CourtListener 10759439•Williams v. Ali CA2/7
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Filed 12/16/25 Williams v. Ali CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
STUART M. WILLIAMS, B333778
Petitioner and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SD030630)
v.
SHAZEENA ALI,
Respondent.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD
SUPPORT SERVICES,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William E. Weinberger, Judge. Affirmed.
Stuart M. Willians, in pro. per., for Petitioner and
Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent Shazeena Ali.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent Los Angeles
County Department of Child Support Services.
_______________________
Stuart Williams appeals from a family court order denying
his request for modification of child support, including an
equitable credit against his child support arrearages pursuant to
Jackson v. Jackson (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 363 (Jackson).1
Williams contends the court erred in considering the responsive
declaration filed by his ex-wife, Shazeena Ali, because the
declaration was not properly served on him. He also contends the
evidence compelled a finding his daughter lived exclusively with
him for six months, thus relieving him of child support during
that period. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Judgment of Dissolution and Final Custody and
Support Orders
Williams and Ali were married in 2003, and their daughter,
Chloe, was born in December 2004. In March 2012 Williams filed
a petition for marital dissolution, and on July 21, 2014 the family
court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage
(2014 judgment). At all relevant times, Williams lived in
1 Equitable credits against child support arrearages for time
periods when a child is living with the obligor spouse are
commonly referred to as a Jackson credits. (See Helgestad v.
Vargas (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 719, 721-722 [“[F]amily law has
developed a shorthand term for credits. They are called ‘Jackson
credits,’ after the first case to allow for them.”].)
2
Brentwood (Los Angeles), and Ali lived in West Hollywood. Chloe
attended high school in Sherman Oaks until her graduation, at
age 18, on May 26, 2023.
The 2014 judgment included a custody order for the
parents to have joint legal and physical custody of Chloe with
equal timeshares. Except for holidays and vacations, each parent
had custody on alternating weeks, beginning on Friday
afternoons.2 The parents shared the right to make decisions
regarding Chloe’s schooling, extracurricular activities,
nonemergency medical and dental treatment, and mental health
therapy, and each parent was required to notify the other
promptly of any changes in these areas.
The judgment included a child support order providing that
Williams would pay Ali $883 per month for Chloe’s support until
Chloe turned 18, or 19 if she was still in high school. The parents
were jointly responsible for Chloe’s reasonable and necessary
health care expenses not covered by insurance, and a parent who
incurred those expenses was entitled to reimbursement pursuant
to the procedures in Family Code section 4063.3 The judgment
also included family law form FL-192 (“Notice of Rights and
Responsibilities – Health Care Costs and Reimbursement
Procedures”), which specified that a parent seeking
reimbursement for health care costs must provide an itemized
statement to the other parent “no more than 30 days after those
costs were given to you.”
2 The final custody order referred to an attached holiday and
vacation schedule, but it is not in the record on appeal.
3 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Family Code.
3
B. The February 27, 2022 Incident and Subsequent Family
Court Proceedings4
On the morning of Sunday, February 27, 2022, during Ali’s
custodial week, Ali and then-17-year-old Chloe got into an
argument that escalated into a physical altercation, and Ali
slapped Chloe on the face. Chloe called Williams and asked him
to pick her up from Ali’s apartment, which he did. Chloe spent
the rest of the week with Williams. Williams contends (but Ali
disputes) that Chloe continued to live with him for several
months.
On June 22, 2022 the family court5 issued, following Ali’s
filing of an affidavit of facts constituting contempt, an order to
show cause for contempt of the 2014 judgment. In her affidavit,
Ali averred that Williams failed to make any child support
payments after March 2022 and he enrolled Chloe in therapy and
an out-of-state summer program without Ali’s knowledge or
consent. Ali also averred Williams “refused to turn the child
over” during Ali’s custodial time in the second week of April 2022.
After a hearing, on November 3, 2022 the court6 dismissed the
order to show cause without prejudice after finding Ali’s affidavit
did not allege contempt with adequate specificity to determine if
her claims were time barred.
4 Our summary of the February 27 incident and its
aftermath is based on the undisputed facts set forth in the
parties’ requests for orders and responsive declarations. We
separately address the disputed facts.
5 Judge Amy M. Pellman.
6 Judge Michael R. Powell presided over the proceedings
from November 2022 through May 2023.
4
On July 7, 2022 Williams, representing himself, filed a
request for order modifying child custody (2022 RFO). Although
the RFO stated on the cover page that Williams was seeking a
change in child custody, he checked the boxes on pages 2 and 3
for a change in child custody and child support (to reduce it to
zero). In a concurrently filed motion and memorandum, Williams
argued that Chloe stopped living with Ali after February 27, and
he requested orders for sole physical and legal custody,
termination of his child support obligation, and reimbursement
for half of Chloe’s health-related expenses incurred in 2021 and
2022. Williams filed an amended motion on August 29 in which
he requested Jackson credits for the period Chloe was no longer
living with Ali.
After additional submissions and a hearing, on
February 24, 2023 the family court denied Williams’s RFO and
motion to modify the existing orders. The court stated it would
need to consider then-18-year-old Chloe’s custody preference, and
by the time the court could hear from Chloe, she would reach (or
nearly reach) her graduation and “emancipation.” The court did
not consider Williams’s request for a child support modification
because Williams marked only the box for a custody modification
on the cover of his FL-300 request form. The court acknowledged
that Williams could refile a request for a modification of support.
C. The March 2023 Request for Order
1. Williams’s RFO, motion, and evidence
On March 6, 2023 Williams filed a second request for order
(2023 RFO) to modify child support. On the same day he filed a
motion and supporting memorandum clarifying the relief he
requested. Williams stated in his memorandum he was seeking a
$5,298 Jackson credit for six months beginning in January 2022
5
“since Chloe was not living with [Ali] for those six months and
[Ali] was contributing nothing to Chloe’s expenses.”7 Williams
also sought $5,674 as reimbursement for “50% of Chloe’s medical
dental and vision expenses in 2022.” Williams further requested
the family court end his child support obligation “due to the fact
that Chloe is self-sufficient since she has a job,” or in the
alternative, recalculate his guideline child support obligation
based on a change in his employment.8
Williams did not submit a separate declaration under
penalty of perjury; he instead signed the RFO under penalty of
perjury and cited the motion and memorandum as the “facts to
support the orders” he requested. (Capitalization omitted.) In
his motion Williams asserted that on January 4, 2022, after Ali
slapped Chloe, Chloe decided she wanted to live with Williams
full-time and visit Ali only on weekends.9 Further, Chloe moved
in with Williams and lived with him “for the next 4 months,”
7 The requested Jackson credit equals the full amount of
Williams’s child support obligation for six months: $883 × 6 =
$5,298.
8 We do not reach whether Williams was entitled to a
modification of child support, because at the hearing on the RFO
Williams stated he was no longer seeking an order relating to
child support for the period after Chloe turned 18 years old (in
December 2022) and he does not contend otherwise on appeal.
9 Although the motion refers to a January 4, 2022 slapping
incident that caused Chloe to move in with him, all other
references in the parties’ papers refer to a February 27, 2022
incident. In his 2022 RFO, for example, Williams stated “Chloe
was living with her mother 50% of the time up until February 27,
2022,” and “[Chloe] moved out of her mother’s apartment on
February 27, 2022.”
6
until the end of the school year, “with the exception of one week
in February 2022 when she tried to reconcile with her mother to
no avail.” During their estrangement, Ali did not attend Chloe’s
performances in the high school musical in March or her dance
recitals in April (whereas Williams went to several
performances). At the end of the school year, Chloe then lived in
Massachusetts for two months “with neither parent” while she
attended a summer program at Harvard University; Williams
paid all of Chloe’s expenses for this program. After returning to
California on August 6, “Chloe resumed living with [Ali] 50% of
the time.”
Williams attached more than a dozen exhibits to his
motion, including screenshots of text messages Williams asserted
he received from Ali. In a message dated February 27, 2022, Ali
acknowledged that Williams was coming to pick up Chloe and
complained that Chloe had been “getting totally out of hand,”
insulting both parents. Ali said that if Chloe continued to
disrespect them, Ali would support Chloe “getting a job . . . and
living with a roommate and taking a bus.” In a text message
dated April 13, Ali wrote to Williams: “[Y]ou’re behind on child
support again. Let me know what your plans are with Chloe. If
she’s going to be with you full-time and you’re not going to be
paying child support[,] I am giving up this apartment and she
will need to get her belongings.” Williams responded, “I will take
her full time,” adding, “[I]f you agree to giving me full custody we
won’t have to go to court. . . . She’s almost eighteen anyway.” On
June 11, Ali wrote, “[Y]ou are 3 months behind with child
support,” to which Williams responded, “Chloe has not lived with
you for those three months.” Williams wrote, “I also want
reimbursement for the money I spent on Chloe that you
contributed nothing to.” Williams demanded payment of $1,700
7
for removal of Chloe’s wisdom teeth, $5,000 for her therapy, and
$10,000 as Ali’s share of “the money I spent on [Chloe’s] summer
program.”
In another exhibit, Williams included a “list of medical,
dental and vision expenses” from January 2021 to June 2022.
(Capitalization omitted.) The list stated the total amounts spent
on therapy ($7,425), vision ($818), and wisdom teeth removal
($3,104) (totaling $11,347). A separate exhibit included a billing
summary from a family therapist stating Williams was charged
$7,425 for 33 psychotherapy sessions between February and
December 2021. Invoices from an optometrist indicated that
Chloe incurred $642 in out-of-pocket expenses for services in
November 2021 and $176 for services on June 14, 2022. Receipts
from an oral surgeon and surgery center indicated total payments
of $3,104 in connection with the removal of Chloe’s wisdom teeth
on June 3, 2022.
Williams also submitted the 2022-2023 bus schedule for
Chloe’s high school, which showed that different school bus
routes served Brentwood and West Hollywood. Williams
provided a declaration signed by the custodian of records at
Chloe’s school that stated the school, in response to a document
subpoena, collected Chloe’s school bus transportation records
from January through June 2022, among other document
categories (including receipts for the purchase of tickets for the
school musical). The declaration stated the documents were
attached, but the declaration does not contain a file stamp or
indicate whether the records were lodged with the court.
Williams argued the transportation records would prove
that Chloe was traveling to and from his home in Brentwood
rather than Ali’s apartment in West Hollywood, but he did not
8
submit the records with his motion or describe their contents.10
Williams stated the school records would also prove Ali never
attended the musical or dance recital.
2. Ali’s responsive declaration
On May 18, 2023 Ali filed a responsive declaration opposing
modification of the existing orders. In her declaration sworn
under penalty of perjury, Ali admitted she slapped Chloe on
Sunday, February 27, 2022 and that Chloe spent the rest of Ali’s
custodial week with Williams. Ali stated the custodial schedule
did not change from the 50-50 timeshare; instead, during the
10 There are no documents produced by the school in the
record on appeal. On October 15, 2025 Williams filed a request
for judicial notice of the documents (and on October 7 a separate
request to augment the record with the documents), but he did
not include copies with his requests. In his opening brief,
Williams asserts the school delivered the documents directly to
the family court and the court “covered up this evidence as [the
judge] did not include it in the record, even though [the judge]
admitted to having it in court. These documents are missing
because [the judge] concealed them.” However, the settled
statement of the hearing on the 2023 RFO does not reflect that
the court had documents lodged by the custodian. We therefore
do not accept Williams’s contention about what the documents
would have shown (or that the family court concealed them).
Whatever the circumstances, we deny Williams’s requests to take
judicial notice of (or augment the record with) documents
purportedly produced by Chloe’s school. These are not “[r]ecords
of . . . any court of this state” subject to judicial notice under
Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). (See also Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.155 (a)(1)(A) [appellate court may order record
augmented to include “[a]ny document filed or lodged in the case
in superior court”].)
9
three-and-one-half months after the February incident, “Williams
violated our custody [o]rders by sporadically refusing to allow me
custody of Chloe for a total of approximately 21 days.” According
to Ali, the 21 days included five days following the February 27
incident and the week after Chloe’s spring break.11
During the summer of 2022, Chloe spent seven weeks in
Massachusetts. Ali declared that Williams enrolled Chloe in the
Harvard summer program without seeking Ali’s consent, arguing
in her memorandum that “[t]he purpose of a Jackson Credit is
(most certainly) not to permit a parent to unilaterally enroll a
child in extra-curricular activities, and then cease making child
support payments when the minor child is temporarily engaged
in the sleep-away extra-curricular activity.”
Ali also argued that although she did not know what
Chloe’s school bus records would show, they would not be
dispositive as to custody. Ali declared that Chloe often “would
take the bus to Brentwood to spend time after school with her
friends or to study, and I would either drive to pick her up or one
of her friends would drive her home to me. Sometimes she would
take the bus to her father’s home after school because she forgot
one of her belongings at his apartment, and I would drive there to
pick her up.”
With respect to Williams’s demand for reimbursement of
Chloe’s health-related expenses, Ali averred that Williams
11 Although Ali asserted that Williams kept Chloe for 21 days
during her custodial time, Ali’s declaration identified only two
weeks when Williams kept Chloe—the week of February 27 and
the week after spring break. Although Chloe remained with
Williams during spring break, he was entitled to custody during
spring break in even years under the 2014 custody order.
10
incurred the expenses without her knowledge or consent; in
particular, he did not notify Ali before scheduling Chloe’s wisdom
teeth extraction and mental health therapy, in violation of the
2014 judgment. Rather, the first time Ali learned Williams was
demanding reimbursement for the expenses was his “curt (and
vague)” text message in June 2022. Ali was never provided with
invoices or receipts, and she did not know the name of Chloe’s
health care providers “until [she] reviewed the exhibits attached
to [Williams’s] moving papers.”12 Ali argued that Williams’s
request for reimbursement should be denied because she did not
approve the expenses and Williams did not provide her with
documentation within 30 days of incurring them as required by
the FL-192 healthcare reimbursement procedures incorporated
into the 2014 judgment. Finally, Ali declared that at the time of
her declaration, Williams owed $12,362 in support arrearages
following his decision to stop paying support.
Exhibits to Ali’s responsive declaration included an email
from Chloe to Ali dated November 9, 2022 with a “statement from
Chloe regarding the custody battle between my parents” (not
under penalty of perjury). Chloe wrote that the time Ali slapped
her was an “isolated incident” and never happened again. She
stated, “I live with [Ali] 50% of the time. Contrary to what my
father stated in court, my mother is not a deadbeat and she does
do things for me. She cooks for me, drives me to school, and gives
me spending money when she can. I want my parents to have
12 Williams attached the receipts for Chloe’s therapist,
optometrist, and wisdom teeth extraction to his 2022 RFO filed
on July 7, 2022, which was served on Ali on August 15, 2022. On
our own motion we augment the record to include the August 25,
2022 proof of service. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
11
split and equal custody.” Ali also submitted a July 11, 2022 text
message exchange in which Ali told Chloe she wanted to discuss
“decisions regarding our living situation going forward,” and
Chloe responded, “I want 50% custody, I’ve told you that
already.”
Ali filed a request to strike Williams’s RFO on the ground
that Williams did not file a sworn declaration as required by
rule 5.111 of the California Rules of Court.13 Ali also objected
that the exhibits to the RFO included inadmissible hearsay and
lacked foundation.
3. Williams’s reply declaration and request to strike
In a reply declaration filed on May 23, 2023, Williams
averred that all of the facts set forth in his 2023 RFO and motion
were “based on [his] personal knowledge” and all exhibits were
“what they are described as being based on [his] personal
knowledge.” Williams argued Ali’s responsive declaration
constituted an admission she did not contribute anything to
Chloe’s living expenses, and Ali’s ignorance about Chloe’s
summer program showed Chloe was not living with or
communicating with Ali.
Also on May 23, Williams filed a request to strike Ali’s
responsive declaration and exhibits on the basis they were not
13 California Rules of Court, rule 5.111 states in relevant
part, “Along with a Request for Order (form FL-300) . . . a party
must file a supporting declaration” that “must comply with the
following requirements: . . . [¶] . . . [(b)(2)] A declaration must
be based on personal knowledge and explain how the person has
acquired that knowledge. The statements in the declaration
must be admissible in evidence.”
12
validly served. The proof of service signed and filed by Ali’s
attorney stated the attorney “caused the documents to be
personally delivered to the person at the person’s office by leaving
the documents in an envelope or package clearly labeled to
identify the person being served with a receptionist or an
individual in charge of the office.” Williams argued the proof of
service was fraudulent, stating “the documents were not left with
anyone at [Williams’s] [o]ffice because it does not
exist. . . . [Williams] lives in an apartment building. There is no
doorman, no security guard, no concierge, and no onsite manager
who receives packages. The documents have not been left with
any person at [Williams’s] residence.” (Capitalization and
boldface omitted). Moreover, although Ali’s attorney attested
that he also emailed the documents to Williams, this did not
constitute proper service because Williams never consented to
service by email. Williams argued the family court should strike
the responsive declaration, exclude Ali’s evidence from the
hearing, and “hold [Ali] in default.”
Williams also filed objections to Ali’s declaration and
exhibits, including Chloe’s July 12 text message stating “I want
50% custody” and her November 9, 2022 “statement . . . regarding
the custody battle between my parents” on grounds of hearsay,
lack of foundation, and “tampered evidence.” (Capitalization
omitted.)
13
4. The hearing on the 2023 RFO
The family court14 heard the RFO on June 1, 2023. As set
forth in the settled statement of the hearing,15 the court stated its
tentative ruling to deny Williams’s request for Jackson credits
and an offset for Chloe’s medical expenses because “[Ali] claimed
the child was living with her at the time and no demand for
reimbursement of those expenses was made within 30 days.”
At the hearing, Williams reasserted his request to strike
Ali’s responsive declaration based on lack of proper service. Ali’s
attorney argued he served the responsive declaration by courier
to Williams’s residence and emailed a courtesy copy. The
attorney noted that Williams filed his reply declaration and
motion to strike immediately thereafter (five days later). The
family court denied the request to strike.
As to the merits of the 2023 RFO, Williams relied on his
June 11, 2022 text message exchange with Ali (in which Williams
wrote “Chloe has not lived with you for those three months”) as
evidence Chloe was not living with Ali, arguing that Ali’s lack of
a denial in response to his statement was an adoptive admission.
He likewise argued that the April 13 exchange (in which Ali
wrote “Let me know what your plans are with Chloe. If she’s
going to be with you full-time and you’re not going to be paying
child support[,] I am giving up this apartment”) was an
admission that Chloe was then living with Williams. Williams
14 Judge William E. Weinberger.
15 There was no court reporter at the June 1, 2023 hearing.
On appeal, Williams elected to proceed with a settled statement.
On January 29, 2024 Williams filed a proposed statement, and on
March 3, 3024 the family court filed a corrected statement.
14
also argued the subpoenaed school records showed Chloe was
living with him.
Ali’s attorney argued that all of Williams’s evidence was
hearsay, and the family court (Judge Powell) had earlier ruled
the same evidence was inadmissible in connection with
Williams’s 2022 RFO. Williams responded that his reply
declaration provided sufficient foundation for the exhibits;
Chloe’s medical receipts were admissible as business records
based on his authentication; and the school documents were
admissible based on the custodian’s declaration of compliance
with the subpoena.
After hearing argument, the family court adopted its
tentative ruling and denied the RFO. The court did not expressly
rule on the parties’ evidentiary objections. The court entered its
order denying the RFO on October 25, 2023.
On November 13, 2023 Williams timely appealed from the
October 25 order.16
16 We do not consider Williams’s challenges to the family
court’s February 24, 2023 order denying the 2022 RFO because
his notice of appeal stated he was appealing from the October 25,
2023 order, his civil case information likewise attached only the
October 25 order, and he filed the notice of appeal more than 180
days after the February 24 order. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(a)(1)(C) & (e) [appeal must be filed within 180 days of
order]; Dakota Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th
493, 509 [“‘A party who fails to take a timely appeal from a
decision or order from which an appeal might previously have
been taken cannot obtain review of it on appeal from a
subsequent judgment or order.’”]; Malatka v. Helm (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082 [“on an appeal from an appealable
ruling, an appellate court will not review earlier appealable
rulings”].)
15
DISCUSSION
A. The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining
To Strike Ali’s Responsive Declaration
Williams contends the family court erred in denying his
request to strike Ali’s responsive declaration because he
presented evidence the declaration was not timely served as
required under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1005,
subdivisions (b) and (c), and 1010 et seq. Even if personal service
was defective, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to strike the declaration after finding Williams had actual notice.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b),
provides that “[a]ll papers opposing a motion . . . shall be filed
with the court and a copy served on each party at least nine court
days . . . before the hearing.” Service on an unrepresented party
may be made by delivering the papers to the party or “by leaving
the notice or other paper at the party’s residence with some
person 18 years of age or older.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1011,
subd. (b).)17 At the time of Ali’s declaration, service by email was
not effective service absent a party’s express and affirmative
consent. (See Code Civ. Proc., former § 1010.6, subd. (c),
eff. Jan. 1, 2023 to July 17, 2024.)
17 In family law proceedings, “[t]he term ‘request for order’
has the same meaning as the terms ‘motion’ or notice of motion’
when they are used in the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 5.92(a)(1)(A).) In some circumstances, a request for
order must be served by a process server, “but all other requests
for orders and appropriate documents may be served as specified
in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010 et seq., including service
by mail.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.92(f)(3).)
16
As discussed, the proof of service Ali relied on included the
attestation by her attorney that he “caused the documents to be
personally delivered” to a representative at Williams’s building.
Williams is correct that the attorney’s statement is based on
hearsay (that the courier delivered the documents to a
representative of Williams). Further, Williams stated that Ali’s
responsive declaration was not “left with any person at [his]
residence” and he had not agreed to accept email service. The
record does not reflect whether the family court found Williams’s
statement (made only in his motion) credible and what weight (if
any) the court gave to Ali’s proof of service.
Regardless of whether Ali personally served Williams,
there was substantial evidence Williams received the responsive
declaration without significant delay. Ali’s lawyer attested he
emailed the documents to Williams (at the email address listed
on Williams’s RFO) on May 18, 2023, and Williams never
asserted he did not receive the documents, either by email or by
other means. And Williams certainly possessed the documents
no later than May 23, 2023—six court days before the hearing
date—because he attached excerpts of Ali’s declaration to his
request to strike. He also filed his reply declaration on May 23,
and he never requested a continuance of the hearing on the RFO.
Beyond a conclusory assertion of prejudice based on Ali’s alleged
past noncompliance with service requirements with respect to the
2022 RFO, Williams did not claim any actual delay in service or
identify any impact on his ability to prosecute the RFO because of
the defect.
A trial court has discretion to accept or reject late-served
documents. (Jack v. Ring LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1210
[“‘A trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed
papers.’”]; Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755,
17
765 [“A trial court has broad discretion under rule 3.1300(d) of
the Rules of Court to refuse to consider papers served and filed
beyond the deadline”]; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(d) [“No
paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was
untimely submitted for filing. If the court, in its discretion,
refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must
so indicate.”].) Although in this case Williams complained of
improper (not late) service, Ali could have simply re-served her
responsive declaration on Williams, albeit late, but Williams
never requested she do so (or assert he did not receive the
documents). In light of Williams’s actual receipt of Ali’s
responsive declaration, his timely filing of a reply brief and
request to strike without requesting a continuance, and in the
absence of prejudice, the family court did not abuse its discretion
in declining to strike Ali’s declaration.18
Williams contends strict compliance with the personal
service requirements was mandatory, and the family court’s
orders in the absence of personal service were void. But
18 Courts have held that if a party who was not properly
served with a motion nonetheless “appears at the appropriate
hearing and opposes the motion on the merits—but without
making any request for a continuance or demonstrating prejudice
from the defective notice, the issue is waived.” (Reedy v. Bussell
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1289, citing Carlton v. Quint (2000)
77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697.) In this case, Williams preserved the
issue for appeal by filing and then reasserting his request to
strike at the hearing. (Carlton, at p. 698.) Even so, Williams’s
failure to request a continuance and to demonstrate prejudice
militates against reversal. (See Reedy, at p. 1289 [“In order to
obtain a reversal based upon such a procedural flaw, the
appellant must demonstrate not only that the notice was
defective, but that he or she was prejudiced.”].)
18
Williams’s arguments are based on the statutes governing
personal service of a summons and complaint initiating
proceedings (e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20 et seq.), the
procedures for setting aside orders and judgments entered
without fundamental jurisdiction because of defective service of a
summons (e.g., id. at § 473, subd. (d) [challenges to void orders]),
or violation of specific statutory requirements (e.g., id. at
§ 1788.61 [setting aside defaults in collection proceedings]).
These authorities do not apply here because the court had
jurisdiction over Williams and the postjudgment proceeding
based on his filing of the 2023 RFO.
B. The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
the 2023 RFO
1. Standard of review
Subject to exceptions not applicable here, “a support order
may be modified or terminated at any time as the court
determines to be necessary.” (§ 3651, subd. (a); accord, In re
Marriage of Hein (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 519, 528.) However, “[a]s
a general rule, courts will not modify child or spousal support
unless there has been a material change of circumstances
following the previous determination.” (In re Marriage of Usher
(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 347, 357; accord, In re Marriage of Cryer
(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048.) The party seeking
modification of a child support order bears the burden of showing
changed circumstances sufficiently material to support the
modification. (Usher, at pp. 357-358; Cryer, at p. 1054.) “‘The
ultimate determination of whether the individual facts of the case
warrant modification of support is within the discretion of the
trial court.’” (Usher, at p. 358.)
19
We generally review an order granting or denying a request
for modification of child support for an abuse of discretion. (In re
Marriage of Usher, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 357.) This includes
modification requests that seek reimbursement of a child’s out-of-
pocket health care expenses under section 4063. (In re Marriage
of Furie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 816, 825 [“We review a trial
court’s order for reimbursement of uninsured healthcare
expenses for abuse of discretion.”]; In re Marriage of Rothrock
(2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 223, 236.)
Under an abuse of discretion standard, “we consider only
‘whether the court’s factual determinations are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the court acted reasonably in
exercising its discretion.’ [Citation.] ‘We do not substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court, but confine ourselves to
determining whether any judge could have reasonably made the
challenged order.’” (In re Marriage of Macilwaine (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 514, 527; accord, In re Marriage of Wittgrove
(2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1327.) “On review for substantial
evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party and give that party the benefit of every
reasonable inference. [Citation.] We accept all evidence
favorable to the prevailing party as true and discard contrary
evidence.” (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139,
1151; accord, In re Marriage of Rothrock, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th
at p. 230.)
However, where, as here, the appellant had the burden of
proof below, and the trier of fact “‘expressly or implicitly
concluded that [the appellant] did not carry the burden . . ., it is
misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether
substantial evidence supports the judgment.’” (Juen v. Alain
Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972, 978; accord,
20
Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.) “‘[W]here the issue on appeal turns
on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law.’” (Juen, at pp. 978-979; accord,
Dreyer’s, at p. 838.) “‘Specifically, the question becomes whether
the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and
unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave
no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.”’” (Juen, at p. 979; accord, Glovis America, Inc.
v. County of Ventura (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 62, 71; Dreyer’s, at
p. 838.)
2. Williams did not present evidence compelling a
finding he was entitled to Jackson credits or
reimbursements
As a general rule, the family court may not retroactively
modify child support. (See § 3651, subd. (c)(1) [with limited
exceptions, “a support order may not be modified or terminated
as to an amount that accrued before the date of the filing of the
notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or terminate”];
In re Marriage of Tavares (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 620, 624-625
[“The Legislature has established a bright-line rule that accrued
child support vests and may not be adjusted up or down.”];
accord, Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 26 [same].)
Accordingly, “‘a trial court has no discretion to absolve an obligor
of support arrearages, or interest thereon.’” (Tavares, at p. 626;
accord, Stover, at p. 26.)
Nonetheless, “it is within the court’s equitable power to
deny enforcement of the arrears on equitable grounds under
certain circumstances.” (In re Marriage of Wilson (2016)
21
4 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1016.) In 1975 the Court of Appeal in
Jackson, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d at pages 365 to 369 concluded that
where a child lived “permanently” with her father for 30 months
although the mother had been awarded sole custody, the family
court would have been “well within its discretion in recalling and
quashing the [the mother’s] writ of execution [for unpaid child
support payments] or permitting only partial enforcement on the
basis that [the father] had directly discharged his obligation or on
the basis of equitable considerations.” Thus, the Jackson credit
was born. In the half-century since Jackson was decided,
numerous appellate courts have recognized the family court’s
equitable discretion to offset arrearages for periods when a child
lived with and was supported solely by the obligor spouse.
(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Trainotti (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1072,
1074-1076; In re Marriage of Okum (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 176,
180-182; see also In re Marriage of Wilson, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1014, 1018.)
On appeal, Williams does not address the court’s equitable
discretion to award Jackson credits. His sole contention is that
the family court’s finding in Ali’s favor was not supported by
substantial evidence because “Williams submitted all of the
admissible evidence in this case, and Ali submitted no admissible
evidence.” We conclude otherwise.
When the family court “does not specifically rule on [an
evidentiary] objection raised by a party, the objection is presumed
overruled” and may be challenged on appeal. (Cal. Rules. of
Court, rule 5.111(c)(2).) We review the family court’s rulings on
the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. (In re
Marriage of Dupre (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1525; see
Symons Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 583, 593 [“‘‘‘Broadly speaking, an appellate court
22
reviews any ruling by a trial court as to the admissibility of
evidence for abuse of discretion.”’”].) “A party challenging a trial
court’s evidentiary rulings must demonstrate both an abuse of
discretion and a consequent miscarriage of justice.” (Kim v. The
True Church Members of Holy Hill Community Church (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1449; accord, Pannu v. Land Rover North
America, Inc. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1317 [“‘The trial
court’s error in excluding evidence is grounds for reversing a
judgment only if the party appealing demonstrates a
“miscarriage of justice”—that is, that a different result would
have been probable if the error had not occurred.’”].)
The family court did not specifically rule on the parties’
evidentiary objections, and thus we presume the court overruled
them. With respect to Williams’s evidence, Ali has not filed a
respondent’s brief reasserting her evidentiary objections; we
therefore assume the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting Williams’s declaration and exhibits as evidence.
With respect to Ali’s evidence, we agree with Williams that
the statements made by Chloe in Ali’s exhibits are inadmissible
hearsay, including Chloe’s July 12, 2022 text message to Ali
expressing her preference for shared custody and Chloe’s
November 9, 2022 email “statement . . . regarding the custody
battle between my parents,” in which Chloe stated she lived with
her parents 50 percent of the time. To the extent the family court
overruled Williams’s objections, the court abused its discretion.
However, the record does not reflect that the family court
considered these statements in deciding the RFO. On the
contrary, the court expressly based its ruling on Ali’s claim
(supported by her declaration) that Chloe continued to live with
her following the slapping incident except for a few weeks in
which Williams refused to return Chloe to her. Absent any
23
showing the court relied on inadmissible evidence, Williams
cannot show reversible error. (See Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville
(2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1122 [“Evidentiary rulings will be
deemed harmless if the record demonstrates the judgment was
supported by the rest of the evidence properly admitted.”]; see
also People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335,
415 [any error in admitting a hearsay statement was harmless
where another witness’s “statements conveyed the same
information”].)19
Even with the admission of Williams’s exhibits and the
exclusion of Ali’s exhibits, Williams cannot show the evidence
compelled a finding that Chloe lived exclusively, or even
primarily, with Williams for six months in 2022. The parents’
text messages in Williams’s exhibits show only that Chloe left
Ali’s home on February 27; Chloe’s relationship with her mother
was fraught; and as of April 13, 2022 the parents were
contemplating a new custody arrangement, with Ali writing, “If
she’s going to be with you full-time and you’re not going to be
paying child support[,] I am giving up this apartment and she
will need to get her belongings,” and Williams responding, “I will
take her full time.”
19 Williams also objects to admission of a June 2022 demand
letter submitted by Ali with her responsive declaration in which
her lawyer threatened Williams with contempt sanctions. Ali
offered the letter to show, with respect to Williams’s request for
reimbursements, that he “has a long history of refusing to consult
with me regarding decisions related to Chloe’s health, education
and welfare.” We agree the demand letter is not admissible
evidence of Williams’s prior conduct, but the family court did not
consider the letter in denying Williams’s request for
reimbursement.
24
Other than these messages, the case rises or falls on Ali’s
testimony and Williams’s statements in his motion. Williams
stated that Chloe left Ali’s home in early January 2022 and,
except for one week in February, Chloe did not return until
August. Further, Williams paid for Ali’s seven-week program in
Massachusetts. In contrast, Ali averred that Chloe spent a total
of only 21 days during Ali’s custodial time with Williams
(between February 27 and early April), and that Chloe’s extended
period away from Ali in March was partly because Williams was
entitled to have Chloe during spring break and partly because he
kept Chloe from Ali. Further, Ali stated, Williams enrolled Chloe
in the summer program without consulting Ali, in violation of the
custody order. In denying Williams’s request for Jackson credits
on the ground that “[Ali] claimed the child was living with her at
the time,” the family court implicitly credited Ali’s testimony over
Williams’s statements. (Bookout v. State of California ex rel.
Dept. of Transportation, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1489
[“unless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of
the losing [party], we presume the trial court found the [losing
party’s] evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry
the burden of proof.”].) Williams has not shown the evidence
compelled a finding to the contrary.
Similarly, the evidence does not compel a finding that
Williams was entitled to reimbursement for Chloe’s uninsured
health-related expenses. Ali averred (consistent with the text
messages submitted by Williams) that Williams never sought
reimbursement for Chloe’s therapy, wisdom teeth, and
optometrist before his June 2022 text message to Ali, and he
never provided detailed information about the expenses before
submitting the receipts with his 2022 RFO, which was filed on
July 7 and personally served on Ali on August 15. The receipts
25
on their face show that Ali was served with the 2022 RFO more
than 30 days after all of these expenses were incurred. The
family court found on this record that “no demand for
reimbursement was made within 30 days,” and Williams has
presented no compelling evidence to the contrary.20
20 On October 15, 2025 Williams filed a request for judicial
notice asking us to take notice of a declaration Ali filed in 2022
(prior to the 2023 RFO) and multiple documents filed after
Williams filed this appeal: six minute orders, a subpoena for
Chloe’s appearance at a postappeal hearing, and an ex parte
application. We deny his request because these documents are
not relevant to our resolution of the appeal. (See Coyne v. City
and County of San Francisco (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1215, 1223,
fn. 3 [denying judicial notice as to documents that were not
relevant to court’s analysis]; Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482 [“We also may decline
to take judicial notice of matters that are not relevant to
dispositive issues on appeal.”].)
Williams also requests we take judicial notice of the
certified transcripts of the family court hearings on November 3,
2022 and February 24, 2023, which the court (Judge Powell)
ordered in response to Williams’s proposed settled statement. We
construe Williams’s request as a motion to augment the record
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A)) and grant the motion.
26
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own
costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
27
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