People v. Strunk CA4/1

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Filed 12/16/25 P. v. Strunk CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085230

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN441659)

GREG JOHN STRUNK,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Laura E. Duffy, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and Anne Spitzberg, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Greg John Strunk pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.

Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)1; count 1), possession of heroin for sale (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11351; count 2), possession of methamphetamine for sale (id.,
§ 11378; count 3), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 4). Strunk also admitted allegations that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury on the victim with respect to count 1 (§§ 12022.7,
subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)); he committed count 1 while out on bail for
counts 2 and 3 (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)); he possessed over one kilogram of
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.4, subd. (b)(1)); and he had
one prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, and 1192.7,
subd. (a)) and one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, and
668).
Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Strunk in accordance with an
indicated sentence the court offered at the time of Strunk’s guilty plea. The
court imposed a total prison sentence of 13 years and 8 months, consisting of
the midterm of three years for count 1 as the principal term, plus a
consecutive two-year term for the out-on-bail enhancement, a concurrent
three-year term for count 2, a consecutive eight-month term on count 3, plus
a consecutive three-year term for the weight enhancement, a concurrent two-
year term for count 4, and a consecutive five-year term for the serious felony

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
prison prior. Additionally, the court struck the great-bodily-injury

enhancement and Strunk’s strike prior.2
Strunk appealed the judgment of conviction. While the appeal was
pending, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) sent the trial court a letter indicating an error in Strunk’s sentence.
Specifically, the CDCR notified the court it should have imposed one-third
the middle term on the weight enhancement attached to count 3, because it
was subject to the limitation of section 1170.1, subdivision (a), requiring
enhancements for subordinate offenses to be sentenced at one third the full
term. In response, the trial court set a status conference. At the conference,
attended by Strunk’s counsel and the district attorney, the court modified the
judgment in accordance with the CDCR’s letter, reducing the enhancement
term from three years to one, resulting in a total prison term of eleven years
and eight months.
Strunk then filed a notice of appeal from the modified judgment and
dismissed his already-pending appeal. On appeal from the modified
judgment, Strunk argues he was entitled to full resentencing as a result of
the original imposition of the illegal term on the weight enhancement. He
also claims that his right to be present at sentencing was violated by the
court’s decision to modify the judgment in his absence. In response, the
Attorney General asserts these arguments were forfeited by his trial

2 After the present notice of appeal was filed, the trial court corrected the
abstract of judgment to clarify it had stricken the great-bodily-injury
enhancement under both sections 12022.7, subd. (a) and section 1192.7,
subd. (c)(8). Strunk filed a motion to augment the record to include the
amended abstract of judgment, but because the document was filed after the
notice of appeal, this court issued an order construing the motion as a request
for judicial notice and deferred a ruling on the request to this panel. We now
take judicial notice of that amended abstract of judgment.
3
counsel’s failure to object at the status conference. Further, the Attorney
General argues this was not ineffective assistance of counsel because
counsel’s failure to raise the issues Strunk now asserts for the first time on
appeal was reasonable under the circumstances. As we explain, we agree
with the Attorney General and affirm the modified judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 23, 2023, police obtained a search warrant for Strunk’s

home.3 Around 6:45 p.m. that day, police saw Strunk leaving the house in a
car driven by another individual. Police stopped the car and detained Strunk
and the driver. Thereafter, the police conducted a search of Strunk’s home
and found evidence of drug sales, including a digital scale, five large bags of
methamphetamine, and two bags of heroin. The methamphetamine totaled
3.65 pounds with an estimated street value of $24,156, and the total weight
of the heroin was 39.18 grams with an estimated street value between $1,567
and $2,350. A loaded revolver was found in the garage with seven rounds of
ammunition in the chamber. Strunk was booked into jail that night. The
next day, he posted bail and was released from custody.
On February 25, 2023, police responded to a call of assault with a
deadly weapon at a hotel. The victim, who was acquainted with Strunk, told
the responding officers that Strunk and another man had cornered and
attacked him. The victim stated that Strunk and the other man had beaten
him to the ground, and that Strunk hit him repeatedly in the head with a
metal pipe. A warrant for the arrest of Strunk and his companion was
issued, and Strunk was arrested several weeks later.

3 Because Strunk pleaded guilty, this factual summary is drawn from the
probation officer’s report.
4
The San Diego County District Attorney initially charged Strunk on
March 9, 2023. On May 17, 2023, the district attorney filed an amended
information charging him with assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1); count 1), possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11351; count 2), possession of methamphetamine for sale (id., § 11378;
count 3), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1);
count 4). The information also alleged that in the commission of the assault,
Strunk personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§§ 12022.7,
subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and committed the assault while out on bail for
the drug offenses (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)). The information further alleged
Strunk possessed over one kilogram of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11370.4, subd. (b)(1)), had one prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667,
subd. (a)(1), 668, and 1192.7, subd. (a)), and had one prior strike conviction
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, and 668). In addition, the information alleged
aggravating factors under section 1170.85, subdivision (a) and California
Rules of Court, rules 4.421(a)(1), 4.421(a)(2), 4.421(a)(4), 4.421(a)(6),
4.421(a)(10), 4.421(b)(1), 4.421(b)(2), 4.421(b)(3), 4.421(b)(4).
On May 10, 2023, the trial court granted Strunk’s motion to represent
himself. After the commencement of trial, on June 5, 2023, Strunk pleaded
guilty to all charges, allegations, and prior convictions contained in the
amended information based on the court’s indication it would strike Strunk’s
prior strike conviction and the great bodily injury enhancement allegation
related to count 1. Before accepting Strunk’s guilty plea, the court also
explained it would not strike the prior serious felony allegation, and that it
would sentence Strunk on the indicated sentence consisting of the midterm
for count 1 as the principal term, plus the on-bail enhancement term; a

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concurrent midterm for count 2; a consecutive midterm for count 3, plus the

weight enhancement term; and a concurrent midterm for count 4.4
On August 3, 2023, the court denied Strunk’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. On August 22, 2023, the court appointed counsel for the
sentencing hearing, and denied both a renewed motion by Strunk to
withdraw his guilty plea and a motion to dismiss.
On October 17, 2023, the court sentenced Strunk in accordance with
the indicated sentence. On count 1, the court imposed the midterm of three
years in prison as the principal term, plus a consecutive two-year term for the
section 12022.1, subdivision (b) out-on-bail enhancement, and struck the
section 12022.7 great-bodily-injury enhancement. On count 2, the court
imposed a concurrent three-year term. On count 3, the court imposed a
consecutive eight-month term, plus a consecutive three-year term for the
weight enhancement under Health & Safety Code section 11370.4,
subdivision (b)(1). On count 4, the court imposed a concurrent two-year term.
The court also imposed a consecutive five-year term for the serious felony
prior. Finally, the court struck Strunk’s strike prior, resulting in a total term

4 In his guilty plea form, signed and entered by the court on June 5,
2024, Strunk stated, “I now plead guilty and admit the charges, convictions,
and allegations described in Item 1. ... I admit that on the dates charged, I
assaulted [the victim] with a deadly weapon on or about 2/25/23 as alleged in
ct. 1, and at the time I did so, I was out on bail for the drug charges – charged
in cts. 2 and 3. On 2/23/23 – I was in possession of heroin and I possessed it
for purpose of sales. On 2/23/23, I was also in possession of more than 1 kilo
of methamphetamine – which I possessed for purpose of sales. Finally, on
2/23/23, I unlawfully possessed and had under my control a firearm – after
having been previously been convicted of a felony.”
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of 13 years, 8 months. On November 14, 2023, Strunk filed a timely notice of

appeal with a request for certificate of probable cause.5
On September 16, 2024, the trial court received a letter from a CDCR
case records manager informing the court that section 1170.1, subdivision (a)
requires subordinate offenses to be sentenced at one third of the term
imposed for any specific enhancement and the count 3 enhancement was
sentenced for a full term of three years, rather than one third of the term or
one year. The letter also informed the court that when it is “notified by the
[CDCR] that an illegal sentence exists, the trial court is entitled to reconsider
all sentencing choices, People v. Hill [(1986)] 185 Cal.App.3d 831.”
On October 17, 2024, while Strunk’s appeal was still pending in Case
No. D083229, the trial court conducted a status conference at which it
corrected the unauthorized three-year term on the count 3 enhancement by
reducing that term by one-third, imposing a corrected total term of 11 years
8 months. On December 3, 2024, Strunk filed a notice of appeal from that

order initiating the present appeal.6
DISCUSSION
Strunk asserts that the trial court erred by modifying his sentence
without conducting a full resentencing hearing. He also contends the trial

5 The trial court denied Strunk’s request for a certificate of probable
cause. However, on May 24, 2024, the trial court vacated its denial order and
issued a certificate of probable cause. In the respondent’s brief, the Attorney
General requested we take judicial notice of the records in the initial appeal
filed by Strunk (Case No. D083229). Although this request does not comply
with California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(1), we take judicial notice of the
records by our own motion.

6 On March 12, 2025, Strunk filed a notice of abandonment of his appeal
in Case No. D083229, and this Court dismissed the appeal and issued the
remittitur.
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court violated his rights by correcting the sentence in his absence. Strunk
asks this court to remand the matter for the trial court to conduct a
resentencing hearing.
The Attorney General responds that Strunk’s claims are forfeited
because they were not raised in the trial court. Further, the Attorney
General contends defense counsel’s failure to object to the correction of the
sentence did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because that
decision was objectively reasonable and benefitted Strunk. In addition, the
Attorney General asserts that because the judgment was not yet final at the
time the trial court corrected the sentence, the court had jurisdiction to
correct the unauthorized sentence and the correction “reflected a lawful
sentence that the court intended to impose under the stipulated plea deal.”
I
As a general matter, claims not raised in the trial court may not be
raised for the first time on appeal. (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107
Cal.App.5th 312, 326; People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589–590.)
“[T]he right to challenge a criminal sentence on appeal is not unrestricted. In
order to encourage prompt detection and correction of error, and to reduce the
number of unnecessary appellate claims, reviewing courts have required
parties to raise certain issues at the time of sentencing. In such cases, lack of
a timely and meaningful objection forfeits or waives the claim. [Citations.]
These principles are invoked as a matter of policy to ensure the fair and
orderly administration of justice.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351
(Scott); see In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 881 [The purpose of the
forfeiture rule is to avoid the situation where an objection would have
permitted the trial court to address the concern or make a better record to
support the court’s decision.].)

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Here, the parties agree that Strunk’s counsel did not object to the
court’s modification of the sentence to correct the error identified by the
CDCR. In response to the Attorney General’s assertion that the issues are
forfeited, Strunk argues only that “an unauthorized sentence can be
challenged on appeal even if no objection was raised at the trial court level.”
This is a correct statement of the law. However, the unauthorized sentence
at issue here was imposed at the initial sentencing hearing on October 17,
2023, when the court imposed a full-length consecutive three-year prison
term, instead of the required one-third of the term, on the enhancement to
the subordinate count 3 term. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a) [“The subordinate term for
each consecutive offense shall consist of one-third of the middle term of
imprisonment ... and shall include one-third of the term imposed for any
specific enhancements applicable to those subordinate offenses.”].) As the
Attorney General notes, despite not objecting to the unauthorized sentence at
that time, Strunk could have challenged that unauthorized term on appeal.
(Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.)
At the postjudgment status conference, the court did not impose an
unauthorized sentence, subject to correction without an objection in the trial
court. Rather, the court corrected the illegal sentence, identified by the
CDCR, that it had previously imposed. After the conference the sentence was
no longer unauthorized. Accordingly, the exception to the forfeiture doctrine
for unauthorized sentences is not applicable here. To preserve sentencing
issues arising from the sentence correction, Strunk was obligated to raise any
problem with the court’s procedure, including the availability of resentencing
and whether Strunk’s presence was required. The failure to do so forfeited
these claims for purposes of appeal. (See Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353
[counsel must understand, advocate, and clarify permissible choices for

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sentencing because “[r]outine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are
easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention”].)
II
Strunk also asserts that if this court concludes his trial counsel’s
failure to challenge the trial court’s procedure on October 17, 2024, forfeited
the issue of resentencing for purposes of appeal, that failure constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
“Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant
has the right to the assistance of counsel.” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43
Cal.3d 171, 215.) That right “entitles the defendant not to some bare
assistance but rather to effective assistance.” (Ibid.) A defendant claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to show: (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) the deficient
performance resulted in prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 687; Ledesma, at pp. 216, 218.) Prejudice is shown when “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland,
at p. 694.)
The record does not establish either that counsel’s performance was
deficient or that Strunk was prejudiced by the failure to request resentencing
or to have appellant present at the October 2024 status conference.
Importantly, where the record does not reflect why counsel acted, or failed to
act, in the manner challenged, the case will be affirmed on direct appeal
unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or

10
unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. (People v. Mendoza
Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.) In addition, “ ‘ “[t]here is a ‘strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘In the usual case, where counsel’s
trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the
record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless
there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.’ ” (People
v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1051.) This court defers to reasonable
tactical decisions made by defense counsel. (See People v. Hinton (2006) 37
Cal.4th 839, 876.) “Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted
with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.” (Harrington v.
Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 105.)
The record before this court contains no explanation for defense
counsel’s decision not to request a resentencing hearing, and/or request
Strunk’s presence during the postjudgment status conference where the court
corrected the unauthorized prison term. In response to the trial court’s
explanation of the erroneous prison term and its intent to correct it by
amending the minute order, defense counsel stated simply “understood.”
These circumstances do not establish an absence of satisfactory explanation
for counsel’s acquiescence in the corrected prison term. To the contrary,
defense counsel’s actions were objectively reasonable and support a
conclusion that defense counsel had a rational tactical purpose for not
requesting a full resentencing hearing. (See People v. Weaver (2001) 26
Cal.4th 876, 926 [“ ‘Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible, and
counsel’s decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of the available
facts.’ ”].)

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Specifically, the trial court corrected the erroneous prison term and set
it at the correct and legally valid term, thereby reducing the term originally
imposed by two years. It is objectively reasonable that defense counsel
believed Strunk received a lawful sentence, exactly as the trial court
indicated at the time of the change of plea, and that no further reduction
would be provided by the court. Given the court’s imposition of the indicated
sentence, and the fact that the record suggests the court made an inadvertent
mistake by imposing the full three-year term on the weight enhancement,
there is no reasonable likelihood a lesser sentence would result even if
Strunk were to be resentenced. Because Strunk has failed to meet his
burden under Strickland, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
DISPOSITION
The modified judgment is affirmed.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

KELETY, J.

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