People v. Wekerle CA4/1

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Filed 12/16/25 P. v. Wekerle CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085092

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STEVEN ANTHONY WEKERLE, (Super. Ct. No. RIF2204240)

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Gail A. O’Rane, Judge. Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
Bruce Kotler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene Sevidal, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Steven Anthony Wekerle appeals from a judgment resentencing him
following the issuance of our opinion in People v. Wekerle (Apr. 22, 2024,
D083429, [nonpub. opn.]) (Wekerle). Wekerle contends, and the People
concede, that the trial court prejudicially erred by conducting the
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resentencing hearing in his absence. As explained below, we agree and
reverse the judgment and remand for a new resentencing hearing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
A jury convicted Wekerle on four counts, including grand theft from a

person (Pen. Code,2 § 487, subd. (c), count 5). The trial court imposed a total
term of 11 years, four months, including an eight-month consecutive term for
count 5.
On appeal, we modified Wekerle’s conviction on count 5 by reducing it
to a misdemeanor petty theft offense, affirmed the remainder of the
judgment, and then remanded the matter for resentencing. (Wekerle, supra,
D083429.)
At a July 16, 2024 hearing regarding resentencing, Wekerle’s counsel
informed the court that Wekerle had requested that he be present at any and
all hearings. She stated that she had “pass[ed] up three transportation
orders [for Wekerle]” and asked the court to allow him to be present and
continue the resentencing hearing until September 9. The court replied, “He
doesn’t have a right to be present because I’m not increasing his time at all. I
don’t know why I couldn’t just sentence him on the misdemeanor to
concurrent time, and then we’re done.” The court further stated, “I just don’t
know that he necessarily has a right because the sentence is not being
changed in any significant way. It’s actually going to be less time presuming
that that count was run consecutive. But if you want me to sign it and order
him here, I will.” Wekerle’s counsel replied, “I know he will want to be here.
Otherwise, he’ll send letters.” The court then continued the hearing until

1 For additional factual and procedural background, including
descriptions of the underlying offenses, see our opinion in Wekerle.

2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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September 9 and indicated that it would sign the submitted transportation
orders for Wekerle’s appearance at that continued hearing. The court stated
that Wekerle would not be entitled “to any additional resentencing” other
than on count 5, which was now a misdemeanor. The court thereafter issued
a transportation order for Wekerle’s appearance.
At the continued resentencing hearing on September 9, Wekerle was
not present and was represented by different counsel who was making a
special appearance for his defense counsel. That counsel stated that she was
“appearing [section] 977 for Mr. Wekerle, who was not transported from
Folsom State Prison.” She further stated that Wekerle’s counsel was
“submitting on the [remittitur]. She’s waiving [Wekerle’s] presence. People
were reducing Count five from grand theft to petty theft and credit for time
served . . . . New sentence would be ten years, eight months.” The court
informed her that on appeal we had previously modified Wekerle’s count 5
conviction to only petty theft (presumably referring to Wekerle). The court
then imposed a new sentence, giving Wekerle credit for time served (i.e., 436
days of credit) on count 5 and leaving the remainder of its previous sentence
unchanged, for a total term of 10 years, eight months.
DISCUSSION
Court Erred by Resentencing Wekerle in His Absence
Wekerle contends, and the People concede, that the trial court
prejudicially erred by resentencing him in his absence because he had the
constitutional right to be present at the hearing and did not waive that right.

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A
After part of a sentence is stricken on appeal, the trial court must
resentence the defendant on the entire sentence and not just its infirm part
and that a resentencing hearing is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings
against the defendant. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; People v.
Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 681; People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
344, 347–348 (Cutting).) Accordingly, a defendant has the constitutional
right to be present at a resentencing hearing. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Cutting, at pp. 347–348; People v. Quan
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 524, 532–534 (Quan).) A defendant can waive that
right if the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. (Quan, at pp. 534–
535; People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 57.)
B
As the parties note, the record does not show that Wekerle waived his
right to be present at his resentencing hearing. Although the counsel making
a special appearance at the September 9, 2024, resentencing hearing
represented that she was “appearing [section] 977 for Mr. Wekerle, who was
not transported from Folsom State Prison,” that representation did not show
that Wekerle had made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his
right to be present at the resentencing hearing. Section 977 provides that in
all cases in which a felony is charged, the defendant has the right to be
physically or remotely present at the time of sentencing unless he or she
waives that right. (§ 977, subd. (b)(1).) The defendant’s waiver of that right
may be in writing and filed with the court or, with the court’s consent, may be
entered personally by the defendant or defendant’s counsel of record. (§ 977,
subd. (b)(2).) However, if that waiver is entered by defendant’s counsel of

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record, counsel must state on the record, among other things, “that the
defendant has been advised of the right to be physically or remotely present
for the hearing at issue [and] has waived that right . . . .” (§ 977,
subd. (b)(2)(B).) Because the record in this case does not show that counsel
who specially appeared for Wekerly’s counsel of record complied with
section 977, subdivision (b)(2)(B)’s requirements and does not otherwise show
that Wekerle voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to be
present at the resentencing hearing, the trial court erred by resentencing him
in his absence. (§ 977, subd. (b)(2)(B); Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at
p. 348; cf. Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 535.)
C
Wekerle further argues, and the People concede, that the trial court’s
error in resentencing him in his absence was prejudicial under the standard
for federal constitutional error as set forth in Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 23. Under that standard, the People bear the burden on appeal
to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome
of the proceeding and was therefore harmless error. (Ibid.; Cutting, supra,
42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 348–349.) Because Wekerle’s handwritten notice of
appeal asserts that there was evidence showing his victim had a preexisting
brain injury that was not previously considered as a possible mitigating
circumstance, it is possible that the outcome of his resentencing may have
been more favorable to him had he been present at this resentencing hearing.
(Cf. Cutting, at p. 350.) Furthermore, there may have been other mitigating
or changed circumstances raised by Wekerle had he been present at the
resentencing hearing. (Ibid.) Finally, the People concede that the court’s
error was prejudicial under the Chapman standard. Accordingly, we
conclude that the People have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the

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court’s error was harmless. Because the error was prejudicial, the sentence
imposed by the trial court at the September 9, 2024, resentencing hearing
must be reversed and the matter remanded for a full resentencing hearing at
which Wekerle has the right to be present.
DISPOSITION
The September 9, 2024, judgment is reversed and the matter is
remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

CASTILLO, J.

RUBIN, J.

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