People v. Machmuller CA1/1

CourtListener 10764109Calctapp23 de dez. de 2025

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Filed 12/23/25 P. v. Machmuller CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171972
v.
ELI MACHMULLER, (Lake County
Super. Ct. No. CR968660)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Eli Machmuller was accused of sexually molesting three
teenagers and charged with several crimes, including aggravated sexual
assault on a child under age 14. At trial, Machmuller testified that he was
drugged before the primary incident, which involved 13-year-old D.W. and
13-year-old C.P., and could not remember what happened. A jury then
convicted him of some crimes as charged but only lesser included offenses of
the most serious ones. He was sentenced to nine years in prison.
On appeal, Machmuller claims that (1) his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to hearsay statements in D.W.’s
forensic interview;1 (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by suggesting
Machmuller’s counsel did not believe his drugging defense; (3) these two

1 Machmuller has a pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus

premised on both this and a second instance of alleged ineffective assistance
of counsel. (In re Eli Machmuller (A174946).)
errors were cumulatively prejudicial; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury on simple battery as a lesser included offense of sexual
battery, the only count involving the third victim, 16-year-old W.B.
We reject these claims, except we agree that the jury should have been
instructed on simple battery as a lesser included offense of sexual battery.
Thus, we reverse the misdemeanor sexual-battery conviction and remand for
the People to elect whether to retry that charge or accept a modification of
the judgment to reflect a conviction of simple battery. In either case,
Machmuller shall be fully resentenced. (See People v. Navarro (2007)
40 Cal.4th 668, 681.) Otherwise, we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
In January 2023, then 48-year-old Machmuller lived in the Lakeport
home of C.P.’s grandmother (grandmother). Grandmother testified that she
invited him to move in a few months earlier after meeting him and learning
he was unhoused. Machmuller had his own room and did not pay rent. C.P.
often visited grandmother’s house and was friends with D.W., who lived with
her parents and brother next door. W.B., a family friend of grandmother’s,
also spent time at the house and was close with the other two girls.
A. The Counts Involving D.W. and C.P.
Around midday on January 15, 2023, C.P., D.W., and another friend,
13-year-old L.B., were hanging out together at grandmother’s house.
Grandmother and Machmuller were also there. According to D.W. and C.P.,
Machmuller went to the store and returned with a bottle of E&J brandy. All
three girls went into his bedroom and began drinking shots of the brandy

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chased with soda.2 D.W., who was about five feet tall and 100 pounds,
testified that she and the other two girls each drank 15 to 20 shots of the
liquor. She testified that Machmuller, who is six feet, two inches tall, drank
even more than that. C.P., who was about five feet, six inches tall and
150 pounds, estimated that she herself drank 7 or 8 shots and D.W. had 10 or
11. The girls, but not Machmuller, were also using marijuana C.P. provided.
While drinking in Machmuller’s bedroom, the girls listened to music
and danced. At one point, D.W. pushed C.P. onto Machmuller’s bed, and the
two girls began “[w]restling around.” C.P. testified that Machmuller said
“something along the lines of ‘keep going.’ ” After C.P. got up from the bed,
Machmuller “reached over and grabbed [her] breast.” She testified that he
had touched her breast on an earlier occasion and “said it was on accident,
and [she] didn’t like that. That made [her] very uncomfortable.”
At some point, C.P. and L.B. left the bedroom, and D.W. was alone with
Machmuller.3 D.W. testified that Machmuller shut the bedroom door but did
not lock it. As they were both sitting on his bed, he began “talking about his
children and how he ha[d]n’t seen them in a long time, and he just liked [her]
and C.P. reminding . . . him” of his own children. Machmuller’s speech was
“slurred,” and he sometimes said things D.W. could not understand.
D.W. was wearing a short top over a bra and a pair of boxers over a
pair of underwear. She testified that Machmuller “pulled at . . . the

2 Grandmother testified that she saw Machmuller drink alcohol that

day but did not realize the girls were drinking or in his bedroom until after
the fact. Grandmother had told him many times not to drink in her house,
explaining, “[H]e was very rude when he was drunk. He would grab at me,
pull at me, just totally take advantage of me, scream in my face.”
3 C.P. indicated that all three girls left the bedroom together, but then

D.W. returned there alone. D.W., on the other hand, indicated that the two
other girls exited the room together, leaving her with Machmuller.

3
waistband of [her] pants and was looking at [her] underwear, but he didn’t
say anything. He was just doing it.” She moved his hands away and told him
to stop, but “[h]e just kept pulling on” her boxers’ waistband. Machmuller
also “touched [her] breasts.”
D.W. testified that Machmuller then “picked [her] up . . . with like full
force[,] like restraining,” and “scooted [her] around the bed.” He removed her
boxers and underwear. Holding her arms above her head “[e]nough to where
it hurt,” he began “licking [her] in [her] vagina.” Machmuller then turned
D.W. so she was facing away from him, “placed [her] on top of him, and . . .
put his penis inside” her vagina. She did not notice him ever ejaculating.
D.W. testified that Machmuller’s actions were unwanted and made her
feel “[u]ncomfortable and gross.” She did not “try to get away,” explaining,
“[N]ot because I didn’t want to, just because I didn’t know how to react. I felt
frozen.”
Eventually, Machmuller “just let go” of D.W., and she put her bottoms
back on and left the bedroom. She found L.B. in grandmother’s room and told
the other girl that Machmuller “had touched [her] inappropriately and done
things that [she] wasn’t comfortable with.” D.W. began crying, and C.P. and
grandmother were told what had happened.
D.W. testified that grandmother then went to Machmuller’s bedroom,
gave Machmuller money she was keeping for him, and told him he needed to
leave. C.P., who was extremely upset, picked up a baseball bat, went to
Machmuller’s room, and yelled at him to leave. C.P. testified that he was not
responding, so she grabbed his arm and dragged him out of the room. At one
point, he fell down, and she hit his shoulder with the bat. She then finished
dragging him outside and “closed the door on him.”

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B. The Investigation
After getting Machmuller out of the house, C.P. called the police.
Around the same time, D.W. called W.B. and told her what Machmuller had
done. Eventually, W.B. arrived at grandmother’s house, after which D.W.
returned to her own house and reported what happened to her parents.
Shortly before 5:00 p.m., within an hour after the call for service, a
Lake County sheriff’s deputy arrived on the scene. He first interviewed D.W.
at her home, with her parents and brother present. After consulting with her
mother, D.W. declined a sexual-assault exam or any medical treatment.
The deputy testified that it did not appear D.W. had been drinking, as
she was talking normally and did not smell of alcohol. There was also no
evidence that she had smoked marijuana. The deputy saw no indication that
the other minors or grandmother had been drinking or smoking marijuana.
The deputy then spoke to Machmuller, who was sitting on the stairs to
grandmother’s house. Machmuller appeared to be “under the influence of
alcohol,” although he was conscious and able to communicate. Machmuller
expressed concern about not getting grandmother in trouble but then told the
deputy that he and the girls were “all dancing and having a very good time
and eating.”4 When the deputy asked whether Machmuller touched D.W., he
responded, “I took a nap.” The deputy then asked whether Machmuller was
ever alone with D.W., and Machmuller replied, “The, the truth is those young
girls are very promiscuous.” Finally, when asked directly what had
happened, Machmuller responded, “I’m actually not too sure.”
The deputy arrested Machmuller and transported him to jail. The
deputy testified that Machmuller “was able to walk in freely unassisted and

4 A body-worn camera recording of the deputy’s interaction with

Machmuller at the scene was admitted and played for the jury.

5
. . . was not sent for medical clearance by jail staff,” as would be done if a
person was more intoxicated. Booking photographs showed Machmuller in a
“fairly disheveled” state, as the zipper of his pants was down, his belt was
undone, and he was not wearing underwear. No blood test or any other
means of measuring his intoxication was ever performed.
A forensic interview of D.W. was conducted on February 2, 2023, about
two weeks after the incident.5 During the interview, D.W. described many of
the details to which she testified at trial, including Machmuller’s pulling at
her waistband to look at her underwear, orally copulating her while holding
her hands down, and having sexual intercourse with her. She also described
two acts that she did not mention at trial: a second instance of oral
copulation after the intercourse, and digital penetration of her vagina after
the first instance of oral copulation.
Law enforcement initially failed to collect the boxers and underwear
D.W. was wearing during the incident. D.W. testified that after changing out
of her clothes at home, she put them on the floor next to the washer and
dryer. When contacted three days later, D.W.’s mother indicated the clothing
was already washed. But five days after that, on January 23, 2023, D.W.’s
mother informed the sheriff’s department she found the clothing still in the
dirty laundry. She put the boxers and underwear in a Ziploc bag, and a
sergeant collected them the following day.
The “outside waistband of the boxer briefs, . . . the inside of the boxer
briefs with special attention to the inside waistband, . . . the outside of the
underwear, . . . [and] the inside of the underwear” were swabbed for DNA.
Testing showed that Machmuller’s DNA was on all four parts of the clothing

5 A video recording of D.W.’s forensic interview was also admitted and

played for the jury.

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swabbed. The criminologist who performed the testing treated the case as
one involving “touch DNA,” and he could not say whether the DNA collected
from the clothing came from “spit, semen, skin,” or any other part of the body.
C. The Count Involving W.B.
W.B. testified about an incident that occurred about two weeks before
the incident involving D.W. and C.P. W.B. was doing dishes in the kitchen of
grandmother’s home. She testified that “just in passing,” Machmuller did
“some sly touching” of her by using his hands and his “side” to touch her
buttocks. She told D.W. and C.P. about this touching at the time, but she did
not report it to an adult until the later incident involving the other two girls.
W.B. testified that Machmuller had previously made her uncomfortable
by making “comments on [her] appearance or the clothes [she] was wearing
or [her] body.” For example, on one occasion he stated that she was “showing
a lot of skin in [her] pajamas.” During the incident in grandmother’s kitchen,
however, Machmuller did not say anything to W.B.
D. Machmuller’s Testimony
Machmuller’s testimony focused on the charges involving D.W. and
C.P., and he did not address W.B.’s allegations. He indicated that C.P. was
staying at grandmother’s house that weekend. D.W. came over around
8:30 a.m. on the morning in question, and W.B. arrived later that morning.
There was also at least one other girl present whom he could not recall
clearly.
Machmuller testified that at some point, W.B. came into his bedroom
and told him she and the other girls were having a birthday party. According
to Machmuller, C.P. and D.W. were celebrating their 14th birthdays, and

7
W.B. was celebrating her 18th birthday.6 He remembered telling W.B.
congratulations and observing that now she could vote.
Around 9:00 a.m., the girls ran out of the alcohol they had been
drinking and asked Machmuller for some. Contrary to D.W.’s and C.P.’s
testimony, he testified that he had bought the bottle of E&J brandy the night
before. He claimed that “part of [his] agreement of living” at grandmother’s
house was that C.P. “gets whatever she wants,” so he gave them his alcohol.
Machmuller testified that around 9:30 a.m., he “t[ook] a couple nips” of
the alcohol himself. Although he had been “busted for DUIs” and was in
recovery, he usually drank some in the morning because of chronic knee pain.
He was “highly susceptible” to painkillers and antibiotics, which made him
fall asleep, so he did not take pills. The girls were aware of his drinking,
which they referred to as “old-man aspirin.”
Machmuller testified that the girls offered him a cup of orange juice
mixed with the brandy. As he was drinking it, he “was strongly encouraged
to finish it because [the girls] wanted the cup back.” He also heard someone
“whisper that it would help [his] knees.” This comment worried him, because
it made him believe there might be drugs in his drink. He testified that
grandmother sold Oxycontin, among other drugs, and C.P. had access to it.7

6 C.P. testified that she was born in May 2009. D.W. testified that she
was 13 years old at the time of the charged incidents and W.B. testified that
she was “[16], turning 17,” in January 2023, but D.W.’s and W.B.’s specific
birth dates were not introduced.
7 C.P. partially corroborated this claim, testifying that grandmother

had a medicine cabinet in which she kept Oxycontin and that C.P. herself
“used to have a problem with taking oxy.” C.P. also testified that D.W. knew
about the medicine cabinet because grandmother took medications out of it in
front of them. Grandmother admitted keeping her “good medications” in a
safe, but she denied any knowledge of C.P.’s having accessed them.

8
Machmuller testified that he put on music that would last about
20 minutes, the time it normally took for “whatever it is” he might take to
“get in [his] system.” Toward the end of the music, he began feeling “warm”
and “weird.” He was unable to focus properly, and around 12:00 or 1:00 p.m.,
he fell asleep. This was unusual, as he rarely took naps.
Machmuller testified that he woke up several hours later, around 4:30
or 5:00 p.m., feeling “groggy.” C.P. “was shaking [him] and extremely happy,”
and she said, “They’re here.” Machmuller remembered her helping him with
his clothes to “get ready to go outside,” but he did not remember her
threatening him with a baseball bat. He “[e]ver so slightly” recalled speaking
to the sheriff’s deputy, but he had no memory of being transported to jail. It
took “several days” for him to feel normal, and he believed alcohol alone could
not have caused his condition. As for his appearance in the jail photographs,
he stated that he usually did not wear underwear but it was “not like” him to
have his zipper down and belt undone.
When asked whether he touched C.P.’s breast, Machmuller did not
deny it. Referring to her trial testimony, he said, “I think when [C.P.] was
here yesterday, I think we both agreed that it was just merely an accident. It
was more like, hey, how’s it going? And believe it or not, a year ago she didn’t
have those. So you have to use your own judgment on that. I saw yesterday
that she had developed[,] I guess would be the word that I’m trying to use
there.”
As for D.W., Machmuller denied touching her breast, said he was not
“aware of” touching her vaginal area, and claimed “forc[ing her] onto the bed”
would be out of character for him. Later in his testimony, Machmuller denied
being attracted to D.W. or ever “inappropriately” touching her.

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E. Procedural History
Machmuller was charged with five felony counts involving D.W.: three
counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under age 14 (based on oral
copulation, digital penetration, and rape), false imprisonment, and lewd acts
on a child under age 14 (groping). He was also charged with one felony count
of lewd acts on a child under age 14 (groping breast) as to C.P. and a
misdemeanor count of sexual battery against W.B.8
The jury was instructed on various lesser included offenses for the
three charges of aggravated sexual assault and on misdemeanor false
imprisonment as a lesser included offense of the false-imprisonment charge.
After the jury indicated it was deadlocked on these counts, on the People’s
motion the trial court dismissed the aggravated-sexual-assault charges, the
next lesser included offense of the oral-copulation charge, and the felony
false-imprisonment charge, leaving the other lesser included offenses. The
jury then convicted Machmuller of oral copulation on a child under age 14,
simple battery for the count originally involving digital penetration, unlawful
sexual intercourse with a child under age 16, misdemeanor false
imprisonment, both counts of lewd acts, and sexual battery.9
In October 2024, after denying Machmuller’s motion for a new trial, the
trial court sentenced him to a total term of nine years in prison, composed of

8 The charges were brought under Penal Code sections 269,

subdivision (a)(4) (oral copulation), (a)(5) (digital penetration), and (a)(1)
(rape), 236 (false imprisonment), 288, subdivision (a) (lewd acts), and 243.4,
subdivision (e) (sexual battery). All further statutory references are to the
Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
9 The convictions were under sections 287, subdivision (c)(1) (oral

copulation), 242 (simple battery), 261.5, subdivision (d) (unlawful sexual
intercourse), 236 (misdemeanor false imprisonment), and, as originally
charged, sections 288, subdivision (a) (lewd acts), and 243.4, subdivision (e)
(sexual battery).

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a term of six years for oral copulation and consecutive terms of one year for
unlawful sexual intercourse and two years for the lewd acts against C.P. The
court imposed a concurrent term of 180 days for the sexual battery of W.B.,
and it imposed and stayed terms of 180 days for simple battery, one year for
false imprisonment, and six years for the lewd acts against D.W.10
II.
DISCUSSION
A. The Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Lacks Merit.
Machmuller first contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to and seek redaction of three portions of D.W.’s
forensic interview that he claims were hearsay. We are not persuaded.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must demonstrate “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” such that
“counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ [constitutionally] guaranteed,”
and “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th
659, 674.) Thus, the defendant must show both that (1) “counsel’s
performance . . . fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms” and (2) there is “a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).)

10 The abstract of judgment contains some errors that the trial court

should ensure are not repeated upon resentencing. The abstract indicates
the convictions for counts 1, 2, and 3 were under section 269 as originally
charged and refers to count 1 as “Sexual Assault Child/Oral Cop” and count 2
as “Aggravated Sexual Assault/Minor.” In fact, Machmuller was convicted in
count 1 of oral copulation on a child under age 14 under 287,
subdivision (c)(1); in count 2 of simple battery under section 242; and in
count 3 of unlawful sexual intercourse under section 261.5, subdivision (d).

11
When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we “defer[]
to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption counsel
acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (Mai,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.) “The decision whether to object to the
admission of evidence is ‘inherently tactical,’ and a failure to object will
rarely reflect deficient performance by counsel.” (People v. Castaneda (2011)
51 Cal.4th 1292, 1335.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for
ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had
no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel
was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be
no satisfactory explanation.” (Mai at p. 1009.) Here, the third basis for
finding ineffective assistance is the only potentially applicable one, as the
issue of hearsay in D.W.’s forensic interview did not arise below.11
Machmuller claims his trial counsel should have objected to three parts
of D.W.’s forensic interview as inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is “evidence of
a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the
hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (Evid.
Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Such evidence is inadmissible unless it qualifies as
an exception to the hearsay rule. (Id., § 1200, subd. (b); People v. Jasso
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 668.) In the following discussion, which addresses
each of the challenged statements in turn, we will assume without deciding
that the trial court would have excluded each statement had counsel objected.
At the start of the interview, the interviewer said to D.W., “Promise
that you’ll tell me the truth?” D.W. responded, “Promise.” Machmuller

11 Ineffective assistance of counsel was one of the bases on which

Machmuller moved for a new trial, but he challenged different aspects of his
trial counsel’s performance, and counsel did not provide a declaration or
address her decisionmaking on the record.

12
claims there is no legitimate reason his trial counsel “would want the jury to
hear that D.W. promised to tell the truth.” But in our view, this response did
little to bolster D.W.’s credibility. As the jury would have known from the
balance of the interview, it was not conducted under penalty of perjury, and
D.W. was old enough that it was virtually assured she would respond to the
question as she did, whether she intended to lie or not. Moreover, as the
Attorney General points out, D.W. swore an oath to tell the truth at trial, and
her trial testimony was mostly consistent with her interview statements.
Counsel would have had little to gain—except perhaps the trial court’s ire—
by seeking to exclude such an insignificant statement. As a result, we
conclude both that counsel’s failure to object to this statement could have
been a reasonable tactical decision and that the statement’s admission was
patently harmless.
The second challenged statement occurred after the interviewer asked
what D.W. liked to do for fun, and D.W., who was homeschooled, talked about
recently staying at a friend’s house for a couple weeks. D.W. stated that she
went home but returned to the friend’s house a few days later, explaining,
“Because I’m bored, and I needed somebody to be with, and I was, like,
having flashbacks to the whole situation [with Machmuller], so I was, like,
crying before I came over there, and at first, [the friend’s] mom didn’t believe
that happened, so, but I started crying, and I guess that made her realize
that it actually happened ‘cause my face was so, like,[¶] . . . [¶] sad and stuff.”
Machmuller argues that this statement also bolstered D.W.’s
credibility, by conveying that the friend’s mother believed D.W. because of
D.W.’s emotional response, and there was no reasonable basis for counsel not
to object to its admission. He points out that during deliberations the jury
asked to review this specific portion of the forensic interview, suggesting the

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jurors found it significant. But we do not see how this statement could
meaningfully affect the jury’s assessment of D.W.’s credibility. Crucially, the
statement did not detail what D.W. told her friend’s mother had “happened,”
so it did not tend to suggest that any of D.W.’s particular allegations were
worthy of belief. The information that D.W. was upset and crying in the days
following the incident also did little to bolster her specific claims. Given the
relative lack of significance of this statement, counsel could have reasonably
decided not to object to it, and its admission was harmless.
Finally, Machmuller challenges the following statements D.W. made
after the interviewer asked whether she “heard of [Machmuller] doing this to
anybody else”:
“No, but he has—I mean, I think he might have, but I’m not
sure if he fully like raped a girl, but I know that he’s like beaten
an ex-girlfriend. [H]e has touched my sister, not my actual sister,
but my best friend, like touched her boob and her butt, and then
like he’s hit that grandma across the face and touched her butt
and like stuff and like making her kiss him. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] And
then he would . . . just like at random times . . . grab her face
kinda and like pull in like super aggressively and . . . make her
kiss him. And then, he touched the . . . best friend’s mother . . . .
So, he’s like done weird stuff before . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . and never
like touched anybody like not in there, I don’t think.”
Machmuller claims that his trial counsel could have had no rational tactical
reason not to object to these statements, which “attack[ed]” his character and,
in the case of the described acts against C.P., bolstered C.P.’s credibility.
We tend to agree with Machmuller that defense counsel should have
sought to exclude these statements about prior bad acts. But ultimately, we
need not determine whether counsel’s failure to object fell below professional
norms, because there is no reasonable likelihood Machmuller would have
obtained a better result had the trial court excluded this evidence. The
statements about the ex-girlfriend and grandmother suggested Machmuller

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was physically violent, but the jury rejected the charges involving use of force
and convicted him of lesser included offenses that did not have force as an
element. The information that Machmuller “kissed” grandmother and
“touched” C.P.’s mother was relatively innocuous, especially since it involved
adult women. Finally, the statement about C.P. lacked detail, and it did not
support the inference that D.W. personally witnessed such acts against her
friend. Indeed, C.P. testified that she did not think anyone else saw
Machmuller touch her during the charged incident, and the mere fact that
she may have told D.W. about it did little to bolster C.P.’s credibility.
In short, we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the
challenged statements individually or collectively affected the verdict. Thus,
Machmuller’s ineffective-assistance claim fails.
B. Reversal Based on Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Unwarranted.
Machmuller next claims the trial court erred by denying a mistrial
based on a comment about defense counsel the prosecutor made during
closing argument. We are not persuaded.
1. Additional facts
In her closing argument, Machmuller’s trial counsel argued that the
girls put Oxycontin in Machmuller’s orange juice because they wanted him to
dance with them, but it caused him to pass out. They then “stage[d] the
situation” by undoing his pants and belt buckle because they were worried
about getting in trouble.
On rebuttal, the prosecutor questioned whether this scenario was
plausible. He said, “The orange juice roofy drink. If [defense counsel] had
that information and she believed that information—.” Defense counsel
immediately objected, and the prosecutor did not complete his sentence. The
trial court overruled the objection, but defense counsel continued, “He’s

15
accusing me of lying.” The court stated, “Counsel, you argue with me again,
you’re going to have troubles,” and directed the prosecutor to proceed.12
The prosecutor continued, “Why weren’t . . . C.P. and D.W. grilled about
the orange juice, about the roofy? Why wasn’t that the topic over and over
and over? Why did we not hear about that until Mr. Machmuller took the
stand? Because I’ll tell you, I asked him. That was never told to law
enforcement. . . . Why if that is the driving force of their defense that this
person is involuntarily intoxicated because 13[-]year[-]olds wanted him to
dance, why weren’t they asked 50 questions about that? Was there orange
juice in the house? When did you give him the orange juice? Didn’t you want
him to dance? Did you know his hips hurt? Would he not join you? I can
think of 40 questions right now. But we didn’t hear about it because it
doesn’t exist.”
After closing arguments were done, the defense moved for a mistrial,
claiming the prosecutor committed misconduct by “impl[ying] that [defense]
counsel did not believe [Machmuller] during the trial” and “shift[ing] the
burden of proof to the defendant.” The trial court denied the motion. The
court did not interpret the prosecutor’s remarks “as calling [defense counsel]
a liar” or shifting the burden of proof. Instead, the prosecutor merely
correctly noted that “any attorney, if they have information they believe,” can
ask witnesses about it.
After denying the mistrial motion, the trial court gave defense counsel
an opportunity to request a curative instruction. Counsel asked that the jury
be instructed “that defense counsel has an absolute duty to not put on

12 When later discussing the issue outside the jury’s presence, the trial

court observed that defense counsel was “offended” when it overruled her
objection: “I don’t even think [counsel] realized, but she yelled back at me
and glared at me saying, ‘He’s accusing me of lying.’ ”

16
witnesses that they believe . . . would lie to the Court.” Although counsel was
“not sure” if the instruction was “enough to cure the harm,” she thought it
was “a step in that direction.” Questioning whether the proposed instruction
truly addressed the issue, the prosecutor suggested that the court “reread the
instruction that the defense has no burden to prove anything.”
The trial court then reread to the jury CALCRIM No. 220, which
discussed the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court continued, “I would also point out that defense counsel has a duty
not to put on witnesses that . . . counsel believe[s] would be lying or
misleading the jury, okay? Just a basic principle of law.”
2. Discussion
“Prosecutorial misbehavior ‘violates the federal Constitution when it
comprises a pattern of conduct “so egregious that it infects the trial with such
unfairness as to . . . [deny] due process.” [Citation.] But conduct by a
prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is
prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves “ ‘the use of
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or
the jury.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 418.) “ ‘ “[W]hen the
claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the
question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed
or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.” ’ ”
(People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 284.)
We review the denial of Machmuller’s mistrial motion for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 283.) “Such a motion
should be granted only when a party’s chances of receiving a fair trial have
been irreparably damaged.” (Ibid.) “[T]he trial judge, present on the scene,
is obviously the best judge of whether any error was so prejudicial to one of

17
the parties as to warrant scrapping proceedings up to that point.”
(Blumenthal v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 672, 678, italics
omitted.)
A prosecutor may not “argue to the jury that defense counsel does not
believe in [the defendant’s] defense. [Citations.] Such argument directs the
jury’s attention to an irrelevant factor,” because counsel’s beliefs do “not help
the jury determine whether, under the evidence presented, [the] defendant
committed the charged crime.” (People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86,
112–113 & fn. 19.) On the other hand, it is proper to make “ ‘ “ ‘comments on
the state of the evidence or on the failure of the defense to introduce material
evidence or to call logical witnesses.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th
1215, 1266.)
On appeal, Machmuller does not contest that it was “fair comment for
the prosecution to point out that the minors were not questioned about
drugging” him. Instead, he primarily takes issue with the prosecutor’s initial
comment about defense counsel’s belief. Although Machmuller “agrees . . .
that if an attorney believes information to be true, they may inquire about
that information,” he argues that here the prosecutor improperly “point[ed] to
[defense counsel’s] disbelief as the reason those inquiries were not made.”
Had the prosecutor completed the challenged remark—“If [defense
counsel] had that information and she believed that information”—by saying
counsel would have questioned the girls about the drink, we agree that the
statement could have been interpreted to mean that counsel did not ask such
questions because she did not believe Machmuller was drugged. But counsel
objected immediately, and the prosecutor never finished the thought.
Instead, the rest of his comments focused on the defense’s ability to ask
questions, and he did not mention defense counsel’s personal views again. In

18
the context of the closing arguments as a whole, the challenged remark was
insignificant, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to
grant a mistrial based upon it.
Even if the prosecutor’s remark rose to the level of misconduct, we
would conclude it was harmless. Machmuller concedes that “the
prosecution’s misconduct did not amount to constitutional error,” meaning
the relevant question is whether there is a reasonable probability that he
would have obtained a more favorable result had the remark not been made.
(See People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1070–1071; People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) He argues that this standard is met
because this was a close case turning on witness credibility, so the
implication that defense counsel did not believe him was particularly
damaging. But as we have said, the prosecutor never completed his
statement about counsel’s belief, instead turning to the questions counsel
could have asked but did not. And the record shows that counsel reacted
angrily to the prosecutor’s unfinished comment, undercutting any perception
that she did not, in fact, believe Machmuller’s story.
Machmuller also claims the curative instruction about counsel’s duty
not to put on untruthful witnesses was ineffective because it “drew the jury’s
attention to defense counsel’s irrelevant beliefs” instead of refocusing the jury
on the evidence. In our view, however, the instruction further dispelled any
possible prejudice from the prosecutor’s comment. It did so because it tended
to convey that counsel thought Machmuller, the primary defense witness,
was credible since she offered his testimony.13 Moreover, the trial court also

13 Of course, a criminal defendant has the right to testify against

defense counsel’s advice, but the jury was not told that, and generally “the
decision whether a defendant should testify is within the competence of the
trial attorney.” (People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 860.)

19
reread CALCRIM No. 220, which did refocus the jury on the evidence and the
prosecution’s burden of proof. Based on the record as a whole, it is not
reasonably probable that the prosecutor’s comment affected the verdicts.
C. There Was No Cumulative Error.
According to Machmuller, the ineffective assistance of counsel and
prosecutorial misconduct he identifies were cumulatively prejudicial even if
not individually so. But the trial court did not err by denying a mistrial
based on prosecutorial misconduct, and any deficiency in counsel’s
performance was harmless for the reasons given. Thus, there is no prejudice
to accumulate. Finally, even if prosecutorial misconduct occurred, it was
minimally prejudicial and would not justify reversal even if combined with
any prejudice resulting from counsel’s performance. Machmuller’s claim of
cumulative error fails.
D. The Sexual-battery Conviction Must Be Reversed Because the Jury
Was Not Instructed on a Lesser Included Offense.
Finally, Machmuller contends the trial court prejudicially erred by not
instructing the jury sua sponte on simple battery as a lesser included offense
of sexual battery. We agree that reversal is required.
“The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on all lesser
included offenses if there is substantial evidence from which a jury can
reasonably conclude the defendant committed the lesser, uncharged offense,
but not the greater.” (People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 29.)
Thus, even though Machmuller did not request an instruction on simple
battery below, the claim is preserved for appeal. (See id. at p. 33, fn. 6.) We
review de novo whether a trial court erred by not instructing on a lesser
included offense, “considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
defendant” to determine whether substantial evidence supported the
instruction. (Id. at p. 30.)

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Machmuller was convicted of misdemeanor sexual battery against W.B.
under section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1), which makes it a crime to “touch[] an
intimate part of another person, if the touching is done against the will of the
person touched, and is for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual
gratification, or sexual abuse.” Simple battery is defined as “any willful and
unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” (§ 242.)
“ ‘ “[T]he least touching” may constitute battery,’ ” and a touching is
“ ‘unlawful’ ” if it is “ ‘harmful or offensive.’ ” (People v. Shockley (2013)
58 Cal.4th 400, 404.) On appeal, it is undisputed that simple battery is a
lesser included offense of sexual battery. (See, e.g., People v. Yonko (1987)
196 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1010.)
Machmuller claims there was substantial evidence that his touching of
W.B. was not for a sexual purpose, and thus that only simple battery
occurred, because the touching happened in passing and he did not say
anything during it. The Attorney General responds that since Machmuller
“offered no defense to [this] count[, t]he jury was presented with only one
version of the event—the prosecution’s version, based on W.B.’s testimony
that [Machmuller] touched her in a sexual manner.” Thus, the Attorney
General argues, “[t]here was no evidence presented from which the jurors
could have reasonably concluded that [Machmuller] committed a simple
battery when he touched W.B.’s buttocks with his hand and rubbed his body
against her as she was washing dishes.”
Machmuller has the better argument. Although he did not testify
about the incident involving W.B., her testimony did not compel the
conclusion that he touched her for a sexual purpose. W.B. testified that
Machmuller “touched” her buttocks with his hand and side, not that he
“rubbed” against her as the Attorney General claims. A reasonable juror

21
could have credited this testimony but nonetheless determined that
Machmuller might have had a non-sexual purpose for doing so, such as
moving W.B. so he could pass. Though Machmuller’s past comments about
W.B.’s body and appearance certainly permitted the inference that the
touching at issue was sexual, he did not say anything at that time that
conveyed such an intent. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Machmuller, we conclude that there was substantial evidence on which a
reasonable juror could have relied to determine that he committed simple
battery only.
We thus turn to whether the error was prejudicial. Generally speaking,
a trial court’s “failure to instruct on [a] lesser included offense[] supported by
substantial evidence [is] state law error” that requires reversal if “a different
result was reasonably probable” under Watson. (People v. Gonzalez (2018)
5 Cal.5th 186, 196, 201; cf. People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260.)
The prejudice stemming from such an error “is the risk that the jury ignored
its instructions and convicted the defendant of an offense . . . for which the
prosecution did not carry its burden. The jury might have been convinced
that the defendant was guilty of some lesser included offense and, as a result,
[been] tempted to convict of a greater offense rather than acquit.” (Gonzalez,
at p. 200.)
Applying this standard, we conclude the failure to instruct on simple
battery was prejudicial. In resisting this conclusion, the Attorney General
claims that “the evidence was overwhelming based on W.B.’s testimony that
[Machmuller] touched her in a sexual manner,” which was corroborated both
by her immediate reporting of the incident to C.P. and D.W. and
Machmuller’s prior inappropriate statements. While there was no real
question that W.B. perceived the touching as sexual, for the reasons given

22
above a reasonable juror could have nonetheless decided that the prosecution
failed to prove that Machmuller intended it as such. In other words, a
reasonable juror could have believed everything W.B. said but still harbored
a reasonable doubt that Machmuller’s purpose in touching her was sexual.
Nor did the jury make any other findings establishing that it necessarily
concluded Machmuller had such a purpose. (See People v. Gonzalez, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 200.) Particularly given that the jury was willing to convict
Machmuller of lesser included offenses on other counts, we perceive nothing
in the record dispelling the risk that because it was not instructed on simple
battery, it convicted him of sexual battery rather than acquitting him.
III.
DISPOSITION
Machmuller’s conviction for sexual battery is reversed, and his other
convictions are affirmed. The matter is remanded for the People to elect
whether to retry Machmuller for sexual battery. If they elect not to do so, the
judgment shall be modified to reflect his conviction for simple battery in
count 7. In either case, Machmuller will be entitled to a full resentencing.

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_________________________
Humes, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

People v. Machmuller A171972

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