBV, Stuart, Hamilton, Bear Bruin Ventures, Inc., and Milestone
jointly demurred to the FACC. They requested judicial notice of, among
other materials, the recorded grant deed from Bernice to Michael and the
recorded deed of trust from Michael to BBV. In her opposition to the

4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.

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demurrer, Bernice requested judicial notice of the recorded trustee’s deed
upon sale conveying Michael’s interest in the Property to the third party
purchasers at the foreclosure sale.
MLS also demurred to the FACC and requested judicial notice of the
recorded trustee’s deed upon sale.
The trial court granted the requests for judicial notice of the recorded
documents and sustained cross-defendants’ demurrers, concluding that
Bernice lacked standing to assert her causes of action because her claims
were based on “wrongful acts against or breaches of duty owed to a borrower.”
The court further concluded that the FACC failed to adequately allege causes
of action for negligent misrepresentation and negligence. The court denied
Bernice leave to amend.
II. DISCUSSION5
A. Standard of Review
When a demurrer is sustained by the trial court, we review the
complaint de novo to determine whether the challenged pleading states facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Committee for Green Foothills v.
Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42; McCall v.
PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.) We assume the truth of
the properly pleaded factual allegations and matters of which judicial notice
has been taken. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074,
1081.) We affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground stated in the
demurrer, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons. (Aubry v. Tri-City
Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

5 We grant Bernice’s unopposed motion for judicial notice of the record

of Appeal No. A168874, including the appellate briefs filed by the parties.

5
A trial court has discretion to sustain a demurrer with or without leave
to amend. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) If
we determine that the plaintiffs have met their burden to demonstrate that a
reasonable possibility exists that the defect can be cured by amendment of
the pleading, then the trial court has abused its discretion in denying leave to
amend and we reverse the denial. (Ibid.) Otherwise, we affirm the judgment
on the basis that the trial court has not abused its discretion. (Ibid.)
Standing is the threshold element required to state a cause of action
and, thus, lack of standing may be raised by demurrer. (Buckland v.
Threshold Enterprises, Ltd. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 798, 813, disapproved of
on other grounds in Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310,
337.) To have standing to sue, a person must “ ‘have a real interest in the
ultimate adjudication because [she] has [either] suffered [or] is about to
suffer an injury of sufficient magnitude reasonably to assure that all of the
relevant facts and issues will be adequately presented.’ ” (Schmier v.
Supreme Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 703, 707.) When a party lacks
standing, the action must be dismissed, unless the complaint can be amended
by substituting a party who has standing. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman
Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1004–1011.)
B. Bernice Has Forfeited Her Financial Code Claim.
In support of Bernice’s negligence cause of action, the FACC alleged
that cross-defendants violated, among other provisions, “Financial Code
(§50500 et seq.).” Those sections provide for enforcement of code provisions,
rules, and orders through action by the Commissioner of Financial Protection
and Innovation; they do not contain any language suggesting that a private
right of action is available. Cross-defendants, therefore, argued below and
again before this court that no private right of action may be asserted under

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Financial Code section 50500 et seq. (See Lagrisola v. North American
Financial Corp. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1196 [no private right of action
under the Financial Code “ ‘ “ ‘unless the statutory language or legislative
history clearly indicates an intent to create a private right of action’ ” ’ ”].)
Bernice has not briefed this issue, though she was on notice of cross-
defendants’ position. Nor does she address her Financial Code claim in her
appellate brief. We therefore consider the issue forfeited by Bernice, and any
claim of error is deemed abandoned with respect to her Financial Code claim.
(See Berger v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989,
1007 [appellants waive issue on appeal by failing to support it with argument
or citation of authority]; Ram v. OneWest Bank, FSB (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
1, 9, fn. 2 [on appeal from a judgment after an order sustaining a demurrer,
unaddressed causes of action are abandoned].)
Consequently, we affirm the demurrer ruling as to Bernice’s negligence
cause of action to the extent it is based on cross-defendants’ alleged violations
of Financial Code section 50500 et seq. because Bernice has not borne her
burden of showing error on appeal. (Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing
LP (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1052.)
C. Bernice Lacks Standing to Assert Her Remaining Tort Claims.
Aside from her Financial Code claim, Bernice’s causes of action for
negligent misrepresentation and negligence are predicated on allegations
that cross-defendants failed to contact Bernice and notify her of her “options”
prior to foreclosing and misrepresented the Property as not owner-occupied,
thereby violating TILA, RESPA, and the HBOR. The trial court sustained
cross-defendants’ demurrers to these claims on the ground that Bernice
lacked standing to sue, because the FACC’s allegations and the judicially-

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noticeable facts established that Bernice was not a borrower on the loan that
served as the basis for the foreclosure. We agree with the trial court.
To have standing, a plaintiff must have “some special interest to be
served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above
the interest held in common with the public at large.” (Dominguez v. Bonta
(2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 413.) A tort—such as fraud or negligence—
“ ‘involves a violation of a legal duty, imposed by statute, contract, or
otherwise, owed by the defendant to the person injured. Without such a duty,
an injury is “damnum absque injuria”—injury without wrong.’ ” (The MEGA
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1527.)
Neither TILA, RESPA, nor the HBOR impose duties to disclose or notify
owed to non-borrower cotenants.
TILA requires creditors to provide borrowers with certain disclosures
on matters like finance charges and borrower’s rights. (15 U.S.C. §§ 1631,
1632, 1635, 1638.) Thus, TILA gives standing to a person to whom the duty
of disclosure is owed, which would be the borrower. (See Johnson v. First
Fed. Bank of Cal. (N.D.Cal., Jul. 8, 2008, Nos. C 08–01796 PVT, C 08–00264
PVT) 2008 U.S.Dist. Lexis 111020, at *8–9 [a party not named in the loan
papers is not a “consumer” under TILA and thus lacks standing to bring a
TILA claim]; Carter v. Bank of America Corp. (E.D.Cal., May 20, 2011, No.
Civ S-10-1238 JAM DAD PS) 2011 U.S.Dist. Lexis 54392, at *5 [“TILA
confers a statutory ‘ “right of action only on a borrower in a suit against the
borrower’s creditor” ’ ”].)
Under RESPA, mortgage servicers and lenders are required to provide
certain information to a “borrower” or loan applicant. (12 U.S.C. §§ 2601,
subd. (a), 2604, subd. (d), 2605, subds. (a), (b), 2609, subds. (b), (c).) As such,
“[c]ourts have uniformly barred non-borrowers from asserting RESPA

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claims.” (Aldana v. Bank of America, N.A. (C.D.Cal., Nov. 26, 2014, CV 14-
7489-GHK (FFMx)) 2014 U.S.Dist. Lexis 166460, at *8 [collecting cases].)
Similarly, the HBOR “was enacted ‘to ensure that, as part of the
nonjudicial foreclosure process, borrowers are considered for, and have a
meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options.’ . . .
(§ 2923.4, subd. (a).)” (Valbuena v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 1267, 1272.) To that end, section 2923.5, one of the statutes
Bernice relies on, requires a loan servicer to contact the “borrower” to discuss
certain information with them, such as “options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure.” Section 2924.17, the other statute cited by Bernice, provides
that foreclosure documents, such as notices of default, must “be accurate and
complete and supported by competent and reliable evidence.” (§ 2924.17,
subd. (a).) Only a “borrower” may bring an action for violation of section
2924.17.6 (§ 2924.12, subds. (a)(1), (b).) Moreover, the HBOR defines “owner-
occupied” as the property that is “the principal residence of the borrower.” (§
2924.15, italics added.)7

6 Bernice also relies on section 2924, which concerns the exercise of a

power of sale and addresses the recording of the notice of default required to
initiate the nonjudicial foreclosure process. Bernice has not identified a
statute that creates a private right of action for violation of section 2924, and
that statute is not among those identified in section 2924.12, which expressly
creates a private right of action for material violations of specified foreclosure
provisions. (See Lucioni v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 150,
157–161 [omission of § 2924, subd. (a)(6), from the provisions listed in
§ 2924.12 defeats claim for injunctive relief].)
7 The HBOR statutes cited in this paragraph were amended after the

nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings commenced in December 2021. (Stats.
2024, ch. 311, § 1; Stats. 2022, ch. 452, §§ 31, 32; Stats. 2024, ch. 601, § 3.)
The amendments do not affect our analysis, as the relevant language was not
changed.

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In sum, the disclosure and notification duties imposed by TILA,
RESPA, and the HBOR were owed to Michael as the borrower, not Bernice.
“ ‘[A] plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and
cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third
parties.’ ” (Independent Roofing Contractors v. California Apprenticeship
Council (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1341.)
Bernice acknowledges she was not a borrower on the loan secured by
Michael’s interest in the Property but asserts she has standing to pursue her
claims because the foreclosure affected her interest in the Property. She
notes that the foreclosure “introduced a stranger” into the tenancy, led to a
partition action to force the sale of her home, and “fracture[d] the unity of
title.” She further contends she has standing based on her financial
contributions to maintaining and preserving the Property.
Bernice has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error. (Intengan
v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.) She
has not met this burden here because she presents no relevant authority or
facts explaining why cross-defendants owed her a duty under the foregoing
statutes. Bare assertions that she has standing to challenge the “wrongful
foreclosure” based on her interest in, or contributions to, the Property are
insufficient; there must be allegations showing that cross-defendants,
through their conduct, invaded her legally cognizable interests. (See Great
Lakes Construction, Inc. v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1358–1359
[plaintiffs lacked standing where they failed to “show any legally cognizable
interest that [was] harmed by” the alleged wrongdoing]; In re Marriage of
Murchison (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [standing requires the “invasion
of a legally cognizable interest”]; Hagen v. Laursen (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d
379, 385 [“violation of a statute constitutes actionable negligence only as to

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those persons for whose benefit or protection the statute was enacted”],
disagreed with on other grounds by Drake v. Dean (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 915,
932.)
Further, as cross-defendants point out, a cotenant does not have a
legally cognizable interest in the encumbrance or sale of another cotenant’s
share. (See Buller v. Buller (1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 694, 698 [tenant in common
has the right to dispose of his or her own undivided share without the
knowledge or consent of other cotenants]; Dieden v. Schmidt (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 645, 650 [same].) When a cotenant encumbers his interest, the
encumbrance does not affect the interests of other tenants, even if it results
in the sale of the encumbered interest to a third party. (Id. at pp. 650–651;
see Schoenfeld v. Norberg (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 755, 765; Kane v. Huntley
Financial (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1092, 1097–1098.) The purchaser of the
encumbered interest simply “succeeds to the interest of the debtor and
becomes a tenant in common with the remaining owners.” (Dieden, at p. 651;
see Zieve, Brodnax & Steele, LLP v. Dhindsa (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 27, 36.)
Moreover, a co-owner also has an “absolute right” to partition of
property absent circumstances inapplicable here. (LEG Investments v. Boxler
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 484, 493.) Here, the FACC and the judicially-
noticeable facts establish that the underlying loan encumbered only Michael’s
interest in the Property. Thus, that the foreclosure “introduced a stranger
into the tenancy” and led to a partition action is insufficient to confer
standing on Bernice to challenge the foreclosure.
While Bernice notes that Michael conveyed his interest in the Property
to her prior to the foreclosure sale (but several months after foreclosure
proceedings were initiated), the HBOR defines “borrower” as a natural person
who is “a mortgagor or trustor.” (§ 2924.12, subd. (a).) “[U]nder the plain

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language of the statute, ‘borrower’ . . . does not include successors-in-
interest.” (Marasigan v. Midfirst Bank (S.D.Cal., May 15, 2023, No. 23-cv-
00634-H-MSB) 2023 U.S.Dist. Lexis 85039, at *6, 8; see Yvanova v. New
Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 926 [the trustor under a deed
of trust is the borrower].) And, in general, someone who is not a party to the
loan lacks standing to bring a claim under RESPA or TILA. (See Green v.
Central Mortgage Co. (N.D.Cal., Sept. 2, 2015, No. 14-cv-04281-LB) 2015
U.S.Dist. Lexis 117241, at *14–15 [successor in interest did not have
standing to bring RESPA claims because she was not the borrower]; Wilson v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (E.D.Cal., June 25, 2010, No. Civ. 2:09-863 WBS
GGH) 2010 U.S.Dist. Lexis 63212, at *17–18 [plaintiff had no standing to
bring a TILA claim because she was not a party to the loan contract].)
Because the deed of trust shows that only Michael is the trustor with
respect to the loan at issue here, and because Bernice makes no showing that
she can assert claims under TILA, RESPA, and the HBOR as Michael’s
successor in interest, we conclude that Bernice does not have standing to
bring claims under those statutory schemes.
Nor has Bernice demonstrated that she could amend the FACC to
allege that cross-defendants owed her duties outside of those statutory
schemes based on her interest in the Property. Throughout her appellate
brief, she alleges that cross-defendants committed fraud, “regulatory
evasion,” and “procedural irregularities” in the foreclosure, allegations that
appear to be based on cross-defendants’ conduct as Michael’s lender, their
misrepresentations regarding whether the Property was owner-occupied, and
their alleged duty to provide Bernice “foreclosure notices.” Bernice fails to
cite any authority other than the HBOR in support of her assertion that her
legal rights were affected by cross-defendants’ alleged misrepresentations

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regarding whether the Property was owner-occupied. Bernice also fails to
cite any authority for the suggestion that she has standing as a non-borrower
to challenge cross-defendants’ alleged “regulatory evasion” in connection with
the underlying loan. The law appears to be to the contrary. (See, e.g.,
Brockington v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal., July 1, 2009, No. 08-
cv-05795 RMW) 2009 U.S.Dist. Lexis 56622, at *7–9 [holding plaintiff who
was not a party to the loan transaction had no standing as an alleged
“equitable owner” of the property to challenge defendant’s conduct in
connection with the loan, or to assert a claim for concealment of facts in the
transaction]; Bleavins v. Demarest (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1542
[“Bleavins lacks standing to assert any claim concerning the contractual
relationship between Allstate and the Dannenbaums . . . because he is not a
party to the insurance policy”].)
As for her claim that cross-defendants violated their duty to provide
her foreclosure notices, the only other notice statute that Bernice alleges she
is subject to is inapplicable here.8 Section 2924b, which is not a part of the
HBOR (Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279,
314 (Morris)), requires the trustee to send notice of the foreclosure sale and a
copy of the notice of default to the following parties: (1) the “trustor,” (2) a
successor in interest whose interest was “recorded in the office of the county
recorder . . . prior to the recording date of the notice of default,” and (3) “each

8 Cross-defendants argue that because Bernice did not raise this claim

in the trial court, she cannot raise it here. Not so. Where a demurrer has
been sustained without leave to amend, a plaintiff may assert a new legal
theory on the sufficiency of the complaint for the first time on appeal.
(Dudley v. Dept. of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 259.)
Moreover, a plaintiff may show how a complaint can be amended for the first
time on appeal. (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990)
222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1386.)

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person whose name and address are set forth in a duly recorded request
therefor.” (§ 2924b, subds. (b)(1)&(2), (c)(1)&(2)(A), italics added.) The latter
category refers to those persons who have filed a statutory request for notice
in the office of the recorder. (Banc of America Leasing & Capital, LLC v. 3
Arch Trustee Services, Inc. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1097–1098, citing §
2924b, subd. (a).) Bernice is not the trustor, and she has not suggested that
she could amend her complaint to include allegations that she filed a request
with the office of the recorder. Moreover, the attachments to the FACC show
that Bernice acquired Michael’s interest several months after the notice of
default was recorded. She therefore was not entitled to statutory notice in
connection with the foreclosure.
Bernice nonetheless urges us to impose a duty on cross-defendants
based on the factors in Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647. The
Biakanja factors are used by courts to determine whether a defendant owed a
duty of care to third parties not in privity with the defendant. (Id. at pp.
648–651.) Because Bernice’s tort claims arise from cross-defendants’
statutory duties, “not from an asserted common law duty,” we need not apply
the Biakanja factors here. (Turner v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516,
534.) Moreover, “the Supreme Court has said that the Legislature intended
to cover the entire subject area of nonjudicial foreclosures by statute and
leave nothing for the courts.” (Diediker v. Peelle Fin. Corp. (1997) 60
Cal.App.4th 288, 295, citing I. E. Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. (1985) 39
Cal.3d 281, 285.) As such, “the duties among and between the pertinent
parties” in a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding are established by statute.
(Turner, at p. 535; see Diediker, at pp. 294–295 [rejecting appellants’
argument that courts should impose a duty on the trustee owed to “all future
purchasers of property”].)

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Accordingly, Bernice has not shown that she can allege facts
establishing that cross-defendants owed her a duty conferring standing to
allege claims for negligence or negligent misrepresentation against them in
connection with the foreclosure or the underlying loan.
The authorities on which Bernice relies are distinguishable and do not
persuade us to reach a different conclusion. In Morris, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th
279, the homeowner asserted violations of the HBOR, but she was the
borrower on the loan encumbering her real property.9 (Id. at pp. 286–287.)
In Royal Thrift & Loan Co. v. County Escrow, Inc. (2004) 123
Cal.App.4th 24, the homeowners’ signatures were forged on a promissory
note and deed of trust for a loan secured by their property. (Id. at p. 29.) The
issues on appeal concerned the lender’s cross-claims against the escrow
company involved in the loan transaction and the individual who notarized
the deed of trust. (Id. at pp. 28–29.) In addressing the parties’ contentions
on appeal, the court first concluded that the cross-defendants had “limited
standing to raise irregularities regarding the foreclosure proceedings under
the doctrine of mitigation of damages” because they were claiming that the
lender had failed to mitigate its damages. (Id. at p. 33.)
Banc of America Leasing & Capital, LLC v. 3 Arch Trustee Services,
Inc., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th 1090 concerned a lienholder’s claim against the
foreclosing trustee for breach of its statutory duties based on the trustee
failing to search for possible creditors before distributing the excess proceeds

9 Several other cases Bernice cites likewise concerned claims brought

by borrowers or the public administrator for the estate of the borrower. (See
Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 575, 580;
Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 948, 950–
951; Estate of Yates (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 511, 521–522; In re Cedano (9th
Cir. 2012) 470 B.R. 522, 525, 529.)

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from a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. (Id. at pp. 1095–1096.) The appellate
court held that the foreclosing trustee did not have a duty to search for
judgment lienholders before distributing excess sale proceeds to the trustor.
(Id. at pp. 1103–1105.)
And in Asisten v. Underwood (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 304, the plaintiff
was misled into signing a quitclaim deed transferring title of his house to his
friend. He brought a claim to cancel the deed and quiet title the property
based on the fraudulent representation that the quitclaim deed was a
promissory note. (Id. at p. 307.) His friend then sold the property to the
defendants. (Id. at pp. 307–308.) The questions on appeal were whether the
evidence supported the trial court’s fraud findings, which would render the
deed from the plaintiff to his friend voidable, and whether the defendants
were innocent purchasers for value. (Id. at p. 309.)
None of the foregoing authorities involve the duties, if any, owed by a
lender, trustee, or beneficiary under a deed of trust to a non-borrower
cotenant. Nor do they concern a non-borrower cotenant’s legal rights or a
cotenant’s standing to challenge the foreclosure of another cotenant’s
property share.
Lastly, Bernice cites Turner v. Seterus, Inc., supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 516,
where a husband and wife asserted a wrongful foreclosure claim against the
lender. (Id. at p. 520.) The husband’s name was not on the deed of trust, but
he argued that he had contributed monthly payments to the home loan,
thereby converting what was once his wife’s separate property into
community property and vesting in him an interest in that property. (Id. at
pp. 523–525.) The court agreed, holding that under the complaint’s
allegations, the community had an interest in the property, so the husband
had standing to pursue tort causes of action “to the extent those causes of

16
action alleged that [defendant’s] conduct resulted in the loss of property—
and, as a result, the community’s interest therein.” (Id. at p. 525.)
In Turner, the plaintiffs were alleging that their home was lost as a
result of the defendants’ failure to allow the husband, acting on behalf of the
wife, to cure the plaintiffs’ default. (Turner v. Seterus, Inc., supra, 27
Cal.App.5th at pp. 520–522.) The appellate court concluded that the
complaint sufficiently alleged a statutory duty to accept the plaintiffs’ full
tender of the amount in default. (Id. at pp. 534–535.) In contrast, here,
Bernice has not alleged facts demonstrating that cross-defendants owed her
any statutory duties in connection with the foreclosure or that she lost her
home as a result of their failure to comply with their statutory duties. (See
Morris, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 294 [to challenge a foreclosure sale “
‘based on a procedural irregularity,’ . . . ‘the plaintiff must show . . . that
there was a failure to comply with the procedural requirements for the
foreclosure sale’ ”].)
Thus, while we sympathize with Bernice, we cannot conclude on this
record that the foreclosure sale was the result of cross-defendants’ invasion of
her legally cognizable interests. We therefore affirm the sustaining of the
demurrers without leave to amend on the ground that Bernice does not have
standing to assert tort claims against cross-defendants for their role in the
foreclosure.
D. Bernice Lacks Standing to Assert a UCL Claim.
Bernice’s third cause of action for violation of the UCL was predicated
on the same misconduct giving rise to her other causes of action. The trial
court concluded that Bernice lacked standing to assert her UCL claim
because any harm she incurred was caused by a breach of duties owed to
other parties.

17
To have standing in an action under the UCL, a plaintiff “must
demonstrate some form of economic injury” that occurred as a result of the
unfair competition. (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp.
323, 326, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Citizens of
Humanity, LLC v. Hass (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 589, 594, fn. 2.) The UCL
defines unfair competition as “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business or
practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.)
While Bernice contends the UCL incorporates federal standing
principles, the standing requirements under the UCL are far more stringent
than the federal standing requirements. “ ‘Whereas a federal plaintiff’s
“injury in fact” may be intangible and need not involve lost money or
property, Proposition 64, in effect, added a requirement that a UCL plaintiff’s
“injury in fact” specifically involve “lost money or property.” ’ ” (Kwikset
Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 324.) Moreover, there must
be a showing that the injury was “caused by” the unfair competition. (Id. at
p. 326.)
We agree with the trial court that Bernice failed to allege that she lost
money or property as a result of cross-defendants’ alleged misconduct in
connection with the foreclosure. The foreclosure of a 50 percent interest in
the Property and the subsequent partition action are “the result of [Michael’s]
default, not the alleged conduct of [cross-]defendants.” (Graham v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 614; see Jenkins v. JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 522–523 [nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings triggered by default are not economic injury caused
by UCL violations, where default occurred prior to allegedly unlawful or
unfair acts (italics added)], disapproved of on other grounds by Yvanova v.
New Century Mortgage Corp., supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 939, fn. 13.)

18
On appeal, Bernice also relies on BBV’s allegedly unlawful conduct in
originating the underlying loan without the required license, but she makes
no showing that she can allege facts supporting a causal link between that
violation of law and her alleged economic injury. (See Kim v. Sumitomo Bank
(1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979 [conclusory averments without legal
argument or citation to the record disregarded on appeal].) We do not see
how she would be able to allege such a link since Michael was entitled to take
out a loan encumbering his interest in the Property without her consent.
(Dieden v. Schmidt, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 650.) Bernice therefore
faced the same risk of foreclosure regardless of whether BBV complied with
licensing laws. “When a UCL action is based on an unlawful business
practice, . . . a party may not premise its standing to sue upon injury caused
by a defendant’s lawful activity simply because the lawful activity has some
connection to an unlawful practice that does not otherwise affect the
party. . . . [T]here must be a causal connection between the harm suffered
and the unlawful business activity. That causal connection is broken when a
complaining party would suffer the same harm whether or not a defendant
complied with the law.” (Daro v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
1079, 1099.)
Finally, Bernice notes that she seeks “more than just personal
recovery” under the UCL; she is also seeking public injunctive relief. Her
claim for public injunctive relief under the UCL must fall with her claim for
private relief since public injunctive relief “is a substantive statutory remedy
that the Legislature, through the UCL, . . . has made available to
those . . . who meet the statutory standing requirements for filing a private
action.” (McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 965, 958–959.)

19
We thus conclude Bernice lacks standing to assert any claims
challenging the foreclosure proceedings.10 In sum, the trial court did not err
in sustaining cross-defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on appeal.

10 Because we find that Bernice lacks standing to assert claims

challenging the foreclosure proceedings, we do not address whether the
FACC alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Scott v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 751.) Nor do we need to
address Bernice’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying her leave to amend her FACC to add allegations regarding cross-
defendants’ alleged misclassification of the loan BBV issued to Michael, as
she has not demonstrated that she would have standing to bring such claims
as a non-borrower.

20
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, Acting P. J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

A170257

21

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