Silvera v. Shorter CA2/1

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Filed 12/22/25 Silvera v. Shorter CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JOVITA SILVERA, B336666

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23IWRO00747)
v.

LECIA SHORTER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Patricia J. Titus, Judge. Affirmed.
Lecia Shorter, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
On August 1, 2023, the trial court granted respondent
Jovita Silvera’s request for a domestic violence restraining order
against her sibling, appellant Lecia Shorter, protecting both
Jovita and Sondra Shorter, Jovita and Lecia’s mother.1 In her
appellate brief, Lecia claims she “inadvertently calendared the
hearing date for August 6, 2023, and as a result was not present
for the DVRO hearing.” Lecia argues the court erred by not
recusing itself when it harbored bias against Lecia, and by
granting the request for a restraining order when no evidence
supported it. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Jovita Requests a Restraining Order
In July 2023, Jovita filed a request for a domestic violence
restraining order against Lecia, asking for an order protecting
herself and their 81-year-old mother, Sondra. Jovita claimed
Lecia “threatened to get ‘rid’ of me,” “made threats to other
siblings against me to sue me for unknown reasons,” and “called
me several names and stated something will happen to me if I am
her enemy because I’m caring for my mom.” Jovita alleged
Sondra was “suffering from dementia and early stages of
Alzheimer’s,” and Lecia was “unstable and trying to [de]fraud my
mother of her property and retirement.” Jovita also asserted
Lecia “threatened my mom” and “kicked her out of her home”
while “cursing her and verbally abusing her.” Jovita specified the
verbal abuse of her mother and threats to her siblings occurred in

1 Because some of the parties share a surname, we refer to

everyone by their first name.

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June 2023, and the threats to Jovita occurred in July 2023, the
same day the request for a DVRO was filed.

B. The Court Grants Jovita’s Request
On August 1, 2023, the court held a hearing on Jovita’s
request; Lecia was not present. Before the hearing began, the
court let Jovita know it recognized Lecia’s name, knew Lecia was
a lawyer, and had just discovered Lecia was disbarred when the
court “looked it up.” The court stated it was not Lecia’s friend
and had not seen or heard from her. After the court assured
Jovita it could be unbiased, Jovita said she was “fine” with the
court hearing the request.
The court informed Jovita that she provided insufficient
information in her papers to obtain a restraining order, so she
should explain to the court why she felt one was necessary. The
minute order from the hearing reflects Jovita was “placed under
oath and testifie[d].”
Jovita informed the court that, on July 10, there was a
conservatorship hearing for her mother, Sondra, and Lecia was in
the audience. Lecia did not think Sondra needed help and had
been fighting the other siblings’ attempt to establish a
conservatorship.2 When Lecia discovered Jovita had obtained a
“capacity declaration” for Sondra, Lecia kept repeating “we got to
get rid of this bitch”—referring to Jovita—because Sondra was
living with Jovita, and Jovita was Sondra’s caretaker.

2 Jovita stated that, out of her four siblings, Lecia was the

only one who believed Sondra did not need help and the only one
who opposed the conservatorship. Jovita reported her brother
Daniel would be the conservator.

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Two or three days after the court hearing, Lecia came to
Jovita’s home and coaxed Sondra to climb over a six-foot gate;
Sondra fell to the other side of the gate. Jovita claimed to “have
that on my Ring video.” Jovita also said she had footage of Lecia
“cursing” and “trying to fight me in the front yard.” Jovita
offered to show the court the video, but the court stated it did not
need to see it.
Jovita claimed Lecia was stoking Sondra’s fear and
paranoia to disrupt the siblings’ estate planning, doing things
such as taking Sondra from the home without telling the siblings
where they were, resulting in Sondra not having her medication,
or accusing Jovita of stealing Sondra’s blueberry juice. Jovita
believed Lecia was “speeding up [Sondra’s] dementia” by “causing
so much turmoil” and worsening Sondra’s hysteria and paranoia.
Jovita related the siblings were “trying to introduce new positive
reinforcements” for Sondra but could not do so “when Lecia keeps
coming in, snatching her, taking her, feeding her all this
negativity, making her feel like it’s 1985 and she doesn’t have a
problem.” Jovita claimed Lecia had taken some of Sondra’s
money and that “even . . . last week,” Lecia was “trying to take
my mom to sign contracts with her diminished capacity outside of
us and secretly.”
The court found Jovita had “met the burden of proof for a
restraining order,” adding the court had independently run
Lecia’s name through CLETS (the California Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System) and found some “misdemeanor
convictions for her violence.” The court issued a five-year
restraining order, requiring Lecia not to contact or communicate
with, and to stay away from, Jovita and Sondra.

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Lecia timely appealed the court’s order.3

DISCUSSION

A. We Deny Lecia’s Request for Judicial Notice
Citing Evidence Code section 459, Lecia requests in her
opening brief that we take judicial notice of “the Court docket,
files and records” in “[t]he conservatorship proceeding in Los
Angeles Superior Court Case No. 22STPB12451.” But “[t]o
obtain judicial notice by a reviewing court under Evidence Code
section 459, a party must serve and file a separate motion with a
proposed order.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(1).)
Additionally, “[i]f the matter to be noticed is not in the record, the
party must attach to the motion a copy of the matter to be noticed
or an explanation of why it is not practicable to do so.” (Id. at
rule 8.252(a)(3).) Lecia neither filed a motion nor included a copy

3 In her opening brief on appeal, Lecia informs us that “[o]n

August 14, 2023, and August 23, 2023, Appellant filed requests to
terminate the DVRO. . . . Each request was summarily denied
without hearing. [¶] On November 6, 2023, Appellant attempted
to file an Order to Show Cause and Affidavit Re Contempt but
the filing was refused by the clerks of the Superior Court.” It is
unclear whether Lecia is arguing the court erred in denying her
requests and refusing her permission to file the Order to Show
Cause. However, the Notice of Appeal Lecia filed indicates the
order she is appealing was entered on August 1, 2023. Because
Lecia has not filed a notice of appeal regarding the court’s actions
after August 1, 2023, we need not—and indeed, cannot—consider
whether the court erred in denying her August 14 or August 23
requests, or refusing her November 6 attempt to file an Order to
Show Cause.

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of the matter to be noticed or an explanation of why it was
impracticable to do so. As such, we deny her request.

B. Lecia Forfeited Any Claim That the Trial Court
Was Required to Recuse Itself
Lecia contends the trial court was required to recuse itself
because it harbored bias against her. She contends this bias is
evidenced by the facts that: (1) the court held a hearing without
Lecia’s presence and without trying to ascertain her
whereabouts; (2) the court “looked [Lecia] up” and discovered her
disbarment; (3) the court issued the DVRO despite Jovita’s
failure to meet her burden of proof in her request for a DVRO.
“If a judge who should disqualify himself or herself refuses
or fails to do so, any party may file with the clerk a written
verified statement objecting to the hearing or trial before the
judge and setting forth the facts constituting the grounds for
disqualification of the judge. The statement shall be presented at
the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts
constituting the ground for disqualification.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 170.3, subd. (c)(1).)
Although the record does not disclose when Lecia obtained
a transcript of the DVRO proceedings, she quoted portions of
Jovita’s testimony in the “Order to Show Cause and Affidavit for
Contempt” she attempted to file in November 2023. Therefore,
by November 2023, she was aware of the statements the court
made, and the fact that the court held the hearing and did not
recuse itself. Yet nothing in the record indicates Lecia filed the
statement required by Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3. “It
is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial court are
forfeited on appeal.” (Kern County Dept. of Child Support
Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1038.)

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“Moreover, objections on such grounds [under Code of Civil
Procedure sections 170.1 or 170.3] must be made at the ‘earliest
practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting
the ground for disqualification.’ ” (Ibid.) “We conclude that
appellant’s disqualification arguments are forfeited by [her]
failure to raise them below.” (Ibid.)

C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Granting the Restraining Order
“Pursuant to the [Domestic Violence Prevention Act], a
court may issue a protective order ‘ “to restrain any person for the
purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and
ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved” upon
“reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” ’ ” (In re
Marriage of Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 225.)
“Domestic violence” includes “abuse perpetrated against” a
“person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second
degree.” (Fam. Code, § 6211, subd. (f).) “Abuse” includes “any
behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section
6320.” (Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (a)(4); see also id. at subd. (b)
[“Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or
assault”].) Behaviors that can be enjoined pursuant to Section
6320 include “threatening,” “harassing,” and “disturbing the
peace of the other party” or “in the discretion of the court, on a
showing of good cause, of other named family or household
members.” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a).) “Disturbing the peace”
includes “unreasonably engaging in any of the following: [¶] (1)
Isolating the other party from friends, relatives, or other sources
of support. [¶] (2) Depriving the other party of basic necessities.
[¶] (3) Controlling, regulating, or monitoring the other party’s

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movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic
resources, or access to services.” (Id. at subd. (c).)
“The DVPA requires a showing of past abuse by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (In re Marriage of Davila &
Mejia, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.) “We review the grant or
denial of a request for a DVRO for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “To the extent that we are called upon to review the trial
court’s factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard
of review.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Lecia argues the court erred in granting the DVRO because
“[t]here was no showing on the record that Appellant engaged in
domestic violence or abuse, within the meaning of section 6200 et
seq.” The record belies her claim. Jovita testified that Lecia
repeatedly stated she needed to “get rid” of Jovita and tried to
fight Jovita in her front yard. Further, Jovita informed the court
that Lecia coaxed their 81-year-old mother to climb a six-foot
fence, resulting in her falling to the other side. Additionally,
Lecia sometimes whisked Sondra away without telling the other
siblings where they were, resulting in Sondra not having her
medication. These statements are substantial evidence Lecia
was threatening and harassing Jovita, and disturbing the peace
of Sondra, all of which constitute abuse under Family Code
section 6203.
Lecia also argues the court abused its discretion in deciding
not to review the video Jovita offered to show. Lecia has forfeited
this argument by failing to raise the objection below because she
was not present at the properly noticed hearing date. (See People
v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589–590 [“ ‘ “An appellate court
will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous
rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted,

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where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the
lower court by some appropriate method” ’ ”].) Moreover, were we
to consider her argument, we would conclude the court’s decision
to take Jovita’s word about the contents of a video she was
readily offering to show was well within the bounds of reason.
(See, e.g., Blueberry Properties, LLC v. Chow (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 1017, 1020 [“ ‘An abuse of discretion occurs only
where it is shown that the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. [Citation.] It is a deferential standard of review that
requires us to uphold the trial court’s determination, even if we
disagree with it, so long as it is reasonable’ ”].)
Finally, Lecia appears to argue the court erred by failing to
state its reasons for granting the DVRO apart from finding Jovita
had met her burden. But Lecia cites no authority stating the
court was required to make such a statement. Indeed, Family
Code section 6340 states that “upon denying a petition under this
part, [a court must] provide a brief statement of the reasons for
the decision in writing or on the record.” (Fam. Code, § 6340,
subd. (b).) The statute has no corresponding requirement when
the petition is granted.4

4 Lecia’s citations to the contrary are inapposite because

they address the requirements of other statutes. (Abdelqader v.
Abraham (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 186, 196 [“If the court
determines the [Family Code section 3044] presumption has been
rebutted, it must state the reasons for its decision in writing or
on the record”]; In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1078
[Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2 requires court to
make finding “either in writing or on the record”]; In re Abram L.
(2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 463 [same].)

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Respondent shall
recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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