CourtListener 10764913•People v. Ardeleanu CA4/1
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Filed 12/24/25 P. v. Ardeleanu CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084840
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD301376)
CHRISTIAN THEODOR ARDELEANU,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert O. Amador and Polly Shamoon, Judges. Reversed and remanded with
instructions.
Matthew M. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Brendon Marshall, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Christian Theodor Ardeleanu was charged with three felony counts of
unlawful use of tear gas (Pen. Code, § 22810, subd. (g)(1); counts 1–3).1 After
the preliminary hearing, he failed to appear at a trial readiness conference.
The trial court then allowed the prosecution to amend the information to add
a fourth charge for willful failure to appear on felony charges (§ 1320.5;
count 4). The case proceeded to trial and a jury found Ardeleanu guilty of all
four counts.
On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Ardeleanu argues the court
erred by allowing the prosecution to amend the information to add the charge
of failure to appear. According to Ardeleanu, the court’s ruling violated
section 1009 and impinged upon his constitutional due process rights because
the new charge was not supported by evidence from the preliminary hearing.
The People concede the court prejudicially erred. We agree. Therefore, we
reverse the conviction for failure to appear (count 4) and remand the matter
for resentencing on the three extant convictions (counts 1–3).
II
BACKGROUND
On November 22, 2023, Ardeleanu was charged by complaint with
three felony counts of unlawful use of tear gas after he sprayed three victims
with bear spray during two separate and unrelated incidents.
On December 21, 2023, the trial court held a preliminary hearing and
Ardeleanu was held to answer on all three counts. At the preliminary
hearing, the parties stipulated that the complaint would be deemed an
information.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
On March 14, 2024, Ardeleanu failed to appear at a trial readiness
conference, which resulted in the issuance of a bench warrant. He next
appeared in custody on May 10, 2024.
On June 6, 2024, the prosecution moved to amend the information by
interlineation to add a fourth count for willful failure to appear on felony
charges. Defense counsel did not object or oppose the motion to amend the
information. The court granted the motion and, on July 3, 2024, an
information charging all four counts was filed.
On July 9, 2024, a jury found Ardeleanu guilty of all four counts.
Thereafter, the court placed him on formal probation for two years, subject to
a condition that he serve 365 days in custody.
On September 11, 2024, Ardeleanu filed a timely notice of appeal from
the judgment of conviction.
III
DISCUSSION
Ardeleanu contends the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to
amend the information to add a fourth count for failure to appear. He asserts
the court’s ruling ran afoul of section 1009 and violated his due process rights
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because the new charge was not supported by evidence taken at the
preliminary hearing. The People agree, and so do we.2
“The court may allow amendment of the accusatory pleading to correct
or make more specific the factual allegations of the offense charged at any
stage of the proceeding, up to and including the close of trial, if there would
be no prejudice to the defendant.” (People v. Graff (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th
345, 361.) However, section 1009 provides that “[a]n indictment or
accusation cannot be amended so as to change the offense charged, nor an
information so as to charge an offense not shown by the evidence taken at the
preliminary examination.” Stated differently, “[s]ection 1009 prohibits
amending an information to charge an offense not shown by evidence taken
at the preliminary hearing.” (People v. Rogers (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1353,
1360 (Rogers); see also People v. Peyton (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 642, 654
(Peyton) [“In enacting section 1009, the Legislature determined that an
accusatory pleading cannot be amended based on evidence not taken at the
preliminary hearing.”]; People v. Winters (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 997, 1007
(Winters) [“Section 1009 specifically proscribes amending an information to
charge an offense not shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary
2 Defense counsel did not oppose or object to the prosecution’s motion to
amend the information to add the count for failure to appear. Courts have
held that a defendant’s failure to interpose an objection in the trial court can
result in the forfeiture of an appellate argument that the defendant was tried
on a charge not subjected to a preliminary hearing. (See People v. Burnett
(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 151, 179 (Burnett).) However, we have “the
discretionary power to entertain an objection first raised on appeal.” (People
v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311.) Doing so is especially
appropriate where, as here, the resolution of an unpreserved issue involves
the application of law to undisputed facts or averts a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. (People v. Yarbrough (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 310.)
Because both circumstances are present here, we exercise our discretionary
authority to address Ardeleanu’s claim on the merits.
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hearing.”].) “This is so, even if the amendment would not prejudice the
defendant or if the defendant had notice of the facts underlying the new
charges.” (Rogers, at p. 1360.)
“The trial court’s accession to an amendment to the information,
including the addition of counts, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People
v. Arevalo-Iraheta (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1581.) Both parties agree, as
do we, that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the amendment
at issue. The preliminary hearing was held before Ardeleanu committed the
acts giving rise to the new charge of failure to appear. Therefore, the new
charge was not based on evidence from that hearing. By allowing the
prosecution to add the new charge, the court violated section 1009 and
exceeded the bounds of its discretion. (See Rogers, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1360–1366 [court erred by allowing new causes of action and
enhancement that were not supported by evidence from preliminary hearing];
see also Peyton, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 652 [“counsel was ineffective in
failing to object to the second amended information because it alleged an
additional fifth offense ... not included in the amended complaint to which
defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing”].)
We turn now to the issue of prejudice. Case law has recognized that
reversal is automatic where, as here, a defendant is convicted of an offense
that was not based on evidence taken at a preliminary hearing. Indeed, as
one court explained, “[i]t is as a matter of law irrelevant whether a defendant
is prejudiced by being prosecuted for an offense not shown by the evidence at
the preliminary hearing.” (Burnett, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 177; see also
Winters, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1007 [“ ‘Before any accused person can
be called upon to defend himself on any charge prosecuted by information, he
is entitled to preliminary examination .... These proceedings are essential to
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confer jurisdiction upon the court before whom he is placed on trial. To say
that he was accorded a fair trial upon an information filed against him
without a substantial compliance with these jurisdictional requirements, and,
therefore, that there had been no miscarriage of justice, hardly meets the
situation. Such an argument would apply with equal force to the validity of
the conviction upon an information filed by the district attorney in a case
where no preliminary examination at all had been held. Such practice would
result, in legal effect, in wiping out all provisions of the [C]onstitution and
the Penal Code providing for a preliminary examination, and in clothing the
district attorney with unlimited authority to file information against
whomsoever in his judgment he might consider guilty of crime.’ ”].)
In any event, a defendant’s conviction of a charge that was improperly
added to a charging instrument is “unquestionably prejudicial.” (People v.
Dominguez (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 858, 868.) Here, Ardeleanu could not
have been convicted of the charge of failure to appear if the trial court had
not erroneously allowed the prosecution to add the charge to the information
in violation of section 1009. It is true that if the court had correctly denied
the prosecution’s motion to amend the information, the prosecution could
have dismissed the case, refiled it with all four counts, and proceeded to a
preliminary hearing on the new charging instrument. Alternatively, the
prosecution could have filed a separate case charging Ardeleanu with a single
count of failure to appear and proceeded to a preliminary hearing solely on
that charge. Even so, the People admit it is “reasonably probable” Ardeleanu
would not have been convicted on the failure to appear charge if the court had
properly disallowed the amendment. As the People concede in their appellate
brief, “the prosecution may have determined it to be too costly and/or time
consuming for the miniscule benefit of pursuing a separate felony case solely
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for the failure to appear.” Alternatively, even if the prosecution elected to file
a separate failure-to-appear case, Ardeleanu could have been “acquitted of
the charge in a separate trial, with a different jury.” We accept the People’s
well-founded concessions of prejudice.3
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the matter is remanded to
the trial court with instructions to strike the conviction for failure to appear
on felony charges (count 4) and resentence the defendant on all remaining
convictions (counts 1–3). The trial court is further directed to prepare an
amended abstract and forward a certified copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
CASTILLO, J.
3 Because we exercise our discretion to consider Ardeleanu’s claim of
error and conclude the trial court prejudicially erred by allowing the
prosecution to amend the information, we do not address Ardeleanu’s
alternative argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
preserve his claim for our consideration.
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