CourtListener 10759394•People v. Smith CA2/7
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Filed 12/16/25 P. v. Smith CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B339061
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA103415-03)
v.
KALEAH BEATRICE SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James D. Otto, Judge. Affirmed.
J. Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Kaleah Beatrice Smith appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted her of first degree murder, attempted murder, and
conspiracy to commit murder and found true related firearm
allegations. Smith argues (1) the evidence did not sufficiently
corroborate the testimony of several of her accomplices; (2) her
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue
the evidence did not corroborate the accomplices’ testimony and
by advancing an argument that was not “viable” and may have
offended the jury; (3) the court erred in imposing the middle
term, as opposed to the lower term, on her conviction for
attempted murder and on the firearm enhancement on her
murder conviction; and (4) her trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance at sentencing by, among other omissions, failing to
present evidence her youth and postpartum depression
contributed to her committing the offenses. Because none of
Smith’s arguments has merit, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Smith Conspires To Murder Jason Beaulieu,
Succeeds, and Attempts To Murder Jacob James
In the late afternoon of November 9, 2015 Smith and her
housemates (Zariah McCollum, Zaria Tate, and Tate’s mother,
Joyce Bryant) returned home and found several bullets had
pierced the front door and walls of the house.1 Smith went to
1 Bryant rented the house and lived there with Tate and
allowed Smith and McCollum, Tate’s childhood friends, to also
2
speak to a neighbor, who told her three people stood outside
Bryant’s house shooting and yelling “Blood.”2
Smith, Tate, and McCollum went to look for Jason
Beaulieu, “the first person” they all believed was responsible for
the shooting. They suspected Beaulieu because, earlier that day,
Beaulieu sent Mariah Johnson (McCollum’s cousin) a text
message stating McCollum “deserved a bullet” in her head (or
words to that effect). Smith had looked through Johnson’s phone
and saw the text message to Johnson. McCollum believed
Beaulieu sent the text message because he was starting a dating
relationship with Johnson or because he blamed McCollum for
not stopping a fight that involved one of Beaulieu’s “homies.”
Smith, Tate, and McCollum walked to “the Carmelitos,”
a housing project where many members of the Bricc Boys
criminal street gang lived and saw Beaulieu walking down the
street with his friend Jacob James. Smith confronted Beaulieu
and accused him of shooting at Bryant’s house. Smith started
hitting Beaulieu and said, “Blood, I know you did it. Just admit
to it, Blood.” Beaulieu stated, “Nah, Blood, on Ps I didn’t do it.”3
Smith concluded Beaulieu shot at Bryant’s house.
Smith, Tate, and McCollum returned to the house.
McCollum’s mother arrived and told McCollum that she had
live there. Most of the details of what happened on November 9,
2015 came from the statements and testimony of McCollum.
2 Smith was an associate of Inglewood Family Bloods. Jason
Beaulieu belonged to West Side Piru, a Blood gang in Compton,
and Alejandro Alvarado belonged to the Bricc Boys, a Crip gang.
3 McCollum explained “Ps” meant the criminal street gang
“Piru.”
3
overheard a telephone conversation between Beaulieu and
Johnson, where Beaulieu told Johnson, “I just shot that bitch
Zariah house . . . . She discovered it.” Smith said that Beaulieu
“deserve[d] a bullet” and that she wanted Beaulieu “to get shot.”
Later that evening, Smith, Tate, and McCollum met with
Devontae Reynolds and Alejandro Alvarado. Smith told the two
men that Beaulieu shot at Bryant’s house, and Reynolds and
Alvarado went with the three women back to the house. At some
point Reynolds and Smith left. When McCollum called Smith to
ask where they went, Smith said she found out where they could
find Beaulieu. Alvarado said to Smith, “I want to do this shit. . . .
Come back and get us.” When Reynolds and Smith returned to
the house, McCollum and Alvarado got into the car. Reynolds
was driving, and McCollum was in the back seat behind him;
Smith was in the front passenger seat, and Alvarado was in the
back seat behind her.
Reynolds drove to the area where Smith had confronted
Beaulieu earlier that evening; Beaulieu was sitting on some
stairs with James, who sat “right behind him.” Alvarado said,
“Let me get in the front seat and let me do it.” Reynolds drove
past Beaulieu and James and stopped in a “back street.” Smith
said, “No. I want to do it. Like, that could’ve been my baby in
the house.[4] Let me do it.” Alvarado insisted he could “handle
it,” and eventually Smith said, “Alright. Are you sure? Like, you
sure you gonna do it? Like, don’t chicken out, you know, because
I could do it myself.” Alvarado stated, “Nah . . . I got this.”
Smith and Alvarado “swapped seats” so that he was in the
front passenger seat and she was in the back seat behind him.
4 But it wasn’t: Smith’s baby was not there at the time.
4
Smith gave a gun she was holding to Reynolds, and Reynolds
gave the gun to Alvarado when Alvarado got into the front seat.
Reynolds drove the car back to where Beaulieu and James were
sitting and slowed down, and Alvarado yelled, “Alright. Y’all get
down. Y’all get down.” Smith did not get down and said, “No.
I want to see this shit.” Alvarado fired at least six shots at
Beaulieu and James. When Alvarado finished shooting, Reynolds
sped away. Alvarado said, “I think I got them both.”
Reynolds drove to his house, where he hid the gun. Smith,
in an “excited” tone, said to Alvarado, “Thank you. Oh, my gosh,
Blood, thank you. I truly appreciate you. Like, . . . if you need
anything, like, if you ever need anything, just don’t hesitate to
ask. Like, I’ll do anything for you or whatever.”5
Reynolds drove the group to a liquor store and then to a gas
station, where everyone sat in silence. Smith said to the group,
“Alright. We gotta make a pact. Like, this can never leave this
car. Nobody else out of this car can know exactly what
happened.” Smith added, “If anybody asks us where we was
tonight or anything like that, just say we went to the homie
tattoo shop over there on Fig and El Segundo.”
McCollum received a call and told the group that the police
had arrived at the scene of the shooting. Reynolds drove back to
the Carmelitos housing project, and as Alvarado stood outside the
car, he “started throwing up.” Reynolds drove the group back to
Bryant’s house. When Smith saw Bryant and Tate, she said,
“Y’all ain’t gotta worry about nothing about the house getting
shot up again. We already handled it.” Smith again said, “You
5 After that day, Smith and Alvarado began a dating
relationship, and Alvarado “routinely” spent the night in Smith’s
room.
5
guys don’t have to worry about nothing. We got them.” Bryant
asked what happened, and Alvarado described the shooting:
“Yeah, I let out the whole clip on him, and I think I got his homie,
too.” Smith said, “Yeah, I seen him fold over, so I knew he was
hit.” Smith told Bryant and Tate that she told Alvarado that she
appreciated what he did and that “if he needed anything . . . .”
Beaulieu died that evening from a gunshot wound to the
head. James left the scene before the police arrived.
B. Smith Pleads No Contest to First Degree Murder and,
After an Unsuccessful Appeal and Successful Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Withdraws Her Plea
The People charged Smith, Alvarado, and Reynolds with
the murder of Beaulieu (§ 187, subd. (a)) and the attempted
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of James (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664)).6 The People also alleged that Smith, Alvarado,
and Reynolds committed the crimes for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the
specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct
by gang members, within the meaning of section 186.22,
6 McCollum agreed to testify for the prosecution and pleaded
no contest to a reduced offense, and the trial court sentenced her
under an “immunity leniency agreement.” A jury convicted
Alvarado of first degree murder and attempted willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder and found firearm allegations true.
(People v. Alvarado (Feb. 22, 2021, B298355) [nonpub. opn.].)
Reynolds pleaded no contest to murder and attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder and admitted firearm and
gang allegations. Reynolds’s appeal is pending before this court.
(People v. Reynolds, B344239.) Statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
6
subdivision (b)(1)(C), and that a principal personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or
death, within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (d)
and (e)(1). On the first day of trial Smith pleaded no contest to
first degree murder and attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder and admitted the gang and firearm
allegations. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the trial
court sentenced Smith to 25 years to life and imposed and stayed
execution of a life term on the attempted murder conviction and
terms on the firearm and gang enhancements. We affirmed
Smith’s judgment on appeal. (People v. Smith (June 18, 2020,
B295351) [nonpub. opn.]).)
In 2021 Smith filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the Supreme Court (after this court summarily denied her
petition), arguing her trial counsel was ineffective in representing
her during her plea hearing. The Supreme Court directed the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to
show cause, returnable in this court, why Smith was not entitled
to relief. (In re Smith (Aug. 11, 2021, S266965).) After an
evidentiary hearing in the trial court and briefing in this court,
we granted Smith’s petition and directed the trial court to allow
Smith to withdraw her plea of no contest and enter a different
plea. (In re Smith (Sept. 15, 2022, B314243 [nonpub. opn.].)
Back in the trial court Smith withdrew her plea, and the
court set the case for trial. The People added a count of
conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)) and alleged the
same gang and firearm enhancements as the People alleged on
the murder and attempted murder counts. The People also
alleged four aggravating circumstances under California Rules of
Court, rule 4.421.
7
C. The Jury Convicts Smith of Murder, Attempted
Murder, and Conspiracy To Commit Murder, and the
Trial Court Sentences Her
The trial was in April and May 2024. McCollum testified
she could not recall many of the details of what occurred on
November 9, 2015. The prosecutor played the video recording of
an interview detectives conducted of her approximately a year
after the shooting. The prosecutor also introduced statements by
Reynolds that incriminated Smith.7 Tate and Bryant testified
about Smith’s conduct and statements on November 9, 2015.
Tate testified: Smith, Tate, and McCollum came home on
November 9, 2015 and saw bullet holes in the house, Smith
became “loud” and “emotional,” called someone, and said, “I need
a gun.” Tate accompanied Smith to talk to one of the neighbors,
who told them that the shooters were “two guys,” one light-
skinned and the other dark-skinned, and that the shooters stood
outside the house “yelling out ‘Blood.’” When Smith returned to
the house, she was “angry,” walking “back and forth,” and
“shouting” and called Alvarado to come pick her up. Smith, Tate,
7 The trial court found Reynolds was unavailable because he
exercised his right under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution not to testify and refused to answer any
questions. The prosecutor played an audio recording of
statements Reynolds made during a Perkins operation. (See
Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 300 [“an undercover law
enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give
Miranda warnings[*] to an incarcerated suspect before asking
questions that may elicit an incriminating response”].) Reynolds
described Smith’s role in the shooting to two undercover agents
who posed as inmates in his jail cell.
* Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
8
and McCollum walked to the Carmelitos housing project and saw
Beaulieu walking down the street holding flowers. Smith angrily
accused him of shooting at her house, but Beaulieu denied any
involvement. Smith grabbed the flowers and began to hit
Beaulieu with the flowers; Smith continued to yell at Beaulieu,
“I know you did it!”
Smith, Tate, and McCollum returned to the house, with
Smith repeatedly saying how angry she was and that it had to be
Beaulieu. Smith called someone and yelled, “Come get me. . . .
I need to do something about it because my house been shot up
and everybody acting stupid like they don’t want to do nothing.”
At approximately 10:30 p.m., someone came by the house to pick
up Smith and McCollum.
Later that evening, Tate heard Smith, Alvarado, and
McCollum come back to the house. McCollum was crying and
told Tate, “I did not know it was going to happen. . . . [Alvarado]
shot [Beaulieu].” Smith said to Tate, “There’s nothing to worry
about. We got him.” Smith described for Tate “how it happened”
and how “she was gonna do it, but then [Alvarado] took the gun
away from her.” Alvarado appeared “really shooken up” and said,
“Can’t believe I did it.” Smith told Alvarado, “It’s gonna be okay.
You don’t have to worry. Calm down. We’ll take it to the grave.”
Smith and Alvarado went to Smith’s room, and Tate overheard
Smith tell Alvarado, “We’re in this together. . . . We did this
together.”
Tate believed Smith was the “aggressor” because Smith
was the one who called Alvarado, comforted Alvarado after the
shooting, and told the group “‘it will be taken to the grave.’” Tate
stated Alvarado shot Beaulieu “because of” Smith.
9
Bryant’s testimony, like Tate’s, described Smith’s rage at
Beaulieu, her determination not to let him “get away with this,”
and her frustration at her friends for not doing anything when
they saw Beaulieu on the street. Bryant testified: When
Alvarado came to the house, Smith “ranted” that the shooter
could have killed her baby and that “they needed to find him.”
Smith said, “You’re not gonna do nothing? It’s my baby. You’re
not gonna help me do this?” Smith, Alvarado, and McCollum
went out late in the evening and returned in less than an hour.
After they returned Smith described what “had occurred” and
explained “how they were passing the gun around” because “they
didn’t know who was gonna do it.” Alvarado made a “gun motion
with his hand” and said, “No mas.” Smith praised Alvarado
(calling him a “Trojan”) and said she was going to get his name
tattooed on her. Smith told the group not to talk about what
happened and asked if everyone understood. Bryant believed
Smith was the “mastermind” because Smith was “trying to talk
[Alvarado] into doing what she wanted him to do,” encouraged
him to “handle their business”, and “kind of made it sound like he
was her man and . . . he’s supposed to do this for her.”
Smith testified in her defense. She denied she told
Alvarado that she wanted him to retaliate against Beaulieu for
shooting at Bryant’s house. Smith stated that Alvarado was
“very aggressive” that evening and that, when the group went to
look for Beaulieu, she believed Alvarado was just going to “fight”
Beaulieu.
The jury found Smith guilty of first degree murder,
attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder and found
true the allegation Smith knew another principal was personally
armed with a firearm, within the meaning of section 12022,
10
subdivision (d).8 On Smith’s murder conviction, the trial court
imposed a term of 25 years to life plus two years for the firearm
enhancement; on her attempted murder conviction, the court
imposed the middle term of seven years plus eight months (one-
third the middle term of two years) for the firearm enhancement;
and on her conviction for conspiracy to commit murder, the court
imposed and stayed execution of a term of 25 years to life.9
Smith timely appealed.
8 During the hearing on the proposed jury instructions the
trial court stated that the jury instruction for the firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53 was “withdrawn” and that
the court would instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 3115, which
lists the elements for the firearm enhancement under
section 12022, subdivision (a). Counsel for Smith stated he did
not object to the instruction. In her closing argument the
prosecutor stated the elements for an enhancement under section
12022, subdivision (d), and the verdict forms asked the jury to
make a finding on the firearm allegation under section 12022,
subdivision (d). Smith did not object to the prosecutor’s
argument or the verdict forms. (See People v. Goolsby (2015)
62 Cal.4th 360, 367 [“‘“[t]here is no difference in principle
between adding a new offense at trial by amending the
information and adding the same charge by verdict forms and
jury instructions,”’” and the “‘defendant forfeits any lack of notice
by failing to object’”]; People v. Fugit (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 981,
993-994 [same].) Smith does not argue that the court erred in
giving CALCRIM No. 3115 instead of CALCRIM No. 3117 (which
lists the elements for the firearm enhancement under section
12022, subdivision (d)) or that the verdict forms incorrectly stated
the firearm allegation.
9 After the clerk read the verdicts, the People dismissed the
gang and gang-based firearm allegations (§§ 186.22,
11
DISCUSSION
A. The Testimony of Smith’s Accomplices Was
Sufficiently Corroborated To Support Smith’s
Convictions
Smith argues that California law requires testimony from
accomplices to be corroborated and that the statements by her
accomplices (McCollum and Reynolds) “comprised the only solid
evidence supporting the conviction at the close of the
prosecution’s case.” (Capitalization omitted.) Smith argues the
testimony from witnesses who were not accomplices “did not
establish that [she] plotted with [Alvarado] to shoot Beaulieu or
helped facilitate the shooting.”
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Under California law, a defendant cannot be convicted of a
crime based on the testimony of an accomplice unless that
testimony is corroborated by independent evidence that connects
the defendant with the commission of the crime.” (People v. Jasso
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 684; see § 1111; People v. Hoyt (2020)
8 Cal.5th 892, 945; People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 452.)
“‘Corroborating evidence may be slight, entirely circumstantial,
and entitled to little consideration when standing alone.
[Citations.] It need not be sufficient to establish every element of
the charged offense or to establish the precise facts to which the
accomplice testified. [Citations.] It is “sufficient if it tends to
connect the defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy
subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)), and the aggravating
circumstances allegations (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421).
12
the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth.”’” (Jasso, at
p. 685; see Perez, at p. 452; People v. Romero and Self (2015)
62 Cal.4th 1, 32 (Romero and Self); People v. Valdez (2012)
55 Cal.4th 82, 147-148.) The corroborating evidence “must tend
to implicate the defendant by relating to an act that is an
element of the crime” (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946,
986), but “does not need to independently prove guilt” (People v.
Hall (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1092 (Hall)). “A defendant’s
own conduct or statements may provide adequate corroboration
for accomplice testimony.” (People v. Jones (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th
420, 440.) “‘The entire conduct of the parties, their relationship,
acts, and conduct may be taken into consideration by the trier of
fact in determining the sufficiency of the corroboration.’”
(Romero and Self, at p. 32; accord, People v. Rodriguez (2018)
4 Cal.5th 1123, 1128 (Rodriguez); Hall, at pp. 1091-1092.)10
“‘The trier of fact’s determination on the issue of
corroboration is binding on the reviewing court unless the
10 The court instructed the jury: “If the crimes of murder,
attempted murder, or conspiracy to commit murder or the lesser
included crimes of voluntary manslaughter and attempted
voluntary manslaughter were committed, then Devontae
Reynolds and Zariah McCollum were accomplices to those crimes.
You may not convict the defendant of murder, attempted murder,
or conspiracy to commit murder or the lesser included crimes of
voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter
based on the statement or testimony of an accomplice alone. You
may use the statement or testimony of an accomplice to convict
the defendant only if: (1) the accomplice’s statement or testimony
is supported by other evidence that you believe; (2) that
supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice’s statement
13
corroborating evidence should not have been admitted or does not
reasonably tend to connect the defendant with the commission of
the crime.’” (Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 32-33; see
People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 245; People v. McDermott,
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 986; Hall, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1092.) If the defendant establishes the evidence was
insufficient, and we reverse the conviction, the double jeopardy
clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California
Constitution “mandate” the defendant “be acquitted of the
charges.” (Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1129.)
2. Independent Evidence Sufficiently Corroborated
the Accomplices’ Testimony and Statements
There was ample evidence independent of the statements of
McCollum and Reynolds to connect Smith to Beaulieu’s murder
and to show McCollum and Reynolds told the truth about Smith’s
leadership role in the crimes. In particular, the testimony of Tate
and Bryant about Smith’s conduct and statements before, during,
and after the shooting of Beaulieu and James sufficiently
corroborated the testimony of McCollum and Reynolds.
Tate and Bryant both recounted Smith’s anger after seeing
the bullet holes in the house and Smith’s decision to retaliate
against Beaulieu. Tate described the physical confrontation
between Smith and Beaulieu in front of the Carmelitos housing
project that corroborated McCollum’s description. Tate stated
that, after the encounter, Smith called Alvarado and complained
or testimony; and (3) the supporting evidence tends to connect
the defendant to the commission of the crimes.”
14
to him that no one wanted to do anything about the shots fired at
her house, told him that she needed “to do something about it,”
and said to “come get” her. Bryant testified Smith was “agitated”
and “ranted” at Alvarado that no one had done anything about
the shooting and that they needed to find the shooter. Tate’s and
Bryant’s testimony established that Smith had a strong motive to
retaliate against Beaulieu and that she persuaded her friends to
assist her. (See People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 28
[accomplice’s testimony “was corroborated by independent
evidence that defendant had a motive to aid the killers in
escaping punishment”]; People v. Samaniego (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1178 [evidence independent of the
accomplice’s testimony “established both a motive and
opportunity for [the defendant] to participate in [the victim’s]
murder”]; cf. Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1129
[corroborating evidence was insufficient where “there was no
evidence establishing a personal motive or opportunity to commit
the charged crimes” and the corroborating evidence “could do no
more than establish the crimes occurred and raise a suspicion
against every . . . gang member” in the county].)
Though Tate and Bryant did not witness the shooting,
Smith told them significant details that showed Smith actively
participated in killing Beaulieu. Tate and Bryant both testified
that, after Smith and Alvarado returned to the house at the end
of the evening, Smith described her role in the shooting: Smith
announced, “We got him,” and told Tate she would have been the
shooter but Alvarado took the gun away from her. Smith also
described to Bryant how they passed the gun around.
Finally, Tate and Bryant testified about comments Smith
made to Alvarado after the shooting that corroborated
15
McCollum’s and Reynolds’s testimony: Tate described Smith
comforting a distressed Alvarado (“we’re in this together” and “we
did this together”). The jury reasonably could have inferred these
statements reflected Smith’s admission she was an equal partner
in the shooting. (See People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 56
[jury could have concluded the defendant’s statement to a
detective, “‘“I was expecting to get picked up sooner or later,”’”
was “an admission by defendant of his connection to the robbery
and murder”].) The jury also reasonably could have inferred
Smith’s promise to get a tattoo of Alvarado’s name indicated she
took pride in and ownership of what Alvarado did for her, which
further connected Smith to the shooting. (See People v. Dalton,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 245 [defendant’s statement, in response to
a question why she killed the victim, the victim “‘was a rat’ who
‘deserved to die’” connected the defendant to the victim’s murder
“independent of [the accomplice’s] testimony”].)
The vivid details from Tate’s and Bryant’s testimony also
corroborated key details from McCollum’s and Reynolds’s
accounts of Smith’s role: Smith expressed her need to retaliate
against the people who fired shots at her house, enlisted
Alvarado to help her, and provided (at a minimum)
companionship and encouragement to Alvarado (and told Tate
that she almost carried out the shooting herself).11 The
11 There is no support for Smith’s assertion “no independent
evidence placed [her] at the scene at the time of the shooting.”
Tate testified Smith left with Alvarado and McCollum late in the
evening and returned to the house with them. And, as discussed,
Smith made numerous statements back at the house that
indicated she was present at the scene of the shooting.
16
descriptions by Tate and Bryant of Smith’s conduct after the
shooting (comforting Alvarado, fabricating an alibi, and telling
the group to “take it to the grave”) also corroborated statements
by McCollum that described Smith as the ringleader. Indeed,
Tate described Smith the “aggressor,”12 and Bryant called Smith
the “mastermind.” The independent evidence reasonably
connected Smith to the murder of Beaulieu and permitted the
jury to conclude McCollum and Reynolds were telling the truth.
(See People v. Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 684-685; Hall,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092 [“The evidence simply must
support the accomplice testimony and permit a reasonable
inference that the accomplice’s testimony is true.”].) The
evidence sufficiently corroborated the accomplices’ testimony.
(See Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 32-33; People v.
Szeto, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 25-26.)
Citing Rodriguez, supra, 4 Cal.5th 1123 and Hall, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th 1077, Smith argues, “No physical evidence” “tied
[her] to the gun, casings, or car used in the shooting.” Perhaps
not. But, as discussed, plenty of other evidence did. Contrary to
12 Smith asserts that, when Tate called Smith the aggressor,
“her statements were stricken as speculative.” The record does
not support that assertion. Tate testified she told the detectives
that Smith was the aggressor because she was “the one who
called” Alvarado to come and “do whatever they did, to pick her
up, whatever.” Counsel for Smith objected to the phrase “to do
whatever they did” on the grounds the answer was based on
speculation and lacked foundation. The court ruled “that part
will go out” and instructed the jury to “disregard that part of her
answer.” The court did not strike Tate’s opinion Smith was the
aggressor and in fact allowed Tate to explain the basis of her
opinion.
17
Smith’s assertion, Rodriguez did not “evince that the type of
corroboration envisaged is indubitably physical evidence that
placed the defendant at the scene.” The Supreme Court in
Rodriguez stated that in that case neither “the eyewitness
testimony” nor “the physical evidence of the murder weapon . . .
tended to connect [the defendant] to the commission of the
crime.” (Rodriguez, at p. 1128.) The Supreme Court did not limit
corroborating evidence to physical evidence. In Hall the court
observed “the GPS pings” on the defendant’s ankle monitor, the
presence of stolen items in the defendant’s trunk, a surveillance
video, and the codefendant’s social media posts corroborated the
accomplice’s testimony. (Hall, at p. 1092.) The court did not say
only physical evidence suffices to tie the defendant to the
commission of the crimes.13
13 Smith does not really argue in a cognizable way the
evidence did not sufficiently corroborate McCollum’s and
Reynolds’s testimony in connection with her convictions for
attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Smith
mentions these convictions in two sentences: (1) “Reviewing the
evidence admitted . . . [and] removing the accomplice statements,
there is no solid evidence that supports the first-degree murder,
attempted murder and conspiracy convictions”; (2) “Since the
accomplice testimony against appellant was not sufficiently
corroborated, her convictions must be reversed.” Smith does not
develop these arguments as they relate to her convictions for
attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder (to the
extent she is making them) and does not provide any citations to
the record or relevant case authority. (See People v. Turner
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19 [“We discuss those arguments
that are sufficiently developed to be cognizable. To the extent
defendant perfunctorily asserts other claims, without
18
B. Counsel for Smith Did Not Provide Ineffective
Assistance in Closing Argument
Smith argues her trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance because “he failed to argue there was insufficient
corroborative evidence to convict,” a failure Smith says
“effectively conceded her guilt”; advanced an argument that “was
‘not recognized as a lawful defense’” (capitalization omitted); and
portrayed Smith in an offensive manner by making a comment
about “‘how women operate.’” Counsel for Smith was not
ineffective, however, for failing to make an argument that was
meritless. In addition, the arguments Smith characterizes as
“not viable” or “insulting to the victim and offensive” fell within
the wide range of prevailing professional norms.
1. Relevant Proceedings
Counsel for Smith focused his closing argument on the
unreliability of the witnesses who testified against Smith, the
“different set of rules” that applied in the “world” of gangs, and
why it did not make sense Smith was the “mastermind” of the
crimes the People accused her of committing. Counsel for Smith
also emphasized the prosecution’s burden to prove Smith did not
kill in the heat of passion, Smith’s “maternal instincts” to protect
her baby, and Beaulieu’s actions that provoked Smith to act
“rashly.”
development and, indeed, without a clear indication that they are
intended to be discrete contentions, they are not properly made,
and are rejected on that basis.”]; People v. Benson (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1078, fn. 2 [same]; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C).)
19
When discussing Beaulieu’s role, counsel stated: “I don’t
think there’s any question that . . . [Beaulieu] and his homie set
into motion what ultimately culminated in his death. Now, I’m
not saying it’s not a tragedy. I’m not saying it’s not a loss. But
don’t get hung up on ‘this poor guy is dead, so we have to make
her pay for it,’ because the reality is, [Beaulieu] and his homie
really started this.”
When discussing the provocation element of voluntary
manslaughter, counsel argued: “Defendant was provoked. Well,
you shooting into a house where you know she lives with her
baby, I think that’s sufficient provocation for anybody, for any
mother. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted
rashly under the influence of intense emotion that obscured her
reasoning and judgment.” Counsel concluded: “In deciding
whether the provocation is sufficient, consider whether a person
of average disposition in the same situation, knowing the same
facts, would have reacted . . . from passion rather than from
judgment. I think it’s safe to say that the average person would
be likely to do so under these circumstances, under these facts,
the average mother of a newborn.”
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“‘When challenging a conviction on grounds of ineffective
assistance, the defendant must demonstrate counsel’s
inadequacy. To satisfy this burden, the defendant must first
show counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms. Second, the defendant must show resulting
prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
20
been different. When examining an ineffective assistance claim,
a reviewing court defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions,
and there is a presumption counsel acted within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance.’” (People v. Jasso, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 675; see People v. Dunn (2025) 18 Cal.5th 129,
169.) “‘If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel
acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless
counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or
there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] These standards apply with particular force at closing
argument because, as we have recognized, ‘[t]he decision of how
to argue to the jury after the presentation of evidence is
inherently tactical.’” (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347,
391; see People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 679 [“When the
record on direct appeal sheds no light on why counsel failed to act
in the manner challenged, defendant must show that there was
no conceivable tactical purpose for counsel’s act or omission.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)].)
“The mere fact that the issue could have been argued
differently, or with a different emphasis or focus, does not
establish ineffective assistance.” (People v. Mincey (1992)
2 Cal.4th 408, 471; see People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223,
1251 [“Closing argument is as much an art as a science.”].)
“[S]ensible concessions are an acceptable and often necessary
tactic.” (People v. Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 392; see
People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 435 [“‘“good trial tactics
often demand complete candor with the jury, and . . . in light of
the weight of the evidence incriminating a defendant, an attorney
may be more realistic and effective by avoiding sweeping
21
declarations of his or her client’s innocence”’”]; People v.
Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1237 [“‘Recognizing the
importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have
repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in
conceding various degrees of guilt.’”].)
3. Counsel’s Closing Argument Fell Within the
Wide Range of Reasonable Professional
Assistance
Counsel for Smith’s failure to argue CALCRIM No. 335
required evidence independent of the accomplices’ statements to
tie Smith to the shooting was not ineffective. Counsel pointed out
McCollum “was lying” to “save herself,” but stopped short of
saying the non-accomplice evidence did not corroborate
McCollum’s statements (because it did). As discussed, among
other evidence, Tate’s and Bryant’s testimony connected Smith to
Beaulieu’s murder. Counsel reasonably decided not to make an
unmeritorious argument. (See People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th
324, 387 [“Counsel does not render ineffective assistance by
failing to make motions or objections that counsel reasonably
determines would be futile.”]; People v. Brannon-Thompson
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 465 [“‘Counsel is not ineffective for
failing to make frivolous or futile motions’ [citation], or for failing
to object when ‘there was no sound legal basis for objection.’”];
People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1092 [“Counsel’s
failure to make a futile or unmeritorious objection is not deficient
performance.”].) Counsel neither “withdrew a crucial defense”
nor conceded Smith’s guilt in Beaulieu’s murder.
Counsel’s argument the jury should not “get hung up on”
Beaulieu’s death and make Smith “pay for it” was essentially an
22
argument that just because there is a murder victim did not
mean Smith committed the murder. Counsel’s comment that,
“the reality is [Beaulieu] and his homie really started this,”
placed the shooting at the Carmelitos housing project in context
with the shooting at Bryant’s house. This was a reasonable
attempt to make Smith seem less blameworthy. Contrary to
Smith’s assertion, these comments did not suggest “the victim
deserved it.” Counsel made a point of acknowledging the
“tragedy” of Beaulieu’s death and stated, “There are no winners
here, no matter how this comes out.” Smith has not shown her
trial counsel did not have a “conceivable tactical purpose” (People
v. Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 679, internal quotation marks
omitted) for framing his argument as he did. (See Yarborough v.
Gentry (2003) 540 U.S. 1, 6 [“Closing arguments should ‘sharpen
and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact,’ [citation],
but which issues to sharpen and how best to clarify them are
questions with many reasonable answers.”].)
Counsel’s argument that Smith, as the “average mother of
a newborn,” acted “out of passion” and “not out of gang
allegiance” was a reasonable means to expand on his argument
Beaulieu’s “evil” and “reckless” conduct “provoked” Smith to
respond “rashly.” Stating he did not believe the People would be
able to prove Smith committed any crime, counsel for Smith
argued, in an effort to persuade the jury to find Smith guilty
voluntary manslaughter rather than murder, the evidence
showed Beaulieu provoked Smith to act rashly. Counsel focused
on Smith’s discovery of bullet holes in her home—where one of
the bullets could have killed her baby (had the baby been there)—
and argued anyone with a newborn would have acted as Smith
did. Given the overwhelming evidence connecting Smith to the
23
shooting, counsel logically attempted to portray Smith as a new
mother who was only trying to protect her child. (See People v.
Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 177 [counsel’s effort “to persuade
that [the victim’s] murder stemmed from a rash impulse rather
than a calculated decision” was an attempt “‘to make the best of a
bad situation,’ given his very limited options”]; People v. Midell
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1079 [because “challenging the
mental state element was a reasonable—if not the only—defense
available to” the defendant, counsel had a “conceivable tactical
reason” to “use animal references to attempt to convince the jury
that [the defendant] did not act with specific intent”]; People v.
Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1169 [counsel’s “negative
comments” about the defendant during closing argument “was
not constitutionally ineffective” because “counsel’s argument
appears to have been a calculated strategy to concede the near
inevitable outcome on certain charges in order to gain credibility
with the jury and pursue acquittal on charges where the evidence
was not as strong”].) The record does not support Smith’s
argument her trial counsel’s strategy “could only have
incentivized jurors, especially female jurors, to vote guilty.” The
court instructed the jury to “impartially compare and consider all
the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial” and
that “nothing the attorneys say is evidence.” We presume the
jury followed the court’s instructions. (See People v. Krebs (2019)
8 Cal.5th 265, 335 [“‘Absent some showing to the contrary, we
presume the jury followed the court’s instructions.’”].)
24
C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing
the Middle Term
Smith argues the court failed to “make a specific finding
that . . . [her] youth was not a contributing factor in the
commission of the crime” and asks us to direct the trial court to
“comply with the lower term presumption” under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), or to “make a specific finding, on the record,
that [her] youth was not a contributing factor in the commission
of the crime.” To the extent the court failed to make any youth-
related findings, the court did not abuse its discretion because
Smith did not present any evidence the factors listed in
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), applied to her.
1. Relevant Proceedings
At sentencing counsel for Smith told the court that Smith
wanted to have a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261,14 but that he did not represent defendants in
“Franklin hearings.” The court stated that it could appoint
14 In People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 the Supreme
Court held section 3051, “which requires the Board [of Parole
Hearings] to conduct a ‘youth offender parole hearing,’ during the
15th, 20th, or 25th year of a juvenile offender’s incarceration”
mooted the defendant’s “challenge to his original sentence” under
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460. (Franklin, at pp. 277, 280; see Stats. 2013,
ch. 312, § 4.) “A Franklin proceeding gives ‘an opportunity for
the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s
characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so
that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation
to “give great weight to” youth-related factors [citation] in
determining whether the offender is “fit to rejoin society.”’” (In re
Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 449.)
25
counsel to represent Smith at a Franklin hearing if counsel did
not feel prepared and that the court was “well aware of” Smith’s
age and would take her age “into consideration.” The court
stated the Franklin hearing would not change Smith’s sentence
and reiterated it was “taking into consideration all information
that’s available” about Smith’s age and “the circumstances of this
case.” Counsel for Smith argued the evidence from the trial
showed that Beaulieu was one of the shooters who fired bullets
into Bryant’s house and that “what was portrayed as a cold-
blooded murder started to look more like a manslaughter and an
attempted manslaughter.” Counsel stated there was “no
question” Beaulieu’s conduct would “arouse passions in a mother”
and argued: “I’m no doctor. I’m no [obstetrician-gynecologist],
but . . . you know, there are postpartum effects that come after
pregnancy. I’m not saying . . . that affected her judgment.
I have no idea. But I do know that she had a right to be upset.
I do know that any reasonable person would be extremely upset
about the danger that their child could have been in that day,
over something that she had nothing to do with.”
Counsel asked the court to sentence Smith to a term of
25 years to life on the murder conviction and a concurrent term of
seven years on the attempted murder conviction and to “not
impose” the firearm enhancements. The prosecutor asked the
trial court to sentence Smith “to the maximum.”
The court stated it “considered a lot of factors in this case,”
including that the two victims in this case, “whether they were
gang members or not,” “had a right, whatever they did, to face
the justice system as opposed to someone’s decision to take ahold
of the justice system and use if for their own purposes.” The
court concluded “revenge seems to be what this case was about.”
26
The court acknowledged Smith was 22 years old at the time she
committed the crimes and that she would receive a youth
offender parole hearing. The court stated: “I understand all of
the allegations, and I understand the one circumstance in
consideration is the defendant’s age. However, that is being
considered through the mechanism that was provided for
consideration of that.”
The court sentenced Smith to a term of 25 years to life on
the murder conviction, plus the middle term of two years for the
firearm enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (d). On
the attempted murder conviction, the court imposed the middle
term of seven years, plus one-third the middle term of eight
months for the firearm enhancement under section 12022,
subdivision (d). The court commented, “This gentleman [James]
deserves some justice also.” The court imposed and stayed
execution of a term of 25 years to life on the conviction for
conspiracy to commit murder.
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), states: “When a judgment
of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order
imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2).”15 Section 1170,
15 Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), provides the court may
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term “only when there
are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
27
subdivision (b)(6), states, “Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and
unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court
shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following
was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense:
[¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect,
exploitation, or sexual violence. [¶] (B) The person is a youth or
was a youth as defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at
the time of the commission of the offense.[16] [¶] (C) Prior to the
instant offense, or at the time of the commission of the offense,
the person is or was a victim of intimate partner violence or
human trafficking.” (See People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416,
419 [section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), “creates a presumption that
the sentencing court ‘shall’ enter a lower term sentence when,
among other things, a ‘psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma’ contributed to the offense”]; People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga
(2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1216, 1224 [same]; People v. Fredrickson
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 986-987 (Fredrickson) [same].)
We review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 428, fn. 8;
People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) “The trial court’s
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (See People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742.)
16 Section 1016.7, subdivision (b), defines a youth as “any
person under 26 years of age on the date the offense was
committed.”
28
sentencing discretion must be exercised in a manner that is not
arbitrary and capricious, that is consistent with the letter and
spirit of the law, and that is based upon an ‘individualized
consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public
interest.’” (Sandoval, at p. 847.) “‘To prove an abuse of
discretion, “‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to
clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial
court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’” [Citation.]
To meet this burden, the defendant must “affirmatively
demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing
discretion.”’” (Fredrickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 988; see
People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 905 [“‘In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court
“knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.”’”].) “We
may not presume error from a silent record.” (People v. Knowles
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765.)
3. Smith Has Not Shown the Lower Term
Presumption Under Section 1170,
Subdivision (b)(6), Applied
Although the court did not discuss section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), at the sentencing hearing, we presume the
court was aware of the statutory presumption to impose the lower
term. (See People v. Caparrotta, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 905.) But even if the court failed to consider whether Smith’s
youth contributed to her conduct in committing the crimes, the
29
court did not abuse its discretion because nothing in the record
showed the provision applied to Smith.
As discussed, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), “establishes a
rebuttable presumption that the court impose the lower term if
any of three specified circumstances was a contributing factor in
the commission of the offense.” (People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga,
supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225; see People v. Hilburn (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 189, 205 [the lower term “is presumed only if the
sentencing court first finds the defendant falls into one of the
three special categories set forth in section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) and, second, finds that circumstance was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense”].) “The
statute does not mandate a presumption in favor of the lower
term in every case in which the defendant was under age 26 at
the time the crime was committed. Instead, the presumption
applies only if the defendant’s youth was ‘a contributing factor’ in
his or her commission of the offense.” (Fredrickson, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 991; see People v. Knowles, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 765 [“As made plain by the statutory text,
the mere fact a defendant is young or has suffered past trauma is
insufficient—either or both must be ‘a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense’ for the low term presumption to
apply.”].) Thus, “in order to trigger the presumption, there must
be some initial showing that the defendant’s youth was a
contributing factor, and only then must the record affirmatively
show compliance with the statute.” (Fredrickson, at p. 992.)
Smith does not cite anything in the record, including the
probation officer’s report, that indicates her youth contributed to
30
her committing the crimes in this case.17 There was no evidence
that she succumbed to the influence of someone older or more
sophisticated or that she was only tagging along for the ride.
Indeed, the evidence showed Smith rallied her friends to join her
in a planned operation to retaliate against the person that she
believed had endangered her baby. Smith called the shots
(literally), concocted an alibi, and made her accomplices swear to
keep their crimes a secret until death. The court did not abuse
its discretion in sentencing Smith to the middle term. (See
Fredrickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 994 [where there was
“no clear indication” from the record the defendant’s youth was a
contributing factor to her commission of the offense, “the trial
court’s failure to expressly consider the lower term presumption”
did not require a remand]; see also People v. Wilson (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1020, 1042 [where the trial court found there
was no evidence the defendant suffered from “‘any mental
insufficiency’” or “‘was a victim of violence,’” the court “did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing [him] to the middle term”].)
D. Counsel Was Not Ineffective in Representing Smith at
Her Sentencing Hearing
Smith argues her trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance at the sentencing hearing by failing (1) to argue
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), “created a presumption in favor
of the low[er] term”; (2) to consult with an expert “on the impact
postpartum had on [her] conduct”; (3) to argue her lack of felony
17 The initial showing “need not be made by the defendant;
the showing could be made by the prosecution or by facts or
recommendations in a probation officer’s report.” (Fredrickson,
supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 994, fn. 8.)
31
prior convictions; and (4) to “present evidence of youth-related
mitigating factors.” (Capitalization omitted.) Smith asks us to
remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing for her counsel
to present “evidence of youth-related and other pertinent
mitigating factors.”
Counsel for Smith’s failure to discuss section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), or the statutory presumption for imposing the
lower term was not ineffective assistance. As discussed, nothing
in the record indicated any of the mitigating factors contributed
to Smith’s commission of the crimes. (See Fredrickson, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 995 [where there was no indication in the
record the defendant’s youth contributed to her commission of the
offense, counsel was not ineffective in failing to argue the lower
term presumption applied].) Even if counsel had made the
argument, there is no reasonable probability of a more favorable
outcome because there was no evidence to support applying the
presumption in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). (See People v.
Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778 [because the defendant
made “no argument on appeal that he experienced trauma; that
there was evidence of trauma the trial court failed to consider; or
that his mental illness resulted in psychological trauma,” he
“failed to establish it is reasonably probable the court would have
sentenced him to the lower term if counsel had objected to the
imposition of the middle term”].) Contrary to Smith’s assertion,
counsel’s failure to discuss section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), did
not necessarily reflect his ignorance of the provision; it just as
easily could have reflected his awareness there was no evidence
to support an argument the statutory presumption for the lower
term applied. Because Smith cannot show there was no
conceivable tactical purpose for counsel’s omission, she has not
32
shown her counsel was ineffective. (See People v. Aguirre, supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 679; People v. Wilson, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1032.)
As for Smith’s assertion her counsel should have consulted
with an expert, counsel’s statement he was not an obstetrician-
gynecologist did not necessarily imply he failed to consult with
one. But even if he did not consult with a medical expert, Smith
has not pointed to anything in the record that should have
alerted counsel to consult with an expert. Counsel’s speculative
argument “there are postpartum effects that come after
pregnancy” was not a representation Smith actually suffered
from these effects, which Smith has left largely undefined in her
briefs. Nothing in the record showed that Smith had any kind of
psychological trauma or, more to the point, that any psychological
trauma contributed to her commission of the crimes. (See People
v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241 [the psychological
trauma “must contribute to the crime under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)”].) To the contrary, the evidence showed Smith
acted deliberately, with determination, and with sophistication.
(See People v. Wilson, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1042 [contrary
to the defendant’s argument his “‘borderline intellectual
functioning’” contributed to his commission of the offenses, the
evidence showed he “‘acted with a level of sophistication’” in
committing his crimes].)
Counsel’s failure to present evidence Smith’s youth was a
contributing factor to her criminal conduct was not deficient
because nothing in the record (e.g., the facts of the crimes or
Smith’s probation report) suggested this evidence existed. (See
Fredrickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 995 [absent any
indication in the record the defendant’s youth “was a
33
‘contributing factor’ in her commission of the underlying offense,”
“we cannot conclude counsel was deficient in failing to present
information that may or may not exist”].) The record shows
revenge was what drove Smith to hunt down and murder
Beaulieu, and Smith does not point to any evidence her youth
contributed to her role in leading her confederates to commit the
crimes in this case.
Finally, counsel’s failure to argue Smith did not have any
prior felony convictions, even if it fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness, did not prejudice Smith because the probation
report contained a record of her criminal history. We presume
the trial court considered all material relevant making its
sentencing choices. (See People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th
1144, 1157 [“‘we presume that the trial court knew the law and
followed it’”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.409 [“Relevant factors
enumerated in these rules must be considered by the sentencing
judge, and will be deemed to have been considered unless the
record affirmatively reflects otherwise.”].)18 Because Smith
cannot demonstrate her counsel’s omission was prejudicial, she
cannot establish counsel was ineffective. (See People v. Jasso,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 675.)
18 One of the factors in mitigation under California Rules of
Court, rule 4.423(b)(1), is: “The defendant has no prior record, or
has an insignificant record of criminal conduct, considering the
recency and frequency of prior crimes.” Though Smith did not
have any prior felony convictions, her probation report indicated
she had been convicted of several misdemeanors.
34
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
35
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